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ABSTRACT 
 
In order to meet the UK Government’s 60% greenhouse gas emissions reduction target, 
there is a need for non-experts to be meaningfully engaged with the issue of climate 
change. This thesis investigates the value of engaging non-experts with climate change at 
the individual level. Research demonstrates that individuals perceive climate change as 
temporally and spatially remote, and not of personal concern. There are psychological, 
social and institutional barriers to meaningful engagement with climate change.  
 
More effective methods for engaging the public with climate change are needed which 
address the psychological barriers to change. An ‘iconic’ approach was developed to 
harness the emotive and visual power of climate icons with a rigorous scientific analysis of 
climate impacts under a different climate future. ‘Icons’ are defined as tangible entities 
which will be impacted by climate change, considered worthy of respect by the viewer, and 
to which the viewer can relate to and feel empathy for. Such icons already exist: for 
example, melting of the West Antarctic Ice Sheet or Thermohaline Circulation shutdown. 
However, these ‘expert-led’ icons have failed to engage non-experts. The selection of non-
expert icons enables individuals to engage with climate change through their personal 
perceptions and values. 
 
A robust sourcing for ‘non-expert icons’ was carried out using focus groups and online 
survey methodologies. A suite of icons representative of the reasoning behind individuals’ 
non-expert icons was selected. Expert-led icons were identified from ‘Sleeping Giants’ 
emerging from the Exeter Avoiding Dangerous Climate Change conference. Impact 
assessments were then carried out for the suite of expert-led and non-expert icons under a 
specified greenhouse gas emissions scenario and to an imaginable timescale. 
Methodologies used to investigate climate impacts on the icons included a survey of expert 
opinion, quantitative modelling and spatial analysis using a Geographic Information 
System (GIS). 
 
The cognitive and affective impact of the non-expert and expert-led icons upon individuals 
was investigated through an evaluative pre/post test workshop. The expert-led icons 
generally disengaged individuals. Expert-led icons had little personal impact and invoked 
emotions such as helplessness or boredom, and were considered too scientific or complex. 
Conversely, non-expert icons tended to impact upon the individual, the local area or 
nature; and invoked affective and cognitive engagement with climate change. 
 3 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
ABSTRACT…………………………………………………………………... 2 
TABLE OF CONTENTS……………………………………………………... 3 
LIST OF ACRONYMS……………………………………………………….. 10 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS…………………………………………………….. 11 
CHAPTER 1. CLIMATE CHANGE FROM A SCIENTIFIC TO A 
SOCIETAL ISSUE……………………………………………………………. 
13 
1.1 Climate change as a scientific issue…………………………………... 13 
            1.1.1 Evidence and impacts…………………………………………. 13 
 1.1.2 Managing the challenge of climate change…………………… 15 
1.2 Climate change and society…………………………………………… 16 
 1.2.1 Societal response to climate change in the UK……………….. 16 
 1.2.2 Communication and engagement……………………………... 18 
1.3 Roadmap………………………………………………………………. 20 
CHAPTER 2. EXPLORING PERCEPTIONS OF ‘DANGEROUS’ 
CLIMATE CHANGE…………………………………………………………. 
23 
2.1 Understanding dangerous climate change…………………………….. 23 
 2.1.1 What is ‘dangerous climate change’?......................................... 23 
  2.1.2.1   The emergence of ‘dangerous climate change’……… 25 
                        2.1.2.2   The IPCC and ‘dangerous climate change’………….. 27 
  2.1.2.3   Exploring the concept of ‘dangerous climate change’. 28 
                        2.1.2.4   Measuring ‘dangerous climate change’……………… 32 
2.2 Tools and agents for engaging individuals with climate change……… 36 
 2.2.1 Tools for engaging individuals with climate change……………. 36 
  2.2.1.1  Imagery……………………………………………….. 36 
  2.2.1.2  Narratives…………………………………………….. 38 
  2.2.1.3  Probabilities…………………………………………... 40 
  2.2.1.4  Scenarios……………………………………………… 43 
 2.2.2 Agents engaging individuals with climate change……………. 45 
  2.2.2.1 Environmental NGOs…………………………………. 45 
                        2.2.2.2 Education……………………………………………… 48 
  2.2.2.3  Government…………………………………………... 49 
  2.2.2.4  Business and advertising……………………………... 50 
  2.2.2.5  Media…………………………………………………. 52 
2.3 Conclusions…………………………………………………………… 55 
CHAPTER 3. EXPLORING ENGAGMENT WITH CLIMATE CHANGE... 56 
3.1 Public engagement with climate change……………………………… 56 
3.2 Barriers to effective engagement……………………………………… 57 
            3.2.1 Psychological barriers………………………………………… 58 
            3.2.2 Social and institutional barriers……………………………….. 60 
 4 
3.3 Models for exploring attitude-behaviour change……………………… 61 
 3.3.1 The Theory of Reasoned Action………………………………. 62 
 3.3.2 The Theory of Planned Behaviour and the value-action gap…. 62 
 3.3.3 The Social Practices Approach………………………………... 64 
 3.3.4 The Attitude Behaviour Constraint model……………………. 65 
3.4 Improving climate engagement……………………………………….. 66 
 3.4.1 Knowing the audience………………………………………… 66 
 3.4.2 Climate confusion……………………………………………... 67 
 3.4.3 ‘Empty vessels’………..……………………………………… 69 
 3.4.4 Shock tactics…………………………………………………... 70 
 3.4.5 Spatial and temporal dissonance……………………………… 71 
 3.4.6 A lack of agency………………………………………………. 72 
 3.4.7 Meeting the challenge of effective climate communication…... 73 
3.5 Icons for engagement…………………………………………………. 74 
 3.5.1 Icon history……………………………………………………. 74 
 3.5.2 Defining an icon………………………………………………. 75 
 3.5.3 Engaging with climate change through icons…………………. 78 
 3.5.4 An ‘iconic approach’ to communicating climate change……... 80 
CHAPTER 4. INTERDISCIPLINARITY IN SHAPING THE RESEARCH... 82 
4.1 Post-normal science and interdisciplinarity…………………………… 82 
 4.1.1 Post-normal science…………………………………………… 82 
 4.1.2 An interdisciplinary approach………………………………… 83 
4.2 Theoretical background……………………………………………….. 85 
 4.2.1 A pragmatic framework……………………………………….. 85 
 4.2.1 A multimethod research design……………………………….. 87 
4.3 The approach taken in this thesis……………………………………… 87 
4.4 Summary………………………………………………………………. 90 
CHAPTER 5. ICON SELECTION…………………………………………… 91 
5.1 Non-expert icon selection methodology………………………………. 91 
 5.1.1   Icon selection methodology 1: Focus groups………………….. 94 
  5.1.1.1   Focus group protocol design………………………… 97 
  5.1.1.2   Piloting the protocol…………………………………. 98 
  5.1.1.3   Implementation: the CNS focus group………………. 98 
  5.11.1.4   Implementation: the LEAD focus groups…………... 99 
 5.1.2   Icon selection methodology 2: Online survey…………………. 100 
  5.1.2.1   Online survey protocol design……………………….. 101 
  5.1.2.2   Piloting the protocol…………………………………. 103 
  5.1.2.3   Implementation through the ClimatePrediction.net 
     forum………………………………………………… 
103 
5.2 Results and analysis for non-expert icon selection……………………. 104 
 5.2.1   Coding of focus group and online survey data………………… 104 
 5 
  5.2.1.1    Reasoning behind participant icon selection………... 106 
   5.2.1.1.1   ‘Affects me’………………………………... 107 
   5.2.1.1.2   ‘The everyday’……………………………... 108 
   5.2.1.1.3   Disaster and fear…………………………… 110 
   5.2.1.1.4   Economic impacts…………………………. 110 
   5.2.1.1.5   Dramatic imagery………………………….. 111 
   5.2.1.1.6   Emotion and ‘touches you’………………… 111 
   5.2.1.1.7   The ‘global village’………………………... 112 
   5.2.1.1.8   Appreciation of nature……………………... 113 
   5.2.1.1.9   Patriotism…………………………………... 113 
  5.2.1.2    Pragmatic and intangible themes in icon selection….. 114 
 5.2.2 Defining the criteria for modelling icons……………………... 115 
 5.2.3    Comparing and contrasting icon trajectories………………….. 117 
 5.2.4 Selection of the non-expert icons……………………………... 120 
5.3 Expert icon selection methodology…………………………………… 121 
 5.3.1 Selection of the expert icons………………………………….. 123 
5.4 Expert and non-expert icon selection conclusions……………………. 124 
CHAPTER 6. ICON MODELLING………………………………………….. 125 
6.1 Icon modelling assumption……………………………………………. 125 
 6.1.1    Timeframe…………………………………………………….. 126 
 6.1.2 Emissions scenario……………………………………………. 127 
 6.1.3 No adaptation………………………………………………….. 127 
6.2 Investigating climate impacts on the expert icons…………………….. 128 
 6.2.1 The Thermohaline Circulation………………………………... 128 
 6.2.2 Ocean acidification……………………………………………. 129 
 6.2.3 The West Antarctic Ice Sheet…………………………………. 130 
6.3 Investigating climate impacts on polar bears…………………………. 131 
 6.3.1 Sea ice and the relationship to polar bear ecology……………. 132 
 6.3.2 Exploring the impact of SRES A1B to 2050 on polar bear  
  populations……………………………………………………. 
134 
 6.3.3 Expert survey design………………………………………….. 135 
 6.3.4 Piloting and implementation of the expert survey…………….. 137 
 6.3.5 Expert survey results………………………………………….. 140 
 6.3.6 Analysis of the expert survey…………………………………. 145 
6.4 Investigating climate impacts for the Norfolk Broads………………… 146 
 6.4.1 The Coastal Simulator………………………………………… 150 
  6.4.1.1 Adaptations of the Coastal Simulator for icon  
   investigation…………………………………………... 
150 
 6.4.2 Visualising climate impacts on the Norfolk Broads using GIS.. 152 
  6.4.2.1 Flood probability……………………………………… 154 
  6.4.2.2 Flood cost damages………………………………….... 155
 6 
6.5 Investigating climate impacts on London……………………………... 158 
 6.5.1 The Thames LISFLOOD-FP model…………………………... 160 
  6.5.1.1 Adaptations of the LISFLOOD model for icon  
   investigation…………………………………………... 
 6.5.2 Visualising climate impacts on London using GIS…………… 
 
161 
163 
6.6 Summary………………………………………………………………. 164 
CHAPTER 7. ICON EVALUATION………………………………………... 166 
7.1 Evaluative workshop design…………………………………………... 166 
 7.1.1 Part one: pre-test questionnaire……………………………….. 168 
 7.1.2 Part two: icon information sheets……………………………... 170 
 7.1.3 Part three: post-test questionnaire…………………………….. 171 
7.2 Piloting and implementing the evaluative workshop…………………. 172 
7.3 Results and analysis of the evaluative workshop: Part one…………… 173 
 7.3.1 Statistical considerations……………………………………… 174 
 7.3.2 Participant knowledge and perceptions of climate change……. 175 
 7.3.3 Comparisons and conclusions of the pre-test…………………. 179 
7.4 Results and analysis of the evaluative workshop: Part two…………… 180 
 7.4.1 Participant knowledge and perceptions of climate change……. 180 
 7.4.2 Focussed icon engagement investigation……………………... 183 
7.5 Open-ended icon engagement investigation………………………….. 191 
 7.5.1 Open-ended icon engagement investigation: quantitative  
  responses………………………………………………………. 
 
191 
 7.4.4 Open-ended icon engagement investigation: qualitative  
  responses………………………………………………………. 
 
192 
  7.4.4.1    Icons which engage…………………………………. 193 
  7.4.4.2    Icons which disengage………………………………. 195 
 7.4.5 Open-ended icon engagement investigation analysis…………. 197 
7.5 Demographic influences………………………………………………. 199 
7.6 Conclusions…………………………………………………………… 201 
CHAPTER 8. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS……………………….. 204 
8.1 Individual barriers to engagement…………………………………….. 204 
8.2 What makes an engaging climate ‘icon’?............................................... 206 
 8.2.1 Exploring engagement through icon selection reasoning……... 206 
  8.2.1.1 The impact of pragmatic and intangible reasoning on 
  icon engagement………………………………………………. 
 
206 
  8.2.1.2 The impact of spatial scale on icon engagement……… 208 
 8.2.2   Exploring engagement through the concept of ‘control’………. 209 
 8.2.3   Exploring engagement through demographic and sectoral  
  variability……………………………………………………… 
 
211 
8.3 Using icons to overcome the difficulties in selecting ‘danger’ metrics. 213 
8.4 Engagement as more than communication……………………………. 213 
 7 
 8.4.1   Addressing cognitive and affective spheres for meaningful  
  engagement……………………………………………………. 
 
213 
 8.4.2   Integration of expert and non-expert knowledge in a   
  participatory approach………………………………………… 
 
215 
 8.4.3   Overcoming further barriers to engagement…………………… 217 
8.5 Methodological reflections……………………………………………. 219 
 8.4.1 Post-normal science and interdisciplinarity…………………… 219 
 8.4.2 Research validity……………………………………………… 220 
8.6 Further research……………………………………………………….. 222 
8.6 Concluding remarks…………………………………………………… 224 
APPENDICES  
 Appendix 5.1 CNS focus group protocol…………………………….. 225 
 Appendix 5.2 Table of icon groups following low trajectories……… 230 
 Appendix 5.3 Discussion of icon trajectories not selected for further 
   analysis………………………………………………... 
 
231 
 Appendix 6.1 Invitation to PBSG participants……………………….. 238 
 Appendix 6.2 Information sheet for PBSG participants……………... 239 
 Appendix 6.3 PBSG expert survey…..………………………………. 242 
 Appendix 6.4 GCMs used to construct expert survey sea ice  
   information……………………………………………. 
259 
 
 Appendix 7.1 Pre-test questionnaire…………………………………. 260 
 Appendix 7.2a  Icon information sheet: Norfolk Broads……………… 264 
 Appendix 7.2b Icon information sheet: London and the Thames  
   Estuary………………………………………………… 
265 
 Appendix 7.2c Icon information sheet: Polar bear……………………. 266 
 Appendix 7.2d Icon information sheet: Thermohaline circulation……. 267 
 Appendix 7.2e Icon information sheet: Ocean acidification………….. 268 
 Appendix 7.2f Icon information sheet: West Antarctic Ice Sheet…….. 269 
 Appendix 7.3 Post-test questionnaire………………………………… 270 
 Appendix 7.4 Evaluative workshop results…………………………... 278 
REFERENCES………………………………………………………………... 286 
FIGURES  
 Figure 1.1 Thesis schematic diagram…………………………….. 22 
 Figure 3.1 The Theory of Reasoned Action………………………. 62 
 Figure 3.2 The Theory of Planned Behaviour……………………. 63 
 Figure 3.3 Barriers between environmental concern and action….. 64 
 Figure 3.4 The Social Practice Approach ………………………… 64 
 Figure 3.5 The Attitude Behaviour Constraint model……………. 66 
 Figure 4.1 Post-normal science…………………………………… 83 
 Figure 5.1 Criteria for non-expert icon selection…………………. 116 
 Figure 5.2 Icon selection by icon group………………………….. 118 
 8 
 Figure 5.3 Icon selection by individual icon……………………… 119 
 Figure 5.4 Icon selection by individual icon (all icon groups  
   excluding SLR)……………………………………….. 
 
120 
 Figure 6.1 Winter polar bear distribution and denning areas…….. 132 
 Figure 6.2 Projected change in polar bear range across the Arctic.. 141 
 Figure 6.3 Projected change in total polar bear population………. 142 
 Figure 6.4 Projected change in polar bear population in five  
   regions………………………………………………… 
 
143 
 Figure 6.5a Location of the Norfolk Broads……………………….. 147 
 Figure 6.5b Location of the Upper Thurne Catchment…………….. 147 
 Figure 6.6a Topographic evidence for geomorphic change in the 
   northern Broadlands area……………………………… 
 
147 
 Figure 6.6b Reconstruction of mid-Holocene geomorphology……. 147 
 Figure 6.7 Comparison of rSLR trajectories for the Norfolk  
   region………………………………………………….. 
 
152 
 Figure 6.8 Build up of sediment lessening flood risk at Winterton. 153 
 Figure 6.9 The ‘ripple effect’ of sediment movement down coast 
   of subcell 3b…………………………………………... 
 
154 
 Figure 6.10 Change in saline flood probability……………………. 155 
 Figure 6.11 Change in expected annual damage of saline flood  
   risk…………………………………………………….. 
 
157 
 Figure 6.12 Projected trajectory of expected annual damages  
   from saline flooding…………………………………... 
 
158 
 Figure 6.13 The defended Thames tidal floodplain………………... 159 
 Figure 6.14 Thames Gateway Regeneration Area new homes and 
   jobs……………………………………………………. 
 
159 
 Figure 6.15 The 1:1000 year flood risk to the Thames Estuary……. 163 
 Figure 6.16 The 1:10000 year flood risk to the Thames Estuary…... 163 
 Figure 6.17 Flood extent today and for the 1:1000 year flood  
   event for the Thames Estuary…………………………. 
 
164 
 Figure 7.1 How serious a threat is climate change?........................ 177 
 Figure 7.2 How dangerous a threat is climate change?................... 177 
 Figure 7.3 Focussed icon engagement investigation mean  
   results………………………………………………….. 
 
184 
 Figure 7.4 How much of the icon information sheet did you  
   understand?.................................................................... 
 
186 
 Figure 7.5 How did the icons make you feel: interest……………. 186 
 Figure 7.6 How did the icons make you feel: concern…………… 187 
 Figure 7.7 How did the icons make you feel: fright……………… 187 
 Figure 7.8 How did the icons make you feel generally about the 
   future?............................................................................. 
 
188 
 9 
 Figure 7.9 Location of hazards and icons on Factors 1 and 2…….. 190 
 Figure 7.10 Which icon do you feel is most directly relevant?......... 191 
 Figure 7.11 Coding categories from the qualitative icon   
   engagement investigation analysis……………………. 
 
198 
 Figure 7.12 Non-expert icons plotted in the dread/unknown risk  
   factor space……………………………………………. 
 
202 
 Figure 8.1 Development of a pro-environmental behaviour 
   framework……………………………………………... 
 
212 
 Figure 8.2 Increasing the likelihood of decarbonisation   
   behaviour……………………………………………… 
 
219 
TABLES  
 Table 4.1 The relationship between research questions and  
   methods………………………………………………... 
 
89 
 Table 5.1 Rationale for participant selection…………………….. 93 
 Table 5.2 Pragmatic and intangible reasoning nodes……………. 114 
 Table 5.3 Comparison of the experiential and analytic systems … 115 
 Table 5.4 Media reporting of the Exeter ‘expert icons’…………. 123 
 Table 6.1 Calculation of rSLR for the Norfolk region using  
   IPCC AR4 projections………………………………… 
 
151 
 Table  6.2 Calculation of rSLR for the Thames region using  
   IPCC AR4 projections………………………………… 
 
162 
 Table 7.1 Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-rank test on general 
   attitudes towards climate change……………………… 
 
182 
 Table 7.2 Focussed icon engagement investigation responses…... 185 
 Table 7.3 Responses to icons ‘most drawn to’ and ‘least drawn 
   to’……………………………………………………… 
 
192 
BOXES  
 Box 2.1 The UNFCCC: Article 2………………………………. 26 
 Box 2.2 Five Reasons for Concern…………………………….. 28 
 Box 2.3 Circumstances leading to different definitions of  
   ‘dangerous’……………………………………………. 
 
30 
 Box 2.4 The ‘five numeraries’…………………………………. 33 
 Box 3.1 Barriers to engaging the (US) public in climate  
   change dialogue……………………………………….. 
 
57 
 Box 3.2 Nine methods of psychological denial for personal  
   action on climate change……………………………… 
 
60 
 Box 3.3 Perceived individual level barriers to engagement……. 70 
 Box 5.1 Resources for generating coding categories…………... 104 
 Box 5.2 Analysis considerations for qualitative research……… 106 
 Box 5.3 Criteria for non-expert icon selection………….……… 116 
 Box 6.1 Participants in the polar bear expert survey…………… 135 
 10 
 Box 8.1 Perceived individual barriers to engagement with  
   climate change………………………………………… 
 
205 
 Box 8.2 Perceived social barriers to engagement with climate 
   change…………………………………………………. 
 
218 
 
 
 
 
LIST OF ACRONYMS 
 
AR4 – Assessment Report four from the IPCC (2007) 
CaCC – Campaign against Climate Change 
CNS - City of Norwich School  
COP – Conference of the Parties 
cp.net – ClimatePrediction.net  
DEFRA – Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs 
DETR – Department for Environment, Transport and the Regions 
FoE – Friends of the Earth  
GCM – General Circulation Model 
IAM – Integrated Assessment Model 
IPCC – Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
LEAD -  Leadership for Environment And Development International network 
MORI – Market and Opinion Research International 
NGO – Non-Governmental Organisation 
OST – Office of Science and Technology 
rSLR – Relative Sea Level Rise 
SCC – Stop Climate Chaos 
SLR – Sea Level Rise 
SRES – Special Report on Emissions Scenarios 
THC – Thermohaline Circulation 
UKCIP – United Kingdom Climate Impacts Programme 
UNFCCC – United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
WAIS – West Antarctic Ice Sheet 
WWF – World Wide Fund for nature 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 11 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
This thesis has benefited from the inputs and support of many. First, I would like to thank 
my supervisory panel for the guidance they have given me over the last three years. My 
main supervisor, Mike Hulme, has guided the thesis research and given constructive advice 
throughout. Upon Nick Pidgeon’s leaving UEA, Irene Lorenzoni joined the panel. I greatly 
appreciate her guidance on the social science aspects of the research. Tim Osborn is 
thanked for his guidance on climate science, in particular for guiding the investigation into 
sea ice. Special thanks to Mike Hulme and Rosie O’Neill for proof-reading and 
commenting on the thesis. This research was supported with a scholarship from the School 
of Environmental Sciences, University of East Anglia. 
 
On first arriving at UEA, I was enrolled into the social science research methods class. The 
group I met there have always been a source of advice and support on interdisciplinary 
research. I thank the convenors, Tim O’Riordan and Peter Simmons; and the M16Y group 
Sian Crosweller, Neil Jennings, Adrian Southern, Matt Cotton, Jacquie Smith and Teresa 
Osorio-Gomez. Colleagues at the Tyndall Centre have provided advice and inspiration. I 
would particularly like to thank Lorraine Whitmarsh, Sophie Nicholson-Cole, Johanna 
Wolf, John Turnpenny and Suraje Dessai. From the start of my contract with the Climatic 
Research Unit (CRU) at thesis submission, several CRU colleagues have provided input 
and support: special thanks here to Mike Salmon for help with various computer matters. 
 
I have many people to thank at each individual stage of the icon investigation. Andrea Deri 
at the LEAD International office in London helped me to set up the focus group research in 
Bhopal, India. Thea Abbott was helpful and enthusiastic in helping to arrange the City of 
Norwich School focus group. Dave Frame set up the online survey forum pages on 
Climateprediction.net. Thanks to all the participants of the focus groups and online survey. 
 
Jim Hall and Rich Dawson at Newcastle University gave advice and data for both the 
London and Norfolk Broads icon. I would particularly like to thank Rich, who has 
generously given his time and effort to discussing and exploring the results from both 
datasets. To analyse these two icons I used GIS: I thank Andrew Lovett for advice here, as 
well as Sonia Ribeiro and Flo Harrison. Thanks to Javier Delgado-Esteban who facilitated 
the polar bear online survey set up. Thanks also to the four ecology researchers who 
piloted the protocol, especially Tom Gray. For comments on the expert survey protocol, 
and for recruitment advice, I thank Péter Molnár and Andrew Derocher at the University of 
 12 
Alberta. I also thank the ten Polar Bear Specialist Group (PBSG) experts who took part in 
the survey itself. Andrew Watkinson provided advice for the analysis of the data. The three 
‘expert icons’ benefited from advice and input from three individuals. Thanks to Frankie 
Hopkins (ocean acidification); Chris Rapley at British Antarctic Survey (WAIS); and Neil 
Jennings (THC). 
 
Many thanks to the volunteers who helped facilitate the Forum evaluation workshop: 
Emma Fiedler, Chris Adams, Matt Cotton, Lorraine Whitmarsh, James Screen and Nem 
Vaughan, and to the participants of the workshop. Thanks to Robin Hankin at the 
University of Southampton for his time and statistical advice on the evaluation results. 
 
Finally, I would like to thank my family and friends who have supported me throughout 
the last few years: my parents Ian and Vicky O’Neill, sister Rosie and brother Dylan. 
Special thanks to my Southampton Uni housemates Helen Smith and Rachel Sheppard, 
whose passion and enthusiasm always inspires and encourages me; and to the ENV PhD 
gang at UEA. Last but not least, thanks to James Screen for keeping me sane, healthy and 
happy. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 13 
CHAPTER 1:  
CLIMATE CHANGE FROM A SCIENTIFIC TO A SOCIETAL ISSUE 
 
 
1. “Is the mean temperature of the ground in any way influenced by the presence of the heat-
absorbing gases in the atmosphere?”             Svante Arrhenius (1896) 
 
2. “Our mission is, in truth, historic and world changing - to build, over the next fifty years and 
beyond, a global low carbon economy. And it is not overdramatic to say that the character and 
course of the coming century will be set by how we measure up to this challenge”     
3.  PM Gordon Brown (2007) 
 
4. “Preservation of the environment, promotion of sustainable development and particular 
attention to climate change are matters of grave concern for the entire human family.  No 
nation or business sector can ignore the ethical implications present in all economic and social 
development.”                       Pope Benedict XVI (2007) 
 
 
The idea of global climate change emerged in the nineteenth century, through the scientific 
academic study of John Tyndall, James Croll and Svante Arrhenuis. But climate change 
has now evolved from a purely scientific endeavour to an issue with political, social, 
cultural and moral facets. The Stern Review (2006) reported a ‘simple conclusion’: that the 
economic cost of not acting on climate change far outweighs the disadvantages of strong 
and early action. A myriad of actors urge society to cut their carbon dioxide emissions to 
change their behaviour in relation to climate change (for example, see DEFRA 2007c, 
Marks and Spencer PLC 2007; and Rising Tide 2007). Yet, UK carbon emissions are rising 
slightly, not falling (DEFRA 2007b) with climate change communications approaches 
generally failing to engage individuals. 
 
 
1.1   CLIMATE CHANGE AS A SCIENTIFIC ISSUE 
 
1.1.1   Evidence and impacts 
Some amount of climate change1 is attributable to variations in the natural cycles of the 
Earth’s system. These natural variations are caused by changes in solar output, by volcanic 
                                                 
1
 In this research, the term ‘climate change’ is used, as it has no direct connotation to increase in temperature, 
unlike terms such as ‘global warming’. ‘Climate change’ is perceived as including other climate impacts such 
as species change, rather than just temperature change and, indeed, to allow for suggestions of cooling 
temperatures. See Whitmarsh (in press) for further discussion of perceptions of both terms. 
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eruptions, by the internal variability of the climate system and on millennial timescales, 
through variations in the Earth’s orbit. Global mean surface temperature has increased by 
0.74°C from 1906 - 2005. Additionally, eleven of the twelve years between 1995 and 2006 
rank as the twelve warmest years in the instrumental record of global surface temperature 
(IPCC, 2007a). Yet these trends cannot be explained by natural cycles alone. The IPCC 
(2007a) states ‘warming of the climate system is unequivocal’, citing evidence from 
increases in global average air and ocean temperatures to the widespread melt of snow and 
ice to rising global mean sea level rise (SLR). Only by considering anthropogenic forcing 
can the increasing temperature trend since the industrial revolution be finally accounted 
for. Anthropogenic forcing is the result of combustion of fossil fuels and land use changes, 
leading to increased greenhouse gas (GHG) and aerosol emissions. Global GHG emissions 
due to human activities have increased by 70% between 1970 and 2004 (IPCC, 2007a). 
From herein, the phrase ‘climate change’ is used to refer to anthropogenically induced 
climate change.  
 
The IPCC developed the Special Report on Emissions Scenario (SRES) to explore the 
impact of increasing GHG emissions (Nakicenovic et al. 2000). The IPCC state ‘high 
agreement and much evidence’ that under current policies and practices, GHG emissions 
will continue to grow over the next few decades, by as much as 90% from 2000 to 2030. 
These scenarios lead to a range in projected increase of global mean temperature of 
between 1.1 - 6.4°C by 2090 - 2099 relative to 1980 - 1999. Climate change is projected to 
increase the frequency and intensity of certain categories of extreme weather events, and to 
increase mean sea level rise (SLR; IPCC 2007a). The SRES scenarios lead to a projected 
range in global mean SLR of 18 - 59cm by 2090 - 2099 relative to 1980 - 1999. Impacts of 
climate change are projected to be many and varied, but range from changes in ecosystems 
(Leemans and Eickhout 2004) to impacts on human systems such as water resources 
(Arnell 1999), to potential forced human migrations (Barnett and Adger 2003), to 
widespread acidification of the oceans (Caldeira and Wickett 2003), to insurance and re-
insurance difficulties (Munich Re 2004). Whilst the transition to a warmer world is often 
forecast as a smooth, linear progression, Lenton et al. (2008) warn of the dangers of non-
linearities within the Earth’s system. Lenton et al. elucidate via an expert elicitation 
potential ‘tipping elements’ of the Earth system; where a tipping element refers to a 
component of the Earth’s system that can be switched – under particular conditions – into a 
different state by a small perturbation. Such tipping elements include Arctic sea ice melt, 
Amazon dieback and changes to the Indian summer monsoon (Lenton et al., 2008). 
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The UKCIP02 emissions scenarios delivered information on possible changes to the UK 
climate and to potential changes in extreme events at a regional level (Hulme et al. 2002). 
This report is currently being updated2, but projected climate changes in the 2002 report 
included average annual temperatures in the UK southeast warming by up to 5°C in 
summer by the 2080s, seasonal shifts of one to three weeks by the 2050s to earlier springs 
and later onset of Autumn, and up to 20% heavier winter rainfall by the 2080s as 
precipitation events become more extreme. 
 
1.1.2   Managing the challenge of climate change 
Both mitigation and adaptation actions are needed to appropriately manage the challenge 
of climate change. Mitigation refers to the reduction of GHG emissions through the 
reduction of fossil fuels use (for example, increasing product energy efficiency) or through 
capturing and storing emitted carbon (for example, through carbon geo-sequestration). 
Adaptation actions are those which reduce the adverse impacts of climate change (for 
example, species acclimatisation to warmer temperatures or policy interventions to build 
better coastal defences to guard against SLR, or those which exploit new opportunities 
offered by climate change such as changes in agricultural products).  
 
Global efforts have thus far concentrated largely on mitigating climate change. In 1992, the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) was signed in Rio 
de Janeiro, framing much of the future debate on climate change around the notion of 
‘danger’. It stated the ultimate aim of the Convention was to achieve: 
 
1. Stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent 
dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system. Such a level should be achieved 
within a time-frame sufficient to allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change, to 
ensure that food production is not threatened and to enable economic development to proceed 
in a sustainable manner. (UNFCCC 1992) 
 
All signatories to the Convention agreed to aim voluntarily to reduce their GHG emissions 
to 1990 levels by 2000. The Kyoto Protocol was adopted in 1997 and entered into force in 
2005, becoming the first legally binding national commitment to GHG emissions 
reduction. The major GHGs subject to emissions reduction under the Kyoto Protocol are 
carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide and three groups of fluorinated gases. Although 
criticised for setting emissions reductions targets too small for significant benefits 
                                                 
2
 The UKCIP08 report will be available from October 2008 
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(Lomborg 2005), the Kyoto Protocol provides only a first step in reducing emissions 
(O'Neill and Oppenheimer 2002). A roadmap to GHG emissions reduction beyond the 
Kyoto Protocol has been negotiated at the Conference Of the Parties (COP-13) held in Bali 
in 2007.  
 
Sir David King (2004), Chief Scientific Advisor to the UK Government stated how Great 
Britain is attempting to show leadership on climate change beyond that of international 
negotiations. The UK government is currently in the process of drafting the Climate 
Change Bill, which states a UK GHG emissions target far more stringent than the Kyoto 
Protocol. The Climate Change Bill states the UK’s target to reduce GHG emissions 
through domestic and international action by between 26-32% by 2020, and by at least 
60% by 2050, against a 1990 baseline (DEFRA 2007d).   
 
 
1.2   CLIMATE CHANGE AND SOCIETY 
Despite the UK’s commitment to the Kyoto Protocol and development of the Climate 
Change Bill, there has been a slight increase in UK carbon emissions during the last few 
years rather than the radical emissions reductions needed to reach national targets. As this 
suggests, in order to meet the UK Government’s 60% mitigative emissions target society 
must be meaningfully engaged with climate change in order to begin to undertake 
decarbonisation behaviours (Nicholson-Cole, 2004; Whitmarsh, 2005; Lorenzoni et al., 
2007). This thesis recognises that individuals have an important role to play in the 
reduction of emissions, and investigates the value of engaging at the individual level with 
climate change. On one hand, individuals are citizens responsible both for influencing 
policy through elections in a democratic society and for driving consumption patterns and 
trends through their purchasing power - regardless of the power an individual may or may 
not hold through occupation or background. On a more pragmatic note, domestic emissions 
through car use, heating, lighting and appliances represent around a third of UK total 
emissions (DEFRA, 2005). Research such as the ‘40% house’ demonstrates that significant 
cuts in domestic emissions are possible to achieve within the Government’s 2050 
timeframe, but that such emissions cuts represent a significant challenge to society 
(Boardman et al. 2005). 
 
1.2.1   Societal response to climate change in the UK 
The public increasingly recognise climate change as a reality. For example, a survey by 
DEFRA (2007) found 99% of the UK public recognised the term ‘climate change’. 
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DEFRA (2007) claim that within the UK, being ‘green’ is now seen as a social norm, 
rather than an ‘alternative’ way of life: although this statement is called into question 
somewhat when examining current environmental practices. Yet rrecognition of the 
language of climate and even recognising climate change as a risk issue represents a fairly 
superficial engagement with climate change, rather than the meaningful engagement which 
is needed. Risk research indicates that the public rank climate change as lower priority than 
other risk issues such as genetically modified foods or nuclear power (Poortinga and 
Pidgeon 2003). Without prompting, over a third of the UK public state crime, health, 
economic concerns or education as issues the government should deal with. Just one 
percent of the public without prompting states climate change or global warming an issue 
the government should deal with (DEFRA 2007).  
 
Several government information campaigns have been run to inform the public about 
climate change. For example, the ‘Are you doing your bit’ campaign was launched by the 
DETR in 1998. The £7 million campaign was designed to reach a mass public audience 
through television adverts showing many different individuals all taking small actions to 
help the environment. The campaign focussed on the personal and economic benefits to 
energy reduction. Although the DETR claim success in that the campaign generated 
recognition of the campaign brand amongst particular target audiences, they note only 
small consequent changes in personal attitudes or behaviour (DETR 2000). Information 
campaigns such as this have generally been unsuccessful in securing decarbonisation 
behaviour. 
 
During the period in which the research for this thesis research was completed, 
considerable change occurred in the field of communicating climate change. In 2005, 
DEFRA announced plans for a new £12 million climate communication strategy, based 
upon recommendations from Futerra (2005). Futerra’s ‘Rules of the Game’ report outlined 
a new approach to climate communication in the form of an evidence-based strategy aimed 
at changing public attitudes towards climate change in the UK. The approach challenged 
some traditional tenets of sustainability communication, such as the use of scare tactics to 
engage the public (see Section 3.4.4 for further discussion). The adoption of the guidelines 
by DEFRA formed the ‘Tomorrow’s Climate, Today’s Challenge’ climate communication 
campaign (DEFRA 2007c). Whilst significant changes to climate communication are in 
progress on some practitioner-led levels, this thesis provides empirical academic evidence 
of the need to engage individuals more meaningfully with climate change in order to 
promote attitudinal change.  
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1.2.2   Communication and engagement 
Thus far, much effort has concentrated on climate change communication. Communication 
is defined as the provision of ideas, knowledge or information (OED online 2007). This 
thesis argues for approaches going further than simply information provision. Instead, the 
thesis examines climate change engagement. Engagement is defined by Lorenzoni et al. 
(2007) as a state of connection comprising the three co-dependent spheres of cognition, 
affect and behaviour. They state that: 
 
1. “It is not enough for people to know about climate change in order to be engaged; they also 
need to care about it, be motivated and able to take action.” Lorenzoni et al., (2007: p 447) 
 
Cognitive engagement is imperative in climate change; as if the public do not have an 
adequate understanding of the issue, any mitigation policy risks being ineffective or being 
rejected. Effective engagement refers to how an individual understands the issue through 
an emotional connection. Whilst the emotional processing system has been much maligned 
in Western society as inferior to a more analytic risk processing, the risk literature 
demonstrates that a significant proportion of our ability to assess risk stems from 
experiential rather than analytical processing (Slovic et al. 2004: see also section 5.4.1.2). 
The behavioural sphere of engagement refers to the actions an individual may take. There 
are two types of barrier to engagement with climate change: individual-level and social-
level barriers (Lorenzoni et al. 2007). Individual barriers include a lack of desire to find 
out information and a lack of locally and personally relevant information. Social barriers 
include a lack of political substantive action and the difficulties of ‘free riders’ and social 
norms (Chapter 3 considers this further). This thesis explores an approach to overcome 
individual-level barriers to engagement with climate change.  
 
The term engagement is used in this thesis to refer to the three inter-related and co-
dependant facets of cognition, affect and behaviour. These three facets to engagement may 
work independently of each other. For example, climate mitigation strategies can be 
successful through ‘piggybacking’, or the promotion of other messages besides carbon 
reduction, whilst also achieving decarbonisation. Thus, Stern (2000) argues that energy 
conservation does not require a knowledge of climate change. However, Whitmarsh (2005) 
notes how these sorts of messages based on a ‘rational actor’ model are not always 
effective (see also Section 3.3). For example, widely used money-saving or ‘thrifty’ 
engagement approaches have limitations. Unless a new behavioural habit has been formed, 
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when the stimulus of the piggyback is removed – in this example, if the new pattern of 
behaviour becomes more expensive for instance – the individual is likely to revert to the 
original behavioural pattern (Dobson 2003). Furthermore, consideration of the affective 
aspect to engagement is needed. Individuals enact particular behaviours not only due to 
economic factors but because of social norms, habitual behaviours or because the 
behaviour represents a cherished activity (Whitmarsh 2005). In the money-saving example, 
the very engagement approach used may act to disengage some individuals, as the ‘thrifty’ 
behaviour is perceived as ‘penny-pinching’, a negative behavioural attribute. Thus, 
approaches promoting behavioural change without a connection to individuals’ underlying 
cognitive and affective values in relation to climate change is unlikely to lead to 
meaningful and long-lasting behavioural change.  
 
This thesis explores individual engagement with climate change within a UK context. The 
thesis is interdisciplinary, crossing the disciplines of geography, psychology, sociology, 
climate sciences, marketing and communication studies. The objective of this research is to 
increase understanding of meaningful individual-level engagement with climate change, in 
order to encourage attitudinal change towards mitigative and adaptive action. The 
originality of the thesis rests in the interdisciplinary linkages made between natural and 
social scientific knowledge, through the investigation of an ‘iconic approach’ to individual-
level engagement with climate change. With this context in mind, the following research 
questions are answered: 
 
Stage 1.   What makes an engaging ‘climate icon’? 
• What do participants select as their climate icons? 
o On what spatial scale(s) are icons chosen? 
o What reasoning lies behind icon choice? 
• Are there commonalities and differences in the icons selected? 
o Does this vary across spatial and cultural contexts? 
o Is there such an entity as a globally engaging icon of climate change?  
 
Stage 2.   Examining non-expert and expert-led icons 
• What constitutes an expert-led icon? 
• What is the impact of a future climate scenario upon selected icons? 
o What is the impact on the non-expert icons? 
o What is the impact on the expert-led icons? 
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Stage 3.   Does the iconic approach engage non-experts with climate change? 
• How do non-experts engage with the expert and non-expert icons? 
• Does the iconic approach alter cognitive or affective aspects of engagement with 
climate change? 
 
The thesis schematic diagram (Figure 1.1) illustrates the relationship between each stage of 
the thesis research: from the methodologies used, to the aims of each stage, along with a 
timeline of the research process. 
 
 
1.3   ROADMAP 
An overview of the contents of each Chapter is provided here. The thesis is a detailed and 
sequential document, with each Chapter building on the conclusions of the previous 
Chapter. Firstly, Chapters 2 and 3 discuss the wide-ranging literature upon which this 
research is based. Chapter 2 explores the emergence of the discourse of ‘dangerous climate 
change’ and the agents and methods involved in this discourse. Chapter 3 then reviews the 
literature on public engagement with climate change. This Chapter specifically focuses on 
barriers to effective engagement, models for exploring behavioural change and approaches 
to improve engagement with climate change. The reasoning behind the use of an ‘iconic 
approach’ to climate engagement is then set out. 
 
This thesis is interdisciplinary in that it applies methodologies from both the physical and 
social sciences. Thus, Chapter 4 provides a brief overview of the theoretical and 
methodological foundation to the thesis. Chapters 5, 6 and 7 provide details of the 
methodologies, results and analysis used in each of the three stages of the primary research 
of the thesis. Chapter 5 discusses the focus groups and online survey methodologies used 
in icon selection. The three emerging overarching themes from the icon selection data of 
spatial scale, pragmatic and intangible reasoning are discussed. Chapter 6 reports on the 
results of the icon modelling of the non-expert icons: the polar bear expert elicitation, the 
London Atlantis research and the Norfolk Broads Coastal Simulator research. The Chapter 
also reviews the literature on the expert icons of the West Antarctic Ice Sheet, ocean 
acidification and the Thermohaline Circulation. Chapter 7 reports on the icon evaluation 
workshop, specifically commenting on participants’ knowledge and perceptions in relation 
to climate change. This Chapter then provides a detailed investigation into participants’ 
intra- and inter-relationships with the expert and non-expert icons.  
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Finally, Chapter 8 brings together the analyses from each of the three stages of the thesis 
and discusses the conclusions in terms of individual engagement with climate change. The 
Chapter considers what makes both an engaging and a disengaging climate icon, and the 
benefits of a climate engagement approach rather than a climate communication approach 
is discussed. The final Chapter concludes with some methodological reflections and 
thoughts for potential avenues for future research. 
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ClimatePrediction.net
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n = 5
Stage 1.
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GIS analysis and 
mapping 
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n = 6
Visitors to the Forum, Norwich for 
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simulator data
River Thames 
LISFLOOD data
• Transcription and coding of focus group and qualitative online 
survey data
• Analysis of quantitative survey data
• Development of icon selection procedure
• Analysis of workshop data
• Discussion of research questions 22
 
Figure 1.1   Thesis schematic diagram
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CHAPTER 2: 
EXPLORING PERCEPTIONS OF ‘DANGEROUS’ CLIMATE CHANGE 
 
 
 
1. “Radical new methods of participatory research are necessary to truly elicit what level of 
climate change might be regarded as dangerous by different cultures, communities and 
constituencies. Much more needs to be done to recognise the importance of the social, cultural, 
institutional and contextual in the definition of danger.” (Dessai et al., 2004: p 21)  
 
The avoidance of ‘dangerous’ climate change is at the centre of international climate 
negotiations, forming a frame around which discourses on climate change are built. Thus it 
is necessary to review the concept of ‘dangerous’ climate change. First, the Chapter 
explores the concept of ‘dangerous’ climate change from the origin of the term to how it 
has been negotiated, and the influence of the concept on the non-expert discourse of 
climate change. A review of the metrics used so far to categorise ‘dangerous’ climate 
change is presented with the conclusion that ‘danger’ can not be categorically defined; and 
how new and socially relevant methods of engaging with the concept of ‘danger’ are 
needed. After this review, the term ‘dangerous’ climate change is not expressed explicitly, 
but it is used implicitly to frame the thesis research which follows. The Chapter then 
focuses on the tools used for engaging individuals with climate change. Lastly, the Chapter 
examines the agents that employ these tools. 
 
 
2.1   UNDERSTANDING ‘DANGEROUS’ CLIMATE CHANGE 
The following Section investigates the notion of ‘dangerous climate change’ and its 
context within non-expert perceptions. Before investigating ‘dangerous climate change’, 
the following Section consists of a necessarily brief review of the literature specifically 
relevant to this thesis on how the concept of ‘danger’ itself may be defined. 
 
2.1.1   What is ‘dangerous climate change’? 
Danger may be one of the oldest concepts relating to threat to oneself, dating at least from 
Sumerian times (Ingles, 1991). Danger is typically defined as: 
 
2. ‘Exposure to harm or injury; the condition of being exposed to the chance of evil, risk or peril’  
(OED online, 2007)  
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It has been argued that danger is inherently linked to disorder (Douglas, 1966). Disorder 
implies disarray and disorganisation. Order implies that a restriction has been made from 
all possible options, and thus this limited selection infers less danger. Danger can be 
defined as that simply which disrupts normality (Lorenzoni, 2004), alternatively, it can be 
defined as an ‘unacceptable risk’ (Hulme, 2000). It is noted that the determination of what 
constitutes danger is deeply normative (Schneider and Lane, 2005).  
 
The use of the two terms ‘danger’ and ‘risk’ has become interchangeable in modern 
parlance (Douglas, 1980). Here, it is argued that the terms do have distinct meanings, but 
that the definition of these terms poses conceptual, logical and epistemological difficulties. 
One may categorise the difference between danger and risk as the difference between 
unrecognised and perceived risk (Luhmann, 1993). There are features which threaten 
humans but are not recognised, and thus are defined as danger; whereas conscious 
recognition of threat constitutes a risk (Pidgeon et al., 2003). But, if danger is distinct from 
risk, in that risk comprises a recognised threat, does this make danger a phenomenon of 
unperceived threat? This makes the conditions under which danger is identified 
problematic. The overriding problem is that there is no clarification of the real-world 
conditions that can specifically define danger; ‘risk’ and ‘peril’ are simply semantic 
substitutions. Further definition of these substitution terms leads in turn to the same 
predicament (Pidgeon et al., 2003). 
 
Douglas (1966) defines danger in two forms, external and internal. An internal definition 
works subconsciously; she defines it as the ‘psyche’. External definitions of danger must 
work consciously. These definitions also define controlled and uncontrolled power over 
danger. Internal danger cannot be controlled, but external danger can be wilfully 
manipulated. Dessai et al. (2004) define danger in the context of climate change using this 
external and internal demarcation. External definitions of danger are based on risk analysis 
of physical or social features, and so link to the definition of risk. Internal definitions rely 
on the danger being perceived or experienced in order to be appreciated as real, and thus 
relate to the categorisation of danger offered by Pidgeon et al. (2003). Barnett and Adger 
(2003) define danger in terms of the internal definition offered by Dessai et al. (2004), as a 
perception of insecurity - whether or not the threat is real or imagined. Lorenzoni and 
Pidgeon (2005) concur that a definition of danger must include that of danger as a 
perceived threat, and cannot be restricted to simply technical or risk-based criteria.  
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Perceiving danger involves recognising both the context in which the danger appears, and 
the processing of this information relative to other previous encounters with danger and 
their subsequent consequences (Barnett and Adger, 2003). Some have argued against the 
definition of danger as perceived, as one can perceive a threat when there is no real danger: 
our perception of danger is frequently incorrect3. Understanding what is perceived as 
dangerous also involves knowledge of what is valued by individuals. If an entity is greatly 
valued by an individual, the individual may consider the entity ‘in danger’ at a lower 
threshold than if the entity is less valued. 
 
Different publics perceive different risks as more or less dangerous. An individual’s 
perception of danger will determine how likely that person is to take a particular risk 
(Lorenzoni and Pidgeon, 2004). An individual’s assessment of danger is not a rational 
process, but involves emotional aspects (Joffe, 2003): there are biases and heuristics 
inherent in risk estimation. As discussed in Section 2.1.2.3, for example, the ‘availability 
heuristic’ - the ability of the hazard to be recalled or imagined - can affect how dangerous a 
particular scenario is. Greater danger is often associated with risks which have not been 
experienced (Whitmarsh et al., 2005). In addition, there appears to be a limit to how 
concerning a suite of potentially dangerous situations can be. A mechanism known as the 
‘finite pool of worry’ effect (Linville and Fischer, 1991) illustrates that as concern for one 
issue rises, concern for another will decline. 
 
2.1.1.1   The emergence of ‘dangerous climate change’ 
Why is the concept of ‘dangerous climate change’ so important for the scientific and policy 
communities? The answer lies within the wording for the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), signed in May 1992 in New York. In the 
policy wording of Article 2, the Convention’s objective is set out in Box 2.1.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
3
 Comment made by anonymous discussant in an online discussion forum titled ‘Dangerous climate change’ 
initiated by S. Dessai (2004). See www.tyndall.ac.uk/forum/messages/archive/dangerous.html (accessed 
11/11/04). 
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Box 2.1   The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change: Article 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
‘The ultimate objective of this Convention and any related legal instruments that the 
Conference of the Parties may adopt is to achieve, in accordance with the relevant 
provisions of the Convention, stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the 
atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the 
climate system. Such a level should be achieved within a time-frame sufficient to: 
 
• allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change 
• to ensure that food production is not threatened  
• enable economic development to proceed in a sustainable manner.’  
 
    
 
(UNFCCC, 1992) 
 
 
 
 
With the wording ‘preventing dangerous interference’, the signatory Parties agree that 
anthropogenic influence can affect the climate in ways that can be detrimental to society 
and ecosystems. By recognising that atmospheric greenhouse gas concentrations needed to 
be stabilised in order to avoid danger, article 2 legitimised climate change as a problem of 
international concern (Bodansky, 1993). The Convention also implies that international 
climate policy must anticipate the inevitable inertia in the climate system and deal with all 
the complex interactions involved, in order to find a common notion of ‘dangerous’ 
(Coffee-Morlot and Hohne, 2003). The wording above has angered some Parties to the 
Convention, who argue that the three focus points concentrate overly on Small Island 
States and on food security in Africa, whilst ignoring other priorities (Lorenzoni, 2004). 
 
Several parts of Article 2 link with Article 3.3: the application of the precautionary 
principle when confronted with scientific uncertainty (Hare, 2003). Ott et al. (2004) states 
that when there are threats of serious damage from climate change which cannot be 
adequately compensated or that which is irreversible, lack of scientific certainty cannot be 
used as an excuse for avoiding commitment by any Party committing to the Convention 
under Article 3.3. Yet, the precautionary principle is not yet being applied in the context of 
dangerous climate change: mitigation targets such as the Kyoto targets finally ratified in 
February 2005 are merely a small step in an ongoing process, and as yet adaptive action 
has not been widely adopted. Even though ‘dangerous’ is not defined, this should not 
become a reason for inaction (Barnett and Adger, 2003). 
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Almost immediately from the publication of the Convention, the legal significance of 
‘dangerous’ was questioned and the UNFCCC stabilisation objective queried as not legally 
watertight (Bodansky, 1993). Although some early proposals relating to reducing 
emissions phrased the Convention as a collective commitment, and the Secretariat 
categorised the proposals on objectives as ‘general obligations’ in a compilation document, 
when finally adopted Article 2 used declarative language and therefore compels no country 
to commitment (Bodansky, 1993). However, Bodansky (1993) asserts that Article 2 may 
be contained within the category of ‘object and purpose’ contained in the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties. If this is so, then those agreeing to the Convention 
would have a legal duty not to defeat the stabilisation objective.  
 
More recently, Risbey (2004: p 1) has questioned why the term ‘dangerous’ was used in 
Article 2:  
 
3. ‘What role has this concept to play? Is it as a form of placeholder or does it play more of a 
pernicious role as a kind of Protocol Trojan horse?’ 
 
Risbey argues that ‘dangerous’ is probably a placeholder for a particular level of climate 
change not yet agreed by the convention: either due to a useful definition appearing 
unwarranted due to a lack of research, or because it was not politic at the time to do so, or 
for both reasons. The lack of definition of dangerous has been described as creating a ‘zone 
of ambiguity’ (Lorenzoni, 2004), from which many vested interests seek to gain.  
 
Defining ‘dangerous’ in the context of climate change remains a ‘critical international 
challenge’  (O’Neill and Oppenheimer, 2002). However, there is still widespread 
international agreement for preventing dangerous climate change according to Article 2 
(Ott et al. 2004). Policy progress on this may be slow due to the complexity of 
understanding a system such as the global climate, and due to the uncertainties involved 
(Corfee-Morlot and Hohne, 2003). Nevertheless, negotiation of Article 2 is essential for 
future policy dialogue (Corfee-Morlot and Hohne, 2003; Yamin et al., 2005). 
 
2.1.1.2   The IPCC and ‘dangerous climate change’ 
One of the aims of the IPCC Third Assessment Report (TAR) was to consider the evidence 
for Article 2 and assess the new scientific information and evidence as an input for 
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policymakers, to aid determination of what constitutes ‘dangerous anthropogenic 
interference’ with the climate system (Smith et al., 2001). 
 
The TAR stresses that it is not the task of the IPCC to decide upon what metric, at which 
level, constitutes a dangerous level of climate change. Danger is defined by the IPCC as a 
‘function of the degree to which effects are negative and the degree to which those effects 
are unacceptable’ (Smith et al., 2001), i.e. at which point danger implies an unacceptable 
risk (Hulme, 2000). At which point the danger becomes unacceptable is what the IPCC 
terms a ‘value judgement’, and as such, is outside of the remit of the IPCC. The IPCC 
states its objective as reviewing the current climate scientific literature so as to provide 
information that is policy relevant, whilst being impartial to the knowledge presented, and 
presenting no recommendations or bias in its reports (Patwardhan et al., 2003). However, 
some do maintain that no conclusions on dangerous climate change can be reached whilst 
the IPCC avoids the value-ridden debate surrounding dangerous climate change, citing a 
need for an ‘interactive forum’ between science and policy (Moss, 1995). 
 
Instead of providing a definition for ‘dangerous’, the IPCC provided five ‘Reasons for 
Concern’ developed from the scientific literature. The Reasons for Concern were designed 
to aid the reader in making their own individual value judgement on what constitutes 
dangerous climate change. Smith et al. (2001) state that the Reasons for Concern (Box 2.2) 
can be used singly, or in combination. There is no attempt to combine them to generate a 
single ‘bottom line’.  
 
 
 
Box 2.2   The Five Reasons for Concern  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. ‘Damage or irreparable loss of unique and threatened systems 
2. The distribution of impacts 
3. Global aggregate damages 
4. The probability of extreme weather events 
5. The probability of large-scale singular events such as the break up of the West 
Antarctic Ice Sheet or the collapse of the North Atlantic Thermohaline 
Circulation 
 
    
 
(Smith et al., 2001: p 958) 
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The IPCC presents three caveats when using the five reasons for concern: 
 
1. There is still substantial uncertainty about how effective adaptation will be (and 
could be) in ameliorating negative effects of climate change and taking advantage 
of positive effects 
2. The effects of changes in baseline conditions, such as economic growth and 
development of new technologies, that could reduce vulnerability has not been 
adequately considered in most impact studies 
3. Most impact studies assess the effects in a stable climate, so our understanding of 
which rates of change may be dangerous may be limited 
 
Corfee-Morlot and Hohne (2003) advocate building on the reasons for concern, using 
‘benchmark indicators of risk’ for every area, through local and regional climate impact 
information. They maintain that these could be used to help guide policy decisions about 
mitigative actions for the longer term. Nevertheless, the concept of ‘danger’ itself will not 
be categorically defined by the IPCC.  
 
2.1.1.3   Exploring the concept of ‘dangerous climate change’ 
The IPCC has so far taken a natural science focussed approach to exploring what 
‘dangerous’ climate change means. Yet Parties may use the lack of agreement on what 
constitutes dangerous climate change as justification for inaction such as the US:  
 
4. “No-one can say with any certainty what constitutes a dangerous level of warming, and 
therefore what level must be avoided.”       US President George W. Bush (11th June, 2001)  
 
‘Certainty’ may only increase gradually over time, and whilst waiting for scientific 
certainty to emerge, a lack of emissions regulation may indeed lead to dangerous climate 
change. The value judgement imposed by using the term ‘dangerous’ was recognised by 
Moss (1995). Whilst the natural sciences have a key role to play in estimating climate 
risks, it has been argued that a full understanding of Article 2 will need to draw on the 
social sciences, psychology, law, and ethics (Oppenheimer, 2005) as well as appreciate 
societal and individual perceptions of danger (Dessai et al., 2004). It has been suggested 
that gaining societal support for emissions regulation whilst a dangerous emissions limit 
cannot be categorically defined would be difficult. However, the public currently accepts 
imposed limits for unknown risks such as car safety, cancer and nuclear power far lower 
than what is currently accepted for the probability of dangerous climate change 
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(Mastrandrea and Schneider, 2004). Risbey (2004) expands on the different perspectives 
that impact on how dangerous climate change is perceived (Box 2.3). 
 
 
 
Box 2.3    Circumstances leading to different definitions of ‘dangerous’  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Points of view (attitude to risk, compassion, political commitments etc.) 
2. Points of stance (manifest as different impacts in different places) 
3. Impact selection and metric (impacts both human and natural systems, 
measurement?) 
4. Impact timeframe (generally increase the danger as the longer the time frame) 
5. Uncertainty (allows disagreement over fairly large range of potential dangers) 
6. Ignorance (we may have no comprehension of what is to happen, we cannot put 
thresholds up to dangers we are not yet aware of) 
 
    
 
(Risbey, 2004: p 2) 
 
 
 
Before discussing what could be considered dangerous, it is constructive to consider the 
different types of danger associated with climate change. Dessai et al., (2004) argue that 
understanding of both the internal and external definitions of danger is needed in order to 
fully comprehend dangerous climate change as stated in Article 2:  
 
• External definitions are usually based on scientific risk analysis, performed by experts, of 
system characteristics of the physical or social world. 
• Internal definitions of danger recognise that to be real, danger has to be either experienced 
or perceived - it is the individual or collective experience or perception of insecurity or 
lack of safety that constitutes the danger. 
 
External risks present an expert view of risk, whereas internal definitions are more 
personally centred. Dessai et al. (2004) argue that for non-experts to recognise danger, it 
must be either experienced or perceived. This is corroborated by Leiserowitz (2004) who 
found American non-experts were highly unlikely to undertake personal actions until they 
perceived climate change as a situated risk.  
 
The occurrence of internal and external definitions of danger leads to two different 
paradigms. The first, a top-down, linear approach, uses future socioeconomic scenarios as 
inputs to a series of hierarchical models. These assessments typically define danger in 
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terms of physical measures, threats to the function of the non-human world, or in terms of 
people at risk or reduction in economic welfare. These assessments often assume no 
adaptation (Dessai et al., 2004). According to Hare (2003) a top-down approach typically 
focuses on avoiding changes of a greater magnitude than have been discovered in the 
palaeoclimatic record of the last few interglacial periods. A bottom-up approach 
investigates the vulnerability of societies or individuals to present-day climatic variability 
and possible future climate changes by investigating their ability to adapt (Dessai et al., 
2004). Scenarios can then be assessed in regard to the adaptive capacity of the examined 
system (Hare, 2003).  
 
If a particular level of climate change exists which is deemed ‘dangerous’, then it logically 
follows that there must also be a level deemed ‘safe’. Brooks et al. (2004) maintain that 
defining any level of climate change as dangerous is unethical, as it condones all deaths 
under this threshold – presumably occurring under a ‘safe’ climate change. An extension to 
this would imply that if a dangerous (and thus a safe) climate change exists; it should 
follow that a dangerous, or safe, climate exists. Yet this does not appear to be the case: the 
lack of a safe climate is demonstrated with respect to current climatic conditions and 
hurricanes. Is a hurricane ever ‘safe’? Kovats et al., (2004) also argue a similar case for 
climate change and health, as even current climate variability is not adequately dealt with 
by current healthcare systems. Hulme (2004) maintains that climate has always been 
‘dangerous’ and will continue to be so. The lack of a safe limit to emitting greenhouse 
gases makes avoiding dangerous climate change increasingly urgent (Allen and Lord, 
2004). 
 
Ethical considerations are paramount in exploring dangerous climate change. Schneider 
and Lane (2005) recognise three areas in which there is likely to be inequity, and hence 
difficult ethical decisions to be made; inter-country, intergenerational, and inter-species 
inequity. One’s cultural values and knowledge of climate change will have impact on how 
dangerous climate change is perceived. Also, the ability to adapt to change, either 
personally, or collectively - for example as a country - may contribute to how one defines 
dangerous (Vlek and Steg, 2004).  
 
Although it may be widely recognised in the scientific community that an understanding of 
dangerous climate change involves value judgements - and thus is outside of the scope of 
science – politicians still look to scientists to aid in defining dangerous climate change. 
Prime Minister Tony Blair commissioned a symposium in Exeter, UK, in 2005 to 
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encourage scientific debate on Avoiding Dangerous Climate Change. Yet scientists at the 
symposium saw the defining of ‘dangerous’ as principally a political task (Pearce, 2005). 
PM Blair structured the symposium debate around three considerations of ‘danger’: 
 
1. Incremental changes in average climatic conditions to which either migration or 
adaptation is a possible option 
2. The effect of changing extreme conditions, such as the 2003 heat wave in Europe 
3. Waking the ‘sleeping giants’ e.g. melting of the Greenland Ice Sheet (GIS) or the 
West Antarctic Ice Sheet (WAIS) 
 
Blair asked scientists to consider ‘exactly how much climate change was self-evidently too 
much’: language used to echo the American Constitution and thus appeal to the US. 
Attempting to use a scientific symposium to answer this question has been challenged, 
however. Yamin et al., (2005) argue that what an individual comes to regard as self-
evident is in effect completely dependant on how the individual interprets dangerous 
climate change, and how this fits with their world view.  
 
2.1.1.4    Measuring ‘dangerous’ climate change 
Deciding what constitutes ‘dangerous climate change’ may involve formal or informal 
assessments of risk. This risk can be assessed through impact measures, and on different 
aggregations of social, cultural or natural systems (Oppenheimer, 2005). These risk 
assessments are referred to here as metrics: defined as an environmental objective which is 
stated in terms of some measure of climate damages and their distribution (Oppenheimer 
and Petsonk, 2004). Possible metrics include monetary cost, number of people affected or 
social costs like the loss of a unique culture. Risbey (2004) recognises that dangerous can 
be defined in many ways (Box 2.3), and the choice of metric - or measurement of the 
impact – has a significant impact on how danger is defined.  
 
A Cost/Benefit Analysis (CBA) approach has been used to try and estimate the costs of 
mitigation and adaptation to climate change against a Business-As-Usual trajectory 
(Lomborg, 2005). However using CBA for climate impact analysis is controversial, as it 
works on a purely economic basis. Climate, by its global nature, has social and 
environmental as well as economic impacts (Schneider et al. 2000).  Some impacts such as 
irreversible damages through species loss cannot be given an economic value 
(Oppenheimer and Petsonk, 2004). In addition, ethical problems occur when using metrics 
such as the Value of a Statistical Life (VOSL) for a CBA. VOSL is based on a willingness 
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to pay for increased safety. For example, using this purely economic tool, poor developing 
countries have a VOSL 15 times less than a developed country.  
 
The principal underlying a CBA is an aggregated market power form of utilitarianism i.e. 
the greatest good for the greatest number of dollars in benefit/cost ratios (Schneider and 
Lane, 2005). Climate impacts will manifest themselves differently in different parts of the 
globe, and is likely to add to greater disparity between the rich and the poor: hence global 
averages can be deemed meaningless (Schneider et al., 2000). For example, an 
economically neutral, but ethically unacceptable situation could occur where more 
developed countries get richer and less developed, poorer.  
 
Integrated assessment models (IAMs) are increasingly used within the climate modelling 
community. It has been argued that as IAMs provide a numerical output, they can be 
directly used in considerations of what may be ‘dangerous’ (Smith et al. 2001). However, 
imaginable climate surprises, let alone those not even known about, are not adequately 
represented in IAMs (Schneider, 2001). IAMs also only use select measures of impacts 
which are in no way comprehensive (Smith et al. 2001). Also, IAMs do not solve the 
problem of not knowing future socioeconomic and physical changes (Brooks et al., 2004).  
 
Schneider and Lane (2005a) propose that in contrast to CBA approaches, a different type 
of metric, or group of metrics, should be implemented (Box 2.4). 
 
 
 
Box 2.4    The ‘Five Numeraires’ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Monetary loss 
2. Loss of human life 
3. Degraded quality of life 
4. Species or biodiversity loss 
5. Mal-distribution / equity 
 
    
 
(Schneider and Lane, 2005b)  
 
 
The Five Numeraires are examples of justice-orientated metrics. Lane et al. (2005) suggest 
that not only should absolute costs be examined in the case of the five numeraires, but also 
that relative costs – for example, relative to a country’s GDP, or species loss relative to the 
number of species in that family - should be examined (Schneider and Lane, 2005).  
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A possible method of measuring ‘dangerous’ climate change is through utilising impact 
metrics, with those that contributed least to the climate change problem probably the ones 
facing the worst consequences (Schneider and Lane, 2005). An impact metric may explore 
physical, social or cultural thresholds of danger. For example, physical thresholds may 
investigate danger in relation to GIS ice sheet collapse (Oppenheimer and Alley, 2005), 
social thresholds the migration from small island states (Barnett and Adger, 2003) and 
cultural thresholds the impact of climate change on Inuit traditions (Rosentrater et al., 
2004). Some impact studies have started to use several metrics together in an analysis. A 
broad-based, multiple metric approach provides a preferable approach to those focusing 
solely on market damages (Schneider and Lane, 2005). Integrated approaches to 
investigating dangerous climate change through impact metrics have been used by Parry et 
al. (2001) in the ‘Millions at Risk’ framework, where a set of global change scenarios were 
used to investigate the impact of climate change on ecosystems, food security, water 
resources, malaria and coastal flooding.  
 
A common impact metric is the level of warming required to melt the GIS or WAIS, 
causing eustatic sea level rise of 4-6m and 7m respectively (Oppenheimer and Alley, 
2005)4. Impact metrics investigating species loss, ecosystem loss and landscape change 
have also been used (e.g. Leemans and Eickhout, 2004). For example, a mean global 
increase of 2˚C would cause mass devastation of coral reefs through bleaching (O'Neill and 
Oppenheimer, 2002). This level of warming may also be used to define danger in the 
context of Arctic sea ice melt, with associated impacts on seals and polar bears, and on 
Inuit culture (Rosentrater et al., 2004). Climate change is likely to have a deleterious effect 
upon global forests, especially areas such as the Brazilian rainforest (White et al., 1999). 
At present, these forests provide carbon storage, if not carbon sinks. So therefore, a 
threshold could be reached where these forests are no longer viable; in itself perhaps 
‘dangerous’ in the context of species loss, but also because the forests may then become 
sources of carbon - a potentially ‘dangerous’ feedback mechanism. 
 
High altitude glaciers have been used as impact metrics for exploring dangerous climate 
change. The UN warned in 2002 that 40 Himalayan glacial lakes were dangerously close to 
bursting after large volumes of water had been released from the glaciers upstream 
(Reuters, 2005). There is a lack of monitoring on these rivers and lakes, so it is not known 
how close to a dangerous climate change we are (FoE, 2004). There is also a large social 
                                                 
4
 The implication of this commonly-used impact metric is that melting of either ice sheet is self-evidently 
dangerous but this assumption is questioned, as the social and cultural context is not taken into consideration. 
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cost associated with this glacial retreat, as millions in India and Bangladesh rely on 
Himalayan rivers such as the Ganges. In addition, the Ganges is a holy river for Hindus, 
and thus any threat to its glacial source has cultural as well as economic and social 
consequences. 
 
Definitions of ‘danger’ less frequently focus exclusively on possible social impacts of 
climate change. A novel impact metric approach to calculating the effect of climate change 
upon tourism has been developed (Viner and Amelung, 2005). Barnett and Adger (2003) 
investigate how sea level rise, sea surface warming, and an increase in extreme weather 
events is likely to put human inhabited coral atoll islands at risk of climate change. This 
poses a risk to the inhabitants of the islands by challenging their national sovereignty. The 
threshold may be recognised when international migration from the atolls reaches a certain 
‘dangerous’ level.  
 
There are a number of inherent difficulties when using impact metrics. The impact metric 
provides only the catalyst for an exploration of what is considered ‘dangerous’ climate 
change. For example, with respect to water availability (from Parry et al., 2001) questions 
arise such as: how large must a region be before a water deficit “counts”? How do multiple 
but less severe water deficits rate against each other? How does a water deficit risk stand in 
relation to the examined population’s vulnerability? And importantly, are the impact 
metrics weighted so they can be compared? (Oppenheimer, 2005). An inherent difficulty 
with using impact metrics is simplification of the real-world situation, occurring even from 
the outset when deciding on the individual metrics to be used. Therefore, whilst impact 
metrics provide a useful method of exploring ‘dangerous climate change’, the negotiation 
of a definition of ‘danger’ still requires recognition that the process involves value 
judgements, as other embedded values are lost. 
 
The literature reviewed above suggests that ‘dangerous’ climate change can never be 
categorically defined. Thus, the process of negotiation is more important than the 
definition itself. If this is the case, then leaving ‘dangerous’ as a placeholder in the 
UNFCCC negotiations was a politic move designed to encourage space for dialogue and 
negotiation rather than to produce a definitive classification of the term. Any negotiation of 
‘dangerous climate change’ will need to account for a balance between different types of 
danger (Ott et al., 2004). For example, a danger to the climate may be offset by reducing 
emissions, but in the short term, this may lead to an economic threat. Parry et al. (2001) 
wrote that economic threats might be more politically accepted should one know the 
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potential climatic threat that would be avoided, in order to calculate the ‘pay off’. The 
Stern Review (2006) explored this, investigating the economics of climate change for the 
UK and calculating the cost for inaction. Yet the Stern Review has not galvanised action 
on climate change, despite the Review’s conclusion that inaction is more costly than action 
on climate change. Impact metrics provide a more explorative method of investigation, but 
may fall short of engaging perceived or internal definitions of risk. It is suggested here that 
this is due to a lack of holistic understanding of what individuals consider ‘dangerous’. 
Instead of purely natural scientific, or risk-based criteria, a post-normal approach is needed 
which would allow different social, cultural, institutional and contextual interpretations of 
‘dangerous’ climate change to be considered.  
 
From this point, the term ‘dangerous’ climate change is not used explicitly. However, the 
notion of ‘dangerous’ climate change is used implicitly as a frame around which the review 
of public engagement with climate change is based. The next Section considers 
individuals’ conceptualisation of climate change, and the tools and agents which influence 
an individuals’ engagement with the issue. 
 
 
2.2   TOOLS AND AGENTS FOR ENGAGING INDIVIDUALS WITH CLIMATE 
 CHANGE 
 
2.2.1 Tools for engaging individuals with climate change 
Four tools which have been used in the communication of climate change are examined 
here: imagery, narratives, probabilities and scenarios. Images and narratives are argued to 
have a powerful impact on the experiential processing system as they are emotionally 
engaging and represent events in a similar manner to how they are experienced in everyday 
life (Epstein, 1994). Probabilities and scenarios are the communications tools typical of the 
communication of climate science. The four approaches are investigated with respect to 
their impact on the non-expert’s conceptualisation of climate change.  
 
2.2.1.1   Imagery 
The advantages of using images are documented by Nicholson-Cole (2004). Imagery is 
eye-catching, and may provoke an emotional response. Images are easier to remember than 
text, and can condense complex information into a simple format. For example, global 
temperature changes can be easily signified through a coloured map, with red indicating 
hotter and blue, cooler temperatures. Images avoid the need for scientific jargon and expert 
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language often associated with climate change (Leggett and Finlay, 2001). Imagery can 
still be used as a communications device when there are difficulties with literacy or 
language barriers exist (Nicholson-Cole, 2004). Using imagery for climate change 
communication has a long history. Early in the 20th Century, palm trees juxtaposed onto 
glacial scenes were used to provide a dramatic illustration of climate change (Bronnimann, 
2002). Most forms of mass communication are now saturated with images (Deacon et al., 
1999).  
  
Climate change imagery is often intended to provoke an emotional response such as fear or 
dread. Alarmist climate change imagery was a central part of the pictography used for the 
Green Party in their 2005 election campaign. A pamphlet for the Norwich area showed a 
flooded local street, whilst the caption read: ‘Want urgent action on climate change?’ 
(Ramsay, 2005). This message was reinforced in national level campaigning, where a 
pamphlet showed ‘the British Isle’ [sic] with Ireland completely inundated and a much 
flooded coastline around Britain. The text read: 'sea levels are predicted to rise at 
alarming rates due to global warming'  (Wootton, 2005).  
 
As discussed in 2.1.1.1, environmental NGOs frequently use alarmist imagery. Doyle 
(2007) notes that since 2002, two distinct campaign strategies can be identified from 
Greenpeace’s climate change literature. The first utilises imagery of glacial habitats and 
their vulnerability to climate change, whereas the second promotes renewable energy by 
focusing on local or national level imagery of flooding and heat waves. Doyle argues that 
despite these two different threads, glacial images have come to dominate the symbolic 
imagery of climate change. This dichotomy of glacial, distant and alarmist imagery set 
against positive, local and solutions-led imagery may undermine Greenpeace’s efforts to 
communicate effectively with the public. Similarly, the media also favour alarmist climate 
imagery despite the lack of saliency that this imagery lends to the climate narrative. Media 
interest tends to focus on the photogenic (Yearly, 1996). An example of this is provided by 
imagery of polar bears which have been viewed as the ‘poster boys of global warming’ 
(Garfield, 2007).  
 
Catastrophic images of climate change have become common. Weingart et al., (2000) 
demonstrate that the image of the half-submerged Cologne cathedral has become iconic of 
the threat of climate change in Germany. This scenario is very unlikely under the 
timescales the public can conceptualise. Baldwin and Charter (2005: p 9) argue that 
imagery of glaciers melting or sea levels rising are “about as interesting as watching paint 
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dry”, indicating a lack of saliency when using these images for communication with the 
public. Baldwin and Charter suggest imagery of famine and disaster carry far more impact. 
However, as is argued in Chapter 3, these groups of images are also likely to lower 
saliency, by increasing a feeling of alienation from climate change. 
 
Nicholson-Cole (2004) investigated the types of images that promoted feelings of saliency 
and efficacy. Her results mirror that of Macnaghten (2003). Participants were found to 
have much to contribute to the mental imagery of climate change, yet most had little sense 
of personal salience or efficacy. The images that strongly communicated the importance of 
climate change were seen as disempowering. Images that encouraged action did not 
promote feelings of saliency. Macnaghten (2003) found pristine natural images such as 
whales and natural forest illustrated with captions such as 'it's in our hands’ produced an 
instant emotional response, but the feeling was largely superficial and did not lead to 
greater involvement with the issue. Nicholson-Cole (2004) argues that overexposure to 
emotional imagery such as this can lead to ‘issue fatigue’. Issue fatigue may not 
necessarily mean that people are tired with interacting with the material. Often, it is 
because of these emotional appeals that people feel a sense of powerlessness, and it is this 
which may cause disengagement. Nicholson-Cole found that the most empowering 
imagery was a combination of the images that promoted feelings of salience and efficacy.  
 
2.2.1.2   Narratives 
Narratives provide a powerful communication method, defined here as an account of a 
series of events or facts, given in order and with the establishing of connections between 
them, as in the form of a story (OED online, 2007). This Section focuses on written and 
spoken narratives.  
 
Much has been made of the film The Day After Tomorrow (Emmerich, 2004) as a vehicle 
for communicating climate change. For example, Friends of the Earth hoped it would 
‘create a sense of urgency to fight climate change in the real world’ (FoE, 2004). The 
narrative depicts an abrupt and catastrophic climatic change into an ice age, through the 
mechanism of Thermohaline Circulation shutdown. The plot focuses on the dramatic, even 
on the apocalyptic. Characters are forced to flee their homes in a fight for survival. Climate 
change as a dramatic vehicle for a narrative is also utilised in fiction. Floodland 
(Sedgwick, 2001) is a novel aimed at young teenagers. Teenage Zoe, abandoned by her 
parents, is left to survive amidst lawless chaos after a catastrophic sea level rise floods 
England. The narrative is bleak and the ending suggests society has broken down under 
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this particular vision of climate change. Ivan’s Appeal (Drury, 2007), a children’s book 
aimed at 8-11 year olds, follows a more positive story of Ivan the talking iceberg. Ivan 
successfully appeals to two children visiting Antarctica to change their lifestyles and 
convince wider society of the need for action on climate change.   
 
Lowe et al. (2006) examined how cinema-goers were impacted by The Day After 
Tomorrow. The public’s attitudes were affected, as viewers were significantly more 
concerned about climate change immediately after seeing the film. Yet, whilst anxiety 
increased, viewers’ beliefs in the likelihood of extreme events through climate change 
were reduced. Cinema-goers also experienced difficulty in distinguishing scientific facts 
from the dramatised science fiction narrative. This suggests that whilst disaster-focused 
climate narratives engage and concern the public on a superficial level, they may cause 
confusion between science fact and science fiction, and distance the public from a more 
meaningful engagement with the issue. 
 
The use of language is of great importance in narratives: 
 
5. 'The greenhouse effect, global warming, global climate change: the environmental phenomenon 
so important that it needs three names.'             (Trumbo and Shanahan 2000: p 199)  
 
Each description carries different associations. The ‘greenhouse effect’ and ‘global 
warming’ are powerful metaphors (Carvalho and Burgess, 2006). Whitmarsh (in press) 
carried out a public attitudes survey investigating flood risk. Half the sample used a 
questionnaire using the term ‘climate change’; the other half completed the survey with the 
term ‘global warming’. Significant qualitative and quantitative differences were found 
between the two samples, with more concern over ‘global warming’ worded surveys than 
‘climate change’. Importantly, a significantly higher proportion of respondents mentioned 
rising temperatures as a response to the survey worded ‘global warming’ than ‘climate 
change’ in Whitmarsh (in press). Public reaction to information worded ‘global warming’ 
rather than ‘climate change’ may also evoke a higher response rate. Whitmarsh also notes 
how although media coverage uses both terms, ‘global warming’ is most often used. This 
contrasts with the scientific and political communities, where ‘climate change’ is the 
preferred term. It should be recognised that the use of terminology is not neutral. The terms 
‘greenhouse effect’, ‘global warming’ and ‘climate change’ invoke different responses 
from individuals, and thus the terms should not be used indiscriminately.  
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The use of language in narratives is not restricted to naming of the overall issue: the same 
effect has been found when investigating the use of terms in sustainability studies. 
‘Alternative energies’ had negative implications, with an insinuation of opting out, and 
there was public mistrust of the term ‘sustainable’ (Leggett and Finlay, 2001). As has been 
discussed, narratives in the media and from environmental NGOs often focus on the use of 
dramatic words or phrases. For example, a month-long series of climate change 
programmes from the BBC termed the ‘Climate Chaos Season’ ostensibly was aiming to 
‘engage and inform viewers about climate change’ (BBC, 2006). However, it is argued 
here that these sorts of narratives do little to engage, and instead prevent the public from 
more meaningful engagement. It is imperative that these issues around narrative 
construction are recognised, and that narratives which promote a more salient involvement 
with climate change are used in their place. 
 
2.2.1.3   Probabilities 
Probabilities are defined as a numerical representation of the extent to which a particular 
event is likely to occur (OED online, 2007). Sarewitz et al., (2004) note how the provision 
of climate change probabilities could lead to more informed decision making. The non-
expert is increasingly provided with risk information presented in probabilistic terms. This 
implies that individuals actively receive risk information, and use a rational, logical system 
to discriminate between different risks. However, research indicates that risk is ‘socially 
constructed’ (Douglas, 1966). That is, how individuals perceive and respond to risk is due 
to personal interests, cultural and moral values, and social and institutional differences.  
Because of this transformation due to the social construction of risk, risk as expressed 
through a probabilistic framework will be interpreted differently by each individual.  
 
Using probabilities in climate change communication poses particular challenges. An 
individual’s assessment of risk will be subject to ‘heuristics’ or cognitive shortcuts used to 
process the risk information presented. These can introduce biases into the public’s 
assessment of risks, which then differ from official risk estimates (Whitmarsh et al., 2005). 
Heuristics can affect the types of risk that the public are prepared to accept, and those 
which are deemed unacceptable. The public tend to find risks that are involuntary and out 
of one’s own control more worrying and less acceptable. This may explain why individuals 
accept risks around smoking and driving, but are concerned about flood risks (Whitmarsh 
et al., 2005). 
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Individuals tend to under-estimate their chance of experiencing negative events. This 
phenomenon is known as the ‘availability heuristic’. If individuals regularly experience a 
beneficial risky activity without harm, such as driving without wearing a seatbelt, then this 
can act to reassure the individual, decreasing the perceived probability of harm. The 
probability of being injured in an accident whilst not wearing a seatbelt on one trip is very 
small. Whilst the probability remains so low, together with the availability heuristic 
mechanism, individuals may discount the risk entirely (Slovic et al., 1978).  
 
There is evidence that a significant proportion of people have difficulty understanding 
numerical risk (see Lipkus and Hollands, 1999). For example, Gigerenzer et al., (2005) 
found when asked what the simple probabilistic statement ‘a 30% chance of rain 
tomorrow’ meant, a majority of participants were incorrect. Cognitive biases and a lack of 
probabilistic understanding can also affect how an individual reacts to an opportunity to 
reduce numerical risk. For example, it may be more difficult to convince individuals of the 
worth of reducing one risk from 45% to 30%, than another risk reduction of 0.01% to 
0.005% (Patt and Schrag, 2003). Very small probabilities present other difficulties. 
Individuals are more sensitised to small changes in probability, such as the difference 
between 0 and 1 deaths, than larger changes further away e.g. the difference between 500 
and 600 deaths (Slovic et al., 2004).  
 
Scientifically accepted standards of probabilistic communication may not be of use when 
communicating with a lay audience. It can be difficult to communicate the probability of a 
1 in a 100 year flood, or what the differences in inundation between a 1 in 100 year and a 1 
in 20 year flood would be (Hulme, 2004). Conceptualisation of these types of probability 
may mean that non-experts assume the flood will not happen for 20 years, and will only 
happen once during that time.  
 
The language used to describe uncertainty can greatly influence the way risk information is 
conceptualised, particularly whether it is framed in either epistemic or stochastic terms 
(Dessai and Patt, 2005). When describing high frequency events, people offer probability 
estimates along the full interval from zero to one, whereas for epistemic uncertainty, risks 
are much more likely to be expressed as an estimate of 0.5, as in ‘a fifty-fifty chance’ 
(Bruine de Bruin et al., 2000). An attempt to provide a useful communication method 
using probabilities has been developed by the IPCC (IPCC 2001, 2007b). A Table is 
provided in each report which specifically links probabilistic language (e.g. ‘very likely’) 
with a numeric probability of occurrence (e.g. more than 90%). This allows readers to 
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choose the scale, numeric- or language-based which they prefer, whilst providing a 
reference for distinguishing risk probabilities in both methods. 
 
The manner in which probabilities are phrased can also act to increase or decrease concern. 
Slovic et al. (2004) asked two groups of people to assess the attractiveness of purchasing 
new equipment to aid in the crash landing of an aeroplane. One group was told that the 
new equipment would save 150 lives, the other were told that it would save 98% of 150 
lives. Though the first option saves more lives, support was higher for the second option. 
Slovic et al. concluded that this is because saving such a high percentage of something is 
clearly very good, whereas saving 150 lives is diffusely good, and hence only weakly 
evaluable. 
 
An examination of the difficulties of using probabilities when communicating climate 
change to the non-expert may suggest it wise not to use probabilistic information at all. 
Yet, the public may distrust a lack of probabilistic information. Whilst studies such as Stott 
et al. (2004) have attributed a very likely human influence at least doubling the risk to a 
heat wave such as that in Europe 2003, probabilities cannot be attributed to particular 
weather events. The Sun newspaper (The Sun Online, 2007) attempted to attribute a month 
of exceptionally heavy and prolonged rainfall to climate change when interviewing a 
climate scientist. The scientist noted that it is impossible to attribute global warming to 
specific events. Whilst this is common practice in scientific discourse, it can cause 
communication difficulties with the public. Public comments posted online after this 
newspaper article suggested that scientists were too arrogant to state that they didn’t know 
the probabilistic basis for the suggestion. 
 
Whilst new methods for communicating climatic probabilistic information such as 
Probability Density Functions (IPCC, 2007b) are being developed, these are of limited use 
for communicating with the public. Quantitative probabilities are used in climate 
communication as it is believed they provide more precise, useful information to the public 
that qualitative risk statements (Gigerenzer et al., 2005). This is only the case when 
probabilistic information is carefully considered. Presenting probabilities as the chance of 
occurrence experienced over a long time period may help trigger concern (Slovic et al., 
1978). Additionally, probabilities need to be ‘infused with affect’: i.e., probabilities need to 
be given emotional meaning, or the public may not act upon even the simplest probabilistic 
information (Slovic et al., 2004). Lastly, the influence of common heuristics must be taken 
into account when using probabilities for communicating climate change. 
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2.2.1.4   Scenarios 
A ‘scenario’ may be defined as an outline or description of an imagined situation or 
sequence of events (OED online, 2007). A ‘climate scenario’ is more thoroughly defined 
as: 
 
6. “A plausible and often simplified representation of the future climate, based on an internally 
consistent set of climatologically relationships, that has been constructed for explicit use in 
investigating the potential consequences of anthropogenic climate change’ 
7.                                                                                                                     (IPCC, 2007c: p 872) 
 
A ‘climate change scenario’ is thus the difference between a climate scenario and the 
current climate. Most climate change scenarios combine elements of both a qualitative 
storyline and quantitative modelling (Doll 2004). They provide a top-down, linear 
approach (Dessai and Hulme, 2004) to communication. Groups of scenarios are often used 
to explore a range of possible climate futures. 
 
There are four possible ways to construct future climate scenarios (Carter et al., 1994): 
 
1. Spatial analogues  
2. Historical analogues 
3. Incremental changes 
4. Quantitative scientific modelling 
 
Spatial analogues involve comparing a present-day climatic regime to another and through 
this constructing a possible future climate scenario, such as comparing the future climate of 
London to present-day Bordeaux. Historical analogues work in much the same way. 
Instead of spatial comparisons, inferences are made to climate regimes from the past, say 
comparing the global mean temperature of the present Holocene interglacial to the last 
interglacial, the Eemian (e.g. Imbrie and Imbrie, 1979). The third method involves 
exploring the impact of incremental changes on the climate regime. This can be examined 
through sensitivity analysis and by investigating different thresholds. Quantitative 
scientific modelling comprises several methods for exploring different forcing conditions 
including using General Circulation Models (GCMs) and regional modelling, downscaling 
and weather generated models.  
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Spatial analogues can be weak as many other factors may play a part in creating the 
climatic conditions, and physical and cultural connotations, experienced at a particular site. 
It is also difficult to find a historical period which provides a meaningful analogue for 
another. If analogues are carefully made they may be of some use in the communication of 
potential climate futures to the public. Hallegatte et al., (2007) used several well-defined 
temperature and precipitation criteria to search for analogues to 17 European cities. They 
selected the scenarios from two climate models. Analogues, such as the comparison 
between present-day northern coastal Portugal and London, were designed to be used as a 
‘heuristic tool’ to investigate adaptation to climate change. It does still presents a 
simplification of the impacts of climate change: the UK public may notionally welcome 
the prospect of the Portuguese climate, for example, but this may be countered if 
information is also provided on the costs for adaptation. Whatever additional information 
is provided though, this approach is considered of limited use as it heavily discounts the 
relationship between climate and culture.  
 
The Special Report on Emission Scenarios (SRES) (Nakicenovic et al., 2000) were 
designed to inform climate policy through the provision of emissions scenarios. Each 
scenario provides a study of a particular set of forcing conditions and their possible effect 
upon future climate (Hulme et al., 2002). The SRES develop along four pathways, or 
‘families’ with the scenario development dependant upon the inputs of demographic, 
social, economic, technological, and environmental factors (Nakicenovic et al., 2000). 
Within each family, there are a variety of different emission scenarios. The SRES 
storylines were designed to represent very different socio-economic and environmental 
attitudes (Viner and Turnpenny, 2002). Feedbacks or extreme events are not accounted for 
in the storylines. Because of the different demographic, social, economic, technological, 
and environmental factored into each scenario, policymakers can more fully explore the 
impacts a future policy may have. The scenarios were purposely designed to be ‘agnostic’. 
No probabilities are attached to the different scenarios; scenario A1 is simply the ‘first 
among equals’ (Nakicenovic et al., 2000).  
 
The IPCC justify the use of the SRES as providing an exploration of potential future 
climates which are easily understood by non-experts. As stated, the purpose of the SRES 
was to inform policy, rather than to inform the public. Whilst the SRES provide a well 
developed example of scenarios as a communication tool, it is argued that the SRES 
themselves do not provide an easily understood communication method for the public. 
There is some superficial attraction in the analogue approach taken by Hallegatte et al. 
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(2007), although as noted, this approach also has inherent difficulties. Providing the 
implication of these factors are carefully considered for communication, scenarios can 
provide a more scientifically robust method for imagining future climate change then 
narratives or imagery and may provide an important tool for exploring decision-taking 
(Hulme, 2004), but remain of limited use for engaging individuals with climate change.  
 
2.2.2 Agents engaging individuals with climate change 
This last Section examines why different agents are involved with the climate change 
issue, how they mediate the climate discourse, and how the public responds to the 
information they provide. There are many agents involved in influencing the public 
perception of climate change, whether this act of communication is undertaken knowingly 
or not. This Section focuses on five main agents: environmental Non-Governmental 
Organisations (NGOs), education, government, business, and the media. Environmental 
NGOs and the UK government have invested considerable resources in the communication 
of climate change, and climate change is now becoming a part of mainstream geography 
education. Businesses are increasingly seeing climate change as both a business risk, and a 
marketing opportunity. The media have a slightly different role. They interpret climate 
information provided by other sources, and reframe the discourse according to a particular 
world view; influencing citizens’ awareness, attitudes and actions towards climate change 
(Slovic, 2000).  
 
2.2.2.1   Environmental NGOs 
Environmental NGOs have played a significant role in the communication of climate 
change to the public. NGOs are in a privileged position for communicating climate change, 
as the public place more trust in NGO scientists than in either industry or government 
scientists (Farrow, 2000). Established NGOs such as Greenpeace, Friends of the Earth 
(FoE) and the World Wide Fund for nature (WWF) have incorporated climate change into 
a central tenant of their campaigns. Greenpeace (2007) state they have: 
 
8. “identified global climate change as one of the greatest threats to the planet” 
 
WWF (2007) have stated that: 
 
9. “humanity is facing the biggest threat to our planet” 
 
and similarly, FoE (2005) call climate change the: 
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10. “single biggest environmental threat facing the planet” 
 
In common to all the established NGOs is the framing of climate change around the 
rhetoric of threat and implied global danger.  
 
Farrow (2000) reports of the past difficulty in engaging the public in climate change. She 
states that NGOs have had to relate climate change to the non-expert in order to promote 
engagement with the issue. However, there is a tendency for NGOs to continue with old-
style communication methods which have been previously found effective. For example, 
the FoE climate change homepage (FoE, 2005) has as its central image three people fleeing 
a falling timber house as it is swept away with the force of Hurricane Katrina. Mike Childs, 
the Campaign Director for FoE (pers. com. 2005) maintains that the public must be 
‘shocked’ into acting on climate change. However, as discussed by Moser and Dilling 
(2007) and in Section 5.4.1.1.3, such appeals are likely not lead to the intended behavioural 
or attitudinal change but to denial or apathy. 
 
Established NGOs attempt to motivate behaviour change through commitment changes, 
such as signing pledges to reduce energy usage. WWF (2007) states on its website:  
 
11. “make a commitment, sign a pledge” 
 
whilst FoE (2005) suggests energy saving solutions in  
 
12. ‘brainy ways to beat climate change’ 
 
These NGOs also encourage lobbying for political commitment. FoE (2005) state: 
 
13. “much can be done to stop catastrophic climate change but decisive action is needed from 
governments and industry now” 
 
FoE (2008) have also implemented ‘the big ask’ campaign. Whilst FoE recognise the UK 
as a frontrunner in implementing a climate change law with legal binding targets for 
reducing emissions, the big ask encourages individuals to add their voice to a campaign for 
a law that also includes emissions from aviation and shipping. They state that this would 
lead to a ‘ground-breaking […] fantastic climate law’. 
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In some cases, NGOs have been involved in corporate initiatives, such as the Ben and 
Jerry’s and WWF Climate College (Ben and Jerry’s, 2007) and the WWF and Marks and 
Spencer CO2 footprint calculator (WWF, 2007). 
 
From 2000 onwards, established environmental NGOs have been joined by one-issue 
climate change NGOs. These groups, such as Campaign Against Climate Change (CACC), 
Rising Tide and the coalition Stop Climate Chaos (SCC) often have a more radical agenda 
than the established NGOs. The rhetoric of fear is taken to the extreme, with stated aims 
such as (emphasis added): 
 
14. “push for the urgent and radical action we need to prevent the catastrophic destabilisation of 
global climate” (CaCC, 2007) 
 
15. ‘ [to] mobilise public concern, and through this the necessary political action, to stop climate 
chaos” (SCC, 2007)   
 
Action already taken on climate change is rejected by the climate change NGOs as 
inadequate. For example, Rising Tide argues that the Kyoto Protocol will fail as the 
emissions cuts are too low and market mechanisms are unable to support the change 
required. SCC state that through their campaign “nothing on this scale has been attempted 
before on climate change, but anything less is unlikely to be successful”. More marginal 
groups such as Rising Tide have also disregarded large corporate events which are 
supported by other NGOs e.g. Live Earth, for what it sees as a “fatal flaw”: recognising the 
issue, but then suggesting what it views as inappropriate mitigative actions such as 
technological change and carbon offsetting (Rising Tide, 2007). These newer groups 
endeavour to bring about action on climate change through more radical social change. 
They aim to mobilise public concern, through awareness raising and pushing for political 
action, often in the form of public protests.  
 
Common to many NGOs campaigning on climate change is a language of fear, and of 
urgency. Increasingly however, this approach is dismissed as unhelpful by climate 
communicators (see Futerra 2005: this issue is discussed in more detail in section 3.1.2). 
Farrow (2000) suggests that NGO members have become disillusioned with ‘doom 
scenarios’ and that NGO policies are becoming more pragmatic and less confrontational. 
Whilst this may be the case with the more established NGOs, this is not evident with the 
newer climate-orientated NGOs. Especially with newer NGOs, climate change may be 
viewed as an issue to be solved through a much wider and more radical social change, to 
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be achieved through awareness-raising in political protests. More established NGOs have 
supported corporate initiatives, which may act to raise the status of climate mitigation 
behaviours amongst non-experts. Such approaches may be disregarded as corporate 
greenwash by grassroots NGOs however 5. 
 
2.2.2.2   Education 
 
1. "It is inconceivable that young people growing up today should not be taught about issues like 
climate change: it has enormous relevance to their lives.” 
2. Alan Johnson, UK Education Secretary (quoted in Smith 2007)  
 
Climate change has now become part of the UK key stage 3 Geography National 
Curriculum (Smith 2007). Climate change narratives are also now appearing in young 
peoples short stories (Sedgwick, 2001; Drury, 2007). Factors such as these may become 
important in driving youth public perceptions of climate change.  
 
The importance of young people in influencing perceptions of climate change is recognised 
by the UK government, with a copy of the film An Inconvenient Truth issued to each 
secondary school in England and Wales (DEFRA, 2007). Others have recognised the 
potential impact this film may have in changing young people’s perceptions, with a High 
Court review challenging the issuing of the film in process in the UK (BBC News Online, 
2007). It is evident that the film’s distributors also appear to value young people’s 
perception of climate change, investing resources in a free educational resource kit 
available to download from the film website (Paramount Pictures, 2007). 
 
Climate change is cited as young people’s biggest concern for the world’s future (DEFRA, 
2006a). With the growth of the internet, young people are able to make contact with a 
global community through networking websites such as Bebo, Facebook and YouTube6. 
Young people increasingly believe that they are part of a global community, which can 
decrease their isolation from global issues such as climate change (DEFRA, 2006a): 
perhaps in contrast to adults, who can find the global scale of the issue paralysing (Futerra, 
2006). If this is the case, engaging young people with climate change both personally and 
as influencers will become more important. 
 
                                                 
5
 Greenwash’ is defined as the selective disclosure of positive information about a company’s environmental 
performance, without a full disclosure of negative information on these dimensions (Lyon and Maxwell, 
2007). 
6
 Websites as follows: www.bebo.com, www.facebook.com and www.youtube.com   
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Education can also be less formalised than that received through schooling. For example, 
the Interdependence Day project (Smith, 2007) provoked individuals to acknowledge and 
respond to the ecological, economic and social interconnections in the world, and to think 
creatively about how the world could be in the future. The project aimed to invite new 
people into the conversation about issues such as climate change and poverty. Importantly, 
the project also aimed to ask new questions of individuals already familiar with such 
issues. 
 
2.2.2.3   Government 
The UK Government has cited climate change as a policy priority, as seen at the G8 and 
during the British presidency of the EU (Giles, 2004). However, whilst the Government is 
on track to meet international Kyoto greenhouse gas reduction targets (due in part to the 
‘dash for gas’ in the 1980s rather than Labour specific energy reduction policy 
achievements), Britain is very unlikely to make the domestic targets it has set (Maslin et 
al., 2007). The Labour government states it has: 
 
1. “displayed leadership at home and internationally, and has a track record of action, not just 
words” (Watt, 2007)  
 
This action on climate change is often framed in the context of energy rather than 
environmental issues: apparent from Labour’s website where climate change policy is 
outlined partnered in the context of energy concerns (see Watt, 2007). 
 
Climate change messages communicated through the government may be received rather 
sceptically by the public, especially with the growth of political ‘spin’ (Collins et al., 
2003). The UK public distrusts both the national government and the EU, and tends to 
think that government is not interested in the views they personally hold. The UK public 
also tend to agree that the government does not provide all the relevant information about 
climate change to the public (Poortinga and Pidgeon, 2003). This theme has been 
highlighted by a review of government communication of climate change (Futerra, 2005) 
where it is emphasised that government policy and communications on climate change 
must be consistent in order to be successful.  
 
The Government has traditionally held an information-provider role on the issue of climate 
change, such as attempting to reduce energy consumption through the advertisement series 
titled ‘Global warming: are you doing your bit?’ (DETR, 1999). However, this 
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‘information deficit’ model has been argued as inadequate for the communication of 
climate change (Moser, 2006), with such approaches unlikely to be successful unless 
paired with appropriate contextualised attitudinal change messages. Instead, interpretations 
of climate change are contextualised by societal values and personal experience (Lorenzoni 
et al., 2007). An indirect ‘influencing’ role is difficult for the Government to achieve 
(Collins et al., 2003), as it relies on a sophisticated understanding of these contextual 
values and experiences. Such viewpoints have shaped more recent climate communication 
campaigns funded by the Government, such as the ‘Tomorrow’s Climate, Today’s 
Challenge’ climate communication campaign (DEFRA 2007b). Central to this initiative is 
the £6 million ‘Climate Challenge Fund’. Individuals and groups could bid for funding 
from the Fund to carry out targeted, community-level climate engagement exercises. 
Importantly, the UK Government has attempted to minimise issues of trust, by funding 
localised peer-to-community communications projects instead of attempting to forge direct 
government-to-public communication channels. Also, the government in this case is not 
attempting to influence behaviour, but to achieve changes in public attitudes towards 
climate change.  
 
2.2.2.4   Business and advertising 
There has been movement within industry towards the issue of climate change. Whilst in 
the past climate change was seen as a threat, it is in many cases now seen as a business 
opportunity (Farrow, 2000), and even as a business priority (Barclays Bank PLC, 2007). 
Farrow argues that since British Petroleum and Shell announced increasing investment in 
renewables, the political atmosphere has changed and the business debate has been 
transformed. Indeed, in May 2005, business leaders from 13 major UK and international 
companies offered to support the government in drawing up new, longer term climate 
policies (The University of Cambridge Programme for Industry, 2005), creating political 
space on the issue.  By 2006, almost 80% of the FTSE 100 considered climate change to be 
a business issue (The Carbon Neutral Company et al., 2006). Marketing theory has also 
undergone change during the last twenty years from simple information provision towards 
focusing more on product ‘brand’, and on the need to create an identity that resonates with 
the consumer (Collins et al., 2003). The change in attitude towards climate change in both 
the business and advertising spheres has implications for the public perception of climate 
change.  
 
The public trust in climate change information from business sources is low. Ninety 
percent of UK and US consumers are unsure about business claims on climate change, and 
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have concerns over greenwash, and 70% of US and UK consumers want climate change 
claims to be independently verified (AccountAbility and Consumers International, 2007). 
A majority of the UK public also distrust scientists working for private businesses 
(Hargreaves et al., 2003). 
 
Governmental regulation goes some way to reducing business emissions, such as the 
Integrated Pollution Prevention and Control framework, which aims to minimise pollution 
from industrial sources across a variety of sources. Increasingly though, businesses are 
aware of the value of communicating their own environmental credentials. Consumers are 
becoming more demanding of the products and services they purchase with regard to 
ethical issues. As this demand increases, it becomes more important for businesses to 
develop products and services in a low carbon way: in a manner ‘that delivers value to 
both society and the business’ (British Telecommunications PLC, 2007). Public 
perceptions of businesses action on climate change is likely to be influenced by this: 
businesses are unlikely to undertake change unless they will see some benefit: either in 
terms of increased product awareness, or through tangible business benefits. For example, 
Richard Branson has received both positive publicity for pledging $3 billion over the next 
ten years to “combat global warming” (e.g. Daily Mail Online, 2006) and a new business 
venture, as this investment will be channelled into a new company, Virgin Fuels, 
developing biofuel. 
 
Business may attempt to state altruistic justifications for action on climate change:  
 
2. “My test is that our children should look back at what I and Barclays did [and say we] ‘really 
made a positive difference’” John Varley, Group Chief Executive (Barclays Bank PLC, 2007) 
 
However, as outlined above, the public have concerns over business greenwash, and so 
may be unlikely to respond positively to statements such as these from a corporate source. 
Some businesses have attempted to address public concerns over greenwash, such as 
Marks and Spencer PLC with its stated targets incorporating climate neutrality, zero-
landfill and ethical trading. The company makes clear:  
 
3. “we're doing this because it's what you want us to do. It's also the right thing to do.” (Marks 
and Spencer PLC 2007, emphasis added).  
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Marks and Spencer PLC have attempted to increase brand value over competitors who 
have not stated similar policies:  
 
4. “we're calling it Plan A because we believe it's now the only way to do business. There is no 
Plan B.” (emphasis added) 
 
It is interesting to note the language of decisive action in the second sentence. Proctor and 
Gamble have attempted to add ‘ethical’ value to their Ariel brand through their advertising 
encouraging consumers to: 
 
5. “do a good turn to 30°, and reduce your energy use by up to 40%” (Procter and Gamble, 2007)  
 
whilst still receiving the same results from using their washing products.  
 
Advertisements are as much as about what is not said than what is actually represented 
(Williamson, 1992). In the Ariel advertisement, there is an underlying association between 
the imagery of the cool, white icebergs and the association of clean washing at lower 
temperatures (and of course with melting sea ice under climate change): perhaps an image 
more likely to engage than the website video imagery depicting enzymes working at lower 
temperatures in a washing machine. Indeed, advertisements may completely avoid stating 
obvious climate messages, and instead subvert the rhetoric towards an ironic reading of the 
issue: often for the aim of promoting greater consumption (Linder, 2004). To date, this 
discourse, coined ‘British comic nihilism’ by Ereaut and Segnit (2006) is only found only 
in middle-class press and radio. 
 
If brand value does increase as a result of including climate change messages, other 
businesses are likely to follow this lead. In doing so, businesses are likely to increase the 
public awareness of climate change. It will be interesting to see how an increasing 
discourse around climate change originating in the business and advertising spheres 
impacts on public conceptualisation of climate change: whether an increase in the  
acceptance of climate change occurs due to increasing exposure to the issue, or if an 
increasingly brand-aware public is more sceptical of such approaches.  
 
 
2.2.2.5  Media 
The complex nature of climate change allows the media opportunities to heavily influence 
public perceptions of the issue: Carvalho and Burgess (2006) referred to the media as the 
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‘map makers of the 21st century’. The media are reflexive, both in shaping public opinion, 
and being in turn influenced by it. The contextual framing of climate change differs 
between media sources and across time. In the US print media between 1987 and 1990, 
there was an overwhelming frame of using technology to ‘fix’ the problem (Wilkins, 
1993), whereas the UK print media between 1997 to 2003 saw a framing through which 
the dangers of climate change were realised in particular geographical places and events 
(Carvalho and Burgess, 2006). The media discourse is largely shaped by the agency of top 
political figures and by the ideological standpoints of the medium concerned (Carvalho and 
Burgess, 2006). 
  
The majority of the public claim they distrust scientific information received from the 
media (Hargreaves et al., 2003). Whitmarsh (in press) found a significant proportion of 
participants agreed that the media was often too alarmist about issues like climate change. 
However, this scepticism is not clear cut. The public still tend to trust the media that they 
personally use (Hargreaves and Thomas, 2002). The media can influence both how 
informed, and how concerned the consumer of that medium is. Generally, the media 
appears to make a positive contribution to the public understanding of climate change, 
although it can also aid in perpetuating popular misconceptions (Stamm et al., 2000). An 
increase in climate change coverage by newspapers has been found to be correlated to how 
concerned its readers become (2003). There are ebbs and flows within climate change 
reporting, with peaks in UK and US reporting in  1988, 1997, and 2006-7. A dramatic 
increase in reporting of climate issues occurred in both the US and UK between 2006-7 
(Boykoff, 2007). 
 
The media has been blamed for inaccuracies, bias, sensationalisation (Carvalho and 
Burgess, 2006) and under-reporting of climate change (Brown and McDonald, 2000). 
Journalistic best practice can influence how issues are handled and presented. 
Documentary and news formats encourage a balanced presentation between two opposing 
‘sides’. Because of this, competing views which scientists may view as very unequally 
matched may be presented as views with a similar balance of merit (Yearly, 1996). This 
has contributed to accusations of bias in climate change reporting. For example, Boykoff 
and Boykoff (2004) found there existed a significant divergence of popular discourse from 
scientific discourse in the US prestige press because of the rigid following of these 
journalistic norms. Farrow (2000: p 196) notes: 
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6. 'For a time, an important time in the climate negotiations - more than 2000 scientists had a 
smaller voice than the 15 paid for by the oil lobby!’ 
 
The media has also been criticised for the sensationalism surrounding climate change 
(Ereaut and Segnit, 2006). Specifically, the media has been criticised around the reporting 
of the results of the Climateprediction.net experiment. The media was provided with a 
press release that mentioned the upper global mean temperature change as 11°C: the 
ensuing headlines were all ‘predictably apocalyptic’, focusing on this upper limit (Cox and 
Valdon, 2005). Ereaut and Segnit (2006) have termed the sensationalisation of climate 
reporting as 'climate porn', and warn against its use in engaging the public with climate 
change. It has been argued that some newspapers take an alarmist line on climate change 
because of commercial motives (bad news sells) rather than ideology: a claim strongly 
denied by The Independent, who stress their commitment to behavioural change reporting 
as well as more ‘alarmist’ coverage of climate issues (Black, 2006).  
 
There is now developing an ironic take on the reporting of sensationalised climate issues. 
Instead of sensationalising climate change as an apocalyptic vision (e.g. Arlidge, 1999; 
Buncome & Carrell, 2005), climate change is presented as a conspiracy theory, thoroughly 
‘debunked’ by the reporter (Murray, 2004). Scientists adhering to scientific norms such as 
the precautionary principle can find their views unintentionally edited to those of a climate 
change sceptic. This style of reporting could be very important in shaping the views of the 
public: when what is seen as ‘sound science’ is presented to the audience, the public may 
use it as a reason for inaction, or disengage with the debate altogether. The public and 
institutional response to the documentary ‘The Great Global Warming Swindle’ (Durkin, 
2007) screened in March 2007, demonstrated this clearly. Several prominent UK 
organisations saw a need to provide an online response to the documentary, such as 
DEFRA (e.g. see Milliband, 2007) and the Royal Society (Rees, 2007), whilst one of the 
scientists involved in the programme later wrote ‘I should never have trusted Channel 4’ 
(Wunsch, 2007). 
 
Whilst in some cases the media provides a public service through information provision, 
the media also have their own demands to publish particular themes and narratives (Yearly, 
1996). Narratives concerning abstract global issues are increasingly hard to publish - ‘the 
key is to keep the human interest in order to write about issues’ in order for an article’s 
editorial acceptance (Brown and McDonald, 2000). This may mean that particular issues – 
those with a human angle, or a photogenic species, are highlighted; and other, less 
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editorially amenable, issues are not addressed. Narratives also have to vie for attention 
with other news stories, becoming sidelined if they are not deemed sufficiently 
newsworthy (see for example, the time taken to print for an article on the environmental 
consequences of the Kosovan War in Brown and McDonald, 2000). Few news reporters 
have a scientific background, and there is a routine under-reporting of environmental 
narratives in the media (Smith, 2000). However, Smith states that this under-reporting 
should not necessarily be blamed on the media. Political friction often stifles 
environmental debate, particularly at election time. Climate change reportage may also be 
influenced by other factors such as the weather: there is some evidence that local 
temperature affects the frequency of such features (Shanahan and Good, 2000).  
 
An interesting emerging academic review centres on the role of celebrities as agents for the 
issue of climate change. Boykoff (2007) discusses how an issue can wind its way to the top 
of the media’s agenda, reaching ‘celebrity status’ as a social problem. Through the media, 
celebrities can act to normalise particular attitudes or behaviours towards climate change. 
For example, Leonardo DiCaprio is seen as one of the most visible advocates of the Toyota 
Prius hybrid car (Forbes, 2007), acting as an agent for change by influencing particular 
social norms of consumption and the environment. 
 
2.3   CONCLUSIONS 
There currently exists a lack of holistic individual-level understandings of ‘danger’. 
Current definitions of danger do not allow for, or do not account for, different perceptions 
or values within the issue of climate change. This thesis argues for a post-normal approach 
to defining danger: where social, cultural, institutional and contextual interpretations can 
be taken into account. The tools and agents which mould public perceptions of climate 
change were then examined. Many different agents are involved in the communication of 
climate change. Each agent uses a variety of tools to communicate with their target 
audience. The next Chapter examines public engagement with climate change in more 
detail, assessing the social psychological literature on attitudes and behaviour. The barriers 
to effective engagement and theoretical models for understanding behavioural change are 
considered. An approach is then suggested which addresses some of the individual-level 
barriers to engagement, and allows for a more holistic individual-level conceptualisation of 
climate change than the approaches presented thus far. 
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CHAPTER 3: 
EXPLORING ENGAGMENT WITH CLIMATE CHANGE 
 
 
As stated in Chapter 1, in order to meet the UK Government’s 60% greenhouse gas 
emissions reduction target, there is a need for non-experts to be meaningfully engaged with 
climate change in order to begin to undertake decarbonisation behaviours. This Chapter 
investigates engagement with climate change: from general UK trends to individual-level 
and societal barriers to engagement. Engagement is defined here (as Chapter 3) as an 
individual’s state regarding the three inter-related and co-dependent facets of cognition, 
affect and behaviour (c.f. Lorenzoni et al. 2007). The Chapter finishes by proposing an 
‘iconic’ approach to engaging individuals with climate change in order to decrease some of 
the individual-level barriers to engagement with climate change.  
 
 
3.1   PUBLIC ENGAGMENT WITH CLIMATE CHANGE 
Many US and UK studies have focussed on revealing what the layperson knows about the 
issue of climate change, ranging in scale from over a thousand risk-orientated mail surveys 
(Fisher et al., 1999) to small-scale, in-depth focus groups (Nicholson-Cole 2004a). A 
majority of the UK public recognise the main causes of climate change and say that they 
are concerned about it as an issue (DEFRA, 2007). There is widespread awareness of 
climate change, with 99% of the public recognising the term ‘climate change’ (DEFRA, 
2007). Yet, the public has serious misunderstandings about climate change (Trumbo & 
Shanahan, 2000). When compared to other risk issues, climate change is of low priority 
(Poortinga & Pidgeon, 2003): this is the case even when compared to other environmental 
issues (DEFRA, 2007). Only a minority of the public translates their concern about climate 
change into taking measures to reduce their own energy consumption (DEFRA, 2007; 
Norton & Leaman, 2004) Additionally, whilst awareness of climate change may be high, 
awareness of the international framework for action is low (Norton & Leaman, 2004). 
 
Lorenzoni et al. (2007) conclude that it is not enough for individuals to know about climate 
change. In order to be meaningfully engaged on the issue, the public needs to care about it, 
be motivated and be able to take action. Mitigation policies are unlikely to succeed unless 
there is a widely held feeling that climate change is a personally relevant and salient issue, 
and that individual actions can make a difference to the climate future (Nicholson-Cole, 
2004a). Moser and Dilling (2004: p 43) call for: 
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1. ‘believable, positive, open-ended, problem-solving and meaning-giving visions […] to offer a 
lasting motivation to participate in conversation and partake in communal action’. 
 
for effective climate communication. Developing constructive visions is seen as key to 
engaging the UK public (Futerra, 2005).  
 
 
3.2   BARRIERS TO EFFECTIVE ENGAGMENT 
Hobson (2003) describes the ‘plethora of barriers to action’ which act to stop individuals 
from engaging with climate change. These barriers range from individual circumstances to 
adherence to public norms and structures. Lorenzoni et al. (2007) elaborate that past 
behaviour, knowledge, emotions, social networks, trust issues and demographic 
background can all present barriers to engagement and influence an individual’s 
connection with climate change.  
 
Moser and Dilling (2004) identified five potential barriers to meaningful climate change 
engagement with the public (Box 3.1). Although this is a US-based critique, engaging the 
UK public in climate dialogue encounters similar difficulties. 
 
 
 
Box 3.1. Barriers to engaging the (US) public in climate change dialogue 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
• The creeping nature of climate change 
• Complexity and uncertainty 
• System lags 
• Human perception limits 
• Communication failures on the part of scientists 
 
    
 
(Moser & Dilling, 2004: p 34-36)  
 
 
 
Whilst the creeping nature of climate change and system lags are inherent difficulties of 
engaging individuals with a macro-environmental issue such as climate change, there are 
methods of minimising the problems these may present. A successful engagement 
approach can address the difficulties in human perception limits, and can restrict the 
perceived complexity and uncertainty associated with the issue. 
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Lorenzoni and Pidgeon (2005) state that climate change is not a problem viewed in 
isolation by individuals, but is instead contextualised in the reality of their lives. This 
contextualisation in everyday reality may reveal barriers to engagement. Barriers to 
engagement can be divided into two types, external and internal (Ajzen, 1985). External 
barriers consist of those relating to time and opportunities for change, and dependence on 
others in order to complete a particular behavioural change. Internal barriers incorporate 
the information, skills and abilities needed in order to enact change; and willpower, 
emotions and compulsions. Internal definitions also encompass the extent to which 
individuals perceive themselves, as opposed to environmental factors, controlling events in 
their lives. Section 3.2 investigates the perceived social, psychological and institutional 
barriers to change cognition, affect and behaviour which an individual may experience in 
regard to climate change.  
 
3.2.1   Psychological barriers 
The psychology of denial surrounding climate mitigation measures has been investigated 
by Stoll-Kleemann et al. (2001), who report that individuals implement psychological 
barriers in order to justify why they should not change their behaviour. Barriers such as 
blaming the inaction of other individuals and governments, doubts over the contribution of 
personal actions, and the costs of changing comfortable lifestyles were used as justification 
for inaction. Whilst participants may have been concerned about climate change, 
behavioural change was often not achieved because alternative options were seen as 
unacceptable.  
 
Psychological barriers to behavioural change also exist when individuals feel helpless or 
are not interested (Lorenzoni, 2003). Kaplan (2000) also suggests that feelings of 
helplessness or powerlessness will influence how likely an individual is to make 
behavioural changes. Other psychological barriers are individuals feeling they are the 
‘wrong type of person’ to carry out particular actions; or that it is not their responsibility to 
act, but instead the responsibility of business or governments (Blake, 1999). A lack of 
saliency may also be linked to the magnitude of the problem. The non-expert may expect 
the issue to be dealt with by the government: or else expect technology to fix the problem 
(Wilkins, 1993). 
 
Individuals may also not undertake behavioural changes because of scepticism in climate 
predictions. A news items interviewing participants living in Winterton-on-Sea, a coastal 
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village in the UK, found participants did not connect the cliffs experiencing serious coastal 
erosion with climate change:  
 
‘I'm not at all convinced the sea will continue to rise at this rate, and I'm sceptical about 
making decisions for the next 100 years when we don't know what'll happen next year’.  
           (Robin Chenery: quoted in Dear, 2005) 
 
Residents had not heard of the Kyoto Protocol, did not make any connection between 
energy use, climate change, sea level rise (SLR) and the erosion of their village, and 
thought the problem was not linked to any global environmental issue (Dear, 2005). 
Indeed, residents are in some sense correct: there are other factors which perhaps lead to 
erosion on the Norfolk coast but are unconnected with climate change (offshore dredging, 
for example). This example serves to highlight the complexities of engaging individuals 
with a macro environmental issue. 
 
Stehr and von Storch (1995) state that the physics of climate change is largely 
incomprehensible to non-experts, and that anticipated climatic changes occur on timescales 
much longer than the ‘time horizon of everyday life’. Individuals are able to distance 
themselves from climate change because it remains a psychologically ‘un-situated risk’ 
(Lorenzoni & Pidgeon, 2005). For engagement to be effective, climate change needs to be 
situated in knowable temporal and spatial dimensions, otherwise it can be relinquished to 
other places and future times.  
 
Mechanisms for psychological denial for action on climate change are investigated by 
Stoll-Kleemann et al. (2001). Denial barriers are created when individuals need to 
overcome the dissonance of their attitude towards climate change and the daunting 
prospect of making meaningful behavioural changes (Stoll-Kleemann et al. 2001). The 
attitude may be changed by displacing the responsibility for change or rejection of blame 
(Lorenzoni 2003; Stoll-Kleemann et al. 2001). Box 3.2 outlines potential denial and 
displacement mechanisms. A reoccurring theme throughout this displacement processing is 
that of the ‘tragedy of the commons’7.  
 
 
 
                                                 
7
 The ‘tragedy of the commons’ (Hardin, 1968) refers to a situation where behaviour that makes sense from 
an individual point of view ultimately proves disastrous to society when repeated by enough individuals. In 
the case of environmental issues, each individual sees little harm in consuming the natural resource since it is 
so huge and their impact on it individually is so small (Gardner and Stern, 1996). 
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Box 3.2.   Nine methods of psychological denial for personal action on climate   
.                   change 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
• Metaphor of displaced commitment “I protect the environment in other ways” 
• To condemn the accuser                        “You have no right to challenge me” 
• Denial of responsibility       “I am not the main cause of this problem” 
• Rejection of blame       “I have done nothing so wrong as to be 
destructive” 
•  Ignorance “I simply don’t know the consequences of 
my actions” 
• Fabricated constraints  “There are too many impediments” 
• ‘After the flood’   “What is the future doing for me?” 
• Comfort  “It is too difficult for me to change my 
behaviour” 
 
• Powerlessness “I am only an inxnitesimal being in the 
order of things” 
 
    
 
(Stoll-Kleemann et al. 2001: p 112) 
 
 
If an individual is confronted with cognitive dissonance8 (for example, they profess to be 
concerned about climate change, yet still carry out carbon-intensive behaviour such as 
driving rather than using public transport) the individual is more likely to change their 
attitude than their actions (for example, would be more likely to justify driving by 
emphasising the disagreeable features of public transport than changing that behaviour in 
future) (Futerra, 2005).  
 
3.2.2   Social and institutional barriers 
Even if an individual is engaged in a psychologically meaningful way, the individual may 
not undertake a particular behaviour. Social networks and institutions can have a powerful 
hold on preventing such behaviours being enacted, regardless of intentions (Blake, 1999). 
For example, Nicholson-Cole (2004a) investigated the power of imagery to enhance 
participants’ engagement with climate change. Even when imagery was considered salient, 
individuals were unlikely to feel more than trivially engaged because of the perceived 
significant barriers to personal commitment. Bulkeley (2000) considers public 
understanding of climate change to be tied into more complicated questions of the 
relationship between society and nature. Hence, rather than communications simply 
investigating what is known, and then filling the knowledge gap with more climate change 
                                                 
8
 The discomfort experienced when there is a mismatch between attitude and behaviour is known as 
‘cognitive dissonance’ (Festinger, 1957). 
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science, engagement approaches should start to investigate what the social and institutional 
barriers to involvement are, and act to decrease these. 
 
The power of social networks to affect an engagement approach is demonstrated by Kurz 
et al. (2005), who investigated domestic water usage in maintaining the appearance of 
participants’ gardens in Perth, Australia. The participants reported a strong social 
obligation to maintain a high standard of appearance to uphold the aesthetic appeal of the 
suburb in which they lived. Participants justified their large water usage reporting that they 
did not want to upset the social status quo, despite a reported personal desire for a more 
environmentally sustainable approach to maintaining their gardens. Perceived institutional 
barriers can also have an impact on whether a behavioural change is enacted. Sarewitz 
(2004) argues that science is inherently and unavoidably becoming politicised in 
environmental enquiries. This can act to undermine public trust, and create a perceived 
barrier to change. Individuals may also perceive behavioural actions such as energy 
reduction as largely ineffective in the context of inertia from institutions such as businesses 
and government (Bulkeley, 2000). 
 
It has previously been considered that individuals with strong environmental concerns 
would be likely to translate this concern into behavioural change (Poortinga, 2002). 
However, even these individuals do not necessarily adapt their behaviour (Lorenzoni 2003; 
Stoll-Kleemann et al. 2001). Individuals are only likely to change their behaviour if the 
change is easy (Norton & Leaman, 2004), and are unlikely to take action if they feel their 
lifestyle is threatened (Lorenzoni, 2003).  
 
The potential impact of social and institutional barriers on a potential behavioural change 
(regardless of whether the underlying attitude may have changed, or how strongly these 
views are held) indicates that attitudinal engagement approaches should be supported by 
wider structural change in order to enable the public to successfully implement mitigative 
and adaptive behaviours in relation to climate change (Lorenzoni et al. 2007).  
 
 
3.3   MODELS FOR EXPLORING ATTITUDE-BEHAVIOUR CHANGE 
Attitude-behaviour change models are attempts to model and predict behavioural changes. 
The theories of reasoned action and of planned behaviour, the Attitude Behaviour 
Constraint model and the social practices approach are examined below in order to provide 
insights into effective engagement approaches.  
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3.3.1   The Theory of Reasoned Action 
The Theory of Reasoned Action (TRA) was developed by Ajzen and Fishbein (1980). The 
TRA is based on the assumption that individuals usually behave in a sensible manner: that 
they take account of available information and implicitly or explicitly consider the 
implications of their actions. The theory postulates that an individual’s intention to perform 
(or not to perform) a behaviour is the immediate determinant of that action (Ajzen, 1985). 
The TRA demonstrates how attitudes towards an issue may be mediated into behavioural 
intentions and behavioural change. The TRA takes into account individuals beliefs and 
value systems about the potential behavioural change, and also the beliefs about how 
others may view the potential behaviour. Although the TRA accounts for personal and 
societal attitudes towards a potential behaviour, these are associated in the literature with 
only negligible intention to act.  
 
 
Fig. 3.1   The Theory of Reasoned Action (adapted by Eiser, 1986) 
 
 
3.3.2   The Theory of Planned Behaviour and the value-action gap 
Ajzen (1985) expanded on the TRA with the Theory of Planned Behaviour (TPB). Ajzen 
recognised that factors such as external obstacles like time, opportunities or dependence on 
others, or personal limits such as a lack of willpower, could obstruct the relationship 
between intention and behaviour. Together, these factors are termed the perceived 
behavioural control (PBC). The TPB therefore postulates that individuals act in accordance 
with both their intentions and perceptions of control over a behaviour (Ajzen, 1985). Potter 
(1996) notes that within the TPB, an individual’s judgement about whether they are able to 
enact a particular behaviour takes priority over any intention they may have to enact that 
behaviour. He also notes that the influences between attitudes, subjective norms and 
perceived behavioural control can work in either direction (see Figure 3.2). 
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Fig. 3.2   Theory of Planned Behaviour (from Potter, 1996) 
 
The TPB can make impressive predictions of how people might act in situations such as 
voting polls and public health campaigns (Potter, 1996). However, the TPB may struggle 
to explain complex attitude-behaviour change around climate change. 
 
The TPB and TRA attempt to model the ‘value action gap’: the difference between what 
people say, and what people actually do (Blake, 1999). Blake explores the history of 
investigations into the value-action gap from the TRA and TPB. Blake argues that whilst 
attitude-behaviour models are becoming increasingly sophisticated by considering a more 
socially constructed nature of environmental values, this research still portrayed theories of 
behaviour based on individuals forming their attitudes and planning their behaviour based 
on a rational thought processing system. Instead, Blake asked respondents to identify the 
barriers or reasons which prevented them from carrying out particular environmental 
actions, despite a general concern for the environment. Three categories of barriers were 
coded from the responses arising from this barrier between concern and action. These were 
individuality, responsibility and practicality; confirming that psychological, institutional 
and social barriers all existed as barriers to behavioural change (Figure 3.3). 
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Figure 3.3    Barriers between environmental concern and action (Blake, 1999)  
 
 
3.3.3   The Social Practices Approach 
Understanding attitudes and behaviour continues to be researched through attitude research 
through the types of models discussed above. However, some have argued for a 
constructionist approach to exploring attitudes. Rather than seeing individuals as simply 
perceiving (or misperceiving) their social worlds it treats those worlds as socially 
constructed (Potter, 1996). The Social Practices Approach (SPA) developed by Spaargaren 
(2003) is one such approach. It is stated that the SPA offers an integrative model to analyse 
and understand environmentally sustainable behaviour. Spaargaren argues that the SPA 
(fig. 3.4) differs from attitude-behaviour models in three ways.  
 
 
Fig. 3.4   The Social Practice Approach (from Spaargaren, 2003) 
 
Firstly, at the centre of the SPA is the behavioural practice situated in time and space, 
rather than the unsituated individual attitude or norm. Secondly, the SPA does not focus on 
individual, isolated behavioural practices but instead looks at groups of actors who may 
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help the individual to enact behavioural change. Lastly, the SPA aims to provide power to 
individuals through providing both knowledge and the social structure in which to enact a 
behaviour (Spaargaren, 2003).  
 
It is stated that attitude-behaviour models are flawed, in that they suppose individual 
behaviour to be responsive to either social, economic or psychological stimuli (Shove, 
2003). Shove also maintains that attitude-behaviour models rely on the isolation and 
analysis of relative factors, and that they assume behaviour can be modified through 
information, incentives or education. Shove reflects that changing behaviour cannot be 
enacted through attitude-behaviour models or through finding particular ‘levers’ to pull; 
instead, behavioural change is enacted by challenging dominant ways of thinking about 
behaviour and lifestyle. 
 
The SPA itself also invokes criticism however. It can be viewed as ambiguous or too 
complex. Qualitative research utilising the SPA can also be seen as too open-ended to be 
reliable. Whilst the SPA criticises attitude-behaviour models for looking for that elusive 
‘lever’ to pull, the SPA itself does not offer a clear alternative. 
 
3.3.4   The Attitude Behaviour Constraint model 
This Chapter has explored two types of barriers to change: psychological (or individual) 
and societal (or social and institutional). Stern (2000) developed a model to integrate both 
types of barriers to environmental change. He terms what this thesis calls individual 
barriers as ‘attitudes’ and societal barriers as ‘external conditions’. Stern notes that when 
individuals have very positive attitudes, the individual is likely to carry out a pro-
environmental behaviour even when external conditions are also high. For example, an 
individual would probably recycle if they have very positive attitudes towards recycling 
even if carrying out the recycling behaviour was inconvenient to the individual (Figure 
3.5). Conversely, if societal conditions are high (for example, recycling was very 
convenient and it was the social norm to recycle), individuals are likely to recycle even if 
they personally hold a negative attitude towards recycling. 
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Figure 3.5   The Attitude-Behaviour-Constraint model for recycling behaviour 
(Jackson, 2005: based on Stern, 2000) 
 
The approach taken in this thesis is based on Stern’s ABC model. It is concluded that if 
personal attitudes towards climate change are increasingly positive, individuals will be 
more likely to carry out decarbonisation behaviours.  
 
 
3.4   IMPROVING CLIMATE ENGAGEMENT 
Within any engagement approach, particular methods and practices improve effectiveness. 
Many of these are based on overcoming known psychological or social barriers to change. 
These practices for improving effectiveness in climate engagement are expanded upon 
below.  
 
3.4.1 Knowing the audience 
Past climate engagement approaches have used mass communication methods, but have 
failed to communicate to specific audiences (Moser, 2006a). These sorts of approaches, 
may have provided information on the science and impacts of climate change, but have 
failed to engage the public in a more profound way and engage the public in a more 
meaningful dialogue (Moser, 2006a). Futerra (2005) call targeting information to particular 
audiences a ‘classic marketing rule’. Mass communication approaches attempt a ‘blanket’ 
style to communication, which is unlikely to engage meaningfully with individuals. One 
form of communication may be successful in motivating some sectors in the public, and 
yet not be effective with others. Nicholson-Cole (2004b: p 269) reports that, with climate 
imagery:  
 
2. ‘No single image will appeal to everyone and different messages and influences will be taken 
away, because of prior perceptions and expectations of climate change and the future’.  
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Whilst traditional communications approaches may have targeted specific demographic 
groupings, Ereaut and Segnit (2006: p 8) state that for effective communication on climate 
change targeting groups by shared values and behaviour can be more effective. These sorts 
of approaches can engender the desired attitudinal change by making the new attitude feel 
like ‘the kinds of things that people like “us” do’. 
 
For communications to be effective, communication approaches must be aware of the 
‘mental models9’ through which the audience conceptualises climate change. The causes, 
effects and solutions of climate change must be effectively linked (Moser & Dilling, 2004) 
so that the individual can enact useful change. Investigations of the layperson’s perception 
of climate change are likely to reveal great diversity, confusion, and often, ignorance (Vlek 
& Steg, 2004) Bostrom et al. (1994) investigated public understanding of climate change 
through mental model interviews with laypeople. They found that many participants 
confused stratospheric ozone depletion with the greenhouse effect and weather with 
climate. The 2002 British Social Attitudes Survey found that a majority of the UK public 
are unaware of the relationship between home energy use and climate change, and that ten 
percent of the UK public believe that mobile phones are a major cause of global warming 
(Park et al. 2002). Bord et al. (2000) found participants thought CFC aerosols were the 
major contributor to climate change. Many other participants in this study believed 
insecticides, nuclear power generation and depletion of ozone to be major contributors to 
climate change.  
 
Bord et al. (1998) argue that lay audiences may view climate change through a ‘general 
pollution model’ and thus may believe that if general pollution causes climate change, then 
good environmental pollution controls will prevent it. Failure to recognise, and to work 
with, these lay mental maps of climate conceptualisation (which differ significantly from 
the scientific expert mental models linking climate cause and effect) may lead to 
ineffective engagement approaches.  
 
3.4.2 Climate confusion 
Climate change is a highly complex, elusive and global hazard, making the issue difficult 
to understand, and difficult to communicate (Moser & Dilling, 2004). For each argument 
or perspective on climate change, there is one declaring its opposite: climate change 
discourse in the UK looks confusing, contradictory and chaotic (Ereaut & Segnit, 2006). 
                                                 
9
 A mental model has been defined as a ‘representation of knowledge’ (Niewöhner, 2001).  
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Scientists emphasise the complexities and uncertainties associated with climate change. 
Whilst this is accepted practice in academic publications, this way of framing climate 
change may be less appropriate for public communications, being viewed as uninteresting 
or esoteric (Moser & Dilling, 2004).  
 
More confusion arises due to the prominence gained by climate contrarians. Provocateurs 
such as Bjørn Lomborg have argued that resources used for tackling climate change could 
be better used elsewhere, on global problems such as poverty or AIDS (Lomborg, 2005). 
Media climate contrarians also add to the cynicism, with derisive narratives of climate 
change:  
 
3. The Vanishing Gulf Stream, Millions Dead of Malaria in the Midlands, the Parboiled Polar 
Bear…’               (Righter, 2005: p 35) 
 
 
Darley (2000) states that climate change is often reported as a balance between two equally 
opposing sides: those ‘pro’ and those ‘against’ the science of climate change. This 50/50 
split is commonly used as it provides a simple and editorially-accepted reporting procedure 
(Darley, 2000). This mechanism has been used despite the majority of scientific opinion 
resting towards one ‘side’ (Smith, 2000)10. This has been stated as ‘balance as bias’ by 
Boykoff (Boykoff & Boykoff, 2004). Boykoff (2004) maintains that the historical 
balancing of narratives for and against within the climate change issue is the result of 
journalistic norms. Moser and Dilling (2004) suggest dealing with contrarians by becoming 
familiar with contrarian tactics; by emphasising the value-laden debate that is climate 
change, instead of disguising it as ‘science’; and marginalising provocateurs by calling 
them their correct name – e.g. naysayers or doomsayers. 
 
Non-experts try to understand the confusing issue of climate change through their own 
mental model conceptualisation, although these may not adequately capture the complex 
relationships between causes, impacts and solutions. Engagement approaches can seek to 
influence the audience’s mental model framework in order to aid the audience in making 
sense of the issue (Moser & Dilling, 2004). Additionally, public-science initiatives on 
                                                 
10
 The media - notably in the UK, the BBC - appears to be addressing this somewhat, with the portrayal of 
climate change now occurring in a more considered way. See for example: 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/blogs/theeditors/2007/02/how_green_should_we_be.html [accessed Sept 2007], where 
Newsnight editors discuss in an online blog how climate sceptics are given an amount of airtime relative to 
their minority opinion. 
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climate change could be used so as to build greater public engagement and confidence in 
dealing with the conduct of climate change science (Abbasi, 2006). 
 
3.4.3 ‘Empty vessels’ 
Methods used to communicate climate change in the past have principally focussed on the 
‘deficit model’: assuming that participants take the given scientific information and 
rationally make a decision based on weighing up the risks involved (Office of Science and 
Technology & The Wellcome Trust, 2001). The deficit model views human thinking as 
analogous to erroneous information processing (Joffe, 2003). This approach implicitly 
assumes that the public does not act on climate change because they do not understand the 
issue (Lorenzoni et al. 2007). However, Collins et al. (2003) state that it is important not to 
overestimate the power of providing information. More information does not necessarily 
lead to more awareness, or increased awareness to behavioural change (Collins et al. 
2003). In fact, ‘science for science’s sake’ – increasing the presence of science related 
narratives in the media appears unlikely to generate engagement (Hargreaves et al. 2003).  
 
Engagement approaches are now beginning to recognise that the deficit model of 
engagement is outdated (Moser 2006a). Climate change is increasingly viewed as a risk 
that is ‘socially constructed’, i.e. affected not only by rational informational input, but by 
the individual’s worldview, beliefs and cultural situation (Wilsdon & Willis, 2004). An 
individual’s response to such a risk is a highly social, emotive and symbolic entity (Joffe, 
2003). An ‘engagement model’ involving two way dialogue between experts and non-
experts is deemed more appropriate than the deficit model (Office of Science and 
Technology & The Wellcome Trust, 2001).  
 
It is important to note that providing scientific information on climate change is not what is 
challenged here11 but that the notion of simply providing scientific information and 
expecting attitudinal change is disputed (Futerra, 2005). When provided, even the 
communication of scientific information itself has been subject to a number of pitfalls 
which should be addressed (Box 3.2). Engagement approaches require useful solution 
information, specific to the particular audience, rather than ‘an extended lesson in climate 
science’ (Moser, 2006a). Abbasi (2006) warns against the ‘yawn factor’: he argues that 
whilst scientific information is critical to telling the climate change story, it should be 
translated into an accessible or entertaining way for non-experts.  
                                                 
11
 For example, Bord et al. (2000) found that caring about the environment is not in itself enough for 
effecting change: knowledge of the causes and effects of climate change is needed too. 
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Box 3.3   Perceived individual barriers to engagement with climate change 
 
 
 
 
 
 
• Lack of knowledge about where to find information 
• Lack of desire to seek information 
• Perceived information overload 
• Confusion about conflicting evidence or partial evidence 
• Perceived lack of locally relevant information, for example about impacts or 
solutions 
• Format of information is inaccessible to non-experts 
• The source of information is not credible or trustworthy (particularly the media) 
• Confusion exists about the links between environmental issues and their 
respective solutions 
• Information conflicts with values or experience 
 
    
 
(Lorenzoni et al. 2007: p 450-451) 
 
 
 
 
3.4.4. Shock tactics 
There is an increasing trend to attempt to make climate change more salient by using 
threats such as fear and guilt as motivators (Moser & Dilling, 2004). For example, Pearce 
(2005: p 8) wrote in New Scientist: 
 
4. ‘Time is running out, and fast. Rising carbon dioxide levels and higher temperatures will soon 
set in motion potentially catastrophic changes that will take hundreds or even millions of years 
to reverse. […] Act now, before it is too late.’ 
 
Whilst some emphasise that fear is essential to create urgency, there is a growing literature 
that generalised appeals and a rhetoric of crisis can be counterproductive (Myers & 
Macnaghten, 1998) or even that it is not possible to provoke fear for an issue like climate 
change given the time lag until serious impacts are realised (Abbasi, 2006). Guilt appeals 
are used in a similar way. Macnaghten (2003) notes how these approaches do cause a 
fleeting sense of guilt, but how the appeals lack reach, and fail to engage on a meaningful 
level. 
 
The rhetoric of fear is widespread, found from broadsheets to tabloids, campaign literature 
to government initiatives (Ereaut & Segnit, 2006). The rhetoric used is extreme, has an 
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urgent tone, and implies death and doom through a language of acceleration and 
irreversibility (Ereaut & Segnit, 2006). Investigating the reporting of the IPCC Working 
Group I report, Hulme (2007a) found that the four UK prestige newspapers all ran front-
page headlines utilising a language of fear and anxiety. All UK newspapers examined used 
one or more of the adjectives ‘catastrophic’, ‘shocking’, ‘terrifying’ or ‘devastating’ within 
the narrative. Hulme (2007a) notes how none of these words came from the original IPCC 
report. However, individual scientists have used this language. In discussing the 
communication of climate change, Sir Crispin Tickell (2002) suggested that ‘perhaps a 
useful catastrophe or two’ would help illuminate the issue.  
 
Threats such as fear used as a motivator should be used with caution (Futerra, 2005) as 
these sorts of rhetoric are unlikely to lead to meaningful engagement. If fear is overused as 
a communication and motivation device, the audience is likely to avoid the approach 
because of its associated negative emotions of apprehension, feeling overwhelmed and 
feeling a lacking personal control of the situation (Moser, 2006a). It is likely the audience 
will avoid these negative emotions using denial, paralysis, apathy or even maladaptive 
responses as coping mechanisms (Moser & Dilling, 2007).  
 
3.4.5 Spatial and temporal dissonance 
Moser and Dilling (2004) discuss how human perception limits and priorities may mean 
that climate change does not rank highly as a personal concern. Although individuals 
consider climate change socially relevant, the consequences are seen as spatially and 
temporally distant; i.e. affecting other more vulnerable communities or future generations 
(Lorenzoni & Pidgeon, 2006). In the UK, 52% of people believe climate change will have 
‘little’ or ‘no effect’ on them personally (BBC News Online, 2004), whilst the Energy 
Savings Trust (2004) found that 85% of UK residents believe the impact of climate change 
will not be seen for decades. The impact of climate change in the UK is seen as far less 
alarming than the impacts in the third world (Hargreaves et al. 2003).  
 
Despite the warnings such as those from the Chief Scientific Advisor to the UK 
Government, Sir David King (2004) warning that ‘delaying action for decades, or even 
years, is not a serious option’ climate change remains a temporally distant risk. Drottz-
Sjöberg (2006) found that when thinking about the future, individuals tended to think about 
30 years ahead, and could conceive of emotional relationships stretching to maximum of 
around 60 years. Individuals found it difficult to imagine the future beyond this point: so it 
is perhaps unsurprising that climate change impacts over greater timescales than these 
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carry little saliency. Whilst climate change remains an un-situated risk, individuals will 
tend to psychologically distance themselves from the issue (Lorenzoni & Pidgeon, 2005). 
This may explain why even if the causes of climate change are correctly identified by 
individuals, the risks may still be seen as minimal (Bord et al. 2000).  
 
The literature increasingly demonstrates that local or regional examples ensure saliency. 
Gupta (2004) declares that communications should ‘think local before global’, and Futerra 
(2005) believe that it is essential when communicating climate change to make climate 
change a ‘home’ rather than an ‘away’ issue. Saliency on climate change is much more 
likely to improve when an audience can perceive a local connection to the issue, and when 
it connects to the personal domain of everyday life (Macnaghten, 2003). Therefore 
communications seeking to minimise spatial and temporal dissonance should connect 
climate change with the everyday life of the individual (Office of Science and Technology 
& The Wellcome Trust, 2001). The OST maintain that this will attract the layperson’s 
attention and ensure that the information given is retained. Thus, finding methods of 
making global climate change a local issue in ways unique to particular audiences can aid 
in connecting individuals to what may otherwise be viewed as remote and impersonal 
(Moser, 2006a).  
 
3.4.6 A lack of agency 
Climate communications frequently rely on fear or guilt appeals. Extreme and dramatic 
climate events are communicated as they sell better than those of slowly ongoing climate 
change (Bronnimann, 2002). Yet such engagement approaches do not encourage efficacy. 
To encourage agency, engagement approaches should be believable, understandable and 
personally relevant (Moser & Dilling, 2004).  
 
Non-experts found that when connections are made to climate change with everyday life, 
approaches are more thought-provoking than conventional methods (Macnaghten, 2003). 
Utilising emotions and visual imagery are also key ways to engage and promote agency 
(Futerra, 2005). This is also emphasised by Abbasi (2006), who states that climate 
communications would be more effective at engaging the public if the human interest in 
narratives was emphasised, and emotional hooks for the specific audience were sought. 
Novel approaches that seek to engage audience and provoke conversations amongst peers 
by inspiring curiosity are needed (Collins et al. 2003). Macnaghten (2003: p 80) maintains: 
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5. ‘A different iconography of the 'global environment' needs to be set out in terms of its human 
dimensions, through focussing on the kinds of experience in the course of which people come 
into bodily contact with the environment.’ 
 
By focussing more on individuals and their immediate social networks, greater significance 
can be found between macro-scale global environmental issues and everyday life. 
 
Recent reports on communication strategy have followed a trend towards ‘social 
marketing’12 i.e. using marketing principles to influence the way in which climate change 
is communicated; for example, the ‘Rules of the Game: the principles of climate change 
communication’ by Futerra (2005). It is argued that models of public service or 
campaigning communications are outdated, and that climate change should be approached 
as a ‘brand that can be sold’ (Ereaut & Segnit, 2006) – something positive and desirable, 
in order to encourage agency. Ereaut and Segnit (2006) emphasise that a large proportion 
of the public have esteem-driven needs. The public expects advertising approaches 
focussed on making individuals feel special through what they do and what they buy. 
Climate engagement approaches could perhaps learn from this and attempt to enact change 
by also emphasising positive esteem-driven attitudes, rather than focussing on negative 
communication.  
 
3.4.7   Meeting the challenge of effective climate engagement 
Although information has a role to play, relying on the information deficit model is 
ineffective for overcoming the value-behaviour gap. Social, psychological and institutional 
norms and beliefs may instigate barriers to effective behavioural change, preventing 
individuals from feeling that they can take action and engage meaningfully with the issue. 
Behavioural models attempt to explain and predict behavioural change. The more 
traditional attitude-behaviour models such as the TRA and TPB have been criticised for 
not situating behavioural change in a specific place and time. The SPA has been postulated 
as a more socially constructed solution, although itself is subject to a number of 
difficulties. Investigating effective engagement approaches can be informed by 
understanding barriers to change, and the values and limitations of these behavioural 
models. It is argued that for a engagement approach to be effective (defined as facilitating 
a social change), it must accomplish two things. First, the approach must elevate and 
                                                 
12
 Social marketing is defined as the use of marketing principles and techniques to influence a target audience 
to voluntarily accept, reject, modify, or abandon behaviour for the benefit of individuals, groups, or society 
as a whole (Kotler et al., 2002). 
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maintain the motivation to change a particular behaviour, and second, the approach must 
contribute to lowering the barriers and resistance to making that change (Moser, 2006b).  
 
 
3.5   ICONS FOR ENGAGEMENT 
 
6. “If people in their communities, in their families, in their local landscapes identify something 
that is precious to them, and you can point out to them how that is going to be threatened by 
uncontrolled climate change, they then will have an incentive to mobilise, to try to protect that 
thing, whether it is a feature of the landscape, a building or whatever. In that process I think 
people are then empowered at the community level and at the local level and indeed the 
individual level by the notion that there are things that they can do which will have traction [on 
climate change]” (Steve Rayner, 2005: p 340) 
 
It is maintained that a bottom-up approach to engagement is needed, focussing on 
approaches which non-experts can relate to and empathise with. The research in this thesis 
investigates a method in which individuals identify things which are precious to them, but 
that are threatened by climate change. The impact of climate change upon this precious 
entity is presented, so these people in the communities and families that Steve Rayner 
refers to in the quote above can be empowered - and find saliency in the issue of climate 
change.  
 
3.5.1 Icon history 
The icon is the most enduring element in any writing system. It is unique in that in can 
impart direct understanding, overcoming language barriers and, within certain limits, 
become universally understood (Sassoon & Gaur, 1997). The word icon is derived from 
the Greek word eikon, meaning ‘an image’ (OED online, 2007). The earliest record of 
using icons as graphic representations to signify thoughts and ideas goes back to the Stone 
Age. Examples of notches cut into stone or bone have been found, perhaps representing an 
early form of tally counting (Sassoon & Gaur, 1997). Later, abstract geometric shapes were 
introduced to represent physical objects such as water holes. More complicated 
representations of animals and Figures started to appear around 30 000 BC. Narratives of 
occasions such as hunts, celebrations and warfare are detailed through more complex 
frescos such as that in Altamira, Spain, and only appear much later between 10 000-8 000 
BCE. Cave paintings became more advanced as time progressed, as did the use of icons. 
Modern times have seen the use of icons continue. The Dakota Indians used iconic 
representation of the main event of the year as a form of calendar. Between 1801-02, 
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smallpox killed many of the Indians, and thus this year is represented as an icon of a 
stylised head and torso filled with small scratches to represent the dead (Sassoon & Gaur, 
1997). Icons continue to be used now, with current uses such as road signs providing a 
widely understood pictorial system of recognising dangers and illustrating rules.    
 
3.5.2 Defining an icon 
Some ancient icon representations have been found with almost universal usage, before 
times of global travel and trade. Evidence has been found in places as diverse as 
Scandinavia, Russia, Italy, North America, and even to the present day in some parts of 
Africa for a system of using a notched stick as a reminder for a traveller to deliver a 
message to a recipient (Sassoon & Gaur, 1997). However, more complex messages often 
form part of the cultural makeup from where they originated. Therefore, the icon cannot be 
understood, or ‘read’ outside of that particular culture or tradition. Gathering the same 
message from the icon may depend upon the readers of the icon having similar cultural 
values, world views and sense of place.  
 
Since ancient Greek times, the term ‘icon’ has been used to represent a range of meanings. 
In Eastern Orthodox Christianity, icons hold religious significance. In this context, an icon 
is a wooden block, on which is painted a representation of a sacred person in the Greek or 
Russian Byzantine style. The icon images are painstakingly copied from one image to the 
next. There is little freestyle artistry involved: each modicum of imagery has great 
religious significance in the painting, from the folds in clothing to the sometimes unusual 
shapes of the facial features (Ramos-Poqui, 1990). After the painting is completed, the icon 
is blessed, and then is itself regarded as sacred. These icons are used as an aid to worship. 
Byzantine iconography has had a convoluted history, falling into disfavour and indeed 
being prohibited during the crisis of Iconoclasm. During this period it was argued that the 
icons, rather than what they represented, were being worshipped. This period ended when 
it was accepted that veneration of the icons, and not worship of them, was acceptable.  
 
An icon may also be defined as: 
 
7. ‘a small symbolic picture of a physical object on a VDU screen’ (OED online, 2007) 
 
This may be a familiar definition for more technologically minded individuals. Although 
not the rich definition of ‘icon’ that is exemplified in this thesis, this definition is of some 
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relevance: the icon in this definition is an abstract representation of a function that can be 
investigated in order to provide further knowledge.  
 
A further definition of ‘icon’ is a recent addition to the English language. This modern 
definition may have most relevance with the layperson. An icon is thus: 
 
8. ‘A person or thing regarded as a representative symbol, especially of a culture or movement, 
and considered worthy or admiration or respect’ (OED online, 2007) 
 
This definition of the word ‘icon’ is heavily used in the popular media. For example, 
Marilyn Monroe may be seen as an icon of modern culture, whereas Mt. Everest may be an 
icon of the natural world.  
 
A further definition for an icon is found in the field of semiotics, where an icon is ‘a sign 
which resembles the object it signifies’ (OED online, 2007). Understanding semiotics and 
the semiotic definition of ‘icon’ is most relevant to this research. The use of semiotics in 
the understanding and communication of ideas has been recognised by fields as diverse as 
philosophy to advertising (Wright, 2000). Saussure (1974) defined semiotics as 'the 
science of the life of signs in society'. Understanding and communication is not just 
conducted through spoken language. Many other methods can be used to communicate, 
such as signals, signs and symbols, which could be conveyed in noise, and through the 
pictures, shapes and colours of imagery (Wright, 2000). It is argued that signs transcend all 
other devices as the basic building blocks of communication, either signifying meaning, or 
making things mean something (Tomaselli, 1996). Semiotics investigates not only how 
things come to mean, but how these meanings are a product of the cultures and worldviews 
from where they originated. If semiotics is understood in this way, then everything in a 
culture can be seen as a form of communication, organised in a way similar to spoken 
language, to be understood in terms of a common set of principles (Hodge & Kress, 1988). 
 
Saussure (1974) argued that in non-verbal communication there is no inherent relationship 
between the signifier i.e., the symbol, and the signified i.e., the actual meaning of the 
symbol. Thus, a symbol of three parallel wavy lines has from Ancient Egyptian 
hieroglyphics to modern day British road signs come to represent water. However, this 
may not always be the case, and an icon will not necessarily carry the same meaning for 
everybody who views it. As an icon is only an abstract representation; decoding the 
message of the icon requires a common understanding. This is echoed by Tomaselli (1996) 
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who notes that signs are unstable, and their meanings change depending on who is 
speaking or using the icons and for which purpose or in what context.  
 
In the semiotics of Pierce, there are three basic categories of sign: symbols, indexical signs 
and icons. Symbols have no obvious association to the idea to which they connect apart 
from through a convention which it is taken for granted is accepted. For example, a 
triangular traffic sign symbols danger, though there is no obvious connection between a 
triangle shape and the concept of danger. Indexical signs draw attention to the thing to 
which it refers. Hence a weathercock is an indicator of wind direction. Icons resemble the 
object which they signify (Peirce 1931-35, 1958).  
 
In semiotics, the more a sign looks like the object it is representing, the more motivating it 
is said to be. Thus icons are more motivating than indexical or symbolic signs, as they have 
a physical correspondence to the 'reality' referred to (Tomaselli, 1996). As icons are 
motivating a common ‘decoding’ method may not need to exist in order for the viewer to 
understand the real entity from the icon sign, as Saussure would suggest. Instead, viewers 
of the icon may be able to visualise and imagine the entity represented directly from the 
icon. 
 
A project titled ‘Icons of England’ launched in 2006 asked the public to vote for and to 
share what they considered to be English icons. The project first asks how exactly an icon 
should be defined: 
 
9. What is an icon? What makes something an icon? Is it to do with being famous or important? Is 
an icon beloved or somehow symbolic? Why is a cup of tea iconic and not a glass of orange 
juice? Do we include the Humber Bridge as well as Tower Bridge? Wimbledon or Wembley?   
                 (Icons Online, 2006) 
 
The project states that icons have to be uniquely important to life in England, and to the 
people that live in England. The project also states that agreement has to be reached on 
what is iconic: some icons are obvious, some controversial. The project set up a number of 
ground rules for what was considered an icon. First, it was considered that icons are 
symbolic: that they represent something in the culture, history or way of life. Second, the 
project considered that icons are recognisable in a crowd: if no-one has heard of it or 
knows what it looks like, it is not considered an icon. Last, icons were entities judged to be 
fascinating and surprising, with hidden depths and unexpected associations (Icons Online, 
2006). 
 78 
 
3.5.3 Engagement with climate change through icons 
A climate change icon would demonstrate the effects of increasing atmospheric 
greenhouse gas emissions upon a particular entity. Some have already used the term ‘icon’ 
for describing an entity impacted by climate change. For example, ecologist Daniel Fagre 
based in Glacier National Park, Montana, US, stated that ‘glaciers are an icon for climate 
change’ as they are symbolic of change across ecosystems, and as they are an easy to 
identify physical phenomenon (Nussbaum, 2006). Another entity described through the 
concept of a climate icon has been the glaciers on Mt. Kilimanjaro. Mabey (2006) writing 
online for The Times newspaper commented: 
 
10. “The snow-cap of Mount Kilimanjaro will soon vanish into the heavens. Will the loss of that 
iconic image of the Earth’s grandeur stir consciousnesses?” 
 
The concept of ‘climate icons’ is used frequently even if this particular terminology is not 
used. For example, UNESCO has named several World Heritage Sites threatened by 
climate change: entities which could be viewed as ‘climate icons’. These include the 
Tower of London, the Belize Barrier Reef and Sagarmatha National Park in the Himalayas 
(Black, 2006). Climate icons portrayed in the media range across a wide variety of entities; 
from impacts on individual buildings to impacts on specific cultures. For example, 
McCarthy (2006) writing for The Independent newspaper, cited 16 entities likely to be 
impacted if climate change reaches a tipping point: entities which could be named ‘icons’. 
These included impacts on the Arctic tundra, crop yields in Africa, water shortages, the 
Inuit, Coral reefs and Alpine skiing. Climate icons also occur in campaigning literature. 
NGOs have utilised icons to carry their climate change message. Greenpeace is typical, 
using retreating glaciers from the Arctic and Antarctic, and species such as polar bears and 
walruses (Doyle, 2007) as icons to carry messages of a changing climate.  
 
The concept of icons of climate change is not limited to non-expert discourses. Indeed, it 
could be argued that many climate icons originate from the scientific literature.  Icons 
found in the scientific literature range from the impacts of climate change on niche 
ecosystems, to the West Antarctic Ice Sheet (WAIS) and the Greenland Ice Sheet (GIS) 
(O'Neill & Oppenheimer, 2004), to impacts on atoll countries (Barnett & Adger, 2003) and 
to climate impacts on water availability in Egypt (Conway et al., 1996). 
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The Avoiding Dangerous Climate Change conference held in Exeter, 2005, provides an 
interesting example of how icons evolve. The conference defined ‘three dangers’, the third 
of which was waking the six ‘sleeping giants’13.  The wasting of the West Antarctic Ice 
Sheet (WAIS) is one of the sleeping giants. If the WAIS were to completely disintegrate, 
then there would be a eustatic SLR of between 4-6m (O'Neill & Oppenheimer, 2002). The 
melting of the Greenland Ice Sheet (GIS) was the second sleeping giant. A complete melt 
of the GIS could, eventually, cause a eustatic SLR of 7m. The third sleeping giant involves 
soils giving up their carbon stores. Much of the world’s carbon is stored in soils and 
swamps, particularly at high latitudes. Climate change and their impacts on soils have been 
modelled by White et al. (1999) who find that after 2050, shifts in temperature and 
precipitation become large enough to adversely affect growth, causing a declining trend in 
forests and a loss of carbon from vegetation and soils. The fourth sleeping giant was a 
weakening of the Thermohaline Circulation (THC). It has been predicted that a shutdown 
of the THC could cool UK temperatures by an average of 5˚C, with winter temperatures 
regularly reaching below -10˚C (Jenkins et al. 2005). Increasing natural methane emissions 
are cited as the fifth sleeping giant. Lastly, the sixth sleeping giant is acidification of the 
ocean by CO2. Increasing the amount of CO2 released into the atmosphere leads to an 
equilibrium uptake reaction by the surface ocean. The action of carbon dioxide with water 
produces carbonic acid. Increasing the concentration of atmospheric CO2 will cause an 
increase in this reaction, and hence a decrease in ocean pH.  
 
These six sleeping giants could be defined as ‘expert’ or (science-led) ‘climate icons’.  
The media picked up on these ‘sleeping giants’ and brought them into public discourse (for 
example, see the Guardian Unlimited 2005)14. However, these top-down ‘expert climate 
icons’ may have done little to engage the public with climate change as they do not 
connect with individual’s everyday experiences. Although it is recognised that this was not 
the aim of this conference, the use of ‘expert climate icons’ more generally indicates a top-
down approach which is at odds with the views expressed by Dessai et al. (2004) as 
reviewed in Section 2.1, and the increasing socio-psychological literature as examined in 
this Chapter, demonstrating that non-experts require non-technical, locally salient 
engagement approaches that promote efficacy.  
 
                                                 
13
 ‘Sleeping giants’ are so called because they are processes that have the potential to accelerate the rate of 
warming beyond that attributed to human emissions of greenhouse gases (Field et al., 2004) 
14
 This process was also aided by the ‘tipping points’ metaphor entering public discourse from the 
conference. 
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Some ‘climate icons’ currently in the public sphere (for example, polar bears) may at first 
glance appear to be ‘non-expert’ climate icons, rather than ‘expert’ climate icons as they 
have gained public understanding and connection to the issue of climate change. However, 
it could be argued that icons in non-expert discourse are still essentially defined through a 
top-down approach by experts. So it may be that whilst ‘non-expert’ climate icons such as 
the polar bear originated as ‘expert climate icons’, these types of icons were considered to 
have greater saliency and be more amenable to public dissemination than others: and hence 
occur more in public discourses, becoming a ‘pseudo’ non-expert icon. So far a public 
participatory approach has not linked the ‘climate icons’ which promote non-expert 
engagement with a scientific analysis of the impacts of climate change upon these ‘non 
expert climate icons’. This is the central idea that lies behind this thesis. 
 
 
3.6   AN ‘ICONIC APPROACH’ TO ENGAGING NON-EXPERTS WITH CLIMATE               
.       CHANGE 
 
Using climate icons (hereafter referred to as ‘icons’) is designed to overcome some of the 
barriers to involvement with climate change as discussed earlier in this Chapter. An iconic 
approach to engaging non-experts with climate change aims to engage through a 
participatory bottom-up approach where individuals express what they consider icons of 
climate change to be. Icons could be entities as diverse as natural systems, indigenous 
communities, communities and landscapes, cultural entities and species at risk. In this 
research, the definition of ‘icon’ will relate to all the definitions discussed above: 
 
• Icons as represented through religious artistry 
• Icons as representations in IT 
• Icons as symbolic representations considered worthy of respect  
• Icons as representations through semiotics 
• Icons as recognisable entities 
• Icons as fascinating, surprising entities with hidden depths and associations 
 
An icon is therefore more than an image or symbol. In common with the definition of an 
icon as a religious artefact, or as the definition of entities with hidden depths and 
associations, a climate icon as defined here is a symbolic representation of more than what 
is immediately apparent. As explained by the semiotic definition of an icon, an icon is 
motivated and therefore a common decoding method is perhaps not needed in order for the 
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viewer to grasp the icon. Viewers are able to visualise and imagine the icon as viewed 
from their individual cultural values, world views and sense of place. Thus, a climate 
‘icon’ in this thesis is defined as: 
 
11. A tangible entity which will be impacted by climate change, considered worthy of respect, and 
to which the viewer can relate to and feel empathy for. 
 
The ‘iconic approach’ investigated here aims to harness the emotive and visual power of 
icons as defined by non-experts with a rigorous scientific analysis of possible changes 
under a different climate future. 
 
The next Chapter sets out the methodological foundations to the development of an iconic 
approach to engaging non-experts with climate change. Chapters 5,6 and 7 then detail the 
methodologies, results and analysis in developing the iconic approach, with each Chapter 
building successively on the last. 
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CHAPTER 4: 
INTERDISCIPLINARITY IN SHAPING THE RESEARCH 
 
 
 
The thesis research is sequential, with each methodological stage building upon the 
conclusions of the previous stage. It is therefore more practical and comprehensible to 
document each stage in a separate chapter. Each of the Chapters 5, 6 and 7 therefore 
discusses the methodologies used in Stages 1, 2 and 3 respectively. This chapter sets out 
the overall theoretical framework to the thesis. First, Section 4.1 provides an insight into 
the necessarily interdisciplinary nature of research into climate change engagement 
through a discussion of post-normal science and interdisciplinarity. Section 4.2 then 
investigates possible theoretical frameworks for such interdisciplinary research including a 
brief survey of how positivist and constructivist epistemologies influence research 
questions, design and methods. The section concludes by stating the pragmatic 
epistemology underlying the thesis research. Section 4.3 summarises the approach taken in 
this thesis, and states the relationship between the research questions posed in Chapter 1 
and the methodologies used. Section 4.4 provides a summary of the chapter. 
 
 
4.1   POST-NORMAL SCIENCE AND INTERDISCIPLINARITY 
Undertaking research in climate change engagement necessarily integrates disciplines from 
both the social and natural sciences, with influences from geography, psychology, 
sociology and from the physical, chemical and biological sciences. This thesis is not 
conventional in the sense that it does not use a single methodology. The thesis combines 
both quantitative and qualitative methodologies through adopting a pragmatic 
epistemology. The thesis is interdisciplinary and was completed in a post-normal science 
setting.  After briefly examining the notion of post-normal science, the following section 
addresses the different methods of between-discipline working and the concept of 
interdisciplinarity. 
 
4.1.1   Post-normal science 
When systems uncertainty and decision stakes are low Kuhn’s (1962) model of science as 
puzzle-solving (i.e., ‘normal’) is an adequate description of the practice of science. 
Funtowicz and Ravetz (1993) developed the concept of post-normal science to describe a 
situation where either or both systems uncertainty and decision stakes are high, and 
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traditional methodologies ineffective (Figure 4.1). In this situation, applied science or 
professional consultancy is ineffective.  
 
Figure 4.1   Post-normal science (Funtowicz & Ravetz, 1993) 
 
Within post-normal science, an ‘extended peer community’ exists of all those with a stake 
in the question under scrutiny. This community comprises advocates and guardians of local 
knowledge and consultancy as well as the traditional peer-reviewed literature, and holds 
‘extended facts’ on the issue under question (Funtowicz & Ravetz, 1993). Post-normal 
science embraces complexity and uncertainty on the understanding that complex issues 
will never be fully understood before action is taken to manage them (McCarthy, 2003).  
 
Funtowicz and Ravetz (1993) state that their post-normal science model is distinctive in 
that it allows explicitly for the interaction of epistemic (knowledge) and axiological 
(values) aspects of scientific problems. Climate change is traditionally seen as a normal 
scientific issue, with associated ‘facts’ and objective truth seeking (see for example PM 
Blair’s request to scientists at the Exeter Conference on Dangerous Climate Change in 
2.1.1.3). In 1999, Bray and von Storch suggested that there is a socio-scientific 
construction of the climate change issue. It is increasingly recognised that climate change 
encompasses social, cultural and politic beliefs and norms as well as the ‘facts’ of normal 
science (as discussed by Hulme, 2007). Thus climate change cannot be seen simply as 
applied science: the climate issue as it now stands is not value neutral and therefore falls 
within the realm of post-normal science. 
 
4.1.2   An interdisciplinary approach 
As discussed, a key part of a post-normal science is the recognition of an extended peer 
community, and an acceptance of the value and belief systems inherent in the research. An 
approach is needed which recognises this. 
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Disciplines are constructs borne out of historical processes involving both objects and 
methods of study, providing frames of reference, topics of study, theoretical approaches, 
methodologies and technologies. Beyond this, each discipline also has shared social and 
cultural dimensions (Petts, Owens & Bulkeley in press) evident in the language and tools 
used, and in epistemological foundations.  
 
There are numerous typologies given to working between disciplines, from cross-, pluri-, 
multi-, inter- to trans-disciplinarity (Pohl, 2007). Each has different connotations for the 
level of integration between disciplines. In brief, cross-, pluri- and multi-disciplinary 
processes are considered here to involve knowledge transfer between disciplines, but with 
the new knowledge created in the process formed within just one of these strands. In 
contrast, inter- and trans-disciplinary research is found occupying the spaces between the 
disciplines (see Petts, Owens & Bulkeley in press). It has been argued that 
transdisciplinary research reaches beyond interdisciplinary research by literally 
transcending traditional disciplinary boundaries, challenging and renegotiating them and 
perhaps even re-drawing the interdisciplinary map (Petts, Owens & Bulkeley in press). 
Pohl (2007) defines transdisciplinary research into two types. Type one reorganises 
knowledge that is produced after consideration of the perceived audience and its demands. 
Pohl’s definition of type two transdisciplinary research goes further than a reorganisation 
of knowledge, and further than the bounds of academia, to a co-production of knowledge 
between the academic, bureaucratic, economic and civic policy cultures.  
 
It is considered here that a continuum exists with weak inter-disciplinary ‘cooperative 
research’ at one end, and transformation of disciplines at the other, rather than the 
classification of research as either inter- or trans-disciplinary (as Petts, Owens & Bulkeley 
in press). Using this broad definition, the term interdisciplinary is used in this thesis to 
describe the research process whereby the final knowledge obtained is more than the sum 
of its disciplinary components (Lawrence & Després 2004). 
 
A shortcoming of traditional scientific research is that topics are viewed isolated from their 
societal context (Lawrence & Després 2004). An issue such as climate change requires an 
interdisciplinary approach which is problem focussed, integrated, interactive and reflexive; 
and involves collaboration and partnership (Robinson, 2005). Thus, the approach needs to 
find ontological frameworks which embrace the complexity of the natural and human 
environment; find epistemological positions that value the complex and inter-related 
spheres of human and natural ecosystems; support collaborative research efforts between 
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related disciplinary knowledge and expertise drawing upon appropriate methods; and 
acknowledge professionals, politicians, interest groups and the public as knowledge users 
and creators (adapted from Lawrence & Després 2004). 
 
 
4.2   THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
The paradigmatic foundations of the research in this thesis were considered before the 
methodology was explicitly defined. It was important that the research was placed in an 
ontological framework recognised and valued the complex and inter-related spheres of 
human and natural ecosystems. Although different paradigms may foster very different 
understandings of the world, an appreciation of other paradigmatic ontologies, 
epistemologies and methodologies would appear a prerequisite for well-grounded research. 
Guba and Lincoln (1994: p 105) define a paradigm as: 
 
1. “The basic belief system or worldview that guides the investigator, not only in choices of 
method but in ontologically and epistemologically fundamental ways.”  
 
Thus, the choice of paradigm plays of primary importance over and above choices of 
method.  
 
4.2.1   A pragmatic framework 
It is easier to conceptualise different paradigms if imagined that they lie along a spectrum 
rather than as individually aligned, easily definable separate entities. The four main 
paradigms along this axis are defined by Guba and Lincoln (1994) as positivism, post-
positivism, critical theory and constructivism, the extremities at each end of the axis being 
positivism and constructivism. Positivism lies within a realist tradition. The ontology in 
this case employs realism. Experimental methodologies are frequently used in positivist 
research, and the epistemology assumes that findings are universally true, or at least 
converging approximations to what is universally true. In constructivism, reality is thought 
of as being locally constructed: an interplay between the material, the cultural and the 
psychological. The methods used in constructivist paradigms are typically explorative and 
interpretative. Findings are considered created, rather than universally true. Knowledge is 
always situated – in a time, in a place and in a culture.  
 
Risk research is traditionally centred in a positivist paradigm, drawing from disciplines 
such as engineering and the physical sciences. However, this approach has raised concerns 
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about the social understanding of risk: for example, involving issues of dimensions of trust. 
Consequently, understanding the conceptualisation of such dimensions of risk often occurs 
through using a more constructivist paradigmatic frame because social science 
methodologies can be more adept at dealing with ‘messy background noise’ (Baum, 1995). 
Therefore, it can be seen that it may be beneficial for risk research to combine elements of 
both positivist and constructivist paradigms.  
 
Each paradigmatic stance has its own advantages and limitations and although it may be 
thought a goal is to combine the different approaches through an interdisciplinary 
approach, these paradigmatic frameworks may be in conflict (Day, 2004). Much has been 
made of the ‘paradigm wars’; the polarisation of paradigms - typically positivist versus 
constructivist - into opposing factions. Gage (1989: p 5) defines the paradigm wars as: 
 
2. ‘Competition between the disciplines - competition manifested in derogation of the concerns of 
the other disciplines and glorification of one's own.’  
 
This quantitative versus qualitative debate came to the fore in the 1970s and 1980s (Sale, 
Lohfeld & Brazil, 2002), ultimately exploding in the science wars of the 1990s as positivist 
and constructivist clashed head-on in the ‘Sokal affair’15. Guba and Lincoln (1994) 
however state that the paradigm wars have been overdrawn and represent the situation as 
more confrontational than is necessary. Debating simply quantitative versus qualitative, or 
positivist versus constructivist, often just devalues the contribution of both paradigms and 
contributes little (Baum 1995; Gage 1989). Baum (1995) maintains that attempts should be 
made to explore, rather than deny, the diversity of the different paradigmatic frameworks. 
An honest and productive cordial relationship between the different paradigms should be 
encouraged (Gage, 1989). 
 
One way around the polarisation of the realist/constructivist debate, and encouraging the 
development of this cordial relationship between the differing ontologies could be through 
pragmatism (Cherryholmes 1992; Reichardt & Rallis 1994; Tashakkori & Teddlie 1998). 
Pragmatism may be defined as a middle ground between positivism and constructionism 
(Day, 2004). It uses both inductive and deductive logic, and employs both subjectivity and 
objectivity (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). A pragmatic framework assumes that an external 
                                                 
15
 Alan Sokal is a physicist who submitted a paper titled ‘Transgressing the Boundaries: Towards a 
Transformative Hermeneutics of Quantum Gravity’ to the cultural studies journal Social Text. As the article 
was published, Sokal submitted an article to Lingua Franca where he announced the first article was a 
parody designed to test whether Social Text would publish an article ‘liberally salted with nonsense if (a) it 
sounded good and (b) it flattered the editors' ideological preconceptions’.  
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reality does exist but denies that truth can be totally determined (Cherryholmes, 1992). 
Pragmatists recognise that the researcher plays a large role in conducting the research and 
in drawing conclusions – thus endowing ‘knowledge with personality’ – but pragmatists do 
not dwell overly on this characteristic (Cherryholmes, 1992). A pragmatic framework has 
been defined as ‘what works’ (Tashakkori & Teddlie, 1998).  
 
4.2.2   A multimethodological research design 
Pragmatism often employs a mixed methodology research design, combining both 
quantitative and qualitative approaches in different phases of the research process 
(Tashakkori & Teddlie, 1998). A mixed methodology has been defined as follows: 
 
3. ‘Those that include at least one quantitative method (designed to collect numbers) and one 
qualitative method (designed to collect words), where neither type of method is inherently 
linked to any particular enquiry paradigm.’ (Greene et al., 1989: p 259) 
4.  
Interdisciplinary research gains its strength from the different methodological structure it 
employs, and offers the possibility of breaking out of the traditional divide and composing 
new methodological strategies (Day, 2004).  
 
The strength of a multimethod approach is that the bias inherent in any particular research 
method is to some extent neutralised by the other methods also used in the research process 
(Creswell, 2003; Denzin, 1970). Brinberg and McGrath (1985) argue that the full research 
endeavour requires the pursuit of multiple paths; no one path is correct, and no one path is 
sufficient. A multimethod approach is not only advantageous in data collection. The use of 
data analysis strategies within a mixed research methodology enables the researcher to 
integrate qualitative and quantitative data, and for the strategies to complement each 
different data set (Caracelli & Greene, 1993). The use of multiple methods allows the 
research problem to be examined from different viewpoints. When many strategies are 
used, data may be discovered that monomethod research may not reveal (Denzin, 1970). 
 
 
4.3   THE APPROACH TAKEN IN THIS THESIS 
It is postulated by some that pragmatism has overcome the paradigmatic differences of 
positivism and constructionism to produce a new paradigm combining the strengths of 
both: yet pragmatism itself has been criticised. Some have expressed concern that there has 
been a lack of awareness of the ontological and epistemological differences associated with 
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the different theories underlying the methods used (Blaikie, 1991) and also that the 
contrasting epistemological assumptions associated with quantitative or qualitative 
methods cannot be reconciled (Caracelli & Greene, 1993). Particularly, Sale et al. (2002) 
state that parts of the positivist and constructivist approach are incompatible, and thus 
cannot be combined in one theoretical approach. For example, constructivists believe that 
objectivity is an illusion, whereas objectivity (whether one believes it may exist or not) is a 
cornerstone of positivist epistemology.  
 
However, Sale et al. (2002) state that there are some cases where combining both 
paradigms in a single study can be methodologically and philosophically successful: when 
quantitative and qualitative work is carried out sequentially in a series of investigations. 
Thus, they can be combined for well-demarcated, complimentary purposes. The thesis 
research has been designed around a sequential, exploratory pathway (Creswell, 2003), and 
therefore fulfils this criteria. 
 
Some thought should also be given to Miles and Huberman’s comment (1984) that the 
quantitative-qualitative debate will not be resolved in the near future and thus researchers 
should not be overly concerned about it – epistemological purity does not get research 
done. It is important that paradigmatic issues are considered, but also recognised that for a 
study such as this into climate change engagement, there is some merit in this very 
practical statement.  
 
A pragmatic epistemological standpoint is taken in an attempt to avoid the polarisation of 
the realist/constructivist debate. As is common within a pragmatic approach, this thesis 
utilises both quantitative and qualitative methodologies. As Tashakkori and Teddlie (1998) 
state, most researchers now use whichever method is most appropriate in their research 
rather than relying on one method exclusively. In the thesis research presented here, the 
choice of methodology has relied more on gaining insight into the research questions posed 
than the determined use of one particular method. Using a multimethodological approach 
within the pragmatic framework provides both the depth and the breadth needed to address 
the interdisciplinary research questions posed in this thesis. 
 
The three main research questions addressed by the thesis (see also Chapter 1) and their 
relationship with the research methods is illustrated in Table 4.1. During Stage 1, focus 
groups and an online survey were utilised. Stage 2 encompassed quantitative modelling 
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and GIS, as well as an expert survey and a literature search. Stage 3 used a pre / post-test 
survey design through a workshop format. 
 
 
 
Table 4.1   The relationship between research questions and methods  
   
 
  
Stage Research questions 
Research 
methods 
Stage 1 
What makes an engaging ‘climate icon’? 
• What do participants select as their climate 
icons? 
o On what spatial scale(s) are icons chosen? 
o What reasoning lies behind icon choice? 
• Are there commonalities and differences in the 
icons selected? 
o Does this vary across spatial and cultural 
contexts? 
o Is there such an entity as a globally 
engaging icon of climate change?  
focus groups 
 
online survey 
Stage 2 
Examining non-expert and expert-led icons 
• What constitutes an expert-led icon? 
• What is the impact of a future climate scenario 
upon selected icons? 
o What is the impact on the non-expert 
icons? 
o What is the impact on the expert-led icons? 
quantitative 
modelling 
 
GIS 
 
expert survey 
Stage 3 
Does the iconic approach engage non-experts 
with climate change? 
• How do non-experts engage with the expert 
and non-expert icons? 
• Does the iconic approach alter cognitive or 
affective aspects of engagement with climate 
change? 
pre / post-test 
survey 
workshop 
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4.4   SUMMARY 
This chapter first discussed the interdisciplinary nature of the thesis. Section 4.1 discussed 
how climate change as an issue encompasses social, cultural and political beliefs as well as 
normal scientific ‘facts’, and hence how it has become a post-normal scientific issue. The 
theoretical basis for the thesis was then set out, with a brief survey of the literature into 
positivist and constructivist epistemologies and the relationship of epistemology to 
influence research design and methods. The chapter concluded by stating the thesis 
research was carried out within a pragmatic framework, using both quantitative and 
qualitative methods in a multimethodological approach. 
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CHAPTER 5:  
ICON SELECTION 
 
 
 
This Chapter explores the research questions posed in Chapter 1 (stage 1) around what 
makes an engaging ‘climate icon’. Sections 5.1 and 5.2 document the process undertaken 
for selecting the non-expert climate icons. In Chapter 3 it was argued that although some 
climate icons already exist in public discourse, they largely originate from expert 
perspectives. The literature explored in Chapter 3 examined the need for more ‘bottom-up’ 
approaches for engaging non-experts with climate change. Section 5.1 thus explores the 
views from a culturally and spatially diverse non-expert participant sample, using the 
methodologies of focus groups and an online survey. The coded results and analysis from 
these methodologies are then discussed in Section 5.2. Section 5.3 provides the rationale 
behind selection of the expert icons. The reasoning for selecting a suite of comparative 
expert icons is presented. Section 5.3.1 then details the icon selection methodology for the 
‘expert’ climate icons. Lastly, the conclusions to both the expert and non-expert icon 
selections to take forward to Stages 2 and 3 (discussed in Chapters 6 and 7 respectively) is 
reported in Section 5.4. 
 
5.1   NON-EXPERT ICON SELECTION METHODOLOGY 
This research was not intended to provide a representative view of the UK public as 
regards the iconic approach to engaging with climate change. Instead, it was designed to 
gather rich, exploratory data. The non-expert icon selection procedure was opened to a 
wide and diverse audience in order to investigate cultural and spatial commonalities and 
differences in icon selection, and to investigate whether a ‘globally engaging’ icon of 
climate change exists. Also, this first stage of the thesis research sought to investigate on 
which spatial scales individuals selected their icons, and the reasoning behind icon choice.  
 
The rationale for the choice of participant groups is outlined in Table 5.1.  The three 
participant groups were deliberately selected as they represented very different social 
groups which would provide interesting data for comparison of icon selection across 
participant groups. The participant groups were of differing background and life stages, so 
it was postulated that the participant groups would have different priorities which may 
impact on icon selection. The LEAD Fellows are successful leaders working on complex 
environmental and developmental issues, and form a professional and mainly young 
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network. The CNS parents were largely representative of a UK middle class population, 
and all lived in the local (Norwich, UK) area. Before the online survey started, the cp.net 
community makeup was a relative unknown. However, it was known that participants were 
computer literate and were interested in either (or both) computer processing or climate 
change. 
 
The type of interaction between participants in their discussion and selection of climate 
icons was also different between participant groups, as each participant group represented 
a different form of community. The LEAD participants form a network of Fellows who 
meet infrequently to attend conferences, but maintain a strong identity through their shared 
mission of sustainable leadership. The CNS parents represent a community sharing the 
commonality of their children’s’ education, but none of the CNS parents had met before 
the focus group was carried out. The cp.net participants represented an opportunity to 
explore perceptions of climate icons with a different kind of community, through an online 
forum. Several cp.net participants had interacted informally with each other through the 
forums before the online survey was initiated. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 93 
 
 
Table 5.1   Rationale for participant selection  
 
 
 
 
Method Group Rationale 
Parents with 
children at 
CNS high 
school 
• Participants have high-school age children at the City 
of Norwich School (shortened to CNS in text).  
• Postulated that the parent’s outlook on climate change 
may be influenced by concern for their children’s 
future. 
• The school’s catchment area is the city of Norwich, 
UK, so provided a local (Norwich, UK) perspective. 
• The school had a higher than UK average GCSE/A 
level attainment in 200416.  
Focus 
group 
LEAD 
International 
fellows 
• Fellows of the Leadership for Environment and 
Development International (shortened to LEAD in text) 
network, designed to inspire leadership for a 
sustainable world. 
• Sustainability (but not climate change) experts. 
• Work in diverse fields e.g. media, government, NGOs 
• Fellows of many different nationalities, so represented 
a spatially and culturally diverse sample. 
• Participants have expertise in meta-environmental 
issues forming valuable discussion for the research.  
Online 
survey 
Climate 
Prediction.net 
forum 
participants 
• Participants of ClimatePrediction.net (shortened to 
cp.net in text) contribute spare computing power to an 
online climate prediction model. Specifically, these 
participants take part in online forums discussing issues 
related to the project (forum discussions are more 
related to computing issues than climate science) 
• Participants expected to have some knowledge of 
climate change due to involvement in the forum, but 
not anticipated to be climate experts.  
• A spatially diverse sample as cp.net reaches a global, 
online audience 
• Investigation into newer forms of ‘community’ through 
exploration of an online forum. 
 
 
   
                                                 
16
 See 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/shared/bsp/hi/education/04/school_Tables/secondary_schools/html/926_gcse_lea.stm 
[accessed January 2006] for full Norfolk school listings 
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Two different methodologies, focus groups and online surveys, were utilised in the non-
expert icon selection process. Parents of high school children and fellows of LEAD 
international participated in focus groups (Section 5.1.1). The focus groups were designed 
to allow in-depth discussion of climate change icons, leading into a participatory exercise 
where participants named their personal icons. An online survey was used (Section 5.1.2) 
where participants were part of an ‘online’ community and could not attend a central focus 
group discussion. Moreover, the cp.net group were specifically asked for their views on 
icon selection because of their status as an online community. The online survey protocol 
was thus specifically designed in order to access such an online community. The online 
survey protocol followed the same path as the focus group protocol, and discussion boards 
were set up to allow participants to discuss their personal icon selections.  
 
5.1.1   Icon selection methodology 1: Focus groups 
A focus group is a small structured discussion group held with selected participants, and 
led by a moderator. Focus groups are set up to explore specific topics within the individual 
participants own views and experiences through the medium of group interaction 
(Litosseliti, 2003). Kamberekis and Dimitriadis (2005) define a focus group as little more 
than quasi-formal or formal instances of many of the kinds of everyday speech acts that are 
part and parcel of unmarked social life, such as conversations, group discussions and 
negotiations. 
 
Focus groups were first postulated as a research method in the 1930s. Researchers were 
beginning to find the structured, closed-ended questions of interviews and questionnaires 
too rigid to gain the sort of rich, qualitative data that they needed. However, the method 
was not embraced by the social sciences as a whole, and focus group discussion methods 
lay more or less unused for twenty more years. In the 1950s post-war era, market research 
began to take hold, and borrowed much of its methodology from these original ideas for 
focus groups. Market researchers realised that focus groups could provide information on 
product marketing, success and failure - and at a reasonable cost - that simply couldn’t be 
carried out using other methods. The 1980s saw a resurgence of the use of focus groups in 
academic research, often borrowing skills and techniques from market research. However, 
this was not always successful in the new setting. Academics turned to the original sources 
of focus group methodology proposed earlier, but still using techniques from market 
research (Krueger and Casey, 2000). It is from these roots that the modern concept of focus 
group discussions has come to be realised in the academic environment.  
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The idea of a focus group is to promote self-disclosure among participants (Krueger and 
Casey, 2000) concerning a specific issue or idea. The method will produce rich, qualitative 
data that can be analysed as a form of discourse (Kamberekis and Dimitriadis, 2005), and 
produces data that are both inductive and naturalistic (Krueger and Casey, 2000). The 
discussion in a focus group around the question will allow the participants to relate the 
topic to their everyday ‘lived realities’ (Kamberekis and Dimitriadis, 2005). It enables 
participants to answer questions in their own vocabulary, and allows an altogether deeper 
discussion than say, through interviewing, through the questioning of the participants own 
priorities. The research uncovers not only what participants think, but how and why their 
thinking is framed in this way (Kitzinger, 1995). Paultikof (2004) maintains that only 
through such rich data collection methodologies such as focus groups can knowledge be 
gained of the social processes of opinion formation. Unlike self-completion surveys or 
questionnaires, the method does not discriminate against a lack of literacy. With careful 
moderation, it also allows the views of all - including those who are shy or think they have 
nothing to contribute - to enter the discussion (Kitzinger, 1995). Focus groups are useful 
for exploring complex issues, for brainstorming and for generating ideas, with participants 
discussing different sides to the issue (Litosseliti, 2003). Focus groups have been widely 
used in a variety of settings around the issue of climate change (for example, see: Jenkins 
et al. 2005; Myers & Macnaghten 1998; Nicholson-Cole 2004; Palutikof et al. 2004; Stoll-
Kleemann, O'Riordan & Jaeger 2001). 
 
The group discussion is normally held for between one and two hours. The location of the 
focus group should have a neutral and permissive environment. Although the discussion 
has structure and is led by a moderator, the underlying notion is that participants contribute 
their views, and a skilled moderator should have little input into the actual discussion. The 
moderator should be careful not to make judgements: either overtly through the use of 
approving or disapproving language, or through more subtle means such as body language. 
The moderator appears neutral on all issues raised, yet encourages further discussion 
through the use of prompts. Essentially, the role of the moderator is to ask questions of the 
participants, to listen, to keep the conversation on the topics to be covered, and to ensure 
that every participant has a chance to share their views (Krueger and Casey, 2000).  
 
Before a focus group initialises, the researcher must decide what kind of information they 
wish to obtain from the group. A protocol is then devised, which covers the topics the 
researcher wants discussed. Discussion is kept conversational, clear, and to the point. 
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Krueger and Casey (2000) suggest a format with opening questions, followed by 
introductory, transition, key and ending questions. Questions are kept open-ended. The 
format is designed to introduce the participants first to each other if they are not already 
known to each other and in all cases to introduce the participants to the ground rules of the 
group, not to interrupt others, and to be non-judgemental. The introductory questions 
introduce the topic to the participants, but are not designed to elicit particularly meaningful 
data. Transition questions lead the participants into thinking more deeply about the issue. 
The key questions provide just that - key data - much of the information in which will be of 
use in analysis. Finally, the ending questions should be designed to wrap up the topic and 
allow participants to voice any other thoughts they may not have already covered in the 
group. Following a protocol allows the moderator to keep structure to the group and to 
easily spot participants wandering off topic. It also allows an element of cross-
comparability between different focus groups on the same discussion topics.  
 
A focus group is run with between five and twelve participants. Too small a group, and the 
thought pool of the participants would be too small and inhibit discussion, whereas too 
large a group and the participants cannot take part as freely as they should. There is also a 
tendency for large groups to fragment into mini groups rather than discuss between the 
group as a whole. In all cases, a compromise will have to be made in the selection process 
for participants between possible bias (or the perception of possible bias), and the cost of 
recruiting a suitable group. Group composition depends on the discussion sought by the 
moderator, but should generally aim to include a range of age groups and a gender balance.  
 
Incentives can be used to maximise attendance. Although there is controversy over 
soliciting responses with a reward, it is generally agreed that such gifts should be given to 
make participation agreeable without bribery. It is likely that giving an incentive would 
have an effect on participation, both of the type and amount of people attending, though it 
is also likely that there may be little uptake with no incentive. It may also be the case that 
giving no incentive would encourage the participation only of those with more time or 
those with strong views on the issue to be discussed. Krueger and Casey (2000) suggest 
that incentives should not be a reward, an honorarium or a salary, but should be a stimulus 
to attend a session.  
 
During the focus group, a recording of the discussion should be made, with an assistant to 
the moderator noting the time on the recording that important points were made, to 
facilitate transcription. Transcription should ideally occur as soon as possible after the 
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focus group by the moderator in order to record as fully and as accurately as possible the 
discussion. It is generally agreed that note taking by the moderator should be avoided in 
order to fully concentrate on the group discussion. Of course, the participants consent for 
recording the session must be obtained, and if refused, taking notes may be the only option. 
The moderator should write reflective notes as soon as possible after the end of the group 
on such issues such as whether the protocol was followed exactly, and observations on the 
group dynamic – including issues such as body language and noting overtly loud or 
noticeably quiet participants.   
 
Despite the successes of focus groups, there are some pitfalls. Although these should be 
considered, they can be avoided in the main through careful moderation and planning. The 
moderator should be careful to avoid bias and manipulation: there is a possibility that the 
moderator can encourage participants into responding to their own prejudices (Litosseliti, 
2003). There is also a danger of participants saying what they think the moderator wants to 
hear, rather than what they actually feel. This can be minimised by the use of neutral verbal 
and body language throughout the discussion, and the setting of a permissive environment. 
Finally, a ‘false’ sense of agreement or disagreement on issues may be obtained as some 
members of the discussion group with strong personalities can dominate the group, whilst 
others are silent (Litosseliti, 2003). Again, this can be overcome in part by careful 
moderation of the group dynamic.   
 
5.1.1.1   Focus group protocol design 
The protocol used in this thesis was designed in five main parts as recommended by 
Krueger and Casey (2000) and discussed above. The first part involved introductions and 
the establishment of ground rules, and the second to fifth involved introductory questions, 
transition questions, key questions and end questions. The protocol was structured to 
provide a logical thought process, from imagining what climate change is and how it is 
communicated, to what a climate icon might be and participant’s views on their personal 
climate icons. The key data question involved asking the participants to write down their 
ideas for climate change icons on record cards. These cards were then collected at the end 
of the group for analysis. Each participant was asked for their suggestions for possible 
climate change icons, to check that all participants had contributed to this most important 
part of the discussion. The protocols were designed to answer the first set of research 
questions as set out in Chapter 1. An example of the protocol used can be seen in Appendix 
5.1. After each focus group, a fieldwork diary was written noting participant behaviour and 
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body language, an assessment of the moderation needed and first impressions of the 
themes arising from the discussion. 
 
5.1.1.2   Piloting the protocol 
A pilot focus group was carried out with a group of environmental science researchers at 
the University of East Anglia. This gave the opportunity to test the protocol and the subject 
matter with a group of researchers who had no expertise in the area of focus group 
research, but some climate change knowledge. The pilot allowed for the practice of focus 
group moderation. Several questions were reformatted and rephrased after the pilot 
exercise, but the overall framework was considered clear and concise. The pilot group also 
allowed for testing of the recording equipment and the overall timing of questions. A final 
run-through was arranged with a group of colleagues after reformatting the protocol for 
final testing of the questions, content and the questioning route. 
 
One focus group was carried out with the CNS participants, and two with the LEAD 
participants. Two groups were held with the LEAD group due to both the time restrictions 
imposed on the groups and the smaller numbers of participants in each group. It was felt 
that two groups would be needed in order to gain breadth in the data. In total, the three 
groups were deemed a sufficient size for the diversification of opinions needed, as 
preliminary analysis of the groups showed that similar themes had developed in each of the 
groups. The same focus group protocol was followed in all three groups. In each case, a 
moderator led the session with a note-taker also present. All sessions were followed with 
brief reflective notes detailing any changes in protocol themes and sub-themes (e.g. due to 
time restrictions), participant enthusiasm, body language and group dynamics (as Marczak 
and Sewell, 2006).  
 
5.1.1.3   Implementation: the City of Norwich focus group 
Participants for the CNS focus group were recruited from a local school via the CNS 
Community Learning Officer. The session was advertised on the school website and in the 
weekly newsletter. The group was held in the school Learning Centre, a neutral 
environment where the discussion could take place freely and without interruptions. It was 
convened at 7.30pm on a Monday evening. The time, date and location took into account 
parents' likely commitments and how best to avoid prior engagements. Participants were 
over-recruited as it was assumed that some would drop out, although this was actually only 
the case for two of those responding to the advert. Thus, the focus group involved twelve 
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adults. This large group was of initial concern, but not wanting to turn away participants, 
the group continued as planned. Ultimately, after the ground rules for participation were 
discussed, the group interacted well and the rather large number of participants did not 
affect the group dynamic. It was ensured that everybody contributed to the discussion. A 
note-taker was available to annotate the proceedings and to organise the recording 
equipment. This was invaluable considering the large size of the group, which required 
especially thoughtful moderation.  
 
No incentive was offered, which is likely to have affected the type of people attending: 
many had environmental concerns and, as a whole, it may be that this group was more 
environmentally perceptive than a cross-sectional sample of the school parent community 
may have been. However, as previously stated, this investigation was focussed on 
obtaining rich exploratory data on participant icon selection rationale from a wide cultural 
and spatial range of participant backgrounds, and was not focussed on obtaining a 
representative sample of the general population. Indeed, the parents that did attend seemed 
very motivated by the discussion. It was advantageous that within the short period 
available, little time was needed to probe the participants on their experiences of climate 
change because of their prior knowledge, as this was not the aim of the focus group. All 
CNS parents were willing and enthusiastic to share their views.  
 
5.1.1.4   Implementation: the LEAD focus groups 
All recruiting for the LEAD participants went through a contact at the LEAD International 
Office in London. It was suggested that the focus groups should be carried out at the 
annual training event, to be held on the theme of Environmental Governance in February 
2006 in Bhopal, India. Fellows first heard about the focus group events through an email to 
the LEAD list serve and were invited to register their interest. Secondary contact was 
established once in Bhopal, when Fellows were handed out information packs on the focus 
groups at registration. In all, 21 Fellows were interested in taking part and eighteen of 
these actually participated.  
 
The participants were asked to sign up for one of a possible three different time slots, 
arranged around the LEAD timetable to fit in during lunch breaks and before dinner. The 
first group was delayed from starting by an hour due to the late running of the previous 
conference session. Subsequently, only three participants turned up and the group could 
only be convened for twenty minutes. It was deemed good practice to carry out a 
discussion with the three, if only because they were still keen to know what the research 
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involved, so a very short introduction to the project and discussion around the possibility 
of using icons for climate engagement was held. However, the group was too small and far 
too short for a meaningful discussion to develop fully and so this group was not transcribed 
or analysed. The second group was held before dinner and the third in a lunchtime slot. 
These were the only times available to hold the group and were a little shorter than ideal, 
but the participants gave their full focus during the discussion and so in all this was of little 
consequence. Both these sessions were transcribed and analysed.  
 
All sessions were held in a quiet outdoor courtyard away from the main conference, in 
order to minimise disruption from other conference Fellows. The location was neutral and 
in a peaceful setting. A note-taker was available in order to annotate the protocol with 
comments and timings to facilitate the transcription process. This was incredibly useful 
given that the protocol in all three cases had to be modified somewhat to fit with the time 
constraints imposed and thus full attention was needed to direct the content of the 
discussion. 
 
An incentive of Rs. 750/ (£10) was given for attending the focus group. It was thought that 
an incentive would be needed to attract the Fellows, considering the busy conference 
timetable commitments they already had. There was no noticeable difference in the 
recruitment of participants because of the incentive: a wide range of Fellows of different 
nationalities and backgrounds took part. 
 
5.1.2   Icon selection methodology 2: Online survey 
Online surveys have a shorter history in social science research. They are very similar in 
design and aim to postal surveys (see Arksey and Knight, 1999), but have fundamental 
differences in data collection methods and analysis. Surveys provide a quantitative social 
science methodology which is of use for collecting specific data on particular issues. The 
data obtained is often factual, often closed-ended and may allow statistical analysis. 
However, survey methodologies may limit the researcher in gathering richer discussion-led 
data. Although the online survey in this research had a number of closed-questions, 
opportunities to elaborate or comment on questions were provided after several questions 
and at the end of the survey. There exists only a limited literature on the use of the Internet 
in gathering data for academic research as it forms a relatively new method of conducting 
social science research. Discussions of the use of the World Wide Web (WWW)  in 
qualitative research exist in both Nesbary (2000) and Dillman (2000), although it should be 
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noted that both of these sources are several years old, and thus may be likely to contain 
some outdated concepts due to fast progress in technological advances. 
 
The Internet started as a military strategy tool, but quickly crossed into commerce, 
education and communication channels as its potential began to be realised (Nesbary, 
2000). Its use as a research tool in the social sciences is only starting to be recognised 
(Dillman, 2000). The use of the Internet as a research tool has been compared to the 
revolutions of both random sampling in the 1940s and telephone interviewing in the 1970s. 
Dillman has gone as far as to say the revolution may be ‘even more profound’ than both of 
these developments. Nesbary (2000) recognises the ‘tremendous practical application’ of 
the use of the internet for organisational surveys.  
 
The WWW offers several options for data collection. Of all methods, the two most obvious 
are email surveys and web surveys. The former offers a direct approach to known email 
applicants, is often easy to set up and distribute, and allows for easy access to see who has 
completed the survey. The latter allows much more complicated surveys to be set up, often 
unseen to the participant, who can be directed through a particular questioning route 
depending on previous answers. Web surveys can also contain more attractive graphics and 
often a more refined appearance and have the ability to allow the data collected to be 
downloaded straight into a spreadsheet. However, web surveys may not load identically 
through different web browsers and more complicated graphics can take longer to 
download than simple text-only email approaches.  
 
5.1.2.1   Online survey protocol design 
The survey was designed to be easy to complete and to be jargon-free. No more than two 
questions appeared on the same page (apart from drop-down boxes for the participant’s 
personal information on the last page) in order to promote a clear structure and allow 
participants to think fully about one question before completing the next. The graphics 
were relatively basic and were designed to be quick to download even on a standard dial-
up modem. The answers to the questions either appeared in a drop-down Box in standard 
‘open’ form (see Dillman, 2000) or were to be completed in a text Box of the approximate 
size of the expected answer. The survey design allowed participants to go both backwards 
and forwards through the survey questions, and to allow questions to be skipped, ensuring 
participants did not feel they had to answer any particular question before they proceeded. 
The survey was designed to work with both Netscape and Microsoft Explorer. An email 
address and phone number were provided in case of any difficulties in completing the 
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survey, but these were not utilised by any participant. A password was provided on the 
forum thread that had to be inputted to the survey's first page in order for it to load. So, it 
would have been difficult to complete the survey had it been accessed through a search 
engine rather than via the cp.net thread. This ensured to a high a degree as possible security 
that the survey participants were cp.net forum visitors, and hence the participant sample 
pool could be controlled.  
 
The questions were designed to lead the participants through a logical enquiry process. The 
first two questions focussed on the potential impacts of climate change, and the potential 
sources of information available to the participant. The following questions were designed 
to encourage the participant to think about current climate communications and how 
effective they found them. Then the participant was introduced to the idea of 'icons' with 
the following statement: 
 
“At the moment, communications tend to use representations of climate change, or 
'icons' that I think may not be relevant to everyday life. Instead, I would like you to think 
about icons that you would find interesting, and would make you want to know more about 
what happens to it in regard to climate change. For example, the Houses of Parliament 
could be an icon of the British Government - but what would make a good icon of climate 
change?”  
 
Participants were asked to consider which they thought were more effective: local, national 
or global icons, and personal or famous icons – or indeed, if they think thought an icon 
should possess all or none of these qualities. Finally, participants were asked to select their 
personal climate change icons bearing all their previous answers in mind. Participants were 
asked several demographic questions at the end of the survey. The demographic questions 
were strategically positioned to encourage participants not to drop out after they had 
completed all of the survey questions and were not positioned at the start so as to not 
discourage them with personal questions at the beginning of the survey. The participants 
were not asked for their name or address, but were invited to input their email address if 
they wanted to receive a report summary or to be involved in possible further research with 
the project. 
 
At the end of the survey, participants were invited to discuss the issues the survey had 
brought up at a second cp.net discussion board solely for those who had completed the 
survey. This board was not well attended, although some discussions did appear. The idea 
of the second discussion board was more to air views of the survey in a public arena to 
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which I had access to, in case any participants had found a problem with the survey, as a 
form of ethical check. It was not designed in order to carry out a content analysis for 
example, so its low attendance was not of concern. 
 
5.1.2.2   Piloting the protocol 
A pilot online survey was carried out within the School of Environmental Sciences at 
UEA. As well as containing the survey questions designed for cp.net participants, the pilot 
survey also included an open-ended question at the very end of the survey where applicants 
could comment on the survey structure and design. One hundred and forty three responses 
were received in 24 hours, at which point the survey was shut down as the content of the 
comments was reaching saturation. Overall, the survey appeared to be easily understood, 
though some useful comments for adapting the survey were taken into account. These 
included suggestions for the wording of the ‘icon’ question, as well as suggestions for 
making the demographic questions clearer.  
 
5.1.2.3   Implementation through the ClimatePrediction.net forum 
Potential cp.net participants were first introduced to the research in late November 2005, 
via a forum posting from a senior board member. Participants from cp.net were invited to 
the forum discussion board via a link from the main cp.net discussion forum. A note was 
repeatedly posted within the survey thread to keep the thread current and in a prominent 
viewing position so those logging on to the general discussion board would see the thread 
without needing to scroll down. The survey itself went online with a posting in early 
December 05. Once on the thread explaining the survey, forum participants were given a 
brief description of the project aims and a link to the survey.  
 
The survey was originally to be run for three months, but in mid-February 2006 the BBC 
ran a 'Climate Change Chaos' season of programmes (BBC News Online 2006), 
highlighting the work of cp.net and asking the British public to sign up to the experiment. 
It was thought worthwhile to leave the survey active in case this publicity caused a surge in 
participation on the forum board. This did not occur however, so the survey was 
deactivated in early April, having been hosted for four months. Cp.net web authors 
estimated that they had 5,970 participants signed up to the forum at the time of the 
survey17, although it is unlikely that these members were all still current forum-goers at the 
time of the survey.  
 
                                                 
17
 http://www.climateprediction.net/board/, accessed Feb 2006 
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5.2   RESULTS AND ANALYSIS FOR NON-EXPERT ICON SELECTION 
This Section details the analysis procedure for all focus group transcripts and the open-
ended online survey responses and the results from the transcript coding. The results of 
icon selection are discussed in regard to three emerging themes. Finally, the icon selection 
process, and the icons chosen to take forward to the second stage, are described. 
 
5.2.1   Coding of focus group and online survey data 
The focus group discussions were fully transcribed noting participant age, name, 
nationality and occupation. All qualitative open-ended answers from the online survey 
were also entered into a text file. The formatting ‘[…]’ was used to remove time fillers and 
moderator prompts, but only when it did not affect the meaning of the overall sentence. 
Spelling for the open-ended cp.net answers was not altered. These data files were then 
inputted into NVivo (QSR International 2002), a qualitative data management programme. 
In NVivo, categories in the data are called ‘nodes’. Groups of nodes can be classified into 
‘node trees’. There are concerns that using such software enables the creation of too many 
codes and that it can distance the analyst from the data. However, such software has many 
advantages: NVivo provides a useful tool for organising large amounts of qualitative data 
and enables a ‘wide angle view’ to be taken, allows quick searching of large amounts of 
data, as well as providing some kind of audit trail of the classification method used 
(Richards, 1999; St John and Johnson, 2000). 
 
The generation of categories was approached using four different methods (Box 5.1) 
 
 
Box 5.1.   Resources for generating coding categories (from Dey, 1993: p 100) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
• Inferences from the data 
            such as the emergence of the node ‘global village’ 
• Initial or emergent research questions 
            such as ‘what reasoning lies behind icon selection?’  
• Substantive, policy and theoretical issues 
            such as ‘do disaster narratives influence icon selection as may be expected from 
aa        the theoretical literature?’ 
• Imagination, intuition and previous knowledge 
            such as an intuition in the reflective fieldwork diary from the CNS focus group that  
a          a sense of ‘appreciation of nature’ was an important icon selection theme 
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These were either coded ‘bottom-up’ or ‘top-down’. Bottom-up coding (also called open 
coding, see Strauss and Corbin, 1990) involves taking ideas for categorising the data 
directly from the data itself. Top-down coding requires the analyst to pre-define codes 
before starting to code the data either from their own preconceptions or from the literature. 
Here, a ‘middle-order’ approach  (Dey, 1993) was taken to code the reasoning behind icon 
selection, where some preliminary categorisations were made (such as codes ‘economic 
impacts), and then the majority of codes were categorised through a bottom-up approach 
(for example, patriotism). Within the bottom-up categorisations, some were coded ‘in-
vivo’ (in-vivo codes use a phrase in the document to name the code directly from the data). 
These can be identified by the single quotation marks around the code (such as ‘global 
village’). Codes were assigned direct to quotations in the text. Often, quotes would be 
assigned to more than one code, reflecting the different processes and themes drawn from 
the data. The data was coded iteratively and the transcripts of the focus groups and online 
survey re-reading and revising the coding system until no new codes were generated. 
Whilst the reviewing process could conceivably continue ad infinitum, it was felt that no 
new themes would emerge from the data, although the grouping and classification of nodes 
may change between analysts. The codes presented here thus are a reflection of the 
richness and complexity of the datasets. 
 
Throughout this procedure, codes were organised into node trees so the emerging themes 
of the data could be clearly seen. Codes that did not fall under the theme of a node tree 
were left as free nodes. No weighting was given to the different node types as the research 
was designed to be exploratory rather than representative. Attached to each node was a 
description note of how the node was conceptualised and how it had evolved throughout 
the coding process. This process enabled a record to be made of the insights into the 
development of the coding process and ensured transparency. 
 
Data coding allowed the large amount of rich, qualitative data to be investigated against 
seven different criteria (Box 5.2). As well as the actual words used, the frequency of 
comments from a particular participant and the extensiveness of comments from all 
participants on a theme; the context, internal consistency, intensity and specificity of 
comments was also considered in the analysis to expose the main themes of the data.  
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Box 5.2   Analysis considerations for qualitative research adapted from Krueger  .   
.               (1997) 
 
 
 
 
 1. Words: The actual words used and the meanings of the words. 
 
2. Context: Responses are triggered by a stimulus (moderator question or other 
participants). Interpret in the light of the context. 
 
3. Internal consistency: Consideration of any views that may have changed in the 
duration of the research. 
 
4. Frequency of comments: The number of times a participant raises a theme. 
  
5. Extensiveness of comments: How many different participants mentioned a particular 
theme.  
 
6. Intensity of comments: Any special intensity, passion of depth of feeling. 
  
7. Specificity of comments: Responses based on specific experience are given more 
weight than impersonal and vague responses. 
 
    
 
 (adapted from Nicholson-Cole, 2004; originally based on Barry and Proops, 2000)  
 
 
 
 
Coding qualitative data provides a rigorous method of analysing large amounts of rich 
data. Ideally to ensure repeatability and reliability of the analyst’s coding, it should be 
carried out by two separate analysts. As a complete review of the coding was not possible a 
Section of each document, the code set and a description of the research aims and 
methodology was made available to a reviewer. The reviewer was asked to independently 
code the data using the codes provided, but also to add or comment on these codes if they 
were felt insufficient. The reviewer was also asked to comment on the structure of the tree 
and free nodes with reference to the research objectives. The review process led to a 
number of nodes being combined, as the data coded within them was felt to essentially 
contribute to the same code categorisation. A number of nodes were also restructured to 
make the themes of the data appear more clearly. The reviewer felt that each code 
(especially those coded ‘in-vivo’) described accurately what the node contained and that 
the notes attached to these nodes contained a thorough description of the reasoning and 
development behind each node. 
 
5.2.1.1    Reasoning behind participant icon selection 
The three focus group transcripts and the online survey open-ended question responses 
provided a rich resource from which to explore participants reasoning behind different icon 
selections. The nine main categorisations coded from the data are discussed below. 
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5.2.1.1.1   ‘Affects me’ 
There were many icons coded in the 'affects me' node. The reasoning attached to this node 
coded both for climate impacts affecting participants directly and for impacts on others that 
they could empathise with and conceptualise. The node ‘affects me’ was coded in-vivo 
from the statement from Beverly, discussing the possibility of flooding in Norfolk:  
 
“When you realise just how much of your own county would flood, and just disappear, I think it 
does make you a little bit more ‘oh gosh, I’ve got to do something, because this affects me’. 
That you start to act.” (Beverly, CNS) 
 
The theme of ‘affects me’ also included icons where participants thought they and their 
peers would be able to relate to it and find it a salient icon of climate change. For example, 
a LEAD participant considered water supply issues in Nigeria a salient icon: 
 
"If… one of the major dams dried up… by increasing temperature, then everybody will be able 
to relate to it and less electricity." (Abiodun, LEAD). 
 
Within the sea level rise (SLR) icon group, there were a number of different reasonings. 
They ranged from direct statements about SLR and its impact on participant’s countries: 
 
"I live in Gothenburg, Sweden and grew up close to the sea. We do have landrise since the Ice 
Age but if the sea rises faster than that everyone living close to the sea will be affected." (cp.net 
17) 
 
to more indirect reasonings: 
 
1. “Beaches of Brazil. Because it’s a very important thing in peoples lives. And we love beach, and 
then maybe we can say about, uh, with climate change there will be no more place to…” (Maria 
Izabel C, LEAD) “… to go and lay!” (Teresa, LEAD) 
 
As in the literature, participants emphasised that icons had to be targeted at particular 
audiences. For example, whilst icons in the SLR grouping resonated with the participants 
above from Sweden and Mexico, Wang disputed their salience for many Chinese: 
 
“For example for China … sea level is rising. But, for the major area, and the major 
people in China, it is, how to say, is a terrestrial, terrestrial country.” (Wang, LEAD) 
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Many participants noted that climate change as a global environmental issue is seen as 
remote and impersonal. Participants stated how they grappled with choosing icons that had 
saliency to them and their peers. For example, cp.net participant 13 almost chose a photo 
of an extreme high tide on Tuvalu, before abandoning the icon as it would only be 
immediately identifiable to those familiar with Tuvalu’s situation. The perceived distance 
from the issue of climate change (or at least from the impacts) is also demonstrated by a 
CNS participant: 
 
“But it’s [climate change] far more obvious in other countries, isn’t it, like nearer the 
 Arctic Circle, where Polar Bears aren’t being able to cross the water, because it’s not 
 freezing and they… was an article… an article on the news, oh, a few weeks ago, about 
 some Eskimos…” (Janet H, CNS) 
 
A LEAD participant noted that until climate change was a situated risk, she felt individuals 
could not conceptualise the issue. This theme is also found in the literature (as discussed in 
Chapter 3): 
 
"People do not get involved in… global environmental issues until they have the 
consequences of that issue in their house, in their most precious dimensions… which is 
your house, and your children." (Fritzea, LEAD) 
 
 
5.2.1.1.2   ‘The everyday’ 
Linked to the issue of icons as salient if they affected individuals (either physically or 
psychologically) was the theme of ‘the everyday’. The reasoning coded here also sheds 
some light on whether participants consider there to be such an entity as a ‘global’ icon of 
climate change. Unravelling this theme from the discussions revealed that generally 
participants felt that local icons were more salient. However, perhaps some icons existed 
which could induce salience at a global level? Huang summed up one focus group 
discussion thus: 
 
“I think because different cultures have different cultural backgrounds and er, for different 
countries people icons for them are different. For China maybe people are familiar with er, 
maybe this is not a good example, maybe for us is panda? But, um, in other countries, like in, 
in Australia people familiar with koala. But I think maybe the climate change icon at I think at 
a local level, or at a national level, they will have some difference. And some, maybe in the 
universal level, or the world level, there also have some icon that has got common, a 
common sense, like the Olympics everybody knows the five circles resemble all those things. 
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So I think um, different, maybe different countries have their own icons that are of climate 
change.” (Huang, LEAD) 
 
Huang uses the analogy of the Olympic symbol18 as a recognisable ‘icon’ throughout the 
world and infers that perhaps a global icon does exist. Despite this recognition, many of 
the participants argued strongly for icons that connected with individuals’ daily 
experiences. Indeed, even in this statement Huang then concludes that different countries 
perhaps do have their own icons. The limitations of past communication approaches was 
discussed in some detail by LEAD focus group 3, with suggestions made for icons that 
connected more in people’s daily lives: 
  
“…how it affects people in their daily life. I mean, people don't feel it. Sometimes we are 
always using this, this um, this stories of, of polar bears, of, of um, low-lying island, and 
all these things are in distant with peoples daily lives. So, I mean, how do you make it real, 
how do you make this linkage strong enough that people can feel it? is the key.” (Liming, 
LEAD) 
 
Several others in the group backed up this claim, as this quote demonstrates: 
 
“I think that icons have been ineffective because they are far away of most of the people in 
the world. […] So, I think if we use er, some icon more related with our human life, or with 
mega city life, it could be useful, to, to communicate the problem. Something that everyday 
affects the, the life of most people in the world.”  (Maria Isabel R, LEAD) 
 
 “If you want to make some many as people as possible to know the sensitivity of  climate 
 change you should talk with the example influence their normal daily lives.” (Wang, 
 LEAD) 
 
The importance of finding icons that connect with everyday experiences and engender 
saliency is demonstrated by a cp.net participant. 
  
“To trigger a change in my everyday life, a personally important icon on local scale would 
 be probably the best. However, most of the impacts of climate change are on global scale, 
 e.g. "somewhere else" on the world.” cp.net 58 
 
 
                                                 
18
 The five coloured rings represent the five populated continents of the world, united by Olympism and 
willing to accept healthy competition. The six colours that are used representing all the colours that were 
used on nation flags when the emblem was designed in 1913. Source: 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Olympic_symbols (accessed August 2007) 
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5.2.1.1.3   Disaster and fear 
A minority of participants thought an icon with a disaster or frightening message would be 
an effective communicator: 
 
“Something conveying the full threat i.e. death of world, human extinction” (cp.net 59). 
 
“The icon should cause some fear that the daily comfort that we are so often be used is 
gone by the effects of climate change.” (cp.net 42) 
 
“Something dramatic like gondolas in New York!” (cp.net 50) 
 
It is interesting that all quotes coded in this node came from cp.net participants, which was 
a well educated and knowledgeable19 sample group. This focus on frightening messages 
could be due then to this participant group being more aware of past communications 
approaches which have often attempted to use fear as a motivator and thus repeating this 
idea through the icon selection approach. Participants across the other participant groups 
(LEAD and to a lesser extent CNS) disagreed strongly with using fear as a 
communications tool, instead citing examples of icons that engaged with peoples everyday 
life as inducing a sense of saliency (see above). Also, the climate communications 
literature also reinforces this view that frightening or disastrous scenarios are likely to 
promote disengagement (e.g. see Nicholson-Cole, 2004 and Chapter 3).  
 
5.2.1.1.4   Economic impacts 
Another very pragmatic reason for icon selection was the impact of climate change on 
economic issues. Whilst all the groups and some online participants mentioned economic 
issues in respect to climate change in general, only Fritzea (LEAD) specifically cited the 
reason for her icon’s importance as a source of income:  
 
“As it's tourism in the Pacific, is one of the most important sources of income for the country. 
So a climate change would directly affect this patches of beaches.” (Fritzea, LEAD) 
 
However, many of the other participants mentioned impacts on their icon which included 
economic impacts. For example, Stephen (LEAD) alluded to the importance of London as 
an economic force within Britain and thus London as a powerful icon, by first stating that 
East Anglia does not hold this same economic power and so cannot, in his eyes, be an icon. 
                                                 
19
 79% of the sample held an undergraduate degree (The UK national average is 27%) and the majority of 
participants considered they were ‘well informed’ about climate change. 
 111 
Frequently these allusions to economic impacts were through tourism, of which most of 
these came from participants from developing or emerging countries: 
 
“So prime properties on the coastline of Nigeria if you show these, people connect with it, […] 
and when prime lands are being threatened, then I think it's a very suggestive view. They can 
relate, they can understand, because there social conditioned to it […] they see property being 
threatened […] and also the beaches too for tourism.” (Abiodun, LEAD)  
 
5.2.1.1.5   Dramatic imagery 
The codes behind this node tree included ‘powerful imagery’ and ‘extreme impacts’. 
Common to the thread was the participant perception that an entity obviously impacted by 
climate change would form an effective icon. Those quotes coded within this node were 
often concerned with imagery where feelings or emotion were not attached to the entity: 
the potential icon is simply seen as a provider of striking pictures. Icons that did link 
emotion and imagery are discussed under the ‘touches you’ node. The icons occurring in 
this node often coded for ice-based imagery, and were mainly cited as icons by cp.net 
participants20. 
 
“A polar bear, because it lives in polar regions that are melting very fast. The global warming 
is clearly visible in these areas.” (cp.net 14.) 
 
“An iceberg calving. It is climate related, it is immediate, it is powerful / dynamic.” (cp.net 
56.) 
 
“A melting arctic glacier breaking apart and dramatically plummetting into the ocean.” 
(cp.net 46.) 
 
5.2.1.1.6   Emotion and ‘touches you’ 
Particularly in the LEAD focus group 2, some participants were keen to state that to be an 
effective icon, it must ‘touch you’ (Liming, LEAD).  
 
“But if it [icons] for the purpose of really touching people to, to trigger peoples'  
empathy on it, you should have a localised thing, icon.” (Liming, LEAD) 
 
                                                 
20
 It is noted that polar icons are a popular form of dramatic imagery. See for example, the Cape Farewell 
project (Buckland et al., 2006) intended to instigate a cultural response to climate change by bringing 
together artists, writers, scientists, educators and the media for a series of expeditions to the Arctic. 
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“So I think, if the icon can touch the hearts of people then it can you know, have some good 
impressions.” (Huang, LEAD) 
 
For example, Thea (CNS) tried to elaborate on why she had chosen an oak tree as an icon 
of climate change: 
  
“Um, it’s it’s the English countryside, it’s too corny to put into words. It’s what, what gives 
you pleasure…  when you are passing thought the countryside.” (Thea, CNS) 
 
However, it would appear that emotion as a communications tool would need to be used 
thoughtfully. As appeared in the CNS group, Janet felt upset that tigers may disappear 
(whether this is to do with climate change is irrelevant), but the reason it has an emotional 
impact upon her is because she feels she is powerless to do anything: 
 
“…in 50 years, there will be no tigers. I’m not quite sure why that is. I don’t know it’s anything 
to do with climate change, but that sort of thing, that really upsets me really.” […] I feel 
there’s probably nothing really that I can do about that.”  (Janet H, CNS) 
 
Therefore, it would appear that emotion can be a powerful tool, but only if it is used in 
such a way as will still induce saliency.  
 
5.2.1.1.7   The ‘global village’ 
The ‘global village’ node was coded in-vivo from a comment by Ang (LEAD). It is 
interesting as it adds to the discussion on whether an entity such as a global icon exists. 
Ang argues that there should be compassion for other cultures and places, regardless of 
whether this is local or not.  
  
“But icons should be a very deep example, not uh, all the world. It cannot be good. One 
person or one animal. Or one country. Because if Japan was flooded by 1/5 of the land, 
then maybe it would produce a disaster to this country. But we are, have live in the global 
village. So we should care about one country and not only the…” 
 
This reasoning reoccurred in particular reference to penguins – in that, as a global 
community, we should care about the possible impact of climate change on penguins even 
though it may not affect us directly.  
 
“Penguin - it comes from an unpopulated area and therefore belongs to no-one in 
particular but to everyone in general.” (cp.net 23.) 
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A member of the CNS group also expressed such altruistic ideals: 
 
“It’s not ‘what’s in it for me, what’s in it for me locally’, I’m more interested in the third 
world countries […] I’ve got a, you know, a picture of the world and the effect on the 
whole earth is what I’m interested in.” (Janet C, CNS) 
 
In these cases, justification for a global (or at least, a non-local) icon exists. 
 
5.2.1.1.8   Appreciation of nature 
Some participants, particularly those from CNS found species-orientated icons particularly 
salient, with over half choosing icons related to this theme. This may be due to several 
factors, although perhaps the most likely is that the CNS group may have been a more 
environmentally-conscious group of individuals (perhaps more willing to come to a group 
on climate change with no incentive as they had an interest in environmental issues) and 
hence perhaps more likely to choose ‘ecological’ icons. 
 
Reasoning for choosing ecological-type icons were along the theme of an appreciation for 
the fragility of nature, and that humans should minimise their impact upon species. 
 
“Great Barrier Reef. […] The biggest coral reef in the world represents the richness, 
beauty and diversity of a healthy ocean to me.” (cp.net 24.) 
 
“[loss of the Broads and Broadland] It would be a tragedy to the natural world”  (Beverly, 
CNS) 
 
“Plants, flowers, things like that, the interaction of all the insects and nature. If climate 
change is too quick then it upsets the ecosystems…. And that, that bothers me.” (Janet C, 
CNS) 
 
5.2.1.1.9   Patriotism 
Lastly, a number of icons were chosen due to reasons of patriotism: 
 
“It’s also iconic for England, isn’t the rose” (Thea, CNS) 
 
“[loss of the Broads and Broadland] it would be… a loss to people of Norfolk.” (Beverly, 
CNS) 
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[the robin] “It’s a very British bird.” (Alex and Martin, CNS) 
 
Participants found it difficult to fully express why they found this reasoning theme 
valuable. The icon was overall felt to be important and to be salient to them because it was 
deemed part of their cultural heritage and national identity. 
 
5.2.1.2    Pragmatic and intangible themes in icon selection 
Two overarching strands of reasoning are apparent from these nine codes. Here they are 
defined as ‘pragmatic reasoning’ and ‘intangible reasoning’. Pragmatic codes were those 
that involved factual assertions involving practical cause-and-effect situations. Intangible 
reasoning codes were those which involved deeper, emotional or spiritual understandings 
that cannot necessarily be measured physically (Table 5.3). 
 
 
 
Table 5.2.   Pragmatic and intangible reasoning nodes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Pragmatic reasoning codes 
matter-of-fact assertions involving practical 
cause-and-effect situations 
Intangible reasoning codes 
deeper, emotional or spiritual understanding 
that cannot necessarily be measured physically 
‘affects me’ ‘touches you’ / emotion 
‘the everyday’  ‘global village’ 
disaster / fear appreciation of nature  
economic impacts  patriotism 
dramatic imagery 
 
 
 
   
 
 
There is a connection between the pragmatic and intangible sets of codes found in this data 
and the two ‘modes of thinking’ as proposed by Slovic et al. (2004), which in turn stems 
from Epstein’s (1994) argument that individuals understand reality via two interactive, 
parallel processing systems: the rational system which is deliberative and analytical and 
functions using logic and evidence, and the experiential system which understands reality 
as perceived in images, metaphors and narratives to which feelings have become attached. 
Slovic et al. named the two modes of thinking as the ‘experiential system’ and the ‘analytic 
system’ (Table 5.4). These name sets could well be used to describe the two icon code sets. 
The only apparent exception to the similarity with the modes of thinking approach is the 
code ‘dramatic imagery’. This first appears as if it should fall under ‘intangible reasoning’. 
However, the reasoning for icon selection coded under this node were related to imagery 
which participants saw as good communications tools, as opposed to ‘images […] to which 
feelings have become attached’ (Slovic et al. 2004). 
 
 115 
 
 
 
Table 5.3.   Comparison of the experiential and analytic systems (from Slovic et al. .  . 
.                    2004) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Analytic system Experiential system 
Analytic Holistic 
Logical: reason orientated (what is 
sensible) 
Affective: pleasure-pain oriented 
Logical connections  Associationistic connections                          
Behaviour mediated by conscious 
appraisal of events  
. Behaviour mediated by "vibes" from past 
experiences                              
Encodes reality in abstract symbols, 
words, and numbers  
Encodes reality in concrete images, 
metaphors, and narratives              
Slower processing: oriented toward 
delayed action  
More rapid processing: oriented toward 
immediate action                       
Requires justification via logic and 
evidence  
Self-evidently valid: "experiencing is 
believing"                                        
   
 
   
 
 
5.2.2 Defining the criteria for modelling icons 
The previous Section sought to illuminate the icon selection rationale that participants used 
when choosing their personal climate icons. Overall, 141 diverse icons were chosen by the 
participants.  
 
This thesis research is sequential, with each stage of the research building on the last. The 
research questions in Stage 2 of the research (see Chapter 1) investigate the impacts of 
climate change upon the expert and non-expert icons. Each icon was required to have some 
form of research base as in-depth quantitative impact assessments upon each icon were not 
feasible within the timescale of the PhD. The research questions in stage 3 explore non-
expert engagement with expert- and non-expert icons. In order to answer the questions 
posed in Chapter 1 for Stage 3, a comparative evaluation between expert and non-expert 
icons was needed. This evaluation was to be carried out with non-experts, and so needed to 
be straightforward and quick to complete. Thus, only 3 non-expert icons could be taken 
forward to the modelling and evaluative stage due to these methodological and time 
constraints. The criteria in Box 5.1 were considered to ensure that the suite of three icons 
selected represented a cross-Section of icon selection choice approaches. 
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Box 5.3   Criteria for non-expert icon selection* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I. Ease of modelling 
II. Sensitivity to climate change by 2050 
III. Spatial scale of icon 
IV. Pragmatic reasoning 
V. Intangible reasoning 
VI. Frequency of selection 
 
 
 * note that the criteria numbering system is also used for Figures 5.1 to 5.3 
 
    
 
This method was designed to provide a valid, rigorous and transparent semi-quantitative 
method of comparing the different icons using the large volume of both qualitative and 
quantitative data available. The method is based on the IPCC ‘reasons for concern’ 
diagram (IPCC 2001b) and contains six criteria. Apart from criteria VI which plots the 
occurrences of chosen icons, the diagram values are not absolute. The trajectories are 
designed to be viewed as comparable to each other rather than viewed as stand-alone 
values. 
 
Criterion I illustrates the results of a scan of the literature for each potential icon. Icons 
were scored depending on whether much academic literature was available and  a 
judgement was made on how straightforward the icon modelling stage would be. As 
previously stated, the icon modelling stage was not designed in order that new icon models 
would be developed, so it was important that at least a basic scientific literature was 
available for the selected icons21. Whilst this could be argued to be an ‘expert’ construction 
on the deliberately non-expert participatory choice exercise, this information needs to be 
investigated in order to see if it is viable to continue with this icon in the selection 
procedure within the constraints of the thesis. If the iconic approach is adopted beyond this 
PhD, it would be feasible to instigate primary research into icons lacking a scientific 
research base and remove this constraint. Similarly to criterion I, criterion II illustrates the 
results from this literature scan of how sensitive to climate change this icon would be to 
2050. 
 
                                                 
21
 Forty nine icons were excluded from this literature scan and subsequent analysis on the basis of being 
unmodellable, as they were related to abstract ideas or concepts and were not spatially located for example 
the ‘natural environment’ and ‘biodiversity’. Other icons abandoned included ‘George Bush’ and ‘gardening 
programmes’.  
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Criterion III illustrates where the individual icon or icon group lies on a spatial scale. For 
example, SLR ranks highly as an impact which will affect the entire globe, whereas the 
species group ranks lower - as the loss of a species would be a fairly localised event. How 
the icon ranked for both pragmatic and intangible themes is plotted in criteria IV and V. 
Lastly, criteria VI plots the frequency of selection for the icon group or individual icon. 
 
Icons that were not modellable or spatially referenced (i.e., did not fulfil criterion I) could 
not be carried forward to Stage 2 (icon modelling) of the thesis research were discarded. 
This research was specifically interested in investigating the reasoning behind icon 
selection. So whilst Nancy (CNS) wrote ‘birds, toads, frogs, butterflies’ on her icon report 
card, did not give any justification for the choice of these icons and did not volunteer these 
icons to the group discussion. Thus any icons which did not have any associated reasoning 
(i.e., did not fulfil criteria IV or V) were also abandoned from further analysis. 
 
An icon shortlist was then drawn up classifying each individual icon into groups, and 
colour-coding each icon by participant nationality to reduce the complexity of the data. 
This shortlist of icon groups condensed the previous list by reducing individual icons 
chosen more than once into one icon group. Although certain icon groups were more 
dominant than others, the actual individual icons coded into these groups varied. For 
example, although ‘species’ as an icon group choice was popular, with 29%, 8% and 19% 
from CNS, LEAD and cp.net participants respectively, the individual icons within these 
groups were quite different. In particular with this icon group, it was interesting to note 
that for the cp.net participants (arguably the most ‘climate expert’ of the participants) polar 
bears and penguins accounted for 33% of the species group; whereas with the LEAD and 
CNS participants these species accounted for just 8% of the individual species chosen.  
 
5.2.3    Comparing and contrasting icon trajectories 
The remaining 35 icons were then subjected to analysis under these six different criteria I 
to VI. Figure 5.1 plots the trajectories of all the icon groups. Columns I and II will vary 
significantly depending on the type of individual icon. For example, there may only be a 
small volume of literature describing the impacts of climate change on ladybirds in 
Norfolk, but a range of literature exists on the impacts of climate change upon polar bears.  
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Figure 5.2   Icon selection by icon group 
 
The trajectory that SLR (SLR icons which did not mention particular cities or towns) 
follows is consistently high, apart from in column II. Other trajectories that remain fairly 
high include city/town SLR (SLR icons specific to named towns or cities) and species. 
However, the species icon group fares fairly poorly on the pragmatic reasoning, but well 
on intangible reasoning. The city/town SLR is the opposite, with much pragmatic 
reasoning coded to this group, but no intangible reasoning. There are a possible 34 icons 
from these icon groups which could be used in the non-expert icon suite. However of 
these, there are a number of icon groups which follow very low trajectories and hence are 
rejected at this stage. For clarity, these icon groups are not shown in Figure 5.1. The icons 
rejected are listed in Appendix 5.2.  
 
Eighteen modellable icons with at least a reasonably high trajectory now remained. These 
individual icons should also be considered in conjunction with the associated group icons 
(Figure 5.1), because although some individual icons may rank fairly low for criteria IV 
and V, the group overall may rank highly, and thus the group as a whole holds salience for 
a range of people even though many different specific individual icons may have been 
chosen within the group.  Half of the eighteen icons were in either the SLR or SLR in cities 
/ towns group. These nine icons are shown below in Figure 5.2 . It can be seen that the 
SLR icons generally follow a medium to high trajectory for criteria I to IV, but few SLR 
icons rank at all for intangible reasoning.  
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Figure 5.3   Icon selection by individual icon (SLR group icons) 
 
The further nine individual icons (Figure 5.3) are from a variety of different icon groups. 
The trajectories followed are varied with no obvious pattern. Icons maintaining fairly high 
trajectories throughout include Broadland, UK and polar bears. Again, there are several 
icons which did not have any associated intangible reasoning. 
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Figure 5.4   Icon selection by individual icon (all icon groups excluding SLR) 
 
 
5.2.4    Selection of the non-expert icons 
Making a choice of icons to model from the eighteen candidate non-expert icons was a 
difficult process. All ranked highly on either pragmatic or intangible reasoning and in some 
cases on both. Many icons were selected more than once, so were salient with different 
people, perhaps for different reasons. Also, all the candidate icons reaching the final 
selection stage were potentially modellable, either via quantitative modelling or via more 
qualitative means.  
 
The final stage of this research (reported in Chapter 7) was designed to evaluate how the 
non-expert and expert icons connected with individuals from a local Norwich audience. 
Thus, taking into account the literature discussed in Chapter 3 it was decided that to 
maximise the impact of the icons with a local audience a suite of three icons would be 
chosen which would be likely to resonate with a Norfolk audience. Also, the icons chosen 
needed to reflect the emerging themes from the first stage of the research - that icons are 
selected by individuals through their connection with the three different axes of spatial 
scale, pragmatic reasoning and intangible reasoning. Therefore, three icons were selected 
which would be salient with a Norfolk audience and which reflect the diversity in the icon 
selection procedure. A short discussion for each trajectory of the icons not selected for 
further analysis is available in Appendix 5.3. 
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• Non-expert icon 1: the Norfolk Broads 
The first icon selected was the Norfolk Broads, an icon which ranked highly on both 
pragmatic and intangible reasoning, and provides a salient and tangible local icon to 
Norfolk residents. This icon was cited by one participant, but similar icons were coded into 
the SLR group. SLR and flooding found salience with several members of the CNS group, 
who appeared to be very concerned about the future of Norfolk and potential flooding with 
climate change.  
 
• Non-expert icon 2: London and the Thames Estuary 
London was the second icon selected, ranking very highly on pragmatic reasoning but with 
no associated intangible reasoning. It was considered that using London as an icon 
provided a contrast to the Broads through differences in both spatial scale and icon 
selection reasoning.  
 
• Non-expert icon 3: Polar bears 
Lastly, polar bears as an icon followed a fairly high trajectory through the pragmatic 
reasoning, but was slightly lower for intangible reasoning. Polar bears were the most 
frequently cited of all the individual icons mentioned22, although it is interesting to note 
that polar bears and penguins accounted for 33% of the stated icons within the species icon 
group with cp.net participants, but only 8% with the LEAD and CNS groups. Polar bears 
as an icon also links with the reasoning for the icon ‘reduction in polar ice volume’ and 
‘penguins’. Using polar bears as an icon provides an interesting case through which to 
investigate the disagreement in participant views found in the first stage of research around 
global-scale icons. 
 
 
5.3   EXPERT ICON SELECTION METHODOLOGY 
As discussed in Section 5.2.2, the research questions in stage 3 explore non-expert 
engagement with expert- and non-expert icons. In order to answer the questions posed in 
Chapter 1 for Stage 3, a comparative methodology to evaluate the commonalities and 
differences between the expert and non-expert icons was needed, and so a limited number 
                                                 
22
 This may be due in part to the western media (of whom a large proportion of participants would have been 
exposed to) frequently choosing the polar bear as their ‘icon’ for illustrating news stories involving climate 
change. Between 5th November 2005 and 5th April 2006 (the month before and the duration of the cp.net 
survey; and the time all the focus groups were carried out) regional and national UK newspapers mentioned 
polar bears in 106 articles related to climate change and/or global warming. Contrast that with coral reefs - 
another icon which may be considered an icon of climate change, which occurred in 35 articles when used 
with the same search criteria.  
 122
of icons could be taken forward in the research. Three expert icons were taken forward to 
the modelling and evaluative stage due to these methodological and time constraints to 
balance the three non-expert icons. 
 
Chapter 3 concluded by defining a climate icon as: 
 
12. A tangible entity which will be impacted by climate change, considered worthy of respect, and 
to which the viewer can relate to and feel empathy for. 
 
Therefore an expert icon is defined as an entity impacted by climate change, to which 
climate experts consider worthy of assigning prominence to: i.e., the entity takes on iconic 
significance. Chapter 3 summarised the six ‘sleeping giants’ arising from the Avoiding 
Dangerous Climate Change conference (Hadley Centre 2005). The six ‘sleeping giants’ 
provide good examples of expert, ‘top-down’ climate icons. These ‘expert icons’ are also 
frequently cited in the media: perhaps due to the ‘tipping point’ metaphor associated with 
the sleeping giants. These ‘expert icons’ provide an interesting comparison for evaluation 
against the non-expert icons originating from the primary research in this thesis.  
 
The three ‘sleeping giants’ occurring most frequently in the media were used as ‘expert 
icons’ to be carried forward to the next methodological stages of the thesis, based on the 
reasoning that these would carry the most salience with a non-expert audience in stage 3 
(icon evaluation, Chapter 7). Obtaining UK-wide media data (e.g. from local, regional and 
national TV coverage, as well as radio and newspaper coverage) was not possible. 
However, database searches were accessible through the Lexis-Nexis portal for all UK 
national and regional newspapers excluding the Financial Times. As a first approximation, 
it was considered that although the amount of coverage given to environmental narratives 
varies between media sources, the ratio of occurrence in narratives on each ‘sleeping giant’ 
would likely be unchanged across sources (for instance, The Independent newspaper may 
carry more environmental items than Sky News, but the ratio of narratives on the West 
Antarctic Ice Sheet compared to that of ocean acidification would likely be similar from 
both sources). Thus, the Lexis-Nexis database, together with a search of the BBC News 
Online archives, was used as a proxy for the ratio in media coverage for each ‘sleeping 
giant’. 
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5.3.1   Selection of the expert icons 
A search was carried out to find how frequently each ‘sleeping giant’ was mentioned in 
any article in the month preceding the Avoiding Dangerous Climate Change conference. 
All searches looked for ‘climate change’, ‘global warming’ or the ‘greenhouse effect’ 
occurring in any part of a newspaper article, together with any of the key search terms for 
each ‘sleeping giant’. The BBC Online archive was also searched using the same criteria 
(Table 5.2).  
 
 Table 5.4.   Media reporting of the ‘expert icons’ arising from the Avoiding . . . . . . . . . 
.                   Dangerous Climate Change conference, Exeter, UK from 01/02/05 –           
.                   01/03/05 
 
   
 
Search 
terms 
‘Expert icon’ 
Added icon 
search terms 
Count* 
UK 
local/regional 
newspapers 
Count* 
BBC 
online 
WAIS “Antarctic” 21 1 
Ocean acidification “acid” 6 1 
GIS “Greenland” 7 0 
Methane burps “methane” 3 0 
Soils giving up their 
carbon stores 
“Soil” 2 0 
“climate 
change” 
 
OR 
 
“global 
warming” 
 
OR 
 
“greenhouse 
effect” 
THC slowdown 
“conveyor” 
“current” 
“Gulf Stream” 
“ocean” 
“thermohaline” 
22 0 
   
 
 
* Mentioning the term ‘sleeping giant’ or a reference to the Avoiding Dangerous Climate Change 
conference. ‘Expert icons’ highlighted in grey were those selected to take forward to Stage 2 of the 
thesis research. 
 
 
 
There was wide variation between reportage of the six ‘sleeping giants’. The ‘sleeping 
giants’ of methane burps and soils giving up their carbon stores appeared in just 3 and 2 
articles respectively, with neither appearing in any BBC Online articles. Ocean 
acidification and melting of the GIS received coverage in a small amount of articles. The 
‘sleeping giants’ of melting of the WAIS and THC slowdown received the greatest 
coverage with over 20 newspaper articles making some reference. The BBC Online 
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archive returned only two articles referring to the ‘sleeping giants’; one reporting on the 
WAIS and the other on ocean acidification. 
 
The WAIS and THC were taken forward as comparative examples of ‘expert icons’ as they 
occurred far more frequently in the media than the other ‘sleeping giants’, and thus it was 
reasoned would carry more salience. Although there were marginally more articles 
reporting on the GIS than ocean acidification, the information provided for the icon 
evaluation stage for the WAIS would be similar to that on the GIS. In order for a diversity 
of icons to be presented in the evaluative stage, ocean acidification was chosen as the third 
‘expert icon’.  
 
 
5.4   EXPERT AND NON-EXPERT ICON SELECTION CONCLUSIONS 
This Chapter discussed the methodology, results and analysis behind the selection of the 
expert and non-expert icons. First, the Chapter concentrated on the non-expert icons, 
considering the rationale behind participant selection and the methodologies utilised of 
focus groups and an online survey. The results from the coding of the qualitative data 
arising from these two methodologies was then discussed. This Section concluded by 
stating the three non-expert icons as the Norfolk Broads, London and the Thames Estuary 
and polar bears. Each of these three non-expert icons ranks differently across the emerging 
themes of icon spatial scale, pragmatic reasoning and intangible reasoning. Second, the 
Chapter gave the rationale behind choosing three expert icons, for use in the comparative 
evaluation stage (Chapter 7). These expert icons were stated as the WAIS, ocean 
acidification and the THC. The next Chapter is concerned with the modelling of these six 
icons under a specified timeframe and emissions scenario in order to maximise saliency to 
a non-expert audience. 
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CHAPTER 6:  
ICON MODELLING 
 
 
The first Section of the thesis primary research (Chapter 5) discussed the icons selected by 
participants, and presented a method for selecting a suite of expert and non-expert icons. 
The aim of this second Section of the thesis primary research was to gather climate impact 
information in order that coherent and consistent assessments of the impacts of climate 
change on each icon could be presented back to non-experts participants (the collation of 
results illustrating climate impacts on the icons are presented in Chapter 7).  
 
The 6 icons are explored for the Special Report on Emissions Scenario (SRES) A1B, to 
2050, under an assumption of ‘no adaptation’ to climate change. The reasoning for these 
assumptions is discussed in Section 6.1. A range of methodologies were needed to 
investigate the suite of icons with climate change. For the expert icons, impacts were 
explored by undertaking a review of published literature and assessments (Section 6.2: 
Thermohaline Circulation, ocean acidification and West Antarctic Ice Sheet icons). The 
methodologies used to examine the non-expert icons were an expert survey (Section 6.3: 
polar bear icon) and quantitative modelling (Sections 6.4 and 6.5: Norfolk Broads and 
London icons respectively). As discussed in Section 5.2.2, one of the selection criteria (IV) 
for choosing non-expert icons stated that the icon should already have some form of 
research base, reasoning that in-depth quantitative impact assessments upon each icon were 
not feasible within the timescale of the PhD. This did not necessarily imply that 
quantitative modelling of each icon had previously been carried out, but that there was a 
scientific or social-scientific literature basis for assessing the impact of climate change 
upon each icon. The methods discussed below recognise and draw upon past research.  
 
 
6.1   ICON MODELLING ASSUMPTIONS 
The reasoning behind exploring climate impacts on the icons to 2050 under SRES A1B 
assuming ‘no adaptation’ is discussed. The rationale behind the thesis was that once non-
expert icons had been selected, it would be informative to explore how participants 
responded to both non-expert and expert icons. Thus, in order to minimise the information 
to be shown to the participants in stage three of the research, each icon was investigated 
using only one emissions scenario and under one timeframe. Both the timeframe and 
 126
emissions scenario were carefully considered from both a scientific impact assessment and 
a social psychological viewpoint, as discussed below. 
 
6.1.1    Timeframe 
The discussion here which examines difficulties in conceptualising long timescales, links 
back to the discussion on psychological barriers to change in Chapter 3 and to 
understanding of ‘dangerous’ climate change in Chapter 2. As noted by Stehr and von 
Storch (1995), climate change occurs on timescales much longer than the time horizon of 
everyday life, and so responses are needed to a danger which is not yet experienced. As 
discussed in Chapter 3, for effective engagement climate change needs to be situated in 
knowable temporal dimensions. Choosing a specific timescale thus represents some 
difficulties for an interdisciplinary thesis such as this. The timeframe must be sufficient to 
illustrate impacts on the icons of anthropogenic changes in climate, yet must not be so 
distant that the icons lose potential saliency. There is little research on which timeframes 
lay publics find more salient, although Lorenzoni et al. (2000) state that it is ‘self-evident 
but rarely acknowledged’ that non-experts think on the basis of extremely short time 
horizons compared to that on which scientists project climate change. 
 
Few studies have explicitly considered the effect of timeframes on public perception of 
climatic information. When presented with global scenario models extending to the end of 
the century, participants in the ULYSSES project (van der Sluijs, 1999) commented that 
‘they would not be around in 2100’ and thus knowing what would happen in the near 
future was more important than impacts in the long term. Tonn et al. (2006) used a 
snowball internet survey to obtain responses on understanding ‘the future’. They found 
participants thought of a point around 15 years ahead when thinking of the future, and that 
respondents’ ability to imagine the future went ‘dark’ after around 15-20 years. Milligan et 
al. (2006) and Lorenzoni et al. (2000) claimed participants found it difficult to 
conceptualise change over 50-year timescales. Drottz-Sjöberg (2006) found when 
investigating the perceptions of long-term radwaste in Sweden that the public generally 
envisaged a point around 30 years time when thinking of ‘the future’. Participants could 
imagine emotional relationships stretching only around 50-60 years into the future.  
 
Despite the need for an easily conceptualised timeframe, there is also a need for a 
sufficient timescale to illustrate climatic impacts on the icons examined. For example, 
when investigating the impact of climate change on polar bears, the IUCN red list criteria 
states that any projecting of climate change impacts on biodiversity must be over a 
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minimum ten years or three generations, whichever is longer (Akçakaya et al., 2006). 
Since polar bears live to an average of between 15-18 years (Polar Bear Specialist Group, 
2006) there is a need to look over a timescale of at least 45 years. 
 
There is obviously then a dichotomy between the timescales over which the public can 
conceptualise (relatively short) and the potential loss of saliency when using long 
timescales, and a sufficient timeframe needed to illustrate climatic impacts on the icons 
(relatively long). From the few studies that investigate this phenomenon it would appear 
that 50 years forms an upper limit of the ability to conceptualise distant times. A 
preliminary exploration of the climatic impacts on the icons revealed that there was little 
noticeable climatic impact on the icons before the 2050s. Considering impacts to 2050 is 
therefore a compromise between these two opposing factors.  
 
6.1.2    Emissions Scenario 
The climate impacts on the icons were examined for anthropogenic emissions scenario23 
SRES A1B (Nakicenovic et al. 2000b). Although it is generally good practice to use 
several emissions scenarios when assessing consequences of potential climate change 
(Nakicenovic et al. 2000a) this set of impact assessments were carried out with a specific 
communications exercise in mind for stage three of the research. SRES A1B was chosen as 
it presents a middle-range scenario, although it is noted that there is little divergence in the 
SRES scenario projections to 2050. The SRES A1B scenario storyline is of sustained 
future economic growth, a global population that peaks mid-century and declines 
thereafter, and a rapid introduction of new and more efficient technologies. The main 
themes are economic convergence amongst regions, techno-scientific capacity building and 
increased social and cultural interactions. There is a substantial reduction in regional 
differences in per capita income. Energy use is balanced across all sources, not relying on 
any particular energy source too heavily (see Nakicenovic et al. 2000b).  
 
6.1.3    No adaptation 
An assumption for all icon impact assessments undertaken within the thesis is that of ‘no 
adaptation’. It is extremely difficult to project adaptive response, especially over such a 
wide-ranging set of icon impact assessments and out to 2050. Whilst research that ignores 
or assumes no adaptation is likely to overestimate residual or net impacts and 
                                                 
23
 A scenario is defined as ‘a projections of a potential future, based on a clear logic and a quantified 
narrative description, highlighting the main narrative characteristics and dynamics, and the relationships 
between key driving forces’ (Nakicenovic et al., 2000b). 
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vulnerabilities, studies that assume full and effective adaptation are likely to underestimate 
residual impacts and vulnerabilities (IPCC 2007c). However, issues around adaptation are 
not the primary focus of this thesis so whilst limits to this approach are acknowledged, the 
assumption of ‘no adaptation’ was adopted as it is a baseline that can easily be projected 
for all icon impact assessments, and thus could allow effective comparison between the six 
icons in stage three of the research.  
 
 
6.2   INVESTIGATING CLIMATE IMPACTS ON THE EXPERT ICONS 
The expert icons had a significant associated body of scientific literature (of course, this 
was part of the reasoning in selecting these icons as ‘expert’ icons). Thus, the relevant 
literature is simply summarised here, in order that an impression of the impact of climate 
change upon the expert icon under this timescale and scenario can be considered. 
 
6.2.1    The Thermohaline Circulation 
What is referred to as the ‘Thermohaline Circulation’ (THC) or ‘short-hailed’ as the ‘Gulf 
Stream’, are both colloquial terms for the Meridional Overturning Circulation (MOC) 
(Schmidt, 2006). The THC is the term of choice for scientific parlance in public spheres 
(for example, it was referred to as such in the Exeter Conference on Avoiding Dangerous 
Climate Change, 2005; from which these expert icons were selected). Indeed, until the 
IPCC Fourth Assessment Report (4AR) (2007) the term MOC was not widely used in non-
scientific discourses. The term THC is used instead of the MOC as it is more accessible to 
non-experts, being named as such in some popular narratives (e.g. Hawkes and Nuttall 
1997; Righter 2005; McCarthy 2006) unlike the MOC24. It is acknowledged that the term 
THC is not used as extensively as the term ‘Gulf Stream’. Here though, the term THC is 
used instead of the Gulf Stream as it represents a more scientifically defensible term.  
 
When the term THC is used in this way, it refers to the inflow of warm, saline upper-ocean 
water from the southern oceans which gradually increase in density due to cooling as they 
move northwards into the North Atlantic. This water body also freshens, which reduces the 
density increase. As the water body reaches the Nordic and Labrador Seas, it is subject to 
deep convection, sill overflows and mixing. Through these processes, North Atlantic Deep 
Water is formed which constitutes the southward flowing lower limb of the MOC (IPCC 
2007b). The transport of heat and freshwater by ocean currents can have an important 
                                                 
24
 see Jennings, N. (2008) From laboratory to policy: the case of the collapse of the Thermohaline 
Circulation. PhD Thesis, University of East Anglia, UK. 
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effect on regional climates: there is evidence for a link between the MOC and abrupt 
climatic changes over the past 120 000 years. A number of abrupt oscillations, such as the 
8.2 ka cold event found in palaeoclimatic records, may have been caused by changes in the 
ocean circulation (IPCC 2007b). 
 
The concern over the impact of climate change on the THC refers to the likelihood of this 
circulation weakening or ‘collapsing’. The public may be aware of the phenomenon 
through popular narratives such as the film The Day after Tomorrow (Emmerich , 2004). 
However, the IPCC state that although it is likely that the MOC will reduce over the 21st 
century, it is very unlikely to undergo an abrupt transition over this period. Nevertheless, 
the occurrence of an abrupt ocean circulation change such as this does becomes more 
likely as the climate system is increasingly perturbed (IPCC 2007b). 
 
6.2.2 Ocean acidification 
Ocean acidification has only recently emerged as a phenomenon of serious scientific study, 
but has the potential to affect a wide range of marine biogeochemical and ecological 
processes in potentially non-linear and complex ways (Turley et al. 2006). The process of 
ocean acidification refers to the uptake by the ocean of anthropogenic carbon in the 
atmosphere in an equilibrium reaction, leading to the ocean becoming more acidic with an 
average decrease of 0.1pH25 in surface waters being observed since pre-industrial times 
(IPCC 2007b). Dissolved CO2 forms a weak acid, so as more CO2 is emitted into the 
atmosphere, the ocean contains greater amounts of dissolved CO2 and hence the pH of the 
water decreases.  
 
The oceans represent an enormous reservoir of carbon, greater than either the terrestrial or 
atmospheric systems (Turley et al., 2006). Fluxes between atmosphere and oceans are 
relatively rapid, such that the oceans have taken up around 50% of the total CO2 released 
to the atmosphere over the last 200 years (Turley et al., 2006). Calderia and Wickett (2003) 
conclude that if CO2 emissions continue unabated, the ocean may experience pH changes 
that are greater than any experienced in the past 300 million years, with the only possible 
exception relating to rare, catastrophic events in Earth’s history. 
 
The acidification process has changed the saturation state of the oceans with respect to 
calcium carbonate (CaCO3) particles (Feely et al., 2004). At present, the surface ocean is 
                                                 
25
 Acidity is a measure of the concentration of H+ ions and is stated in pH units, where pH = -log(H+ ). A pH 
decrease of 1 unit therefore indicates a 10-fold increase in the concentration of H+, or acidity (IPCC, 2007a) 
 130
saturated with respect to CaCO3, but decreasing ocean pH is impacting on the level of 
CaCO3 saturation (Orr et al., 2005). Key marine organisms such as corals and some 
plankton build their exoskeletons from CaCO3. If under-saturation occurs, these organisms 
will have difficulty maintaining their exoskeletons as their shells begin to dissolve in the 
more acidic waters (Orr et al., 2005). Most living organisms reside near the surface where 
the greatest pH changes would be expected to occur, although deep-ocean biota may be 
more sensitive to pH changes (Caldeira and Wickett, 2003). Southern Ocean surface waters 
are predicted to become undersaturated in aragonite, a form of CaCO3, by 2050. By 2100 
this undersaturation could extent throughout the entire Southern Ocean and into the 
subarctic Pacific Ocean (Orr et al., 2005). Simulations of the North Sea suggest that by 
2050 some areas will experience a pH range completely distinct from current levels. By 
2100, much of the North Sea will have a distinct pH range from today (Blackford and 
Gilbert, 2007). 
 
6.2.3 The West Antarctic Ice Sheet 
Palaeo-records indicate that ice sheets shrink in response to warming and grow in response 
to cooling, and that shrinkage can be much faster than growth (IPCC, 2007). Ice core data 
indicates that ice sheets can respond to changes over very long timescales. A rise in 
temperature now could take more than 10,000 years to penetrate to an ice-sheet bed. 
Mercer (1978) first proposed that anthropogenic climate change could eventually lead to a 
rapid deglaciation of a large part of the West Antarctic Ice Sheet (WAIS). If WAIS were to 
melt, it would add about 5m to sea level (IPCC 2007b). WAIS is vulnerable because it 
rests on a bed which is mostly below sea level. If the ice sheet were to lose contact with the 
bed, then there would be a reduction in the force that restrains ice-flow. Ice-flow could 
then accelerate and leave an imbalance between outflow and replenishment by snowfall. 
The imbalance would also cause thinning of WAIS at the point where it begins to float, 
allowing this point to retreat inland. At present, the ice sheet is anchored to the bed because 
it is too thick to float (see Vaughan, 2007).  
 
There is much uncertainty associated with the impact of climate change on the WAIS, due 
both to a scarcity of observational data and to incomplete knowledge of ice dynamics 
physics (Rapley, 2007). An expert elicitation undertaken by Vaughan and Spouge (2002) 
indicated that only a few glaciologists consider it likely that a complete collapse of WAIS 
could occur within a few centuries. Most considered it was possible over a thousand-year 
timeframe. Current models suggest that the WAIS will remain too cold for widespread 
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melting and the Antarctic Ice Sheet may indeed gain mass through increased snowfall 
(IPCC, 2007).  
 
6.3 Investigating climate impacts on polar bears  
Polar bears (Ursus maritimus, Phipps) are the biggest species of bear in the world, with 
males up to 3m long and weighing up to 1000kg. They are at the top of the Arctic food 
chain, having no predators except humans. Their primary food is ringed seal (Phoca 
hispida, Schreber), although they also prey on bearded seal (Erignathus barbatus, 
Erxleben) (Amstrup, 2006). Polar bear populations are located throughout the Arctic 
(Figure 6.1). Their range is limited to areas in which the sea is ice covered for much of the 
year, and are most abundant in shallow-water areas near the shore and at polynya26 where 
currents and upwellings increase productivity and stop the ice cover from become too thick 
(Stirling, 1997). Because polar bears hunt marine prey, the population extent varies with 
sea ice cover.  
 
Polar bears rarely venture onto land except in regions such as Hudson Bay. Here, where 
the sea ice melts and the bears are forced onto land for several months they may forage for 
berries, but are generally not adapted to life on land, being unable to efficiently digest 
these different nutrition sources. When denning, female bears fast for a period of up to four 
months whilst they give birth and feed their young. Bears that come ashore such as those in 
the Hudson Bay area also fast for up to four months until the ice sheet has reformed 
(Derocher et al., 2004). In the recent past, the main threat to polar bears was over-harvest, 
but this has been largely corrected through management regimes involving all countries 
with polar bear populations. The biggest threat to polar bears is now climate change (Polar 
Bear Specialist Group, 2006).  
 
There six main population groups are the Chukchi Sea group on Wrangel Island and 
western Alaska, the Northern and northwestern Alaska and northwestern Canada group 
(also referred to as the Beaufort Sea population), the Canadian Arctic Archipelago group, 
the Greenland group, the Spitzbergen-Franz Josef Land group and the Central Siberian 
group (Amstrup, 2006). They are more common in the Chukchi and Beauford Seas, Baffin 
Bay and in the Canadian Arctic Archipelago. Of these six main groups, several are studied 
more intensively than others. For example, linkages between climate change and polar bear 
populations were first proposed for the Hudson Bay population, which has been intensively 
studied for thirty years or more. 
                                                 
26
 A polynya is a space of open water in the midst of ice, found especially in Arctic seas (OED Online, 2006) 
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Figure 6.1   Winter polar bear distribution (light grey) and denning areas (hatched) 
(Amstrup, 2006)  
 
Polar bears Ursus maritimus are frequently used as an iconic species in the communication 
of climate change by the media (e.g. Debnam 2007; Pearce 2006). Popular articles 
frequently suggest a rapid and alarming decline in polar bear populations under climate 
change. It is not clear, however, that these articles represent the range of views held by the 
expert community. Current scientific evidence indicates that most populations of polar 
bears are either stable or increasing, and that the likely extent of the population declines 
under climatic warming is uncertain (Stirling & Derocher 1993; Stirling and Parkinson 
2006). Only in certain regions such as in western Hudson Bay (Stirling & Parkinson 2006) 
and Svalbard, Norway (Derocher, 2005) have relationships been drawn between bear 
populations and climate change, although it has been established that there is a highly 
significant relationship between the date of sea-ice break-up and the condition of bears 
when they go ashore (Derocher et al., 2004).  
 
6.3.1   Sea ice and the relationship to polar bear ecology 
Climatic warming is predicted to impact on the timing of sea ice break-up and formation as 
well as its distribution in the Arctic. All climate models used in the Arctic Climate Impact 
Assessment predict a decrease in Arctic sea ice extent and sea-ice thickness over the 21st 
Century (ACIA 2005). A rapid acceleration in Arctic warming has also been detected in 
recent satellite data (Comiso 2003) with the annual mean and summer minimum ice extent 
declining respectively from 1978/79 at a rate of 2.7 and 4.7% per decade (Lemke et al., 
2007). It has been projected that by 2050, except for the most northerly parts of the 
Canadian Arctic Archipelago and Greenland, the average minimum extent of sea ice will 
be several hundred kilometers north of continental coastlines (Comiso, 2003). This has 
important implications for polar bears, who favour habitats on ice over the continental 
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shelf rather than over the deeper waters of the polar basin where there is a lower biological 
productivity (Derocher et al., 2004). In more southerly areas such as Hudson Bay, ice 
cover may disappear by mid-century (Gough and Wolfe, 2001).  
 
Possible changes in sea-ice include variables such as reduced total sea ice area, reduced sea 
ice duration, thinner ice, smaller ice floes, a greater area of open water, altered snow cover 
and increased rates of ice drift (Derocher et al., 2004). A continuing decrease in sea-ice 
distribution and thickness can be expected to impact negatively on polar bears, as the sea-
ice provides a platform for travel and hunting, mating and in most cases, for maternal 
denning, so changes to its distribution, characteristics and timing have the potential to have 
profound effects (Stirling and Derocher, 1993).  
 
Polar bears are particularly abundant on the near shore annual ice over the continental shelf 
where biological productivity is highest and it is these sea-ice habitats that are, in 
particular, projected to be impacted by climatic warming. This will affect polar bears 
through the availability of seals, their main prey (Derocher et al., 2004). Decreases in the 
amount of snow, or an increase in winter rain, could mean there is not enough snow for the 
construction of seal pupping lairs, or that lairs collapse.  Although this initially leads to an 
increase in easily-available prey to the polar bears, the seal pups are not mature and lack 
the nutritional value of an adult seal, and will likely lead to an increase in the number of 
starving bears later in the season (Rosing-Asvid, 2006). So whilst warming could briefly 
increase seal numbers in the short term, the reduction in sea ice will eventually lead to a 
decline in seal populations, a reduction in the fat intake of the polar bears and a lowering of 
their fecundity. Confounding problems of fasting for longer on land, bears also have less 
time on the ice in order to hunt for seals as the sea ice breaks up earlier during the most 
important feeding time of late spring and early summer (Derocher et al., 2004), also 
leading to a lowering of bear fecundity. It is postulated that this could happen in Hudson 
Bay by 2012 if the linear decline on body mass and ice break up continues (Derocher et al., 
2004).  
 
Radio-tracked female polar bears have shown a high degree of fidelity to a particular area, 
continuing to hunt in areas of disintegrating sea ice, rather than travelling to areas where 
ice still remains (Stirling et al., 1999). This will lead to an increase in the expenditure of 
energy on swimming to maintain contact with preferred habitats (Derocher et al., 2004). 
Similarly to seal lairs, polar bear denning could also be adversely affected. Rain and 
increased air temperature could cause snow dens to collapse. Thus, dens may become 
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opened to ambient conditions causing a loss of the thermal insulative properties of the den 
to the litter within (Polar Bear Specialist Group, 2006).   
 
Despite the ability of bears for adaptive behaviour, the specialised nature of polar bears 
coupled with the rapid changes projected for the Arctic puts the bears at risk (Derocher et 
al., 2004). Changes in the sea-ice distribution, characteristics and length of the ice-free 
season could have ‘profound impacts’ on bears (Stirling & Derocher, 1993).  
 
6.3.2   Exploring the impact of SRES A1B to 2050 on polar bear populations 
A range of modelling techniques are available to predict the impacts of environmental 
change on species distribution and abundance (see Sutherland 2006). Of the range of 
modelling approaches available, phenomenological models and, in particular, stochastic 
population viability analysis (PVA) has been used most extensively to determine the 
likelihood of future polar bear population decline for particular subpopulations (Aars et al., 
2006). PVA relies on the availability of recent quantitative estimates of abundance, 
density-dependence, as well as survival and reproduction parameters. Reliable estimates of 
these parameters are not available for all populations, such as the Barents and Chukchi 
Seas. Furthermore, it is difficult to extrapolate to novel conditions, especially a long time 
into the future, as it is not known how the parameters will change (Aars et al., 2006). 
Consequently the predictions of PVA models are often contentious (Brook et al., 2000). 
 
The projection of polar bear population dynamics under climatic warming is an 
ecologically complex issue involving many unknown variables, and is associated with 
considerable uncertainty. In such cases, conventional approaches to modelling polar bear 
population dynamics such as extrapolation, PVA or climate envelope modelling are not 
satisfactory, both because the required data are not available, and due to the long time 
periods involved. With a lack of available data and considerable uncertainty surrounding 
all aspects of the problem, expert opinion is perhaps the only available method for 
assessing future risks to polar bear populations.  
 
Expert judgement is not intended to be a substitute for definitive scientific research 
(Morgan et al. 2001), but to define the ranges of uncertainty surrounding a given response. 
Expert opinion combines scientific information with judgement, intuition, belief or gut-
feeling, in common with other predictive fields such as weather forecasting or economic 
prediction (Vaughan & Spouge, 2002). Expert opinion is of value for management 
decisions where uncertainty is high and where there is a lack of empirical data to assess 
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uncertainty. It can make knowledge available that may not be easily accessible otherwise 
(van der Sluijs et al., 2004). Expert opinion can illustrate the state of current knowledge, 
illuminate areas of greater or lesser agreement and help to drive future applied research.  
 
Expert opinion is increasingly used as a method for assessing evidence and uncertainty. 
There are numerous examples of surveys of expert opinion, both investigating non-
contingent and contingent phenomena. A non-contingent investigation (i.e. where the 
phenomena under consideration is unaffected by human activity, and where one particular 
response is ‘correct’; whether this number is eventually known or not) includes studies 
such as investigating aerosol forcing (Morgan, 2006) and the possibility of West Antarctic 
ice sheet collapse (Vaughan & Spouge, 2002). Surveys of expert opinion have also been 
undertaken for contingent phenomena (i.e. where the phenomena under consideration will 
be influenced by human activity, and hence where there is no ‘correct’ response because 
the outcome for the phenomena in question depends on human influences which have not 
yet occurred). Population response to climate change is such a contingent phenomena. 
Examples of expert surveys investigating contingent phenomena include forest ecosystem 
change (Morgan et al., 2001) and the risk assessment of herbicide-tolerant oilseed crops 
(von Krauss et al., 2004).  
 
A survey of expert opinion was undertaken in order to investigate the trends, variance and 
consensus (or lack of it) in current expert opinion on polar bear population dynamics, using 
a robust and systematic methodology27. This survey of expert opinion was the first 
undertaken for assessing risk to a particular species. 
 
6.3.3 Expert survey design 
Members of the IUCN Species Survival Commission Polar Bear Specialist Group (PBSG) 
were approached to take part in the expert survey through an email sent by the PBSG 
chairman in December 2006. A cover letter (Appendix 6.1) and information sheet 
(Appendix 6.2) were attached to the email. Attempts to increase participation were made 
using follow-up emails and telephone calls. Experts were not asked to contribute views on 
climate change, but for contributions on polar bear population dynamics under a specified 
climate future. The survey was designed to gather responses on eight issues (Appendix 
6.3). Experts were asked to identify the three greatest threats to polar bear populations over 
the next fifty years. The body of the survey then obtained responses on the direction of 
change in polar bear populations and the associated uncertainties. Experts were asked to 
                                                 
27
 Much of what follows is based on O’Neill et al. (2007, Journal of Applied Ecology: submitted). 
 136
provide responses as a percentage change in range and population across the Arctic as a 
whole and in five specific regions. Lastly, experts were asked for their definition of ‘best 
conservation practice’ and its potential impact on population change across the Arctic. 
Participants were also asked to assess their own expertise in both climate science and 
population ecology. 
 
Experts were asked to provide their responses with reference to supporting material on sea-
ice change. This comprised two maps of projected sea-ice cover change for March and 
September, the months of maximum and minimum Arctic sea-ice extent respectively, a 
map of the change in the length of the ‘ice-free season’ and a map defining the regions 
under consideration (see Appendix 6.3 for all Figures). The ‘ice-free’ season was defined 
for each grid cell of the climate model’s sea-ice component, as the maximum monthly 
sequence for which monthly mean sea-ice concentration remained below 50%, a threshold 
chosen as polar bears are known to abandon sea ice under such conditions (following 
Etkin, 1991). 
 
The sea-ice information used to construct the maps and time series was diagnosed from the 
large database of general circulation model (GCM) based climate models from phase 3 of 
the World Climate Research Programme’s Coupled Model Intercomparison Project 
(CMIP3; http://www-pcmdi.llnl.gov).  This database of model simulations has been used 
extensively in the IPCC 4AR (see IPCC 2007). All of the GCMs for which monthly sea-ice 
concentration data were at the time available for the historic period and for the 21st century 
under the A1B scenario were used, except for one model that exhibited an unaccountable 
step-change in sea ice between the 20th and 21st centuries. For most GCMs, an ensemble of 
simulations under the same scenario was available; in these cases, an average of all 
ensemble members was used. Finally, a multi-model average of all 16 models was taken 
(Appendix 6.4 for GCMs used). 
 
Polar bears are long-lived species (DeMaster & Stirling, 1981): whilst one or two years 
with reduced sea ice extent may impact survival, reproduction or body condition during 
those particular years, such small-scale variation would be unlikely to have an effect in the 
long run on overall population dynamics. Thus five time-series of projected changes to 
2050 were embedded in the survey for each of the five specific regions to incorporate 
plausible inter-annual variability. The ECHAM5/MPI-OM GCM (Max Plank Institute for 
Meteorology, Hamburg) was chosen to provide the regional time-series on the basis of 
three criteria: first, because of its faithful simulation of the present-day annual cycle of 
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Arctic ice extent; second, because it simulates a change in Arctic sea-ice extent close to the 
multi-model mean of the change in Arctic ice extent (i.e. the model is not an outlier); and 
third because of the model’s relatively high horizontal resolution (1.5° latitude and 
longitude) of the sea-ice component. The regions were defined to be as closely aligned, as 
the GCM grid allowed, to specific populations as described by the PBSG. 
 
6.3.4 Piloting and implementation of the expert survey 
The survey was iteratively refined, and was piloted with four researchers specialising in 
population ecology. No major changes were made to the protocol after piloting. 
Participants were given three weeks during January 2007 to complete the first iteration of 
the questionnaire. Experts were asked to give responses using a Box-plot question format, 
based on an expert survey instrument devised by Granger Morgan et al. (2006).  
 
The Box-plot questions first requested participants to provide the 5% upper and lower 
confidence bounds first, rather than the best estimate. This was to minimise ‘anchoring and 
readjustment’ (Morgan et al., 2001) whereby participants first provide their best estimate, 
and then draw outer bounds narrowly around this best estimate, rather than first imagining 
the range that their uncertainty estimate may fall between.  
 
There is a general tendency towards overconfidence when providing estimates for 
probability distributions (Morgan et al., 2001). The distributions given tend to be too 
narrow, and do not encompass the true range of uncertainty that may exist. Even if 
calibration questions are used in a survey to demonstrate this overconfidence, or if 
participants are thoroughly briefed on the relevant psychological literature, participants 
may continue to be overconfident in their predictions (Morgan et al., 2001). Given the time 
constraints and the lack of evidence that either of these approaches are particularly 
successful, an attempt to de-bias the responses was made by briefly explaining the routine 
bias towards overconfidence before the survey began. After the experts had given upper 
and lower 5% confidence bounds for the first Box-plot question, they were again reminded 
of the tendency towards overconfidence, and asked to reconsider their responses and adjust 
them if they considered their previous responses range too narrow. 
 
Absolute population totals, especially in some of the regions examined, are quite uncertain. 
For this reason, participants were asked to give their responses as a percentage change in 
range or population relative to today, rather than in hectares or absolute numbers of bears. 
Five confidence bounds were requested: 
 138
E1    lower confidence bound (corresponding to the 5% confidence bound) 
E2    mid-lower confidence bound (corresponding to the 25% confidence bound) 
E3    best estimate (corresponding to the 50% confidence bound) 
E4    mid-higher confidence bound (corresponding to the 75% confidence bound) 
E5    upper confidence bound (corresponding to the 95% confidence bound) 
 
Absolute lower and upper bounds were not requested as polar bear population dynamics 
are contingent upon so many other factors apart from climate change. Experts were 
therefore requested to quantify only ‘reasonably extreme’ outcomes, rather than 
‘absolutely extreme’ ones. 
 
Selecting experts for a survey of expert opinion can be a controversial procedure, as the 
choice of participants will invariably affect the results. However, in this case, a pre-defined 
group of experts was already available through the PBSG. Experts were offered an 
honarium of £50 donated to a polar bear charity if they participated. Recruitment was via 
email with an endorsement by the PBSG Chairman to seventeen permanent members or 
researchers closely affiliated to the work of the PBSG. Eleven experts (Box 6.1) agreed to 
participate (with one later withdrawing due to time commitments). Two experts did not 
respond and four experts declined to participate. Reasons for non-participation were time 
constraints, or because of a self-stated lack of expertise. 
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Box 6.1. Participants in the polar bear expert survey* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Participant Institute 
Andrei Boltunov All-Russian Institute for Nature Protection 
Andrew Derocher University of Alberta, Canada 
Aqqalu Rosing-Asvid Greenland Institute of Natural Resources 
Erik Born Greenland Institute of Natural Resources 
Jon Aars Norwegian Polar Institute 
Lily Peacock Government of Nunavat, Canada 
Martyn Obbard Ontario Ministry of Natural Resources, Canada 
Mitch Taylor Government of Nunavat, Canada 
Øystein Wiig Zoological Museum, University of Oslo, Norway 
Stanislav Belikov All-Russian Institute for Nature Protection 
  
 
 
 
 
* Note that the expert numbers used in the Chapter text are randomly assigned 
 
    
 
 
 
None of the experts expressed doubts regarding the validity of using expert judgement, 
which contrasts with other studies (e.g. Vaughan & Spouge, 2002). It could be 
hypothesised that this is because expert judgement has played a significant, but informal, 
role to date in the ecological field (Sutherland, 2006), and thus ecologists may feel more 
comfortable than experts from other disciplines with combining judgement and intuition 
with scientific information. 
 
The Delphi method28 is being used here as a technique for combining expert judgements 
for a risk analysis (Vaughan and Spouge, 2002). It was not the aim to reach consensus on 
each of the eight questions posed.  Rather, the Delphi method was used so that participants 
could view their responses to each specific scenario anonymously against others in the 
research community, allowing the chance to reflect both on the information given and 
other expert responses. 
 
Once the first round of responses had been received from all participants, results were 
collated. Each expert was allocated a participant number so they could identify the Box-
                                                 
28
 The Delphi Method is a systematic method of obtaining projections from a group of independent experts. 
Results from each round are collated by a facilitator and re-sent to participants. Participant identities remain 
anonymous throughout. Often, the process is stopped when consensus is reached on a particular issue. For the 
polar bear expert survey, the process was halted once no new responses were received from participants. 
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plot of their individual response for each question against those of the group (as for Figures 
6.2 to 6.6, but without the group median Box-plot). The collated results were then sent 
back to the experts and everyone was asked to view their answers in the light of those of 
the group as a whole, and reply via an online form if they wished to reassess any of their 
responses. Only one expert chose to do this; many of the others e-mailed to express interest 
in the collated results, stating that whilst they had reviewed their responses they were 
satisfied with their contributions and did not wish to change them. The results were again 
collated and re-sent to the expert group for a third round. None of the experts chose to 
change their responses in the third round and thus the survey closed. 
 
Combining expert judgements is controversial, since the percentage of experts holding a 
given view is not proportional to the probability of that view being correct (Keith, 1996). 
Although a number of methods of combining judgements exist (Sutherland, 2006) simpler 
aggregation methods generally perform better than more complex methods such as 
weighting individual views (Clemen & Winkler, 1999), and provide a useful overview of 
the current state of expert opinion and associated uncertainties. It is the aim in aggregating 
the results to display the diversity and commonalities of opinions on polar bear population 
dynamics. Therefore, the collated results are shown as individual expert Box plots (Figures 
6.2 to 6.6), which demonstrate the trends, uncertainty and variance in opinion. The final 
Box plot is the median value from all expert responses. The mean is not used in order to 
avoid the skew that may be introduced by a minority of extreme individual views.  
 
6.3.5 Expert survey results 
The three main threats to polar bear populations over the next fifty years were viewed as 
climate change, hunting and pollution. Many of the specific concerns listed could also be 
linked to climate change, for example the future availability of permafrost for maternal 
denning. Other salient concerns included the increasing frequency of human-polar bear 
interactions due to climatic warming, perhaps leading to an increase in ‘defence kills’.  
 
It is evident from all Box plot responses that although the range of uncertainty varied, most 
experts were willing to express wide uncertainty bounds. 
 
The experts indicated a negative trend in polar bear range across the Arctic as a whole by 
2050 (Figure 6.2). The median best estimate for range change across all experts was for a 
33% decline, relative to 2007. Individual expert best estimates ranged from no change, to a 
70% decrease, with half the experts projecting at least a 30% decline. There was a large 
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amount of uncertainty surrounding the projections of polar bear range, evidenced by expert 
responses between the absolute upper and lower confidence bounds spanning 125%. 
Although responses from experts 1 and 10 are significantly different to the main body of 
expert responses, their responses do overlap in at least part of the range of experts 2-8. 
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Figure 6.2   Projected change in polar bear range relative to today under current management 
practice. Projections were undertaken for SRES emissions scenario A1B to 2050. Each ‘Box-plot’ 
represents the views of an individual expert; the error bars indicate the expert’s 5% and 95% 
confidence bounds, the Box spans the 25% and 75% confidence bounds, and the central line the 
expert’s ‘best estimate’. An average Box plot of all the expert views is given on the right. 
 
In considering where there was most likely to be a change in range, experts specifically 
named Hudson Bay, the Beaufort Sea, Baffin Bay, the Davis Straight, the Barents Sea, the 
Chukchi Sea and the Laptev Sea. Of these, the Barents Sea was mentioned by six experts 
and the Chukchi Sea by four. Five experts either specifically named Hudson Bay, or 
discussed range changes in more southerly populations. 
 
Projections on changes in total polar bear population size were very similar to projections 
regarding changes in total habitat area (Figure 6.3a). Experts identified a potential negative 
trend in polar bear population across the Arctic, with a median best estimate of a 28% 
decrease, relative to 2007. Eight of the ten best estimates were a 20% decrease or more in 
polar bear population size. As with estimations of polar bear range, there exists a large 
amount of uncertainty surrounding projections of population. Expert 1 projected an upper 
confidence bound of a 30% increase in population size relative to today. In contrast, expert 
3 suggested a lower confidence bound as a 95% decrease in population: an overall 
uncertainty range of 125%. Changes in population size were considered to be most likely 
in the same areas as those experiencing changes in range, with the Barents and Chukchi 
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Seas both named by five experts, and Hudson Bay and the Beaufort Sea named by four 
experts.  
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Figure 6.3   Projected change in total polar bear population relative to today under (a) current 
management practice (b) expert-defined ‘best management practice’ 
 
Figure 6.4 reports expert judgements for five specified regions: the Barents, Chukchi and 
Beaufort Seas, Hudson Bay and the Canadian Archipelago. For each of the five regions, 
the median best estimate from all expert responses shows a projected decrease in 
population. This projected decrease is greatest in Hudson Bay and the Beaufort Sea, and 
smallest in the Canadian Archipelago.  
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      (c) Beaufort Sea               (d) Canadian Archipelago Question 5
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      (e) Hudson Bay Question 7
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Figure 6.4   Projected change in polar bear population in five regions, relative to today under current 
management practice. 
 
Experts 6 and 10 declined to give responses for population change in the Barents Sea, 
stating a lack of knowledge of polar bear dynamics in these regions. Although little 
literature exists on Russian polar bear dynamics, the remaining participants gave responses 
for population change in the Barents Sea (Figure 6.4a). Of the eight experts, all projected a 
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decrease in population for the Barents Sea, with a median best estimate of a 63% decline in 
population relative to the 2007 population. The range of responses given was the narrowest 
from any of the questions asked, but still spanned 99% between the upper and lower 
confidence bounds. 
 
Expert 6 also declined to give responses for the Chukchi Sea for the same reasons as 
detailed above. The median best estimate for the Chukchi Sea region is a decrease of 38%, 
relative to 2007 population levels (Figure 6.4b). Although there is a general consensus in 
the expert opinion of population decrease, expert 10 considered that the Arctic basin and 
southern populations will be impacted more severely during the timescale presented than 
those further north. Consequently this region has the greatest range (250%) between the 
upper and lower confidence bounds.  
 
All experts gave projections for the Beaufort Sea, with estimates (Figure 6.4c) similar to 
the Chukchi Sea region. Again, expert 10 provided a very different estimate. The median 
best estimate for the region is a 30% population decrease by 2050 compared to 2007 levels.  
 
Eight experts project a decrease in population in the Canadian Archipelago (Figure 6.4d), 
while experts 1 and 10 both project an increase. The reasoning behind expert 10’s views is 
stated above, whereas expert 1 considered a loss in population likely to occur in Russian 
regions around Svalbard and Novaja Semlja rather than in the Canadian Arctic. The 
median best estimate for the Canadian Archipelago is an 18% decrease in population, the 
smallest population decrease of any of the regions.  
 
Lastly, the experts all projected a population decrease for Hudson Bay by 2050, relative to 
the population in 2007 (Figure 6.4e). This was the only situation where responses were 
gathered from all ten participants, and where all responses showed a decrease in 
population. The median best estimate is a 45% decline in population relative to 2007 
levels.  
 
Experts were asked to reassess their projections regarding changes in total polar bear 
population size across the Arctic under their own definition of ‘best management practice’ 
rather than current practices (Figure 6.3b). Nine experts considered a precautionary 
approach to hunting was needed, with some stating hunting should be eliminated 
altogether. Some experts questioned the current situation of a ‘sustainable harvest’ as not 
practical, as detailed population data on which to base sustainable harvest estimates is only 
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available for a few specific populations. This uncertainty is likely to worsen in a warming 
climate and with associated changes in sea ice. Only three experts mentioned the issue of 
climate stabilisation as being important in polar bear conservation. The statement from 
expert 8: ‘it [climate stabilisation] is unlikely to happen at a significant level within this 
time frame’ may be insightful: perhaps other experts considered it too low a likelihood for 
climate stabilisation before 2050 to impact on their projections. No experts commented 
that if no action is taken to abate climatic warming within this time period, there will be an 
even greater climate commitment beyond 2050, with increasing longer-term impacts upon 
polar bear populations.  
 
One expert stressed that, with climatic warming, bears may increasingly be crowded on 
land and come into contact with human settlements. Education could be key in reducing 
‘nuisance kills’, or kills in defence of lives or property (expert 7). Lastly, several experts 
stated the importance of intensive monitoring and research into polar bear populations and 
the relationship of these populations to climate change, with facilitation of co-management 
initiatives using both scientific and traditional knowledge. 
 
Most experts considered that under scenario A1B, considerable population loss by 2050 is 
inevitable, regardless of management technique (Figure 6.3 a, b). For half of the 
participants, responses to each confidence bound E1 to E5 changed no more than 5%. 
However, the responses from expert 4-6 were impacted rather more by implementing best 
management, with at least one response E1-E5 changed by 20% or more. In the case of 
expert 6, implementing best management practice raised the lower confidence bound by 
70%: from a 90% decrease to a 20% decrease in the total Arctic polar bear population. 
Changes in expert responses were evenly spread over the confidence bounds E1 to E5, 
with no more pronounced change in either the upper or lower confidence bounds.  
 
6.3.6 Analysis of the expert survey 
The IPCC states polar bears will face a high risk of extinction with warming of 2.8°C 
above pre-industrial, associated with a 62% decline in sea-ice calculated from the multi-
model mean  (Box 4.3 and Table 4.1, Fischlin et al., 2007). This IPCC statement is 
compared to the expert survey undertaken for this thesis research by extrapolation. In the 
expert survey, experts were asked for projections based on a projection of 47% loss of 
summer sea-ice extent. In order to compare the results from the expert survey, a 
temperature rise of 0.4°C is assumed from pre-industrial to 1961-90. Subtracting this from 
the 1.9°C pre-industrial to 2050 A1B multi-model mean (Table II.4: IPCC, 2001) gives a 
 146
temperature rise of 1.5°C relative to 1961-90. An assumption of a linear relationship 
between sea-ice and temperature is made, although the limits of this assumption are 
acknowledged. Under this assumption, there is a sea-ice decline of 60% by 2050 relative to 
pre-industrial. Therefore, when presented with this summer sea-ice decline of 60%, the 
median expert projection was a total population decline of 28%, amid considerable 
uncertainty and regional variation.  
 
The IPCC statement of population risk was agreed amongst the authors of Working Group 
II Chapter 4 based on the available literature and on modelled sea ice decline, in itself 
forming a process of expert assessment. This thesis research sought to provide a more in-
depth and transparent analysis of the current state of expert knowledge. There is a 
considerable difference between the risk statements of the IPCC (62% decline in sea ice, 
high risk of extinction) and that from the expert survey participants (60% decline in sea 
ice, population decline of 28%). However, caution is urged in interpreting the extrapolated 
statement from the expert survey. It is based on the median of the experts mean values and 
thus does not demonstrate the full range of expert projections (though neither does the 
IPCC statement) and, second, in order to compare the two statements an assumption of a 
linear relationship between sea-ice and temperature was made.   
 
Best management practice does not greatly impact on projections of future polar bear 
populations according to the experts surveyed, with the projected median decline 
decreasing from 28% to 20%. It is clear from the suggestions given for ‘best management 
practice’ that no expert considers current management across the Arctic of polar bear 
populations as optimal; a number of methods, and in particular the reduction of hunting, 
could be used to help conserve populations. It has been suggested for a range of habitats 
that the resilience of communities and taxa to climate change could be increased if other 
stresses are decreased (Fischlin et al., 2007). However, the rather small differences 
between the projections of the experts under current and optimal management indicate that 
the scope for this in the case of polar bears is limited. The impacts of the climate change 
driver are seen as increasingly dominant in the future and global mitigation efforts are, 
therefore, seen as key for future conservation. 
 
 
6.4   INVESTIGATING CLIMATE IMPACTS FOR THE NORFOLK BROADS 
The main threat to the Norfolk Broads from climate change is in Upper Thurne catchment, 
part of the northern Broads network. The catchment is situated around 30km from Norwich 
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(Figure 6.5a). The catchment area is broadly defined as the area between Potter Heigham, 
Eccles and Winterton (Figure 6.5b), with most of the area lying under 5m OD.  
 
     
 
Figure 6.5 (a.) Location of the Norfolk Broads and (b.) Location of the Upper Thurne Catchment29 
 
Geomorphic evidence suggests that northern Broads has been tidal during the Holocene 
(English Nature and the Environment Agency, 2003). During this time, the River Thurne 
flowed directly into the sea via the course of the present Hundred Stream (Figure 6.6 a, b). 
Now, the River Thurne receives drainage from only a small area of the catchment and has 
a very low natural discharge. There is a slight tidal influence at Hickling Broad, but saline 
water rarely proceeds sufficiently along the River Bure to enter the Thurne system 
(Holman and Hiscock, 1998).  
 
Figure 6.6   (a.) Topographic evidence for geomorphic change in the northern Broadland area and (b.) 
Reconstruction of mid-Holocene geomorphology  (English Nature and the Environment Agency 2003: 
p 7) 
 
                                                 
29
 Image reproduced with kind permission of Ordnance Survey and Ordnance Survey of Northern Ireland. 
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Low-lying areas are protected from inundation from the sea by an extensive belt of sand 
dunes that extend for over 30km, with heights of up to 10m OD and a width of about 100m 
(Holman and Hiscock, 1998). However, the Winterton and Sea Palling Gap has always 
been vulnerable, evidenced from historical records of the flood of 1287 recorded by 
William of St Benet's Abbey, to the last inundation in 1953. The 1953 ‘Great Flood’ surge 
tide flood broke through the dunes at Sea Palling covering a large area with sea water. 
Seven people drowned and there was significant damage to property and the environment 
(English Nature and the Environment Agency, 2003).  
 
After the 1953 floods, a concrete sea wall was built to protect the 14km stretch of 
coastline. Construction was finally completed by 1989. However, a combination of sea 
level rise (SLR), increased storm surges and water extraction threaten to further undermine 
the current defences. Strategies including groynes, rock revetments and reef-building are 
now being pursued to keep the integrity of the sea wall (English Nature and the 
Environment Agency, 2003).  
 
It is estimated that breaching of the sea wall could entail flooding of over 6 000 hectares of 
the northern Broadland area of Horsey, Martham and Hickling Broads, including six large 
villages and numerous isolated houses and farms (English Nature and the Environment 
Agency, 2003). Nicholls (2002) found that under the UKCIP98 ‘high’ emissions scenario 
there were significant local flooding impacts in the Norfolk Broads by 2050. A flood of 
this kind would have a large negative impact on the ecology of Hickling Broad national 
nature reserve (K. Turner, Chair of the Broads National Park Authority; pers.comm., 
26/06/06).  
 
Changes in rainfall patterns due to a changing meteorology under climate change (Hulme 
et al., 2002) coupled with SLR will have a large impact on the coastal aquifer (Tanaka, 
2006) although the process may take many years to become apparent (Holman and 
Hiscock, 1998). SLR would increase the speed of groundwater flow, and so the interface 
between saltwater and freshwater can travel further inland. Saline groundwater would 
therefore underlie at a shallower depth many of the adjacent inland marshes, increasing the 
salinity of the inland drainage systems. As summer rainfall is projected to decrease in this 
region, it is likely that the need for groundwater abstraction for agriculture irrigation will 
also increase. More extensive saline intrusion would be expected if this were the case 
(Tanaka, 2006). Abstraction also impacts on the land level relative to the sea, as the peat 
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on which the marshes are situated shrinks due to water extraction. Also, sea level relative 
to land is increasing due to long-term isostatic change (Shennan and Horton, 2002).  
 
Although the long-term impact of saline intrusion through groundwater should not be 
underestimated, it is of lesser importance over the timescale examined here than the 
potential for seawater to overtop the Winterton dunes and flood the low-lying area with 
saline water during severe winter storms (English Nature and the Environment Agency, 
2003).  
 
Tidal surges present the greatest threat. These surges occur when an area of low pressure 
moves south or southwest over the North Sea, creating a bulge of water that can be up to 
100 miles wide. Under certain meteorological conditions, this water mass is forced 
between the UK and the European coasts where the sea is shallow. This water mass can 
increase tide height by up to 1.5m (Lonsdale et al., 2005). The worst case scenario is such 
a tidal surge combined with a spring tide, when the increase in sea level can be large 
enough to overtop defences, as seen in the 1953 flooding event. As the mean sea level 
rises, the mean height of storm surge heights is also increased. There is therefore also an 
associated change in the magnitude and occurrence of extremely high sea level events. 
This depends not only on the mean rise in sea level, but also on the changes in the 
variability around the new mean. Thus, expert knowledge was sought to investigate the 
impact and risk of saline flooding due to climate change on the Norfolk Broads.  
 
Uncertainty exists in the projection of SLR. Thermal expansion and ice cap melt will result 
in increased SLR, although Antarctica’s growth and the increased storage of water by 
society could act to reduce SLR (IPCC, 2007b). A great deal of uncertainty surrounds 
regional projections of SLR in particular. Regional variations exist because the warming of 
ocean water is not uniform, and therefore neither is the thermal expansion of ocean water. 
Ocean circulation and atmospheric pressure changes will also cause regional variation in 
SLR. In addition, regional vertical land movement can act to increase or decrease the 
relative SLR (Shennan and Horton, 2002). Regional variations are not satisfactorily 
represented in Atmosphere Ocean Global Climate Models (AOGCMs) with significant 
differences in the projected spatial pattern of relative SLR (IPCC, 2007). Regional 
variations can be quite substantial, varying up to +/- 50% of the global mean SLR (Hulme 
et al. 2002).  
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6.4.1 The Coastal Simulator 
An integrated assessment of both flooding and erosion risk has been carried out for the 
East Anglian coastline for sub-cell 3b30, which covers the area between Sheringham and 
Lowestoft. The study area includes the Thurne Catchment. Flooding and erosion risk were 
examined in conjunction with each other, as the two processes interact to regulate the risk 
of coastal defence breaching and subsequent flood risk: i.e., as beach sediment levels fall, 
the flood risk in adjacent low-lying coastal areas increases and vice versa (Dawson et al. 
2006). The study investigated a range of relative SLR (rSLR) scenarios under a range of 
socio-economic conditions. Overtopping and / or inflows through breaches were simulated 
in 20,000 separate model runs, with a spatial resolution of 250m. The research is part of a 
wider project called the ‘Tyndall Coastal Simulator’ (referred to as the 'Coastal Simulator'. 
See Dawson et al. 2006 and Nicholls et al. 2005 for a full description of the project). The 
Coastal Simulator research provided an in-depth impact assessment that would not have 
been possible to recreate during this PhD research. However, the Coastal Simulator 
research was based on SLR scenarios from the IPCC Third Assessment Report (TAR) and 
the UKCIP02 scenarios, rather than on more recent IPCC 4AR projections31. It was 
important that the same emissions scenario was used across all six expert and non-expert 
icons. Thus, the projected SLR for SRES A1B was calculated from the IPCC 4AR and 
compared to the three SLR scenarios presented in Nicholls et al. (2005). 
 
6.4.1.1   Adaptations of the Coastal Simulator for icon investigation 
The Coastal Simulator project used three scenarios of SLR together with a regional 
subsidence rate through isostatic change of 0.7mm yr-1 (from Shennan and Horton, 2002). 
The ‘low’ scenario represented no anthropogenic influence and thus a continuation of the 
recent historic rSLR of 1.5mm yr-1.  The ‘medium’ scenario followed the UKCIP02 
medium-high scenario and resulted in an increase of 45cm by 2100. The ‘medium’ 
scenario also includes a scaling factor for offshore winter wave heights. As wind increases, 
offshore winter wave heights are increased linearly up to a maximum of 3.5% by 2050. 
The ‘high’ scenario was based on the IPCC TAR high limit plus an additional regional 
sensitivity of 50%, following Hulme et al. (2002) to allow for spatial variability in thermal 
expansion. Current meteorology is imposed on future sea levels for all three scenarios. 
 
                                                 
30
 In UK coastal management planning, a costal sub-cell indicates a reasonably self-contained system of 
sedimentary interactions with neighbouring coastlines (DEFRA, 2006) 
31
 The 4AR states that SLR projections would have had similar ranges to the TAR if it had treated 
uncertainties in the same way. For each scenario, the midpoint of the range is within 10% of the TAR model 
average for 2090-2099 (IPCC, 2007c) 
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Relative SLR (rSLR) is the sum of global mean SLR, regional factors and vertical land 
movement (Hall et al., 2005). Thus, the global mean SLR for SRES A1B, a regional 
addition and an estimate of isostatic change were summed in order to calculate the rSLR 
projection for the Broads region using SRES A1B. The Figure for global mean SLR to 
2050 under SRES A1B was taken from the model mean of 17 Atmosphere Ocean Global 
Climate Models (AOGCMs) in the IPCC 4AR (IPCC, 2007b). SLR in the north Atlantic 
region is often under-represented in AOGCMs (IPCC, 2007b). The single most important 
factor in driving sea level variability in the region is the North Atlantic Oscillation (NAO) 
(Osborn, 2003); although the NAO-sea level relationship and the inter-annual variability in 
the winter NAO index are assumed to remain applicable under a different climate state. So, 
a regional SLR component sourced from the IPCC (2007) was added to the global mean 
SLR Figure. The final component of rSLR is for regional subsidence due to isostatic 
readjustment (Shennan and Horton, 2002). The rSLR was thus calculated as shown in 
Table 6.1. 
 
 
 
 
Table 6.1   Calculation of rSLR for the Norfolk region using IPCC 4AR projections 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
NORFOLK BROADS yr-1 
 
 
 
(mm) 
2050 
relative to 
2000 
 
(mm) 
2080 – 2099 
relative to 1980 – 
1999 
 
(mm) 
Isostatic change  
(Shennan and Horton, 2002) 
 
0.61 
 
30 
 
Global mean SLR  
(IPCC 2nd order draft, FAR: 03/03/06 suggests 
global average SLR with respect to 2000 of 120 
± 60 mm by 2050 projected under scenario 
SRES A1B by 2050) 
 
 
 
120 
 
Regional addition 
(IPPC 2007b: Figure 10.32 suggests between 
50-100mm addition to global mean SLR for 
this region from 1980-1999 to 2080-2099 for 
SRES A1B. Upper limit used). 
 
 
 
 
 
50 
 
 
100 
Total (mm rSLR)  200  
 
 
 Figures in bold are taken directly from source reference: rSLR for 2050 is then calculated for 
comparison with low, medium and high SLR trajectories in Nicholls et al. (2005). 
 
 152
 
The rSLR of 200mm by 2050 most closely resembles that of the medium SLR scenario 
used in the Coastal Simulator (Figure 6.6). The ‘medium’ SLR scenario from the Coastal 
Simulator research therefore gives the best approximation to projected rSLR under SRES 
A1B. 
 
  
Figure 6.7   Comparison of rSLR trajectories calculated for the Norfolk region from Nicholls et al. 
(2005). Black dashed line shows approximate trajectory under SRES A1B as calculated in Table 6.1. 
 
The East Anglian coastline is current managed with around 71% of the coast protected. 
This management is in the form of seawalls, groynes or palisades.  
 
Therefore, data was taken from the ‘medium’ rSLR scenario, with 71% coastal protection 
(Table 2 in Dawson et al., 2006: this rSLR and coastal protection percentage are named as 
'scenario 14'). This scenario most closely fulfils the conditions for icon examination of ‘no 
adaptation' under SRES A1B for the Norfolk region. 
  
 
6.4.2 Visualising climate impacts on the Norfolk Broads using GIS 
A Geographical Information System (GIS) was used in order to produce a map of the 
spatial variability in flood risk and flood cost damages within the Coastal Simulator 
scenario 14. 
 
Non-experts appear to identify more readily with aerial photographs than with traditional 
cartographic maps (Haynes, 2005), and an attempt was made to source free access aerial 
photographs for the area. However, free access data was not available. Instead, tiles from 
low SLR 
medium SLR 
high SLR 
approximate A1B trajectory for comparison 
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the Meridian2 dataset were obtained from the Digimap datacentre32. The Meridian2 files 
were converted from .ntf files for manipulation in ArcView 9.1 (ESRI, 2003) using 
MapManager (ESRI, 2007). The results from Coastal Simulator scenario run 14 were 
extracted as an ASCII file and imported into ArcView 9.1. The scenario information was 
then converted to a raster map using the Spatial Analyst extension. Typical ‘roadmap’ 
features were added from the Meridian2 dataset within the GIS in order that participants in 
stage three could identify more easily with the area. Five categories were used for the 
symbology of the flood risk, so the participants in stage three could easily distinguish the 
spatial pattern of flood risk. 
 
Figure 6.9 gives an indication of how beach volume fluctuates in a ‘ripple effect’ (the 
image is given for illustration only as it is not produced from scenario 14). Lighter areas 
represent higher beaches, and hence areas where defence structures are less likely to fail 
(Figure 6.7 illustrates this process occurring near Winterton). The x-axis shows projected 
beach movement through the 21st century. Towards 2050, the ripples indicating low beach 
sediment move down the coast. This effect can be seen in Figure 6.7. 
 
 
Figure 6.8   Build up of sediment in front of a seawall defence near Winterton lessens flood risk 
 
As sediment builds in front of a sea defence, the area behind the defence is subject to a 
lowering of flood risk, and vice versa. So, flood probabilities within sub-cell 3b show 
much variation year to year. Because of this wide annual variation in relative flood risk, a 
10-year average was taken for both the present day (2002 to 2012) and for the future (2045 
to 2055). Change in flood probability and flood risk were calculated by subtracting present 
day cell values from the future scenario values using the ArcView 9.1 raster calculator 
function (ESRI, 2003).  
                                                 
32
 All Meridian2TM2 Digimap data © Crown Copyright / EDINA right 2007. An Ordnance Survey / EDINA 
supplied service 
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Figure 6.9    The ‘ripple effect’ of sediment movement down coast of sub-cell 3b. Darker shading 
represents lower beaches, and thus beach defence structures more likely to fail; lighter shading 
represents higher beaches and thus those less likely to fail. The letters on the Y-axis indicate major 
settlements north of Winterton: Happisburgh, Bacton, Mundesely, Trimingham, Overstrand, Cromer 
and Sheringham. (Note, this image is not for scenario 14 but for a scenario of lesser coastal protection: 
so sea cliffs are able to erode and later start to offset the ripples. In scenario 14, this cliff erosion is not 
present so the ripple effect continues throughout the 21st century). 
 
6.4.2.1   Flood probability  
The change in the flood probability expressed as a change in the return period33 of a flood 
event is illustrated in Figure 6.9. The spatial pattern of flooding is fairly complex, 
especially in the low lying area between Eccles, Potter Heigham and Winterton. The 
greatest change is seen around Hickling Broad, where saline flood return periods increase, 
in some cases, by over 1000 years. The lightest blue cells around the coast and along the 
Hundred Stream indicate areas already at considerable risk of saline flood inundation now, 
and in which saline flood event return periods increase by a more modest 30 – 100 years.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
33
 A ‘return period’ is defined as the average length of time between events (in this case, the occurrence of a 
saline flood event). If a particular flood event has a return period of 20a this means that there will be a 1 in 20 
chance that a flood will occur in any one year and that on average there will be one such flood every 20a 
(adapted from Summerfield, 1991: p 10) 
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Figure 6.10   Change in the saline flood probability expressed as a change in the flood return period 
 
 
6.4.2.2   Flood cost damages 
The change in flood risk is expressed as a change in the expected annual damage34 in £UK 
per 250m × 250m cell based on 2003 valuations. The pattern of expected annual damage is 
estimated by calculating a value per cell based on the agricultural value of the land and the 
                                                 
34
 The ‘expected annual damage’ is defined as the average damage cost per year calculated from all flood 
event simulations. 
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value of property within each cell. Six agricultural band valuations were available, with 
inundation losses ranging from arable land at £1,160, to unfarmable land valued at £20 per 
hectare; and erosion losses of arable land at £5,683, to unfarmable land valued at £4,571 
per hectare. Properties lost through cliff top erosion were assigned an average market value 
of £150,000 per residential postal address, as determined from average market valuations 
and the UK Land Registry. Discounting was carried out to 2003 levels at a rate of 3.5% for 
the first 30 years and 3% for the subsequent 20 years (Dawson et al. 2006).  
 
The spatial pattern of flood risk is not as complex as that of flood risk. Necessarily, the 
greatest losses occur nearest the coast, with the area around Horsey and between Sea 
Palling and Eccles experiencing the greatest change in expected annual damage. The 
maximum change occurs near Horsey, with nearly £1.3 million expected annual damages 
in one cell by 2050. In contrast, much of the area experiences a change in expected annual 
damage of less than £100 per cell.  
 
Some areas experience a negative change in flood risk. This is due to a trough in the 
expected annual damage occurring over the 2050-centred time span, and is a consequence 
of sediment build up as illustrated in Figure 6.11  (and as discussed in 6.3.3, and in Figures 
6.7 and 6.8). Figure 6.8 indicates that there is a general trend of increasing expected annual 
damage under scenario 14, and that the expected annual damages from saline flood risk are 
anticipated to increase in this region, especially towards the end of the century. 
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Figure 6.11   Change in the expected annual damage of saline flood risk 
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a change from 2003 valuations in £UK) 
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Figure 6.12   Projected trajectory of expected annual damages of saline flood risk for coastal sub-cell 
3b under scenario 14 
 
 
 
6.5   INVESTIGATING CLIMATE IMPACTS ON LONDON 
Much of London lies within the 5m contour of the River Thames (Figure 6.12) on what 
was originally low-lying marshland. Thus, London has always been vulnerable to flooding. 
The first written record of a flood was from the Anglo Saxon Chronicle in 1099, and 
extends to the Great Flood of 1953. This last flood event was the catalyst for building the 
Thames Barrier, which became fully operational in 1982. The Thames defences are the 
UK’s most costly and complex flood defence system and are of global significance in 
terms of the value of assets protected from flooding (Hall et al., 2005). Since 1982 the 
Barrier has provided reliable flood defences for London, so much so that should the 
defences be breached, there is now very little appreciation of the consequences of tidal 
flooding (Lavery and Donovan, 2005). Redevelopment of housing and industry continues 
apace in the Thames Gateway Regeneration Area, including potential flood-risk regions 
such as Shellhaven, Stratford and Havering riverside (Figure 6.13). New business and 
finance areas in Canary Wharf are very vulnerable to increasing flood risk (Lonsdale et al., 
2005).  
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Figure 6.13   The defended Thames tidal flood-plain (from Lavery and Donovan, 2005) 
 
 
1. Figure 6.14   Thames Gateway Regeneration Area new homes (blue) and new jobs (red) from 2001–
2016 and beyond. Zones of change are: 1. Isle of dogs  2. Greenwich, Deptford and Lewisham  3. 
Greenwich Peninsula  4. Stratford, Leaside and Royals 5. London Riverside 6. Charlton and 
Crayford 7. Thurrock  8. Ebbsfleet/North Kent  9. Basildon  10. Shellhaven (from Lavery and 
Donovan, 2005) 
 
London is vulnerable to climate change through flooding in a similar way to the Norfolk 
Broads. Because of the position of the city on the eastern coast of Britain, London is 
susceptible to storm surges. As the mean sea level rises, the mean height of storm surges is 
also increased. Therefore there is also an associated change in the magnitude and 
occurrence of extremely high sea level events. This depends not only on the mean rise in 
sea level, but also on the changes in the variability around the new mean. There is also a 
smaller influence from potentially high fluvial flows flowing downstream from the River 
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Thames catchment. Extreme sea levels as experienced during storm surges could be 1.2m 
higher by the 2080s in the London area (Hulme et al. 2002). London is also vulnerable to 
local flooding when the drainage network is overwhelmed by intense rain storms (Lavery 
and Donovan, 2005) which are likely to become more significant under a projected 15% 
increase in winter precipitation by 2050 (Hulme et al. 2002). London is also undergoing 
isostatic subsidence (Shennan and Horton, 2002).  
 
Even without climate change the Thames Barrier and associated structures will come to the 
end of their design life at similar times (Environment Agency, 2003). By 2030 the Thames 
Barrier will be 50 years old and although the structure itself should last much longer, the 
operating infrastructure will require overhauling to ensure a high operating reliability 
(Lavery and Donovan, 2005). The Thames Barrier and associated London flood defences 
are now undergoing extensive review in light of potential SLR through the Thames Estuary 
2100 Project, or TE2100 (ThamesWEB, 2006). The Thames Barrier engineering is based 
on calculations made during the design period of the 1960s and 1970s. This does include 
an allowance for isostatic change of 8mm yr-1 (Lavery and Donovan, 2005), but not for 
projected changes due to climatic warming (and SLR). 
 
Within the Thames Estuary area, there are approximately 500 000 properties at risk of 
flooding, including 420 000 properties at risk of tidal flooding in the estuary and 85 000 at 
risk from fluvial flooding , with 1.25 million people resident in this vulnerable area. Also 
at risk in the floodplain are 400 schools, 16 hospitals, 8 power stations, London City 
airport, and most of the central part of the London Underground. This could entail property 
damages of £80 billion without even considering valuation of other infrastructure and the 
impact on the UK and ultimately the worldwide economy (Lavery and Donovan, 2005) 
The losses from a serious flood would push insurance premiums out of the reach of those 
on low incomes. In some areas, insurance cover could be withdrawn entirely, leading to 
property market collapse and associated urban decay (Lonsdale et al., 2005). The 
international nature of business would mean the impact of a serious flood event in London 
would be likely to have global economic repercussions (Munich Re, 2004).  
 
6.5.1   The Thames LISFLOOD-FP model 
A quantified analysis of the probability of extreme high sea levels overtopping the Thames 
Barrier and associated defences has been carried out (see Dawson et al., 2005). The 
research sought to model the impact of extreme high water scenarios to examine the 
probability of flooding in London. Whilst this research investigated imaginable worst-case 
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scenarios, lower SLR scenarios were also included in the modelling exercise. Simulation of 
inundation of the River Thames with its significant associated flood defence structures 
requires a two-dimensional (2D) modelling approach with a relatively high spatial 
resolution of 250m cells or smaller. However, full 2D modelling is computationally 
prohibitive at this scale (Dawson et al., 2005). Dawson et al. (2005) instead used 
LISFLOOD-FP to model the extent of flooding. The LISFLOOD-FP model has been 
shown to perform as well as 2D codes for costal and fluvial flood modelling, whilst 
reducing the computational burden a 2D model would require. Whilst LISFLOOD-FP does 
not simulate the fine details of wave propagation it adequately captures the maximum 
flood extent of a simulated SLR input (Dawson et al., 2005). Although London is 
susceptible to inundation by water from the River Thames and local flooding when 
drainage systems are overwhelmed, tidal surges represent the greatest flood threat 
(Lonsdale et al., 2005). Thus, although LISFLOOD-FP does not take into consideration 
fluvial flows from the River Thames catchment, the model is still a reasonable first 
approximation for gauging maximum flood extent (R. Dawson, University of Newcastle, 
pers.comm., 02/03/07). The Thames LISFLOOD-FP model was run for 90 different 
scenarios. These 90 scenarios spanned those with current flood management strategies in 
place, to those with additional flood barriers added. The project also investigated rSLR 
scenarios of no change, to what was considered the imaginable worst case scenario of a 6m 
increase in sea level by 2100.  
 
6.5.1.1   Adaptations of the LISFLOOD model for icon investigation 
As for the Norfolk Broads icon (Section 6.4.1.1), rSLR had to be calculated in order to 
select the scenario to investigate further. The LISFLOOD-FP model required a rSLR input 
in mm yr-1 rather than an absolute rSLR total. The Figure for global mean SLR to 2050 
under SRES A1B was taken from the model mean of 17 Atmosphere Ocean Global 
Climate Models (AOGCMs) in the IPCC 4AR (IPCC, 2007b). SLR in the north Atlantic 
region is often under-represented in AOGCMs (IPCC, 2007b). The single most important 
factor in driving sea level variability in the region is the NAO (Osborn, 2003). So, a 
regional SLR component sourced from the IPCC (2007b) was added to the global mean 
SLR Figure. The final component of rSLR is for regional subsidence due to isostatic 
readjustment (Shennan and Horton, 2002). The annual rSLR in mm yr-1 for input into the 
LISFLOOD-FP model was calculated as shown in Table 6.2. 
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Table 6.2   Calculation of rSLR for the Thames region using IPCC 4AR projections 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
LONDON AND THE THAMES ESTUARY yr-1 
 
 
 
(mm) 
2050 
relative to 
2000 
 
(mm) 
2080 – 2099 
relative to 1980 – 
1999 
 
(mm) 
Isostatic change  
(Shennan and Horton, 2002) 
 
0.74 
  
Global mean SLR  
(IPCC 2nd order draft, FAR: 03/03/06 suggests 
global average SLR with respect to 2000 of 120 
± 60 mm by 2050 projected under scenario 
SRES A1B by 2050) 
 
 
2.4 
 
 
120 
 
 
Regional addition 
(IPPC 2007b: Figure 10.32 suggests between 
50-100mm addition to global mean SLR for 
this region from 1980-1999 to 2080-2099 for 
SRES A1B. Upper limit used). 
 
 
1.0 
 
 
 
100 
Total 4.14   
 
 
 Figures in bold are taken directly from source reference: annual rSLR is then calculated for 
comparison with scenarios of the Coastal Simulator  
 
 
As for the other icons, a scenario of ‘no adaptation’ was assumed. The annual rSLR was 
then inputted into an Excel spreadsheet containing macro links to output files of each 
Coastal Simulator scenario run. The results for the 1:1000 year flood and a 1:10,000 year 
flood can be seen in Figures 6.15 and 6.16 respectively. 
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Figure 6.15   The 1:1,000 year flood (black line) after 4.14mm yr-1 rSLR for 2050 assuming no 
adaptation. The blue shading indicates the current River Thames extent, the white shading indicates 
flooded land. Grey shading shows higher ground (lighter shades indicate lower ground). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.16   The 1:10,000 year flood (black line) after 4.14mm yr-1 rSLR for 2050 assuming no 
adaptation. The blue shading indicates the current River Thames extent, the white shading indicates 
flooded land. Grey shading shows higher ground (lighter shades indicate lower ground). 
 
 
6.5.2   Visualising climate impacts on London using GIS 
A Geographical Information System (GIS) was used in order to produce a map of the 
1:1,000 and 1:10,000 flood limits for London and the Thames estuary. Tiles from the 
Meridian2 dataset were obtained as for the Broads icon (see footnote 10, p 28). The 
Meridian2 files were converted from .ntf files for manipulation in ArcView 9.1 (ESRI, 
2003) using MapManager 8 (ESRI, 2007). Again, typical ‘roadmap’ features were added 
from the Meridian2 dataset within the GIS in order that participants in stage three could 
identify more easily with the area. The results from the 1: 1,000 and 1:10,000 year flood 
were obtained and imported into ArcView 9.1. The contour function was used in order to 
 164
define the flood extent limits. Although the flood outline appears ‘blocky’, smoothing of 
the contour resulted in a considerable loss of spatial detail. Flood extents can be seen in 
Figure 6.17.  
 
 
Figure 6.17   Flood extent for today and the 1:1,000 year flood event for London and the Thames 
Estuary 
 
The flood risk to central London and the upper estuary increases only very slightly under 
this scenario of SLR, as the Thames Barrier and associated defences are designed to cope 
with SLR of this magnitude within its design specification. There are greater impacts for 
the Essex coastline, particularly around Churchend, Southend and Shoeburyness, where 
parts of urban centres would be inundated by the 1:1,000 year flood. Parts of urban 
settlements in Kent such as Sheerness and Chatham, as well as the Grain Power Station on 
the Isle of Grain (near All-Hallows-on-Sea) would also experience flooding with the 
1:1,000 year event under this scenario. 
 
 
6.6   SUMMARY 
This Chapter covered three areas. First, it began by justifying the timeframe and scenario 
choice for investigating the six icons. The reasoning behind investigating climate impacts 
under ‘no adaptation’ was also discussed. Second, the impact of climate change on the 
three expert icons of the THC, ocean acidification and WAIS was explored using published 
literature and assessments. Third, impacts on the three non-expert icons of polar bears, the 
Norfolk Broads and London were explored using an expert survey, the Coastal Simulator 
research, the LISFLOOD-FP model and through using GIS. The next Chapter examines the 
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emotional and cognitive reactions of non-experts to the impact of SRES A1B to 2050 on 
both expert and non-expert icons through a pre / post-survey test design. 
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CHAPTER 7:  
ICON EVALUATION 
 
 
An evaluation workshop was designed to explore research question 3 (Chapter 1): namely, 
does the iconic approach engage non-experts with climate change? This question will be 
answered by considering how non-experts engage with both the expert and non-expert 
icons, and by assessing whether the iconic approach alters non-experts cognitive or 
affective spheres of engagement with climate change. The evaluative workshop comprised 
three parts: a pre-test questionnaire to investigate current cognitive and affective 
engagement with climate change, viewing of a set of icon information sheets derived from 
the modelling research in Chapter six, and a post-test questionnaire. The pre- and post-test 
questionnaires contained both qualitative and quantitative questions. The workshop data 
was analysed using a combination of statistical and coding tools to investigate the 
influence of the iconic approach on participants’ engagement with climate change.  
 
 
7.1   EVALUATIVE WORKSHOP DESIGN 
A three part pre/post-test workshop was designed to investigate participant engagement 
with climate change through the iconic approach. Pre/post-test methodologies are used 
throughout the medical, psychological and behavioural sciences for exploring changes 
after an input, referred to as the ‘treatment’. A pre-test examines participants’ views prior 
to any treatment, and provides a baseline on which to observe the impact of the treatment. 
The post-test questionnaire contains identical questions so changes in participants’ views 
after treatment can be examined. This workshop was based on a similar pre/post-test study 
by Lowe et al. (2006) investigating climate change engagement with the film The Day 
After Tomorrow (Emmerich, 2004); and a pre/post-test study investigating cognitive 
change through a museum visit by Henriksen & Jorde (2000). The impact of the treatment 
was assessed through the use of two questionnaires, where the post-test questionnaire 
repeated many of the questions posed in the pre-test questionnaire.  
 
The use of pre/post-test methodologies to self-report measures can potentially be 
contaminated by response shift bias, a change in respondents’ understanding of the 
phenomena being tested between pre- and post-tests35. Retrospective pre-tests in these 
                                                 
35
 For example, consider the following pre-test question ‘how large is your carbon footprint compared to the 
UK average?’  The participant may think that as they recycle and care about the environment, their footprint 
would be low (though they actually have a high carbon lifestyle). The participant then takes part in an 
exercise about carbon footprinting and energy reduction. In the post-test a month later the participant states 
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cases can be useful for assessing response shifts (Robinson and Doueck, 1994). However, 
the workshop described in this Chapter concentrated on exploring participants’ cognitive 
and affective engagement. Whilst some questions in the pre-test investigated participants’ 
self-stated current behaviour in relation to climate change, participants were not asked to 
re-evaluate this information and state future behavioural intentions based on the icon 
treatment. Behavioural elements of engagement would be overly influenced by social 
desirability bias using this survey methodology and thus changes in question responses 
investigating behavioural engagement may have referred more to participants’ desire to 
change behaviour, rather than an actual change in behaviour (behavioural aspects could be 
more successfully researched by using a longitudinal interview study, for example). As 
stated in Chapter 2, this research focused on the exploration of changes in attitudes towards 
climate change rather than behavioural change. Therefore, as the workshop methodology 
was specifically used to explore participants’ cognitive and affective engagement before 
and after the icon treatment, rather than behavioural change, it was not necessary to 
conduct a retrospective pre-test. 
 
The workshop format used a pre- and post-test questionnaire to detect attitudinal changes 
towards climate change after seeing the icon information. The post-test questionnaire also 
explored participants’ engagement with the icons in more depth using qualitative open-
ended questioning. The collection of qualitative data was particularly important for 
exploring the reasoning behind participants’ choice of which icons they found most 
engaging or disengaging.  
 
The considerations for questionnaire design are analogous to those for designing an online 
survey (as discussed in Section 5.3.2). Reference was made to the methodologies and 
structure of similar questionnaires (Lorenzoni et al. 2006; Lowe 2006; Lowe et al. 2006; 
Poortinga & Pidgeon 2003; Whitmarsh 2005). As suggested by Dillman (2000), the 
questionnaires were presented in a non sans-serif font in least 12-point type. Questions 
were evenly spaced and shading was used to distinguish the more extreme responses at 
each end of the attitude statements. All attitude scales were evenly spaced and covered the 
same area on the page. 
 
A logical flow of questions was designed to lead participants through both questionnaires. 
The questions specifically investigating which icons participants considered most and least 
                                                                                                                                                    
that their footprint is higher than average as they can validly answer the question. It would appear that after 
the intervention, their carbon footprint has increased, although it may be the same, or even have decreased - 
because the participant did not have the knowledge to answer the pre-test question previously. 
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engaging were penultimate to the demographic questions. Whilst this could have affected 
response rate because of participants dropping out of the survey before completion, the 
question structure was designed so that participants could consider a multi-faceted 
response to their engagement with each icon before selecting the icon to which they were 
most engaged overall. For example, participants were asked for their responses on their 
understanding, emotional response and perceived relevancy of all the icons viewed, before 
providing a response to which icon they were most engaged with. In the same way, 
participants were asked to consider separately the map and imagery elements of the icon 
information sheet before being asked for which icon they were most drawn to overall. This 
last structural consideration was designed to compel participants to imagine the icon entity, 
and to somewhat filter responses such as an attachment to a particular photographic or 
cartographic representation. 
 
7.1.1   Part one: pre-test questionnaire 
The pre-test questionnaire protocol began with a statement that the workshop was designed 
to gather participants’ opinions and feelings, and was not a ‘test’. Participants were 
reminded that the facilitators could help with understanding the survey questions but could 
not answer queries about climate change. The pre-test questions were designed to 
investigate the prior levels of cognitive, affective and some aspects of behavioural 
engagement before the treatment was carried out. The pre-test questionnaire (Appendix 
7.1) involved four Sections over four pages: 
 
• General impressions of ‘climate change’. An open-ended question requested the 
participants write down the first three things that came to mind when hearing the phrase 
‘climate change’. The question was placed to focus participants on the workshop topic. 
It also provided a check that participants had some knowledge of the term ‘climate 
change’ before the main survey questions.36 
• Level of concern over climate change. These questions were taken from Lowe (2006), 
and Leiserowitz (in prep.). In some cases, the question wording has been slightly 
adapted to make questions clearer. Some of the original questions were also augmented 
with an additional category by adding a ‘neither/nor’ mid-range value. These questions 
provide a tool for assessing participants’ views about the seriousness of climate change 
on a variety of spatial and temporal scales. Participants also stated their level of interest 
and worry over climate change. Lowe (2006) investigated the impact of two 
                                                 
36
 A study by Defra (2007) found 99% of the UK public had heard of ‘climate change’.  No participants in 
this sample required clarification of the term. 
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interventions on risk perceptions and behaviour using both terms climate change / 
global warming on undergraduate students, compared to a control group who were not 
subject to any intervention. Lowe’s (2006) study also took place in Norwich, UK. The 
results from the control group are shown here for comparison. Leiserowitz (in prep.) 
undertook a nationally representative poll investigating American opinions on global 
warming, administered through Gallup and the ClearVision Institute. This thesis 
explores in detail attitudes towards climate change in the UK rather than internationally. 
Also, the icon pre-test questionnaire used the terminology ‘climate change’ rather than 
the term ‘global warming’ used by Leiserowitz. Noteworthy comparisons with the US 
study are highlighted.  
• General attitudes towards climate change. A battery of 12 statements on a ‘strongly 
agree’ to ‘strongly disagree’ five-point Likert scale was drawn up to investigate prior 
perceptions of cognition, interest, scepticism and engagement. Some of these questions 
were taken from Whitmarsh (2005), a study investigating public understanding and 
response to climate change and flooding in the UK through a survey methodology. 
Comparisons can therefore also be made with this study, although it is noted that 
whereas the attitude scale in Whitmarsh (2005) uses the same 1-5 Likert scale, it is 
measured from ‘strongly disagree’ to ‘strongly agree’. As this is the reverse of the pre- 
and post-tests scale, (which measured 1-5 from ‘strongly agree’ to ‘strongly disagree’) 
the scaled results from Whitmarsh (2005) have been inverted. A question was also 
included on how likely participants were to talk to family, friends and colleagues about 
climate change. Poortinga and Pidgeon (2003) found the public trust information about 
climate change from friends and family more than any other source: above university 
scientists and well above national government37. Thus, until climate change is seen as a 
topic of everyday conversation with information received through trusted sources, rather 
than as a narrative of scientists and policy makers, the public may be unlikely to take 
action to address the issue (Ereaut & Segnit, 2006). 
• Perceived personal vulnerability. Both quantitative and qualitative questions were used 
to investigate participants’ current attitude and behaviour towards climate change as a 
risk issue: whether they considered climate change would affect them personally, and if 
they currently took action out of concern for the issue. 
 
 
 
                                                 
37
 Trust in various sources to tell the truth on a 1-5 scale from ‘distrust a lot’ to ‘trust a lot’: friends and 
family 4.12, scientists working for universities 3.87, national government 2.66 (Poortinga and Pidgeon, 
2003).   
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7.1.2 Part two: icon information sheets 
The second stage of the workshop involved the treatment of viewing the icon information 
sheets. An icon information sheet was prepared for each of the six icons (appendices 7.2a-
f). The information sheets were designed to summarise the impact assessment information 
gained in stage two of the thesis research for each of the icons under SRES A1B to 2050, 
as discussed in Chapter 6.  
 
Significant divergence in information perception can occur through the use of differing 
communication devices (Sanfey & Hastie, 1998). In order to minimise apparent differences 
in icon engagement because of communication devices, each icon information sheet used 
the same format  The icon information sheets consisted of an obvious and informative title, 
an image, three short text paragraphs and a map arranged in the same layout throughout.  
 
As discussed in Chapter two, there is evidence that a significant proportion of people have 
difficulty understanding numerical risk (see Lipkus & Hollands, 1999). For example, a 
majority of UK participants could not identify the correct probabilistic statement when 
asked to clarify the statement ‘a 30% chance of rain tomorrow’ (Gigerenzer et al., 2005). 
Likewise, communications difficulties exist when presenting information such as the 
probability of a 1 in a 100 year flood, or the difference in inundation between a 1 in 100 
year and a 1 in 20 year flood (Hulme, 2004). In addition to difficulties in identifying 
scientific statements of probabilistic risk, an individual’s assessment of risk is subject to 
heuristics, used to process the risk information presented. These can introduce biases into 
an individual’s assessment of risk, which may differ from the probabilistic information 
presented. Therefore, for the icon information sheets, probabilistic information was 
minimised. For example, the London icon showed a 1:1000 year flood extent for the 
present day and 2050 (as depicted in Figure 6.14) but this return period was referred to for 
the London icon sheet as an ‘extreme’ flood. A 1:1000 year value was chosen as it 
represents the timeframe to which the Thames Estuary 2100 Project / Espace considers a 
baseline flood risk (Reeder, 2007). Similarly for the Norfolk Broads icon sheet, the flood 
cells with a higher flood risk probability are indicated by increasingly dark blue colouring 
rather than the flood return periods expresses in Chapter 6. 
 
Particular care was taken to select icon images that did not depict the impact of climate 
change upon the icons, so that a particular impression of potential impacts on the icon 
entity was not forced on the participants. For example, the polar bear image did not show a 
polar bear struggling to mount a melting ice floe, the ocean acidification icon did not show 
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a dissolving coccolithophore, and the London icon did not show a flooded Southend. The 
icon pictures were also all manipulated so they all covered an area of ~40cm2. As with the 
images, each map was adjusted to cover the same area, in this case ~70cm2. Clear captions 
were provided for the maps and images. The icon sheets were not numbered so no ranking 
or order to the icons was apparent to participants. The maps and images were labelled ‘a’ 
and ‘b’ only with no numerical identifier, for similar reasons. The three text paragraphs 
were divided into a short introduction to the icon, an assessment of the vulnerability of the 
icon to climate change, and a statement regarding how the icon could be impacted due to 
climate change by 2050. The icon text was limited to a maximum of 300 words38. 
Technical language was avoided where possible.  
 
7.1.3 Part three: post-test questionnaire 
The final part of the workshop involved a longer post-test questionnaire (Appendix 7.3). 
Participants were first asked to complete all questions even if they were repeated, as the 
first eight questions were the same as those posed in the pre-test questionnaire. The post-
test questionnaire involved the same four Sections as the pre-test plus three further 
Sections, grouped over eight pages. 
 
• Focussed icon engagement investigation. This Section asked participants to rate the 
icons they had seen on a 7-point Likert scale. The Section examined specific responses 
to the icons in regard to understanding, interest, concern, fright and the future. A 
question was also included investigating which icon was most relevant on a personal to 
an international level. 
• Open-ended icon engagement investigation. This Section provided an option for a more 
qualitative, open-ended exploration of engagement with the icons. Participants were 
asked to state which icon picture and map they were most and least drawn to, before 
stating which icon they were most drawn to overall. As previously discussed, the 
questions were subdivided in this way in order to separate more trivial engagement with 
the icon communication device (e.g. a particular image) as opposed to a more 
meaningful engagement with the icon entity. 
• Demographic questions. These were placed last to maximise response and discourage 
questionnaire abandonment (Dillman, 2000). These questions asked for responses on 
gender, age, number of children in the household, postcode, highest qualification, 
highest scientific qualification, political affiliation, car ownership, income, newspaper 
                                                 
38
 On the basis that the average reading speed is around 250 words per minute (Symonds and Nicholson, 
2007) each icon information sheet would take less than 2 minutes to read fully. 
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readership and membership of an environmental organisation. Space was provided for 
participants to make any additional comments on any aspect of the workshop. 
 
 
7.2   PILOTING AND IMPLEMENTING THE EVALUATIVE WORKSHOP  
The workshop was designed so it could be completed within 30 minutes. This was 
implemented to maximise completion and attendance at the workshop, considering 
participants would be recruited to take part directly. Completion of the pre- and post-test 
surveys as well as reading and responding to the six icon information sheets would be 
difficult within this timeframe. Therefore, the workshop was designed instead so 
participants viewed a ‘set’ of two expert and two non-expert icon information sheets, 
instead of all 6 information sheets. Nine sets of all possible combinations of 2 non-expert / 
2 expert icons were devised. Each set had a corresponding post-test survey, where the 
questions related only to the icons which that participant had viewed. The same pre-test 
survey was used throughout. In order that similar numbers of participants completed each 
set, the post-test sets were ordered into groups. So, the first 10 participants completed set 1, 
the second 10 completed set 2, and so on. In this way, it was expected equal numbers of 
participants would complete each set. 
 
The icon information sheets went through many iterations with colleagues in 
environmental science, in order that the information presented was considered clear, 
concise and scientifically defensible. The workshop was then piloted with six participants 
from different demographic backgrounds recruited through a snowball sample. This gave 
the opportunity to test the pre- and post-test survey protocol, the content of the information 
sheets, and the timing of the workshop. The information sheets and the pre- and post-test 
survey wording were considered clear, although slight changes were made to the 
formatting of the survey Likert-scale questions. Although participants differed in the time 
taken to complete the workshop, no participant took longer than 30 minutes. 
 
The workshop was held in the atrium of The Forum situated in Norwich city centre. The 
building houses the city library, a restaurant, cafés, and a museum. The Forum attracts a 
footfall of approximately 50,000 people per week (The Forum Trust, 2007), with the 
highest footfall occurring on Saturdays. The workshop was held on a Saturday in May 
2007. Thus, a large cross-Section of the public was accessible for participation in the 
workshop.  
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The workshop was open between 9am and 5pm, so participants were able to join the 
workshop at any convenient time during the day. Individuals were randomly approached as 
they entered The Forum atrium and were provided with a minimum of information before 
they participated in the workshop. They were told that the workshop would take around 30 
minutes, that it was about ‘the environment’, and that the first 100 participants allocated on 
an age/gender basis39 would be given an honorarium of five pounds. The workshop 
facilitators identified themselves as from the University of East Anglia rather than from the 
Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research.  
 
A tape barrier was set up around Tables and chairs in a quiet Section of The Forum atrium. 
Participants were asked to contribute their views and opinions, and not to consider the 
workshop a ‘test’. Participants were able throughout to ask one of the three facilitators if 
they required assistance. Participants were seated and handed the pre-test survey and given 
as much time as they wished to complete it. Participants generally took between 5-10 
minutes to complete the pre-test. When participants had finished, the pre-test was collected 
and they were given the icon sheets corresponding to their set number and given around 10 
minutes (or longer if they wished) to look over the four information sheets. After this time, 
the participants were given the post-test corresponding to their set number, but retained the 
icon information sheets. Participants were then given as long as they needed to fill in the 
post-test; on average taking between 10-15 minutes.  
 
 
7.3   RESULTS AND ANALYSIS OF THE EVALUATIVE WORKSHOP: PART ONE 
 
A total of 153 participants completed the workshop with 147 participants completing both 
pre- and post-test surveys, a usable response rate of 96.1%. Pre-test surveys without 
accompanying post-test surveys were omitted from the analysis. The results were analysed 
using means, ranges and standard deviations to describe the central tendencies and 
variance of the data. The impact of the icon information tests was analysed using Wilcoxon 
matched-pairs signed-rank test, in order to compare participants’ engagement before and 
after seeing the icon information.  
 
 
                                                 
39
 An incentive budget of £500 was available. In order to encourage both male and female participation 
across the seven age groups, the first seven male/female participants’ from each age range received an 
incentive. Recruiting females aged 65+ proved very difficult; recruiting males 25 or under straightforward. 
Thus this system helped to encourage participation across gender and age groups. 
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7.3.1 Statistical considerations 
Nine sets of icon data were used in the analysis. In all, 53 participants took part with no 
incentive, over and above the 100 participants receiving an incentive. In addition to this, 
there were six unfinished post-test attempts. Thus, unequal numbers of post-test surveys 
were obtained for each of the nine sets.  
 
This does not affect analysis of the pre-test data, as all the pre-tests were the same. It also 
does not affect questions 1 to 8 of the post-test, as the questions are identical in all sets. 
However, this could present two difficulties with using the different icon data from 
questions 9 to 20 of the post-test sets. First, it is not statistically defensible to weight 
(‘gross up’) the data based on the number of participants per set, as some set participant 
sizes are too small. For example, although more participants saw the polar bear icon than 
the ocean acidification icon, it is not defensible to gross up the ocean acidification data 
based on the smaller total viewing participants (or, conversely, to lessen the weight of the 
polar bear icon). This is countered here by reporting participant responses as a percentage 
of the participants that saw the icon, rather than as a percentage of the total number of 
participants. In the majority of cases this distinction would not change the ranking of icons 
for each question, but the convention is followed for statistical thoroughness. Note that 
percentages across a question will not therefore sum to 100%. 
  
The second statistical difficulty is more subtle and could still apply with a larger 
participant sample size. The combination of icons seen could affect how likely it is that 
particular icons are chosen. In essence, is there a fixed ratio between the selection of each 
of the six icons (even if this ratio is not known) that stays the same, regardless of which 
two icons are removed to form the set? The presence of a fixed ratio was tested for using 
the Alymer test. Monte-carlo sampling revealed that there was no statistically significant 
relationship between the icons removed from a set and the likelihood of the participant 
selecting a particular icon40. 
 
All potential changes in attitudes between pre- and post-test questionnaires were tested for 
statistical significance. A statistical test was required that compared data from a study 
design that featured within subject variation of a matched pairs type. The parametric test 
requirements (in this case, a t-test) cannot be satisfied here. The t-test requires that data are 
interval-level. All the data used in the pre- and post-test questionnaires are measured on an 
                                                 
40
 Collaboration is ongoing in developing the Alymer test. See: 
West, L.J. and Hankin, R.K.S. (in prep.) A generalization of Fisher’s exact test. Journal of Statistical 
Software. 
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invented assessment scale (of the type ‘mark on a scale from 1 to 5’) and so are ordinal 
level data. Thus, a non-parametric matched-pair test, the Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-
rank test, was used. The non-parametric Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-rank test carries at 
least 95% of the statistical power of the parametric equivalent (Coolican, 2004). Wilcoxon 
matched-pairs signed-rank test investigates the null hypothesis that the two populations 
from which the scores are sampled are identical. More specifically, Wilcoxon matched-
pairs signed-rank tests if the medians from these two populations are equal. Of importance 
here is that it is only the direction of any change which is considered, rather than the 
strength of any change. With an ordinal style ranking system, one cannot justify that a 
change of 2 places (say, from scale rank 2 ‘quite worried’ to scale rank 4 ‘very worried’) is 
worth double that of a change of 1 place (say, from scale rank 1 ‘not at all worried’ to scale 
rank 2 ‘not very worried’).  
 
Non-response rates for specific questions are not reported here. Any percentage values 
given in the following Sections are calculated only from participants who gave a response. 
In no case was the non-response rate to any one question higher than 6.5%.  
 
7.3.2 Participant knowledge and perceptions of climate change 
The pre-test questionnaire results are discussed first, before comparison of the pre- and 
post-test in the following Section. Results of both the pre- and post-test questionnaire are 
provided in Appendix 7.4. 
 
A majority of the participant group viewed climate change as a serious threat to either 
themselves or the natural world (Figure 7.1). Just 8% of participants stated climate change 
as ‘not at all serious’ a personal threat. Participants’ viewed the threat of climate change on 
animals and plants as more serious than the threat to humans (on a 1-4 scale with 1 
representing ‘very serious’ and 4 representing ‘not at all serious’, the mean score for threat 
to animals and plants was 1.71, SD 0.71; the mean score for threat to humans 2.00, SD 
0.78). The threat to the individual participant was seen as least serious (mean score 2.11, 
SD 0.80), with the threat to animals and plants in other countries considered most serious 
(mean score 1.36, SD 0.53). Participants also viewed the threat to other people in the UK 
and people in other countries as more serious than to themselves personally (mean scores 
of 2.08 and 1.59, and SD of 0.71 and 0.73, respectively). Lowe (2006) found similar 
results. His participant group were slightly less personally threatened by climate change 
than the icon participant group (mean of Lowe’s control study participants was 2.51 on the 
same 1-4 scale for ‘you and your family’). Lowe’s study also found participants considered 
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people in other countries slightly less threatened by climate change than found in the icon 
participant group (mean of Lowe’s control study participants 1.55 on the same 1-4 scale 
for ‘people in other countries’)41.  
 
Participants generally thought climate change would be dangerous to them personally in 
around 25 years time (on a 1-6 scale with 1 representing climate change as dangerous 
‘now’, 2 ‘in 10 years’, 3 ‘in 25 years’, 4 ‘in 50 years’, 5 ‘in 100 years’ and 6 as ‘never’, the 
mean score was 2.80, SD 1.43, Figure 7.2). Participants considered climate change would 
be dangerous to animals and plants before humans (mean score for humans 2.51, SD 1.31, 
mean score for animals and plants 2.02, SD 1.12). As with the question examining the 
threat of climate change, participants considered climate change would be dangerous to 
others – in their local communities, the UK and to people in other countries - sooner than 
to themselves personally. This is in agreement with the risk perception literature on 
‘unrealistic optimism’ (Weinstein, 1980). Lowe (2006) asked the student sample when 
they considered climate change would be dangerous for ‘people around the world’. He 
found the mean participant response considered there would be slightly longer until  
dangerous impacts were felt than the icon participant group (mean of Lowe’s control study 
2.49 on the same 1-6 scale for ‘people around the world’, compared to a mean score of 
1.87 for ‘people in other countries’ in the icon participant group)42.  
 
The pre-test results revealed a participant group that was quite interested in climate change 
(mean score 3.37, SD 0.67, on a 1-4 scale from ‘not at all interested’ to ‘very interested’) 
and quite worried about climate change (mean score 3.04, SD 0.75, on a 1-4 scale from 
‘not at all worried’ to ‘very worried’)43. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
41
 Leiserowitz (in prep) posed a very similar question. Global warming was considered a very serious 
personal threat by a similar proportion of participants in each study (19% stated it was a ‘very serious threat’ 
in the US poll when asked ‘how serious a threat is global warming to you and your family’ compared to 22% 
asked ‘how serious a threat is climate change to you’ in the icon participant sample. The US sample 
considered global warming a less serious threat to people in other countries than the icon participant sample 
(US poll stating the threat ‘very serious’ 40%, the icon participant group 54%). 
42
 Leiserowitz (in prep) again posed a very similar question. The proportion of participants considering global 
warming / climate change was already having dangerous impacts on people around the world was 
considerably larger in the icon participant sample. (US poll 30% compared to 51% of the icon participant 
group). 
43
 Leiserowitz found when asked ‘how much do you personally worry about global warming’, Americans 
worried less than the icon participant sample (US mean 2.43, icon participant sample mean 3.04). 
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Figure 7.1   How serious a threat is climate change?  
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Figure 7.2   How dangerous a threat is climate change?  
1.0
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
2.0
2.2
2.4
2.6
2.8
3.0
you people in
your local
community
people in
the UK
people in
other
countries
animals
and plants
in your local
area
animals
and plants
in the UK
animals
and plants
in other
countries
sc
o
re
average score (pre) average score (post)
very serious 
not serious 
very serious 
not serious 
 178
A battery of 12 questions examined participants’ general attitudes towards climate change 
on a 5-point Likert scale, from 1 ‘strongly agree’ to 5 ‘strongly disagree’. There was fairly 
strong recognition across the sample of anthropogenic climate change as an issue, with 
participants’ tending to agree with the statement ‘human activities are altering global 
temperatures’ (mean 1.68 SD 0.96) and tending to disagree with ‘I don’t think climate 
change is a real problem’ (mean score 4.19, SD 1.06). This contrasts with the findings of 
Whitmarsh (2005), where participants were far less inclined to think climate change was a 
real problem (Whitmarsh study mean score 2.74, SD 0.89). 
 
Participants tended to disagree that too much fuss was made about climate change, 
although there is some considerable variation around the mean (3.78, SD 1.26). Lowe 
(2006) asked the same question and also found participants also somewhat disagreed that 
too much fuss was made about climate change (mean of Lowe’s control study participants 
3.37 but on a 1-4 scale from ‘strongly agree’ to ‘strongly disagree’ with no ‘neither agree 
nor disagree’ category’). There was some weak agreement amongst the icon participant 
group that the effects of climate change are likely to be catastrophic (mean score 2.27, SD 
1.13). 
 
It would appear that the participant sample felt at least slightly empowered to take action to 
abate climate change, with participants tending to disagree with the statement ‘nothing I do 
makes any difference to climate change one way or the other’ (mean score 3.89, SD 1.13). 
Participants tended to agree that they personally felt a moral duty to do something about 
climate change (mean score 2.06, SD 1.04). This contrasts with the findings of Whitmarsh 
(2005), where participants were rather more inclined to feel a moral duty to address 
climate change (mean score 1.38, SD 0.83 on the same 1-5 scale). However, Whitmarsh 
found participants a little more ambivalent about whether anything they did would make a 
difference to climate change compared to the icon participant sample (Whitmarsh study 
mean 2.68, SD 0.81). 
 
Participants were somewhat ambivalent about the statement ‘I am well informed about 
climate change’ (mean score 2.50, SD 0.98). Lowe’s (2006) sample perhaps considered 
themselves a little less informed about climate change (mean of Lowe’s control study 
participants 2.79 but on the 1-4 scale with no ‘neither agree nor disagree’ category’).  
 
Participants in both the icon participant sample and Lowe’s (2006) student sample were 
also somewhat ambivalent about whether the thought of climate change filled them with 
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dread (mean score of this icon participant sample was 2.67 on the 1-5 scale; Lowe’s 
control study participants mean score 2.79 but on the 1-4 scale from ‘strongly agree’ to 
‘strongly disagree’, with no ‘neither agree nor disagree’ category’).  
 
Participants were inclined to agree that if they came across information about climate 
change, they would tend to look at it (mean score 1.97, SD 0.90). Whitmarsh (2005) found 
participants slightly more inclined to look at information on climate change than the icon 
participant sample (Whitmarsh study mean score 1.25, SD 0.66). Participants in the icon 
sample group were unlikely to think climate change was ‘too complicated for me to 
understand’ (mean score 3.99 SD 0.96).  
 
Participants were unlikely to think that ‘talking about climate change is boring’ (mean 
score 3.91 SD 1.13). The sample were quite likely to talk to their family about climate 
change (mean score 1.99 on a 1-5 point scale from ‘very likely’ to ‘very unlikely’, SD 
1.11). Similar values were obtained for how likely participants were to talk to friends and 
to colleagues. Relatively few participants were either ‘very unlikely’ or ‘quite unlikely’ to 
talk to friends, family or colleagues about climate change (the highest value obtained for 
participants considering they were ‘very’ or ‘quite unlikely’ to talk about climate change 
was that of 12% of participants to their colleagues). Within this sample at least, 
participants already appear to consider climate change a potential topic of conversation.  
 
A majority (70%) of participants thought climate change was going to affect them 
personally. Twenty percent of participants thought climate change would not impact them, 
and nearly 10% of the sample said they didn’t know if climate change would affect them 
personally. 
 
7.3.3 Comparisons and conclusions of the pre-test 
The comparison with Lowe (2006) indicates that his student sample considered climate 
change slightly less threatening. Lowe’s (2006) sample also considered there would be a 
slightly longer timeframe until climate change was ‘dangerous’. The student sample stated 
similar responses to the icon participant group for the attitudinal questions on ‘fuss’ and 
‘dread’. Some interesting contrasts were found with the participant sample of Whitmarsh 
(2005). Participants in Whitmarsh’s sample were far less inclined to think climate change 
was a real problem, and were a little more ambivalent about whether anything they did 
would make a difference to climate change compared to the icon participant sample. 
However, Whitmarsh (2005) found participants slightly more inclined to look at 
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information on climate change than the icon participant sample, and rather more inclined to 
feel a moral duty to address climate change. Several differences were found when 
comparing the icon participant sample to the nationally-representative US poll by 
Leiserowitz (in prep.). The US sample considered the threat of global warming to people in 
other countries a less serious threat than the icon participants. A significant proportion of 
the US poll also thought dangerous impacts of global warming were not yet being 
experienced around the world compared to the icon participant sample. However, a similar 
proportion of participants considered global warming / climate change a very serious 
personal threat. 
 
A majority of the participants considered climate change a threat to either themselves or 
the natural world. On average, climate change was considered a personal threat in around 
25 year’s time. Climate change was considered more dangerous for animals, plants and 
other people, in agreement with the risk perception literature on ‘unrealistic optimism’ 
(Weinstein, 1980). Participants were generally quite interested and quite worried about 
climate change.  
 
The pre-test questionnaire results indicate a participant group who generally recognise 
climate change as an important issue. The participants are ambivalent about how much 
they know about climate change, but as a sample group are somewhat inclined to further 
their knowledge of the issue. The participants tended to consider there was a moral duty to 
act on climate change. Participants were ambivalent about whether climate change filled 
them with dread, but there was some agreement that climate change impacts would likely 
be catastrophic. Participants were slightly empowered to take action to abate climate 
change, and were already likely to consider climate change a potential topic of 
conversation. 
 
 
7.4   RESULTS AND ANALYSIS OF THE EVALUATIVE WORKSHOP: PART TWO 
 
7.4.1 Participant knowledge and perceptions of climate change 
 
Participants thought climate change was a more serious threat after viewing the icon 
information (Figure 7.1) significant at P < 0.05 for all categories except ‘you’ (on a 1-4 
scale, where 1 = very serious, 4 = not at all serious). It is noted that participants considered 
climate change fairly serious even before the intervention (see previous Section). This 
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change in attitude towards the seriousness of climate change was particularly strong for 
‘people in your local community’ and ‘people in the UK’ (Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-
rank test, Z = -5.024, P < 0.001, n = 144; and Z = -4.193, P < 0.001, n = 144 respectively). 
Similarly to the pre-test, participants considered climate change a greater threat to other 
people than themselves. The personal risk category also experienced the smallest change in 
attitude after treatment, although the change is significant at P < 0.10.  
 
The threat of climate change on nature and to humans was considered more serious after 
viewing the icon information. The threat to animals and plants in other countries was 
considered the most serious, with the mean concern of the sample on the 1-4 point scale, 
where 1 represented ‘very serious’ and 4 ‘not at all serious’, increasing to 1.23 (SD 0.46) 
(Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-rank test, Z = -3.037, P < 0.01, n = 143). 
 
There was no statistically significant relationship between the pre-test and post-test scores 
across any of the human or animals and plant categories when examining the temporal 
‘danger’ scale. There was also no statistically significant relationship between pre- and 
post-tests when examining how interested or how worried participants were about climate 
change or the proportion of participants who considered climate change would affect them 
personally. It is noted here too that participants were already quite interested and 
concerned about climate change before the intervention took place. 
 
The repetition of the general attitudes towards climate change statements allows 
investigation into the use of icons generally44 (both non-expert and expert) for climate 
change communication. Attitudes towards each statement were measured using Likert 
scale, from 1 ‘strongly agree’ to 5 ‘strongly disagree’. Some statistically significant 
changes in attitudes were observed (Table 7.1) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
44
 An interesting extension to this research would be to test the cognitive and affective impact of the expert 
icons against the non expert icons specifically: i.e. half of all participants’ view the expert icons, the other 
participants’ the non-expert icons. Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-rank test could then be used to investigate 
the statements examining general attitudes towards climate change under each treatment. 
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Table 7.1   Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-rank test on general attitudes. . .   
. . .               towards climate change 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
Statement 
Direction of change 
after viewing icons n Z P 
The thought of climate change fills me with 
dread 
agree more 142 -1.089 0.276 
Too much fuss is made about climate change disagree more 143 -3.192 0.001* 
I feel a moral duty to do something about 
climate change 
agree more 143 -1.186 0.235 
I don’t think that climate change is a real 
problem 
disagree more 143 -1.748 0.081 
Nothing I do makes any difference to climate 
change one way or the other 
disagree more 143 -0.711 0.477 
The effects of climate change are likely to be 
catastrophic  
agree more 141 -2.365 0.018* 
If I come across information about climate 
change I will tend to look at it  
agree more 142 -2.863 0.004* 
I am well informed about climate change agree more 143 -1.368 0.171 
 It is already too late to do anything about 
climate change  
disagree more 143 -1.489 0.137 
Climate change is too complicated for me to 
understand  
disagree more 143 -0.478 0.633 
Talking about climate change is boring disagree more 143 -0.999 0.318 
Human activities are altering global 
temperatures  
agree more 143 -0.365 0.715 
 
* significant to at least P < 0.05 
 
   
 
 
Icons are a useful tool for climate change communication. Participants agreed more 
strongly after viewing the icon information that if they came across climate information, 
they would tend to look at it (Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-rank test, Z = -2.863, P < 
0.01, n = 142); the participant sample mean increased from 1.97 (SD 0.90) to 1.83 (SD 
0.80). Although this is a fairly small mean increase in score, it is a statistically significant 
change. This goes some way to demonstrating that an iconic approach utilising 
communications theory for icon presentation, as well as an imaginable timescale and mid-
range emissions scenario (not even considering the impact of non-expert or expert icons) 
engaged this non-expert sample in viewing climate information.  
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There was a significant change in participants’ views towards climate change as an issue 
after viewing the icon information. Significantly more participants disagreed that too much 
fuss was made about climate change (Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-rank test, Z = -
3.192, P < 0.01, n = 143; the sample mean decreased from 3.78, SD 1.26 to 4.01, SD 1.18). 
There was a slight change in the score of participants ranking the statement ‘I don’t think 
climate change is a real problem’ with participants tending to disagree more after viewing 
the icon information, although with lower statistical significance and greater disagreement 
for this statement than in the pre-test (mean pre-test score  4.19, SD 1.06, to post-test mean 
4.33, SD 0.91, Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-rank test, Z = -1.748, P < 0.1, n = 143). 
Taking these two results together, the use of climate icons for this sample group appears to 
increase the level of engagement with climate change.  
 
Despite the careful use of language avoiding emotive statements and the ‘fear rhetoric’ (for 
reasons as outlined in Section 3.4.4) within the icon sheet narratives, participants were 
more likely to agree after seeing the icon information that the effects of climate change are 
likely to be catastrophic (Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-rank test, Z = -2.365, P < 0.05, n 
= 141; the mean of the sample increased from 2.27, SD 1.13 to 2.06, SD 1.11). This result 
taken singularly may be of concern, especially if this impact is found to originate within 
the ‘non-expert’ icons as the iconic approach was intended to reduce the potentially 
paralysing impact of fear inducement, in order to promote meaningful engagement (as 
suggested by Nicholson-Cole, 2004). However, this does not appear to be the case, as 
illustrated through the examination of the qualitative responses to each icon (Section 
7.4.4). 
 
There was no statistical significance between the pre- and post-test data when investigating 
how likely participants were to engage in conversation with different groups of people. 
 
 
7.4.2 Focussed icon engagement investigation 
Participants’ responses were gathered on five quantitative scales of understanding, interest, 
concern, fright and feelings about the future (Table 7.2). This data is also displayed in 
Figure 7.3.   
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Figure 7.3 Focussed icon investigation mean results 
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Table 7.2   Focussed icon engagement investigation responses 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
Understanding Interest Concern Fright Future*  
Icon 
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Norfolk Broads 5.96 1.20 5.30 1.73 5.43 1.71 4.00 2.01 2.88 1.57 
London 6.13 1.10 5.51 1.67 5.50 1.71 4.32 2.09 3.11 1.67 
Polar bear 6.22 0.91 5.45 1.50 5.54 1.51 4.17 2.04 2.48 1.79 
THC 5.14 1.53 5.17 1.85 5.41 1.09 4.31 1.94 2.84 1.58 
Ocean acidification 5.16 1.48 5.04 1.63 5.43 0.93 4.13 1.93 2.70 1.52 
WAIS 5.41 1.41 5.24 1.80 5.57 0.99 4.36 2.17 2.80 1.72 
 
 
 
* Mean from pre-test ‘how do you feel generally about the future?’ was 6.11 
 
Results for understanding, interest, concern and fright on a 1-7 scale where 1=smallest, 7=greatest; results 
for future on a 1-7 scale where 1=bleak and 7=positive. Figures in bold highlight the highest mean per 
question. 
 
 
 
Participants first stated how well they felt they had understood the icon information sheets 
(Figure 7.4). Overall, the icon information sheets appeared quite well understood (mean 
5.67, SD 1.27 on a 1-7 scale from 1 ‘understood none of it’ to 7 ‘understood all of it’). 
There was some variation between the icons. Most obvious is the difference between 
expert and non-expert icons; with the non-expert icons better understood (mean 6.10, SD 
1.07) than the expert icons (mean 5.24, SD 1.48). The most well understood icon was polar 
bears. 
 
Participants were asked to rate how they felt on three scales of uninterested to interested 
(Figure 7.5) unconcerned to concerned (Figure 7.6) and frightened to not frightened 
(Figure 7.7). Participants were most interested in the three non-expert icons (non-expert 
icons group mean 5.42, SD 1.63 on a 1-7 scale from 1 ‘un-interested’ to 7 ‘interested’) 
London, polar bears and Norfolk Broads. Participants were less interested in the expert 
icons (group mean 5.15, SD 1.76), and least interested in ocean acidification. The mean 
level of concern was fairly consistent across all icons (range 0.16).  
 
There was no trend between the feeling of fright experienced when viewing an expert or 
non-expert icon (overall between-icons mean range 0.36 on a 1-7 scale from 1 ‘not 
frightened’ to 7 ‘frightened’). The most frightening icon was WAIS, followed by London 
and THC. The least frightening icon was the Norfolk Broads. There was considerable 
variation in response to this question as evidenced by the larger standard deviations.  
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Figure 7.6   How did the icons make you feel: concern 
Score based on a 1-7 rank scale
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The majority of participants felt generally quite positive about the future in the pre-test 
(mean 6.11, SD 1.68 on a 1-7 scale from 1 ‘bleak’ to 7 ‘positive’). When asked in relation 
to the icons, participants felt much less positive about the future (mean of all icons 2.80, 
SD 1.64). There was a relatively large score range between icons (range 0.63, SD 1.67) 
with polar bears causing the bleakest response, and London the most positive45. The 
positions of the non-expert icons on the ‘future’ scale (Figure 7.8) are intriguing. A 
hypothesis is considered that participants feel they have greater control over the two more 
local non-expert icons (Norfolk Broads and London) and hence felt a greater efficacy for 
the future of these icons. A smaller degree of personal control may be perceived over the 
future of the more spatially distant non-expert icon (polar bears) and hence lead to less 
positive feelings about the future in light of this icon. This corresponds to research on non-
expert risk perceptions and attitudes within a dread risk / unknown risk factor space 
(Slovic, 1987; see Figure 7.9). Factor one ‘dread risk’ is the most important factor. The 
                                                 
45
 Although London scored highest on the ‘fright’ scale, as stated above, there was a substantially smaller 
range between icons on this scale compared to the ‘future’ scale. Additionally, there was considerable 
variability on the ‘fright’ scale responses. Thus, the ‘fright’ scale was not considered further in relation to the 
‘control’ hypothesis discussed for the ‘future’ scale.  
Figure 7.8   How did the icons make you feel generally about the future?
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higher a hazard scores on this factor (i.e., the further to the right it appears in the space), 
the higher its perceived risk, the more people want to see its current risks reduced, and the 
more they want to see strict regulation employed to achieve the desired reduction in risk 
(Slovic, 1987). Factor one is defined at its high end by a lack of perceived control and 
dread, amongst other risk factors. Factor two ‘unknown risk’ is defined at its high end to be 
unobservable and unknown amongst other risk factors. A third factor observed in several 
studies quantifies the number of people exposed to the risk (Slovic, 1987). This third factor 
is not depicted in Figure 7.9, but it is apparent in some participants’ icon selection 
reasoning. 
 
Figure 7.10 illustrates which icon participants felt is most relevant to four different 
peoples: themselves, their local community, people in the UK and people in other 
countries. There was some variation in participants’ choice of the most personally relevant 
icon, though the most popular choices were the non-expert icons Norfolk Broads and 
London. The least popular choices were the non-expert icon polar bears and the expert icon 
ocean acidification. A majority of the participants considered the most relevant icon for 
their local community to be the Norfolk Broads. There are two clear selections for the icon 
most relevant to people in the UK, London and the Thermohaline Circulation. The icons 
considered most relevant to people in other countries are the three expert icons the THC, 
ocean acidification and the West Antarctic Ice Sheet. There are two interesting conclusions 
within these results. First, participants generally considered the non-expert icons most 
relevant to them and their local community, and the expert icons more relevant for people 
in other countries; and second, polar bears were considered the least relevant icon across 
all groups scoring a maximum of just 7% in the personal and international categories. 
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Figure 7.9   Location of hazards on Factors 1 and 2 derived from the interrelationships 
among 15 risk characteristics as detailed at the end of each axis. From Slovic (1987).
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7.5 OPEN-ENDED ICON ENGAGEMENT INVESTIGATION 
The previous Section provided an insight into the quantitative closed attitudinal 
perceptions for each of the icons. Also of interest, though, is participants’ open-ended 
qualitative reasoning behind icon selection. When presented with both expert and non-
expert icons, which icon were participants most drawn to? More importantly, why were 
participants drawn to some icons and not to others? First, icons participants found they 
were most and least drawn to are examined, then the methodology for exploring the 
qualitative responses is explained. Lastly, the qualitative data are discussed in the context 
of icons for promoting engagement, and icons which may disengage. 
 
7.5.1 Open-ended icon engagement investigation: quantitative responses 
The quantitative responses to the most and least engaging icons are presented in Table 7.3. 
The polar bear was the icon picture participants were most drawn to. The Norfolk Broads 
and London icons were also selected by participants substantially more times than the three 
expert icons. The Norfolk Broads was the map which participants were most drawn to, 
followed by the London and THC map. Overall, participants were most drawn to the 
Norfolk Broads icon, followed by the polar bear icon. Participants selected the THC and 
ocean acidification icons substantially more than any of the other icons as the picture to 
Figure 7.10   Which icon do you feel is most directly relevant?
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which they were least drawn. The WAIS icon was selected considerably more than any of 
the other icons as the map to which participants were least drawn. Overall, participants 
stated they were least drawn to the ocean acidification icon, followed by WAIS. The 
qualitative reasoning behind icon selections is explored in the next Section. 
  
 
 
 
Table 7.3   Responses to icons ‘most drawn to’ and ‘least drawn to’ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
% 
Norfolk 
Broads 
London 
Polar 
bears 
THC 
Ocean 
acidification 
 
WAIS 
Most drawn to:       
Picture 34 31 42 10 16 18 
Map 47 35 13 30 17 5 
Overall 36 27 34 24 17 11 
Least drawn to:       
Picture 18 18 11 41 40 21 
Map 16 15 28 22 25 46 
Overall 25 23 18 12 40 32 
 
 
  
Figures in bold highlight the highest icon percentage per category 
 
 
 
7.4.4 Open-ended icon engagement investigation: qualitative responses 
The qualitative responses to each icon selection response were fully transcribed and were 
entered into a spreadsheet containing participant details. NVivo (QSR International, 2002) 
was not used in this case as the volume of data was relatively small, and the spreadsheet 
design allowed easier comparison between question responses. Categories were generated 
both ‘bottom up’, with code names taken directly from the data; and ‘top down’, where 
certain categories were pre-defined before the coding took place (Section 5.4.1 provides a 
more in-depth discussion of the coding methodology used in this thesis). The data was 
coded iteratively until no new code names were generated. The qualitative responses 
obtained were necessarily brief owing to the space allocated on the questionnaire form. 
Responses ranged from one word answers to one or two sentences. Again, as for the 
coding performed for icon selection (Chapter five), a reviewer was asked to independently 
code the overall ‘most’ and ‘least drawn to’ qualitative icon data. The reviewer stated some 
codes could be combined if categories were to be condensed, but there was deemed no 
advantage to combining the categories and thus they were kept separate. 
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7.4.4.1    Icons which engage 
The most common reasoning for selecting an icon picture when asked which they were 
most drawn to was because participants felt they could personally relate to the icon. Many 
participants who selected the Norfolk Broads used this form of reasoning:  
 
‘realising how vulnerable we are in Norfolk’  (participant 75) or: 
‘local and relevant to here’ (participant 120) 
‘because I live in Norfolk and this is my area’ (participant 16) 
 
Similarly, many participants felt that they were drawn to the London icon: 
 
‘because [I] am familiar with the area’ (participant 38) and as it is: 
‘very identifiable, helps to understand enormity’ (participant 40) 
 
Participants also stated an emotional connection with the icon as their reasoning. For 
example, several people stated the Broads as the icon picture they were most drawn to as it 
depicted an ‘idyllic scene’  (participant 132) to which they could relate. Polar bears were 
cited most as the icon image participants were drawn to, for the participants that saw this 
icon. Two rather different strands of reasoning were attached to this choice. One line of 
reasoning was empathy with this charismatic mega fauna, for example:  
 
‘because it is a big fluffy polar bear’ (participant 46) 
 
Others reasoned that they selected polar bears because they represented:  
 
‘the idea of pure environment and fragile environment most affected by change’ 
(participant 56) 
 
 
Of the participants’ that saw the Broads information sheet, almost half chose it as the icon 
map they were most drawn to. Typical reasons for choosing this map were:  
 
‘I can imagine these areas water covered’ (participant 56) and  
‘it is of local interest and concern’ (participant 6) 
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Similar reasons existed for participants choosing the London map as that which they were 
most drawn to. It is of note that a significant proportion of respondents were most drawn to 
the THC or ocean acidification maps, despite them both representing expert-led icons (both 
maps are from the Fourth Assessment Report; IPCC 2007b). A small proportion of 
participants selected the map as it demonstrated the global impact of the icon, using 
reasoning such as it represented a ‘clear world effect’ (participant 129). However, the 
majority of explanations were due to both maps’ red colours:  
 
‘looks so hot, really really bad’  (participant 13) and because:  
‘it seems the most dramatic / scary possible change’ (participant 101) 
 
This reasoning demonstrates why the survey protocol asked for opinions on the image and 
map first, and why participants were asked to explain why they chose particular icons. In 
some cases, participants responded directly to the presentation device of the icon 
information (in this case, red signalling ‘danger’) rather than to what the icon may 
represent to the participant, despite attempts to minimise the impact of the communication 
devices.  
 
Generally, participants were more drawn to the non-expert icons, although a proportion of 
participants were drawn to the expert icons. Participants who chose the Broads and London 
followed similar lines of reasoning to that seen in the earlier responses:  
 
1. ‘because it is our home and one day it will affect my children and my friends’ children’ 
(participant 2) or: 
2. ‘because it is so local’ (participant 14) and because it: 
3. shows people how climate change will directly impact on their lives’ (participant 55) 
4.  
Participants chose polar bears again for similar reasons: because the icon is: 
 
1. ‘easily understandable, tangible’ (participant 89) 
2.  
The THC was chosen because: 
 
3. ‘it seems "global" rather than specific’ (participant 148) 
4.  
Again, the THC was chosen because of the dramatic nature of the icon as perceived 
through the map. 
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7.4.4.2    Icons which disengage 
The majority of participants were least drawn to the expert icon pictures, in particular the 
ocean acidification and THC icons. The reasoning for this coded into fewer categories than 
seen with the previous questions. Participants felt that the icons were difficult to 
understand:  
 
1. ‘too scientific’ (participant 150) 
2. ‘more complicated’ (participant 58) 
 
Of note is that the icons: 
 
1. ‘doesn’t tell so much of a story (participant 83) 
 
Participants felt these icons were: 
  
2. ‘too vast and global, feels remote and impersonal’  (participant 31) and: 
3. ‘more schematic, less real’ (participant 31) 
 
Participants also commented directly on the imagery used:  
 
1. 'couldn’t work out where map is – strange, unfamiliar angle’  (participant 132) 
 
Of those that saw the WAIS information sheet, almost half of them chose it as the icon 
map they were least drawn to. Participants commented that the WAIS map was  
 
2. ‘boring’ (participant 11) and individuals: 
3. ‘found it more difficult to understand’ (participant 106) 
 
Some participants commented that it was difficult to distinguish any difference between 
the two timescale maps. Participants also commented for all three expert icons that it was 
harder to engage with the icon because it was not perceived in a knowable spatial 
dimension:  
 
1. ‘you can always put it to the back of your mind because of the distance’ (participant 105) or: 
2. ‘it is not specific to a place I recognise’ (participant 41) 
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 Some participants also found the polar bear icon map difficult to understand, commenting 
it was: 
 
1. ‘hard to understand immediately’ (participant 89) 
 
There is less variation in icon selection for the icon participants were least drawn to 
compared to the icon participants were most drawn to. The majority of participants stated 
an expert icon as the one to which they were least drawn, in particular, stating ocean 
acidification and WAIS. Reasoning was similar to that previously cited. Participants stated: 
  
2. ‘complicated to understand’ (participant 50) or: 
3. ‘most technical’ (participant 84) or  
4. ‘don’t see the immediate impact’ (participant 70) 
 
Again, participants commented that there was: 
  
1. ‘nothing on the article to really connect people with the problem’ (participant 151) 
 
In correspondence with the literature (Lorenzoni and Pidgeon, 2005), it appears many 
participants’ feel an icon needs to connect them in knowable spatial dimensions in order to 
engage their interest. However, this reasoning was also used by participants to state why 
the icon was disengaging. A proportion of participants felt they were least drawn to the 
non-expert icons the Broads and London, with similar reasoning to this participant: 
 
2. ‘will only effect locals, and is not as much as a global issue’ (participant 141) 
 
Participants also commented that their selected non-expert icon: 
  
3. ‘seemed more manageable’ (participant 71) 
 
This links back to the hypothesis proposed on the ‘controllability’ of icon futures. Here, a 
perception of control over the non-expert icon exists, which acts to make this icon less 
engaging for this participant. 
  
Though some commented that the loss of polar bears was sad, it called for an emotional 
response that sometimes did not appeal: 
 
4. ‘Works on sentiment (or not!) (participant 45) 
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5. ‘Sorry to lose them, but there are many more serious impacts to worry about’ (participant 112) 
 
7.4.5    Open-ended icon engagement investigation analysis 
When coding was complete, codes were sorted into groups, as illustrated in Figure 7.11. 
Three overriding themes emerged from the data:  
 
• Understanding 
The ‘most drawn to’ responses coded here illustrated how participants felt the icon aided in 
their understanding of climate change. This increased understanding was in some cases 
attributed to the particular graphics (image or map) in the icon information sheet. In other 
cases participants noted how the icon was novel to them and thus increased understanding. 
The ‘least drawn to’ responses often stated the icon was too scientific or complex to 
understand. In some cases, participants who had already had knowledge of the icon stated 
it did not add to their understanding of climate change (i.e. the icon was not novel). 
 
• Emotion 
The ‘most drawn to’ responses under this code exemplified how an emotional response 
such as sadness or danger connected participants with the icon. The ‘least drawn to’ 
responses stated how participants felt emotions such as helplessness or boredom in 
response to the icon. Some participants stated that they simply disliked the icon. The one 
code that contained both ‘most’ and ‘least’ drawn to responses was ‘scary / dramatic’. 
Some participants felt this drew them towards the icon, others found it disengaging. 
 
• Impact 
This group coded for the greatest number of responses. In particular, important connections 
for participants in the ‘most drawn to’ responses were for icons which impacted on them, 
their local area or on nature. The lack of impact on individuals was also important for 
responses in the icons participants found they were least drawn to. Also noteworthy is the 
proportion of responses that stated there was the smallest impact on the icon (at least, 
under this timeframe and emissions scenario) and so engaged them the least.     
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Figure 7.11 Coding categories from the qualitative icon engagement investigation analysis 
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7.5   DEMOGRAPHIC INFLUENCES 
The workshop recruitment design sought to recruit participants from a wide demographic. 
This was achieved, with 48.4% males and 45.1% females taking part, (6.5% non-response 
rate); and a spread across the age ranges from a minimum of 14.0% participation in the 
65+ age group to a maximum of 19.6% in the 35-44 age range (6% of participants declined 
to answer this question). Participants were mainly Norwich residents (73.2%), with 82.5% 
residing in the Eastern region (with a 13.7% non-response rate). Over half of all 
respondents earn £19,999 or under, which is somewhat less than the 2006 UK average of 
£23, 224 (National Statistics, 2006). The sample represents a fairly educated cross-Section, 
with over 40% of participants holding an undergraduate degree, although this dropped to 
under 20% holding a degree in a science-related subject. Just under a quarter of 
participants were members of an environmental organisation, with the RSPB supported by 
the largest proportion of participants. Only two participants cited support for the climate 
change specific environmental organisations Rising Tide or Campaign against Climate 
Change. Those taking the survey, especially those who took part despite not receiving an 
incentive, may have been a more environmentally-conscious group46. This may impact the 
data for the non-icon questions such as participant concern, but it was not the aim of the 
survey to assess overall attitude to climate change. Pre- and post-test surveys were 
undertaken to investigate any potential change in participant attitudes, rather than to 
examine their perceptions of climate change per se. For the full demographic breakdown, 
refer to Appendix 7.4. 
 
The demographic data was not collected to statistically examine differences in icon 
selection specifically: climate communication methods increasingly value the targeting of 
population ‘segments’ (where a segment is as a group of individuals bound by a shared 
range of values, beliefs and behaviour) rather than population demographic details per se  
(Ereaut and Segnit, 2006; Moser and Dilling, 2007). However, some of the demographic 
data was examined in conjunction with the open-ended icon investigation questions to 
investigate general trends47 across the gender, age range and highest science qualification 
categories. Generally, there appeared few trends across the demographic groupings when 
examining expert and non-expert icon selection. For example, there were no trends 
                                                 
46
 Indeed, this statement is corroborated by the response to question 27 ‘which political party are you most 
likely to support?’ Support for Labour, Liberal Democrat and Conservative Parties in the sample was 
between 13% and 17%, but there was over 30% support for the Green Party. It is unclear whether this is local 
and/or national-level support. Norwich has a strong Green Party presence (10 of 39 City Councillors in 2007) 
but the Green Party impact was less pronounced at the 2005 General Election (taking just 2.7% and 7.4% of 
the vote in Norwich North and South respectively). 
47
 Specific research questions, such as ‘are males under 25 years old drawn to expert icons rather than non-
expert icons?’ cannot be investigated here as sample sizes are too small.  
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apparent when examining the icon data by gender. Two trends that may warrant further 
investigation are discussed below: 
 
 
• Age and selection of local icons  
The Norfolk Broads were selected by 40% of the 16-24 age group as the icon they 
were least drawn to. For this age group, the other icons each received between 10-
15% of the sample. This result is surprising because the Broads was selected by the 
greatest number of participants overall as that to which they were most drawn to. 
Whilst the Broads is a salient icon to many, it may not resonate so well with 
younger participants.  
 
• Highest scientific qualification and selection of expert icons  
The icon data was examined in relation to participants’ highest science 
qualification. As the reasoning behind icon choice has demonstrated, the expert 
icons are often dismissed by participants as ‘too complicated’ or ‘too technical’ to 
engage. A hypothesis could therefore be considered: participants with a lower level 
of science education may be less likely to choose the expert-led icons as those to 
which they find most engaging.  
 
Participants with no formal science qualifications were likely to pick a non-expert 
icon as the one they were most drawn to (73% of participants chose a non-expert 
icon). This participant group were also fairly likely to choose an expert icon as that 
to which they were least drawn to (63% selecting an expert icon). In contrast, 
participants with an NVQ or vocational degree or higher in a science-related 
subject (including undergraduate and postgraduate degrees) were not as likely to 
pick a non-expert icon as the icon they were most drawn to as those with no formal 
scientific qualifications (55% selected non-expert icons, 45% expert icons). Also, 
the trend for choosing an expert icon as the ‘least drawn to’ icon was reversed for 
the participant group with an NVQ or higher in a science-related subject compared 
to those with no formal scientific qualifications (63% selected a non-expert icon). 
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7.6   CONCLUSIONS 
The iconic approach itself provides a useful tool for communicating climate change. 
Participants were more engaged with climate change after viewing the icon information. 
They viewed climate change as a more serious issue, they were more likely to engage with 
information about climate change, and they were more likely to consider climate change a 
real problem. 
 
Interesting intra- and inter-relationships were found within the non-expert and expert icons. 
All the icons were well understood by participants, with the non-expert icons all 
substantially better understood than the expert icons. Interest in all the icons was also 
reasonably high, again, with the non-expert icons ranked higher than the expert icons. 
Concern was consistently high across all six icons. There was no discernible trend in the 
perceived fear across the non-expert and expert icons.  
 
Participants ranked the more local non-expert icons, the Norfolk Broads and London, as 
making them feel less bleak about the future than the more global icon of polar bears. This 
could be linked to feelings of control (Slovic, 1987) over possible futures for these icons: 
the more distant an icon is perceived, the less participants feel they have control over the 
icon, and the greater the negative feeling about the future it produces. Control can either 
act to engage or disengage participants. Many participants felt that in order to be engaged 
the icon needed to be perceived as controllable (i.e. local), but others felt that in order to 
shock into action the icon needed to be less controllable (i.e. global). An illustration of the 
possible placement of the non-expert icons, using the scales of ‘future’ and ‘understanding’ 
as proxies for factors one and two (see Slovic 1987, and section 7.4.2) is proposed in 
Figure 7.12. This theme of control, and its relationship with fear and the unknown, is 
considered further in Chapter 8. 
 
Of the non-expert icons, the polar bear icon is particularly intriguing. Throughout this 
thesis research the debate over the power of global-scale icons has proved controversial 
(see Chapter five). The disparity in perceptions of polar bears as either an engaging or 
disengaging climate icon was again revealed in the evaluative workshop. When asked 
which icon was most relevant, polar bears scored very low across all categories, from the 
personal to the global. Yet, participants cited it the greatest number of times as the icon to 
which they were most drawn to. This disparity is considered further in Section 8.3.1. 
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Figure 7.12   Non-expert icons plotted in the dread risk / unknown risk factor space using 
data from ‘future’ and ‘understanding’ icon scales. Adapted from Slovic (1987).
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Three themes emerged from coding the qualitative responses to icon engagement selection: 
impact, emotion and understanding. Much of the reasoning for selecting icons which 
engaged participants was connected to the perceived impact of an icon: personally, locally 
or on nature. Conversely, icons which disengaged had little impact on individuals. Icons 
which affected emotions such as sadness, danger, or calmness drew participants towards 
some icons. Icons which disengaged through this emotional sphere affected helplessness or 
boredom. The only coded data participants found they were both most and least drawn to 
was that of frightening or dramatic imagery. Some perceived it as a positive icon attribute, 
whereas others felt it was disengaging. Reasoning coded under the understanding theme 
was largely related to perceptions of the maps and images. Participants found icons which 
engaged them most were those which they could understand best, or which were novel. In 
contrast, disengaging icons were too scientific or too complex, or were not novel. 
 
Lastly, the influence of several key demographic influences was investigated. 
Relationships were found between the age of participants and how likely they were to 
choose a local icon, and the highest scientific qualification of participants and how likely 
they were to choose an expert icon. These represent further avenues to explore regarding 
icon selection. 
 
This Chapter examined the data from a pre/post test workshop, evaluating engagement 
with the iconic approach to communicating climate change. In the final Chapter, the results 
of the evaluative workshop are explored in regard to the research questions posed in 
Chapter one.  
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CHAPTER 8:  
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
This Chapter first considers individual barriers to climate engagement and how the iconic 
approach overcomes these difficulties. The iconic approach is then examined in more 
detail, investigating what makes a climate icon engaging through considering the impact of 
pragmatic and intangible reasoning, and the impact of icon spatial scale. The concept of 
‘control’ and icon (dis)engagement, and demographic and sectoral differences are also 
considered. A brief review of the literature discussed in Chapter 2 on ‘dangerous’ climate 
change leads to a proposal for the use of icons as tools to overcome difficulties in the 
selection of ‘danger’ metrics. The broader concept of climate engagement is then explored 
in the context of addressing cognitive and affective spheres within a participatory 
approach. The Chapter concludes with a reflection on the methodological process and 
consideration of future research opportunities arising from the thesis. 
 
 
8.1   INDIVIDUAL BARRIERS TO ENGAGEMENT 
Chapter 3 discusses the evidence that whilst the public respond to economic and other 
incentives intended to induce carbon reducing behaviour, there are limitations to the 
‘rational actor’ models of behaviour such as the Theory of Reasoned Action (TRA) and the 
Theory of Planned Behaviour (TPB). Providing economic incentives is an unsustainable 
engagement strategy, for if the economic incentive is removed behaviours revert to those in 
place before the incentive was given (Dobson, 2003). Additionally, individuals are 
motivated by values and attitudes as well as by economics (Dobson, 2003). Engagement 
strategies which address purely economic concerns, but do not hold an appreciation for 
personal or societal norms and values, risk being unenforceable (Whitmarsh, 2005). As 
individuals with pro-environmental values are more likely to be cognitively, affectively 
and behaviourally engaged with climate change (DEFRA, 2007; Stern, 2000; Whitmarsh, 
2005) approaches seeking to explore attitudes and values towards climate change are 
needed which go further than simple information-providing communication approaches. 
 
Lorenzoni et al. (2007) have identified a series of barriers to engagement with climate 
change. They elaborate on the individual and social barriers that the UK public perceive to 
engaging with climate change. These barriers to meaningful public engagement with 
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climate change have serious implications for the UK’s efforts to reduce emissions. 
Lorenzoni et al. argue that whilst information on the causes, impacts and solutions of 
climate change is available, on its own it may not lead to meaningful engagement. The 
individual-level barriers are discussed below (Box 8.1). Social barriers are discussed in 
Section 8.4. 
 
 
 
Box 8.1   Perceived individual barriers to engagement with climate change  .   
.                 (from Lorenzoni et al., 2007) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1. Lack of knowledge about where to find information 
2. Lack of desire to seek information 
3. Perceived information overload 
4. Confusion about conflicting information or partial evidence 
5. Perceived lack of locally-relevant information, for example about impacts or 
solutions 
6. Format of information is not accessible to non-experts 
7. Source of information is not credible or trustworthy, particularly the mass media 
8. Confusion about links between environmental issues and their respective 
solutions 
9. Information conflicts with values or experience and is therefore ignored 
 
   
 
The iconic approach seeks to minimise many of these barriers. Within the iconic approach 
information overload and the accessibility of information format was expressly considered 
(Section 7.1.2) by limiting the amount of information provided, using non-technical 
language and considering factors such as average reading speed.  
 
Whitmarsh (2005) suggests that the provision of more information, particularly scientific 
information, is unlikely to foster public engagement. Whilst the deficit model is 
acknowledged here to be an unsatisfactory model for promoting public engagement with 
climate change, participatory approaches such as the iconic approach that provide scientific 
information in conjunction with an appreciation of non-expert values and experience can 
be effective. Indeed, Whitmarsh (2005) comments that engagement with climate change 
relates to broader cultural beliefs and moral concerns rather than with narrower expert 
understandings of the phenomenon. The iconic research has shown that by presenting 
information in a clear manner, and by taking into account the communications literature 
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(for example, on the timescales of which individuals can reasonably imagine), the desire to 
seek further information about climate change is increased.  
 
Participants in Stage 1 of the research indicated that the spatial scale of icons was an 
important consideration in icon selection. Thus, locally-relevant icons were included in the 
analysis. Stage 3 (Section 7.4.4.1) demonstrated that local icons were indeed more 
engaging for a large proportion of participants, although there were exceptions (this is 
discussed further in Section 8.1.1). An extension to the fifth statement (Box 8.1) could be 
considered: that there is a need for personally-relevant information. Whilst locally-relevant 
information is often engaging, the iconic research presented here demonstrates that 
knowledge about the impacts that resonate in the intangible and pragmatic spheres is also 
important. This links to the ninth barrier considered by Lorenzoni et al. (2007). A two-
way, participatory approach to climate engagement was performed, taking into 
consideration non-expert understandings as well as both natural- and social-science expert 
knowledge. Thus, the non-expert iconic information did not conflict with participant 
values. 
 
The next Section explores the major themes arising from investigation of engagement and 
the iconic approach by considering icon selection reasoning, the concept of control and 
demographic and sectoral variability. 
 
 
8.2   WHAT MAKES AN ENGAGING CLIMATE ‘ICON’? 
 
8.2.1   Exploring engagement through icon selection reasoning 
The icon selection data was categorised both by top-down codes generated from the 
research questions and by bottom-up codes arising from the data itself. Three overarching 
themes emerged from the icon selection reasoning.  These were defined as pragmatic 
reasoning, intangible reasoning, and reasoning concerning the spatial scale of the icon’s 
impact.  
 
8.2.1.1   The impact of pragmatic and intangible reasoning on icon engagement  
Reasoning coded into the pragmatic category involved factual assertions about practical 
cause-and-effect situations. Within this theme, there were five sub-themes. These were 
‘affects me’48, ‘the everyday’, disaster/fear, economic impacts and dramatic imagery. Icons 
                                                 
48
 Code names taken directly from the data are presented in quotation marks. 
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that were coded into this theme included London, coastal flooding in Nigeria, Alpine 
skiing and food security in China. Intangible reasoning codes were those which involved 
deeper, emotional or spiritual understandings that cannot necessarily be measured 
physically. Within this second theme, there were four sub-themes. These were ‘touches 
you’ / emotion, the ‘global village’, appreciation of nature and patriotism. Icons that were 
coded into this theme included the Norfolk Broads, penguins and the reduction of polar ice.  
 
There is a connection between the pragmatic and intangible sets of codes found in this data 
and the two ‘modes of thinking’ proposed by Slovic et al. (2004; based on Epstein, 1994). 
Slovic et al. propose that individuals understand reality via two interactive, parallel 
processing systems: the rational system which is deliberative and analytical and functions 
using logic and evidence, and the experiential system which understands reality as 
perceived in images, metaphors and narratives to which feelings have become attached. 
Slovic et al. named the two modes of thinking as the ‘experiential system’ and the ‘analytic 
system’ (Table 5.4); categorisations that well describe the ‘intangible’ and ‘pragmatic’ 
system within the icon data. The only apparent exception to the similarity with Slovic’s 
modes of thinking approach is the code ‘dramatic imagery’. This first appears as if it 
should fall under ‘intangible reasoning’. However, the reasoning for icon selection coded 
under this node were related to imagery which participants saw as practical 
communications tools, as opposed to ‘images […] to which feelings have become attached’ 
(Slovic et al., 2004). 
 
Slovic et al. argue that analytic reasoning has been placed on a pedestal and portrayed as 
the epitome of rationality, and that affect and emotions have been seen to negatively 
interfere with the perceived ‘superior’ analytic reasoning. Slovic et al. contend that 
affective reasoning has played an important part in human evolution, and that the two 
systems work in partnership to assess risk. Although analytic reasoning is important in 
some circumstances, reliance on affect and emotion is quicker and easier and more 
efficient way to navigate in complex, uncertain and sometimes dangerous world. In some 
situations, individuals may knowingly ‘suspend’ the analytic system, allowing the 
emotional / affective system to wholly process information. For example, Leiserowitz 
(2007) commented when exploring the impacts of engagement for the film ‘The Day after 
Tomorrow’ (Emmerich, 2004) that cinema-goers are asked to leave their rationality at the 
door and suspend belief, thereby creating an opening for the affective system. It is clear 
that affective (intangible) reasoning for icon selection exerts a powerful hold over certain 
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participants, and can be just as effective for climate engagement as analytic (pragmatic) 
reasoning. 
 
1. KEY INSIGHT 1: Pragmatic and intangible reasoning both provide important 
approaches to engagement with climate change. Affective reasoning may provide an 
effective shortcut to engagement, bypassing the analytical system. 
 
 
8.2.1.2   The impact of spatial scale on icon engagement  
Spatial scale was concerned with the local to global extent of the impact of climate change 
upon the icon. Local icons selected included the River Wensum ecosystem and the North 
Norfolk coastline, national icons London and water supply in Nigeria, and global icons 
included the reduction of polar ice. The theme of icon scale is apparent throughout much of 
the icon selection data. For example, participants in a LEAD focus group were adamant 
that icons distant in peoples’ daily lives like polar bears and low-lying islands were not 
engaging  (Section 5.4.1.1.1). It was stated that making a linkage with an individual’s 
everyday locality and climate change was key to effective engagement.  
 
The evaluative stage (Chapter 7) also demonstrated that spatial scale provided a strong 
basis for distinguishing particular icons as more engaging than other icons. In many cases, 
the Norfolk Broads was cited as a particularly salient icon because of its local scale and its 
relevancy to local people. To a lesser extent, the London icon provoked a similar response. 
This is in accord with the literature. Nicholson-Cole (2004) states that a ‘global’ emphasis 
is not an adequate stimulus for engagement. A global perspective can lead to a state of 
being overwhelmed and unsure about a distant issue, and to feelings of issue ambivalence. 
Individuals engage in environmental problems that threaten local areas and resonate with 
their personal experiences (Macnaghten, 2003). Whitmarsh (2005) states that trust, 
personal concern and efficacy are highest at the local level, and that engagement is likely 
to be most effective at this level.  
 
However, local is evidently not always more engaging. A participant in the CNS focus 
group told of how polar bears as a spatially distant icon meaningfully engaged her and her 
young daughter in the issue of climate change more successfully than a local icon. A small 
proportion of participants in stage three (Chapter 7) stated that they were least engaged 
with the local icons, and were instead drawn to the global scale icons such as WAIS 
because of their potential global impact, or because the local icons lacked novelty. Also of 
 209 
note here is the icon selection reasoning in stage one (Chapter 5) on the ‘global village’. 
Some participants stated altruistic factors for engagement. These participants were likely to 
be more interested in the impacts of climate change on developing countries, and with 
climate change on a planetary scale. 
 
KEY INSIGHT 2: Local icons are often more engaging, but icons on different spatial 
scales can also be effective at engaging if they invoke strong pragmatic or intangible 
engagement. 
 
 
8.2.2   Exploring engagement through the concept of ‘control’ 
In Chapter 7 it was proposed that participant ranking of non-expert icons when 
investigating feelings about the future could be linked to the concept of ‘control’ as 
proposed by Slovic (1987). Participants ranked local non-expert icons as inducing a less 
bleak feeling about the future than the more global non-expert icon.  
 
2. KEY INSIGHT 3: The more distant an icon is perceived to be, the less an individual 
may feel they have control over the icon and the greater the negative feeling about the 
future this icon induces. If this is the case, then for more effective engagement feelings 
of control should be maximised.  
 
A minority of participants were more engaged by icons that stimulated shock or fear and 
thus lessened this feeling of control. One participant specifically mentioned that the icon 
seemed more manageable, and thus the icon was less engaging. Yet, the literature on risk 
perception states that inducing feelings of fear, or a lack of control, is not an effective 
engagement tool (see also section 5.4.1.1.3; Hastings et al., 2004; Moser and Dilling, 2004 
and Hulme, 2007). Research also carried out in Norwich found that dramatic imagery 
sometimes conveyed a sense of issue salience, but it was disempowering and decreased 
issue efficacy (Nicholson-Cole, 2004). This would be interesting to investigate in the 
context of icons; in particular whether fear appeals are effective for stimulating and 
maintaining climate engagement for particular sectors.   
 
8.2.3   Exploring engagement through demographic and sectoral variability 
This research was partly provoked by the frequent use in public discourse of particular 
climate icons. For example, polar icons are more frequently found in the media than other 
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icons (see Figure 5.5). Therefore, a research question was posed concerning whether a 
globally engaging climate icon existed. 
 
The diversity in icon selection demonstrates that individuals hold very different views 
about which icons best engage them with the issue of climate change. In all, 145 icons 
were cited by participants in the focus groups and online survey. Even when condensed 
into categories, fourteen icon groups remained ranging from sea level rise (SLR) to 
individual species to agriculture. There was little agreement on which icons promoted 
engagement across participants of different nationalities, with participants in the LEAD 
focus groups specifically commenting that individuals from different cultural backgrounds 
will select different icons (Section 5.4.1.1.2). Indeed, there was still considerable diversity 
in icon selection from participants of the same nationality and locality. The evaluative 
workshop is further evidence that an overarching icon of climate change that encourages 
engagement does not exist. Each icon, both expert- and non-expert, engaged at least some 
participants. Equally, each icon also disengaged a proportion of participants (Table 7.3).  
 
Because of the emerging consensus from stage one that no overarching global climate icon 
existed, and taking into consideration communication literature on targeted communication 
approaches (Section 3.4), three non-expert icons likely to resonate with a Norfolk audience 
were chosen to take forward to the icon modelling and evaluation stages. The icons chosen 
reflected the emerging themes from the first stage of the research - that icons are selected 
by individuals through their connection with the three orthogonal axes of spatial scale, 
pragmatic reasoning and intangible reasoning.  
 
This research illustrating the diversity in icon selection and engagement supports more 
recent public engagement literature where it is argued that engagement approaches need to 
move away from the ‘one size fits all’ approach exemplified by past climate campaigns 
(such as those run by environmental NGOs, Section 2.1.1.1) and recognise the 
heterogeneity in attitudes and values of the public. Futerra (2005) state that 
communications approaches should follow more mainstream marketing rules in targeting 
particular groups, an approach also advocated by former Greenpeace campaign 
coordinator, Chris Rose (2005).  
 
Further avenues relating to population demographics from this research are identified in 
Section 7.5. In this sample at least, it appears that participants’ age may have some impact 
on the icons they select. Younger participants found the most local icon, the Norfolk 
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Broads, far less engaging than any of the other icons. An additional affect which could be 
further investigated is the impact of participants’ level of education upon the icons they are 
most engaged with. In the evaluative workshop, participants with no formal science 
qualifications were more likely to engage with a non-expert icon. Conversely, participants’ 
with an NVQ or higher in a science related subject were more likely to engage with an 
expert icon. 
 
In addition to recognising demographic variability, climate communication methods 
increasingly value the targeting of population ‘segments’ (where a segment is as a group of 
individuals bound by a shared range of values, beliefs and behaviour) rather than 
population demographic details per se (Ereaut and Segnit, 2006; Moser and Dilling, 2007). 
For example, the pro-environmental behaviour framework (Muckle, 2004) recognises 
seven different groups identified by their current engagement with environmental issues, 
ranging from ‘greens’ to ‘basic contributors’ (Figure 8.1). The use of this type of model 
could inform future work investigating engagement and disengagement with climate icons. 
Engagement through demographic and sectoral variability is discussed further in Section 
8.5. 
 
3. KEY INSIGHT 4: There is great diversity in individuals’ engagement with climate icons 
across geographical and cultural contexts. Engagement approaches should seek to 
recognise and connect with differences in demographic and sectoral groups. 
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Willingness 
to Act
Ability 
to Act High ability 
+ willing 
Low ability + 
unwilling
Long Term 
Restricted 
“I can’t afford a 
car so I don’t 
drive.  I use the 
train instead”
Greens
“I try to conserve 
whenever I can…
a lot of people don’t 
think like that”
Basic 
Contributors
“Organic food –
you pay twice the 
price and how 
can you be sure 
that it really is 
organic”
Dis-interested
“Those Greenies, 
they’re too 
concerned about 
the 
environment…they 
need to chill out, 
live a little.”
Consumers with
Conscience
“Going away is 
important…I’d find it 
hard to give up, well I 
wouldn’t, so that 
[carbon off-setting]
would make me feel 
better”
Currently 
Constrained
“I am on a restricted budget 
so I cannot afford organic 
food…When I 
earn more in the future I 
definitely will 
buy it.”
Wastage 
Focussed
“We now turn the 
thermostat down…This is 
to cut down the bill, but
then you start to think 
about the environment 
as well”
Figure 8.1   Development of a pro-environmental behaviour framework (from Muckle, 2004)
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8.3   USING ICONS TO OVERCOME THE DIFFICULTIES IN SELECTING           .      
‘DANGER’ METRICS 
Different metrics have been used to quantify a value for when climate change becomes 
‘dangerous’ (Section 2.2.2.4). These metrics have not provided a holistic method of 
investigating ‘dangerous’ climate change. To come to a full understanding of ‘dangerous’ 
climate change, the role of danger both in societal and individual perceptions must be 
recognised (Dessai et al. 2004). Lorenzoni and Pidgeon (2005) define danger as a 
perceived threat.  
 
1. KEY INSIGHT 5: A definition of danger cannot simply be restricted to technical or risk-
based criteria; individuals are not rational actors acting on risk information alone. 
Within the iconic approach, individuals can impose their own perceptions of ‘danger’ 
upon the icons consistent with their personal values and attitudes.  
 
The suite of icons deliberately prevented a reduction to the lowest common metric. 
 
The impact of climate change to 2050 under A1B under an assumption of ‘no adaptation’ 
was explored for each of the icons (Chapter 6). A literature review was conducted to 
investigate impacts on the expert icons of the THC, ocean acidification and WAIS (Section 
6.2). Impacts on the three non-expert icons of polar bears, the Norfolk Broads and London 
were explored using an expert elicitation, the Coastal Simulator research, the Atlantis 
project research and through using a GIS (Section 6.3 to 6.5). This information was 
presented to participants in stage three of the research (Chapter 7). 
 
 
8.4   ENGAGEMENT AS MORE THAN COMMUNICATION 
 
8.4.1   Addressing cognitive and affective spheres for meaningful engagement 
It is not enough for people to know about climate change in order to be engaged; they also 
need to care about it, be motivated and be able to take action. Lorenzoni et al. (2007) 
define three elements of engagement as cognitive, affective and behavioural. This 
definition of engagement is also used in this thesis (Chapter 1).  
 
2. KEY INSIGHT 6: This research has shown that connecting with the affective and 
cognitive elements through using icons leads to meaningful public engagement with 
climate change.  
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A research question posed in Chapter 1 was whether this participatory icon selection 
methodology would enable enhanced cognitive engagement with climate change. The 
empirical data supports this hypothesis. The iconic approach engaged through the cognitive 
sphere. The iconic approach (the influence of both expert- and non-expert icons) 
stimulated participants to find out more about climate change, to consider climate change a 
serious issue and to view climate change as a real issue. The non-expert icons were 
selected under consideration of several criteria (Section 5.3). The non-expert icons were 
perceived by participants to be considerably better understood than the expert icons. In 
addition, interest was higher across the non-expert icons than the expert icons. 
Additionally, the ‘understanding’ meta-themes which emerged from coding the qualitative 
responses to icon engagement selection (Section 7.4.5) closely relates to the notion of 
cognitive involvement proposed by Lorenzoni et al. (2007).  
 
A second research question posed in Chapter 1 was whether a participatory icon selection 
methodology would enable enhanced affective engagement with climate change. The 
empirical data also supports this hypothesis. The ‘emotion’ theme which emerged from 
coding the qualitative responses to icon engagement selection links with the affective 
element proposed by Lorenzoni et al. (2007). Reasoning coded into the ‘impact’ meta-
theme was the most common: reasoning where icons engaged participants because the icon 
had an impact personally, locally or on nature. This theme included icons engaging 
through both affective and cognitive elements. 
 
The power of the affective element to engage individuals in climate change is well 
demonstrated by the polar bear icon. There was general agreement in stage 1 of the 
research that a global icon of climate change did not exist, and that local icons were more 
engaging (see Section 8.1). However, the polar bear icon appears to override this finding. 
In the icon selection stage, polar bears were the most frequently cited of all the individual 
icons, but participants were divided over whether polar bears constituted an engaging icon 
of climate change. This dichotomy was seen again in the evaluative stage. Polar bears 
scored the lowest of any of the icons when asked which icon was most relevant across any 
of the individual to international categories, yet it was the icon the greatest proportion of 
participants was most drawn to. Examining the qualitative reasoning behind icon selection 
clarifies this dichotomy (Section 5.4.1.2). Those most drawn to polar bears as an icon did 
not do so because they felt it was ‘relevant’ in a logical or analytical sense, but because it 
connected through the affective sphere.  
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3. KEY INSIGHT 7: Polar bears were an engaging icon despite a lack of analytical 
reasoning, because they connected through the experiential system. This finding 
empirically demonstrates the power of the affective state for engaging the public with 
climate change.  
 
 
8.4.2   Integration of expert and non-expert knowledge in a participatory approach 
Much evidence suggests that information deficit models of public perception, 
understanding and action are inadequate. Owens (2000) does not argue for an 
abandonment of the dissemination of the relationship between environmental risks and 
consumption: Owens considers it better to be informed than ignorant even if behavioural 
change does not necessarily follow from information provision. However, she argues that 
the information deficit model is at best insufficient. Instead, a more participatory process 
which integrates scientific analysis with deliberative communication is called for. A 
participatory form of engagement is appropriate in the context of climate change, where 
the public are included as a social actor as able to contribute to agenda setting as other 
actors (Wilsdon and Willis, 2004). A participatory approach does not infer that ‘anything 
goes’, but neither does it uncritically accept ‘objective truths’ about the physical world 
given by experts (Owens 2000).  This thesis has presented a participatory approach where 
scientific and non-expert knowledge have been integrated to produce a new method for 
encouraging public engagement with climate change. 
 
The public is given ownership of issues through a participatory approach. By including the 
public as vital actor in decision making, workable solutions are more likely to emerge. The 
public knowledge is given legitimacy, and the importance of non-expert knowledge is 
acknowledged. A public perspective may also define, or reframe, what the issues may be 
(Burgess et al. 1998). In this thesis, it is clear that ‘expert led’ icons prevalent in climate 
science on the whole fail to meaningfully engage with non-experts, whereas icons chosen 
by non-experts engender a much stronger pragmatic and intangible connection with other 
non-experts. 
 
Climate change can no longer be defined as a scientific ‘problem’ waiting for a ‘solution’. 
Hulme (in prep.49) contends climate change is a cultural and political phenomenon which 
                                                 
49
 Hulme, M. (in prep., publication 2008/9) Why we disagree about climate change. Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, UK. 
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reshapes the way individuals think about themselves and about society. As discussed in 
Section 2.2.2.2, the IPCC has refused to define ‘dangerous climate change’ as to do so 
would be a value judgement and is therefore outside the scope of science. As climate 
change has become a social, moral, cultural and political issue, including public knowledge 
and ethics in the negotiation of climate change is imperative. 
 
Defined ‘experts’ hold non-expert knowledge that will influence them in a decision-
making situation. This was demonstrated to the author through the examination of the 
expert elicitation literature in this thesis (Section 6.2.2). Even after experts are educated on 
the problem of overconfidence, overconfidence often still exists in expert responses. In 
common with non-experts, the interviewed experts are still subject to heuristics and biases 
in their responses. Indeed, Jasanoff (1997) states that many risk assessment exercises 
expose uncertainties and unacknowledged expert assumptions which much reduce the 
perceived distance between expert and non-expert knowledge. Further, it is recognised that 
the reach of expert knowledge is limited. Blake (1999) defines the ‘public’ in terms of 
‘alienation from dominant political or knowledge regimes in a particular context’. Owens 
(2000) states that this implies that most individuals, on any issue of particular complexity, 
fall into this ‘non-expert’ category. 
 
As climate change becomes a social, moral, cultural and political issue as well as an 
academic scientific field of study, conflict between science and society becomes more 
frequent. As discussed in Section 3.4.2, a minority of climate contrarian voices are 
disproportionately heard in the public arena, often challenging the predictions and 
probabilities provided by science. Together with perceived individual and social barriers, 
this creates a potent recipe for inaction on climate change. Providing more information, 
whether in the form of increased public information communication or an increased 
precision in climatic research (for example, scientific endeavour to reduce errors in sea ice 
projections in climate models) is unlikely to quieten these voices. A participatory approach 
aids in addressing this issue. A more inclusive approach to decision making and knowledge 
creation which builds trust and understanding between the different actors is increasingly 
appropriate (MORI, 2005). Communications approaches to facilitate engagement and 
knowledge creation are moving away from mass public campaigns and towards more 
targeted, community-led endeavours: an example being the UK’s Climate Challenge Fund 
discussed in Section 2.2.2.3.  
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The urban lifestyles sustainability and integrated environmental assessment (ULYSSES) 
project developed tools to facilitate citizen participation in integrated environmental 
assessment. The project successfully integrated computer modelling with citizen 
deliberation on climate change through a participatory approach. Participants supported 
both technological and behavioural change strategies to reduce energy consumption. 
However, van der Sluijs (1999) states how individuals were still reluctant to make personal 
sacrifices after taking part because of the ‘free rider’ effect. This emphasises the 
importance of consideration of both individual and social barriers to engagement, as 
discussed next. 
 
8.4.3   Overcoming further barriers to engagement 
The iconic approach to engaging the public with climate change has successfully addressed 
many of the individual barriers to engagement as explored in Section 8.1. The iconic 
approach did not seek to address social barriers to engagement. Previous research suggests 
that tackling social barriers is key to allowing individual decarbonisation of lifestyles. 
Nicholson-Cole (2004) found a lack of action from even the most engaged individuals. She 
explains this through the many social barriers  that affect an individual’s sense of self 
efficacy, and which obstruct the links between concern, intention and action. Similarly, 
Whitmarsh (2005) states that attempts to change values without changes to social barriers 
such as physical infrastructures is unlikely to produce sustainable changes. She states that 
climate mitigation policies must provide opportunities for an individual to change their 
behaviour, using tools such as incentives. Lorenzoni et al. (2007) state the following social 
barriers to change (Box 8.2): 
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Box 8.2   Perceived social barriers to engagement with climate change   
.               (from Lorenzoni et al., 2007) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1. Limited political activity by local, national and international governments 
(especially the US government, and the lack of substantial British action) 
2. Lack of action by businesses and industry 
3. Inaction by others in society (‘free riders’ and the tragedy of the commons) 
4. Lack of enabling infrastructure and mechanisms 
5. Social norms and expectations 
 
   
 
Jackson (2005) describes the complex dependency and feedbacks between economic 
constraints, institutional barriers, inequalities in access and restricted choice together with 
habits, routines, social norms and values as consumer ‘lock in’. Lorenzoni et al. (2007) cite 
one participant’s view of this lock-in as a ‘strangle hold’.  
 
The relationship between attitudes and external conditions is discussed in the context of the 
Attitude Behaviour Constraint model (Stern, 2000) in Section 3.3.3. The model is adapted 
below (Figure 8.1) to show a generalised behavioural change model, where the two axes 
are modified to ‘individual attitudes’ and ‘societal conditions’. The iconic approach to 
engaging the public with climate change increases positive individual attitudes and thus 
increases the potential of an individual towards decarbonisation behavioural change. For 
widespread behavioural change, engagement approaches to modify individual attitudes 
towards climate change need to be paired with much wider changes positive changes to 
societal conditions such as policy, infrastructure and mechanisms. 
 
 
 
 
 
 219 
 
Figure 8.2   Increasing the likelihood of decarbonisation behavioural change by changing attitudes 
through the iconic approach (adapted from Jackson, 2005: originally based on Stern, 2000) 
 
4. KEY INSIGHT 8: The iconic approach positively changes individual attitudes and 
increases the potential for decarbonisation behaviour. For widespread behavioural 
change, societal conditions also need to be addressed. 
 
 
8.5   METHODOLOGICAL REFLECTIONS 
 
8.5.1   Post normal science and interdisciplinarity 
The concept of interdisciplinary in shaping this research was discussed in Chapter 4. As 
with Dessai (2005), it could be argued that this is not a thesis in the tradition of ‘normal’ 
science (c.f. Kuhn, 1962). Instead of a narrowing of knowledge and specialisation with a 
clear methodology linked to neat results and conclusions, this research has followed an 
exploratory and interdisciplinary path in the realm of post-normal science requiring an 
‘extended peer community’ and ‘extended facts’ (Ravetz, 2004). This research 
investigation of the iconic approach as a tool to engage individuals in climate change has 
crossed the disciplines of geography, psychology, sociology, climate sciences, marketing 
and communication. This has been the most challenging and yet the most satisfying aspect 
of the research. 
 
Petts et al. (in press) recognise the challenges of interdisciplinary research. Of note for this 
thesis research are two related difficulties of interdisciplinary endeavour. Discussed first is 
the difficulty of interdisciplinary research defined purely as real-world problem solving 
and second, the difficulty of integrating social science into interdisciplinary research. Petts 
et al. argue that interdisciplinary research is persistently sold as a tool for tackling real 
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world problems. Whilst not in itself a difficulty, it can lead to the research being viewed 
with suspicion by those within disciplinary ‘silos’. The author has attempted to address 
these concerns by basing knowledge contributions to the research from within the 
disciplinary literature (such as grounding the findings of intangible and pragmatic 
reasoning within psychology literature on experiential and analytic systems in Chapter 5), 
whilst recognising that the original contribution of the thesis is from the interdisciplinary 
linkages between each stage of the research (see Chapter 1).  
 
Petts et al. (in press) also explore the difficulty of integrating social science into 
interdisciplinary research. Social science may be viewed as ‘soft science’: offering 
simplistic insights, and open to competition from ‘common sense’ worldviews. This has 
resonance with the author who has experienced such opinions expressed by colleagues in 
the undertaking of this research. Thus, attempts have been made to clarify the different 
methodologies used so as to be intelligible to different disciplinary audiences (for example, 
see Section 5.3.2 on focus groups as a methodology). Similarly, consistency checks were 
performed and validity of each method is discussed (see individual Chapters and Section 
8.4.2) 
 
Lastly, Petts et al. (in press) state that success in interdisciplinary research must recognise 
that there are different ways of framing the issue. Selecting a timescale for the icon 
modelling provides an example of the framing and balancing of knowledge between 
disciplines. The choice of timescale was carefully considered (Section 6.1) as a dichotomy 
exists between the timescales non-experts can conceptualise together with the potential 
loss of saliency when using long timescales, against a sufficient time period needed to 
illustrate climatic impacts on the icons. The literature examined in Section 6.1.1 indicates 
that 50 years forms an upper limit of the ability to conceptualise distant times. A 
preliminary exploration of the climatic impacts on the icons revealed that there was little 
noticeable climatic impact on the icons before the 2050s. Considering impacts to 2050 was 
therefore a compromise between these two opposing factors.  
 
8.5.2   Research validity 
This research was not intended to provide a representative view of the UK public as 
regards the iconic approach to engaging with climate change. Instead, it was designed to 
gather rich, exploratory data. The validity, meaningfulness and insights generated from 
qualitative research are more concerned with the richness of the information, and the 
observational or analytical capabilities of the researcher, than with sample size (Patton, 
 221 
2002). The icon selection reasoning was from a culturally and spatially diverse participant 
group. Insights from this methodological stage were then used to inform the further two 
methodology stages, with each stage building on the underlying data. Thus, specific results 
are not generalisable to the UK population. However, there are reoccurring themes that 
appear through different participant groups throughout the different stages of the research. 
These themes are discussed in Section 8.1. 
 
The validity of the data was increased through consideration of the methodology used. For 
example, pre-testing was carried out for all protocols. The protocols for the online survey 
(Section 5.3.2.1) focus groups (Section 5.3.1.1), expert elicitation (Section 6.3.4) and 
workshop questionnaires (Section 7.2) were pre-tested for question comprehension, 
question flow and timing. 
 
A combination of complementing qualitative and quantitative questioning was used 
throughout the individual methods. Quantitative responses allowed statistical tests to be 
used to directly compare participant responses, as qualitative data on attitudes is often not 
amenable to statistical methods. Statistical tests were carried out on the quantitative 
workshop questionnaire Likert scale responses, but are inappropriate for measuring 
qualitative reasoning. Nevertheless, some quantitative mention is made of the frequency 
and extensiveness of comments as one of the seven methods for assessing qualitative data 
(see Box 5.2). Open-ended questions in the online survey, expert elicitation and workshop 
questionnaires allowed participants to elaborate on fixed-choice questions, providing a 
deeper and richer data source. Qualitative data was examined using the seven criteria as 
described in Box 5.2. 
 
Attempts to increase data reliability were made by making a summary of the data collected 
as perceived by the author available to participants. In the focus groups, a summary was 
made of the main themes at the end of the focus groups and participants were asked to add 
to this as they wished. In the online survey, expert elicitation and workshop questionnaires, 
participants were asked a final question requesting additional thoughts not covered 
elsewhere. For the online survey and workshop questionnaires, participants could request a 
report of the results. For the expert elicitation, participants were explicitly requested to 
adjust responses after the first iteration as they saw fit. 
 
Digital recordings were made of the focus groups to maintain a full and accurate record of 
the event, and to facilitate moderator focus on event facilitation. Full transcripts were made 
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for the focus groups. Time fillers and moderator prompts were only removed when they 
did not affect the overall meaning of the sentence. Qualitative responses from the online 
survey, expert elicitation and workshop questionnaires were also recorded and analysed in 
full. Spelling and grammar was not altered for these files in order to keep true to the data. 
 
The reliability of the data is also increased through consideration of data analysis. 
Reliability checks were carried out for the coded data. An independent analyst checked 
samples of qualitative coded data for consistency and theme categories (Sections 5.4.1 and 
7.4.4). Additionally, appropriate statistical tests were used in data analysis. The statistical 
tests used considered assumptions in the data source. For example, the expert elicitation 
data used medians, not means (see Section 6.3.4) and the Likert scale analysis for the 
workshop questionnaires used the Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-rank test rather than the 
t-test. Additionally, to ensure statistical thoroughness grossing-up of the sets in the 
evaluative workshop was not performed due to some small set numbers, but comparison of 
sets was made through the Aylmer test (see Section 7.3.1 for further discussion of the 
Wilcoxon and Aylmer test). 
 
 
8.6   FURTHER RESEARCH 
This research has opened several possibilities for further research both investigating the 
icons defined here, and identifying other icons salient for different audiences. 
 
The impact on engagement of three non-expert and three expert icons has been addressed 
in this research. Further research could track engagement with these six icons over time. Of 
particular interest is public engagement with the polar bear icon. As this thesis research has 
progressed, media attention has become ever-more intense over the potential impact of 
climate change on polar bear populations (see Arlidge, 1999; Buncome and Carrell, 2005; 
Winter, 2005; Black, 2006; Joling, 2006; McCarthy, 2006; Pearce, 2006; Ashford, 2007; 
Debnam, 2007; Garfield, 2007; Langan and Leonard, 2007; New Scientist, 2007; Pennisi, 
2007). In 2007, Garfield wrote an article in the broadsheet newspaper The Observer 
naming polar bears the ‘poster boys of global warming’. It could be that media activity 
intensifies engagement with the icon, as it becomes better known and increasingly 
associated with climate change. Conversely, it may decrease icon novelty (see Section 
7.4.5) and hence decrease engagement. 
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An obvious extension to this research is to investigate the differences between the different 
demographics in icon selection. Further avenues relating to population segmentation from 
this research are identified in Section 7.5. First, in this participant sample at least, it 
appears that participants’ age may have some impact on the icons they select, with younger 
participants finding the most local icon far less engaging than other icons. The importance 
of engaging young people lies not only with their status as the future electorate, but also as 
individuals in a transition period of their lives. Research by Verplanken and Wood (2006) 
has demonstrated that transition periods are very effective periods to instigate attitude and 
behavioural change. An additional avenue which could be further investigated is the 
impact of an individual’s highest level of scientific education in regard to the icons they 
find most engaging. The iconic research found participants with no formal science 
qualifications were more likely to engage with a non-expert icon, whereas participants’ 
with an NVQ or higher in a science related subject were more likely to engage with an 
expert icon. 
 
Further to demographic factors, attitude/behaviour categories such as the DEFRA 
Segmentation Model (Dresner et al., 2007) could be used to identify key icons for 
particular groups. This approach holds appeal, for it categorises sectors based on their 
current environmental attitudes and behaviours. Thus, icons may be identifiable that would 
help to connect with specific target sectors such as those currently least engaged with 
climate change; for instance, the ‘basic contributors’ in Figure 8.1. Or, engagement 
approaches could aim to reach those who are only superficially engaged through invoking 
more affective engagement, such as the ‘wastage focussed’ (see Figure 8.1). 
 
An extension to the above could be to specifically focus on social networks bound by 
shared world views. Approaches through social networks are significant in influencing an 
individual’s behaviour as people are far more likely to trust family and friends than the 
media or politicians (Poortinga and Pidgeon, 2003; Future Foundation, 2006). For 
example, it has been suggested that religious institutions could hold great influence over 
their congregations in regard to engagement with climate change (McNamara, 2007). 
Indeed, as discussed in this thesis and elsewhere (Whitmarsh, 2005; Hulme, 2007; Moser 
and Dilling, 2007),  there is a strong moral aspect to the issue of climate change. In this 
respect, it would be very interesting to investigate the iconic approach to engagement with 
climate change through several different religious lenses; investigating commonalities and 
differences in the conceptualisation and selection of icons for engagement. 
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8.7   CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This thesis has demonstrated that an iconic approach to representing climate change 
engages individuals through invoking affective and cognitive change. It has shown that 
pragmatic and intangible reasoning, as well as icon spatial scale, are important in the 
selection of particular non-expert climate icons. When these non-expert climate icons were 
tested against expert-led icons, the expert-led icons were generally found to disengage. 
Expert-led icons had little impact on individuals and invoked emotions such as 
helplessness or boredom. The expert icons also disengaged as they were too scientific and 
complex. Conversely, non-expert icons tend to impact upon the individual, the local area or 
nature and invoke emotional responses and increased understanding. Thus, non-expert 
icons move individuals to feeling more engaged with climate change. However, social 
barriers to engagement also need to be overcome before individuals will make significant 
behavioural changes to a low-carbon lifestyle. 
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Date:           ____________________________________________________________ 
Participants: ____________________________________________________________ 
 
 
Hi. 
 
Thanks for taking the time to come to this discussion group. As you’re probably aware, we’re 
going to be talking about climate change and ways in which it is communicated. The discussion 
shouldn’t take any longer than 1 ½ to 2 hours. Please help yourself to tea and coffee which has 
been provided by CNS. Hopefully you’ve also had a chance to look at the information and consent 
form [check]. I'll collect these in at the end of the session. 
 
I’m recording the session because I don’t want to miss any of your comments. This is so I can 
transcribe the session so I don’t miss anything. The tape will be destroyed after transcription. No 
names will be included in any write-ups of the research, and your comments are confidential, 
unless you specifically want to be named.  
 
I’ve asked all of you to wear a name tag to help me remember names, but they can also help you. If 
you want to follow up on what somebody has said, you want to agree, disagree, or give an example, 
feel free to do that. Don’t feel like you have to respond to me all the time. Feel free to have a 
conversation with one another about these questions. I am here to ask questions, listen, and make 
sure everyone has a chance to contribute. I’m interested in hearing from all of you. 
 
There are some basic ground rules I’d like to go through before we start the discussion. First, 
please don’t talk over anyone. You’ll all get a chance to speak and I’d like to hear everyone’s voice 
clearly when I come to transcribe the tape! Second, this is designed to be a comfortable atmosphere 
- consider other peoples opinions, and feel free to oppose them but please do so in a respectful way. 
I’m sure there will be some times when you’ll all agree - and other times when you’ll all have a 
different opinion, and that’s fine! There are no right or wrong answers. I’m not here to answer any 
particular questions on climate change, but to find out what you think about the issue. If you have 
any particular questions about climate change that you want directed to me, please ask me at the 
end of the group when I’d be more than happy to talk to you about them. 
 
 
Opening Question: 5-10 mins 
If we could just go round the circle to introduce ourselves to each other now. OK… to start… Let 
me introduce myself. I’m working as a researcher at UEA - the University of East Anglia. My 
research is looking at ways in which climate change is communicated now and possible ways it 
could be communicated in the future. I’m really interested in listening to your ideas about what you 
APPENDIX 5.1    
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know about climate change and whether you feel it’s relevant or irrelevant. Particularly, I’m 
interested to know what you know about climate change and how you feel about the 
communications you’ve come across. 
 
- introduce Sian (technical assistant) 
OK, just tell us your name and how you heard about this focus group – whether you’re a teacher 
here, or if your child goes to CNS… 
 
Introductory Questions: 5 -15 mins 
(1.)  What is the first thing that comes to mind when you hear the phrase ‘climate change’? 
- Do you know climate change by any other words or phrases? (e.g. global warming) 
- Does climate change mean anything in your everyday life? (recycling, using car less, 
getting hotter…) 
 
(2.)  I’d like to discuss what you think about the way climate change is communicated (e.g. media, 
education, government - through TV, radio, magazines, newspapers, movies) 
- What do you think about it / them? 
- Do they affect the way you think? 
- Are they relevant to you / your life? 
- Tell me how they make you feel. 
- Tell me how they make you act. 
 
OK, now we’re going to move away slightly from how you have seen climate change 
communicated in the past to start thinking about a way that it may be communicated in the future. 
I’m calling this approach the ‘iconic’ approach. 
 
Transition Questions: 5 – 20 mins 
(3.)  Can you tell me what the word ‘icon’ means to you? 
- Where have you heard the word ‘icon’ before? (e.g. pictures, semiotics, on a PC, a 
famous entity / person) 
- What do you consider to be iconic, or an icon?  
- Can you think of something you think is ‘iconic’ or someone you think is ‘an icon’?                      
 
OK, the way I’m thinking of using this ‘iconic’ approach combines elements of all the things we’ve 
just discussed. An icon could be a famous person or thing that you might consider representative of 
a particular culture or way of life, and which you admire. Examples of icons might be the Houses 
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of Parliament as an icon of the British Government, Marilyn Monroe might be an icon of American 
filmmaking, a red telephone box might be an icon of England. 
 
 
At the moment, communications tend to use representations of climate change, or 'icons' that I 
think may not be relevant to everyday life - think back to our discussion on how climate change is 
communicated in the media. Instead, I would like you to think about icons that you would find 
interesting, and would make you want to know more about what happens to it in regard to climate 
change.  
  
 
(4.) What kind of factors do you think would make an engaging icon – one that is easy to 
communicate and a lot of people care about? 
- Maybe think about location – would it be better to have a local/global icon?  
- What about the relationship individuals would have with the icon - would it be better 
for it to be a personally important or famous icon? 
- Think back to the Marilyn Monroe example – do you agree she become ‘iconic’ – 
why? E.g. can personally identify with her struggle for success, lowly beginnings etc. 
 
Key Questions: 30 – 50 mins 
OK, remember that example of the Houses of Parliament being a possible icon of the British 
Government. Well: 
(5.) What do you think would make a good icon of climate change? I really value your input into 
what you think would be relevant and interesting icons for you. 
- The icon you choose should be valuable to you 
- you may be concerned about what happens to it in the future with climate change 
- perhaps you value that this icon is still there for future generations to appreciate 
 
Your climate change icon can be: 
- a place 
- something from the natural world 
- a culture 
- a species 
- a city 
- a building 
- an indigenous community… the choice of icon is limited only by your imagination! 
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I’d like you to all take a minute to think about all the issues we’ve been discussing. Consider what 
we’ve discussed an icon is, and which icons you feel are most effective for communicating climate 
change. 
 
 
OK, draw up a list of several icons that you would like to know more about, in relation to future 
climate change? What would make a useful icon of climate change to you? (i.e. one that excites 
your interest and makes you want to know more about climate change?) 
 
 
(6.) So, what icons did people come up with? 
Prompts: Who / what is the icon? 
           Where is the icon? 
           What are your reasons for choosing your icons? 
           Why is it important? 
            How do you think your icon will alter with climate change? 
 
 
Ending Questions: 
Summarise discussion:  
- talked about climate change and how it’s communicated 
- then we discussed what an icon was 
- we talked about what makes a good / bad icon and discussed what icons you might 
want to know more about in respect of climate change 
 
- emphasise that those who want to be will be kept informed if they want: report or 
further discussion groups - need contact details 
 
(7.)  How well does that capture what was said in our discussion? Are there any points you think 
I’ve left out or overemphasised? 
 
(8.) Is there anything you would have liked to have talked about, but didn’t get the chance?  
 
(9.) Could you all please fill in the consent form and give one copy back to me 
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OK, thanks for taking part! I’ll wrap up the discussion now, but if anybody wants to talk about 
anything we’ve discussed this evening, I’ll be around for a few minutes more. 
 
Thank you!  
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Icons following a low trajectory in IV, V and VI and excluded from further analysis 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Amsterdam 
Cairo 
Coast, UK 
Glaciers, Alps 
E.Anglian coast, UK 
Ladybirds, UK 
Whales 
Robin, UK 
Eastern spine-billed honeyeater 
New York 
Droughts, Brazil 
Floodplains, UK 
Glaciers, Arctic 
Health, Brazil 
Oak trees, UK 
Permafrost melt, Russia 
Small island states, Pacific 
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(1.) Venice (city / town SLR) 
Venice was chosen by Eros (LEAD group 3) and Ang (LEAD, group 2).  
 
 “So immediately I will say, the Venice Lagoon. Because the temperature will go up, 
  actually so will the level of the water go up and with the consequence that you can 
 imagine.”            Eros, Italian, living in Luxemburg 
 
Venice rates moderately highly on pragmatic reasoning. As an icon, there is a variety of literature 
available surrounding the issue of Venice and SLR, and it would be quite sensitive to climate 
change over the timescale modelled. However, Venice does not code under any of the intangible 
nodes.  
 
(2.)  Shanghai (city / town SLR) 
Shanghai was chosen only once, by Wang (LEAD). 
 
 “Shanghai city, the most important city in China.”    Wang, China 
 
Shanghai ranks on pragmatic, but not on intangible reasoning. There has been a significant quantity 
of research on SLR on this area of coastline, although some of it is in Chinese and as such may be 
more difficult to access. Shanghai was also chosen by the BBC (BBC 2006) in a programme titled ‘ 
5 disasters waiting to happen’, so it could be assumed that Shanghai may already be seen as an icon 
of climate change. The impact of negative climate change impacts upon Shanghai as a major 
finance and population centre would be felt across the globe, hence it scores highly on III. 
However, there is little reasoning attached to this icon. 
 
(3.)  North Norfolk Coast, UK (SLR) 
The North Norfolk Coast (including Happisburgh and Cromer chosen as individual icons) was 
chosen by Janet and Alison, both CNS participants. Janet did not provide any reasoning for this 
particular icon choice. 
 
 “So Happisburgh, I often think of [...] And then Dunwich, you know, in Suffolk, which  
 actually did go, didn’t it. You know, which was drowned. So I do think about the East 
 Anglian coastline and I do think that is a very clear image.” […]  
 "...and then…Happisburgh… you know. Because I get that picture in my mind of the 
 houses, right on the edge… and you know it’s gonna go…"                 Alison, Norfolk, UK 
 
APPENDIX 5.3    
 DISCUSSION OF ICONS NOT SELECTED FOR FURTHER ANALYSIS  
 
 232
Although this icon ranked on both pragmatic and intangible reasoning, it was not particularly high 
in either. It ranks as a regional icon on criteria III. Models are available to quantify the effects of 
climate change upon the icon. The icon would be particularly sensitive to climate change over the 
timescale examined. 
 
(4.)  Coastline, Japan (SLR) 
Japan was chosen by Ang (LEAD). 
 
 "Japan. Something you can imagine a picture that after the sea level rising maybe 
 two or three centimetres and maybe 1/5 or 1/6 of lands in Japan will be flooded."[…] 
 "Because if Japan was flooded by 1/5 of the land, then maybe it would produce a  disaster 
 to this country. But we are, have live in the global village. So we should care about one 
 country and not only the…"              Ang, China 
 
It scored fairly low on pragmatic reasoning, and little higher on the intangible reasoning. Overall, 
though, this icon did not seem to resonate with Ang’s group and was not mentioned by any other 
participants. 
 
(5.)  Pacific Coast, Mexico (SLR) 
Several of the participants in the LEAD groups were able to relate to this icon, and added their own 
icons in a similar vein (see icons 7 and 8). 
 
 "...our Pacific beaches. Uh! As it's tourism in the Pacific, is one of the most important 
 sources of income for the country. So a climate change would directly affect this patches 
 of beaches."         Fritzea, Mexico 
 
 "It is the same thing. Er, beaches… " [see Abiodun's comment: beaches for tourism, and 
 property being threatened]             Maria Isabel, Mexico 
 
This icon ranks highly compared to many of the others on pragmatic reasoning, although nothing 
was coded under intangible reasoning. This icon was chosen three times (although a large 
proportion of the LEAD participants were Mexican so this would have influenced icon selection). 
However, there may be difficulties in modelling as a preliminary review found very little research 
in this location. 
 
(6.)  Coastal flooding, Nigeria (SLR) 
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This icon was chosen by Abiodun (LEAD). It ranked highly on pragmatic reasoning, but again, 
didn’t code on intangible reasoning.  
 
 “So prime properties on the coastline of Nigeria if you show these people connect with it, 
 […] They can relate, they can understand, because there social conditioned to it, so when 
 they see some ocean surge, and they see property being threatened, […] and also the 
 beaches too for tourism.”                         Abiodun, Nigeria 
 
The literature provided a few examples of research at this location, and it would be somewhat 
sensitive to climate change over the timescale examined. 
 
(7.)  Property flooding on the coast, Brazil (SLR) 
This was chosen by two participants, Marcelo and Maria Izabel (LEAD). Teresa from Mexico also 
found this theme salient though, finishing off Maria Izabel’s explanation: 
 
 “I thought about the beaches of Brazil. Because it’s a very important thing in peoples 
 lives. And we love beach, and then maybe we can say about, uh, with climate change  
 there will be no more place to…”                                    Maria Izabel, Brazil  
 “…to go and lay!”                 Teresa, Mexico 
  
 “People who has, who have houses by the beach which normally in Brazil are the 
 richest people, they would be very touched by losing their house.”            Marcelo, Brazil 
 
Thus, this icon ranked in a middle position for pragmatic reasoning, and coded under several nodes 
in intangible reasoning - more than any other individual SLR icon. However, again, this may be a 
difficult icon to model as not much research appears to have been carried out in this location. 
 
(8.)  Coastline, Sweden (SLR) 
This was chosen by one of the cp.net participants.  
 
 “Rising seas. I live in Gothenburg, Sweden and grew up close to the sea. We do have 
 landrise since the Ice Age but if the sea rises faster than that everyone living close to the 
 sea will be affected.”              Participant 17, Sweden 
 
The icon was placed in an average position for pragmatic reasoning, but did not rank at all for 
intangible reasoning.   
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(9.) R. Wensum (ecosystem) 
This was chosen by two participants, both in the CNS group. 
 
  "...and my house is under water too, as I live quite near there… (laughter) and half way 
 up the Cathedral, and Mercy nightclub up on Prince of Wales Rd is (laughter) [... ]and 
 you’ve got crocodiles in the river. And various other tropical plants.[...] I thought it 
 would be quite nice to show people what they are going to lose."     
                Tom, Norfolk, UK 
 
 "I’ve got the rivers Yare and Wensum, and further salinity creeping up the rivers… and 
 the different species that would be displaced because of that."           Tiny, Norfolk, UK 
 
This icon has an average trajectory, through both intangible and pragmatic reasoning. However, 
there is a lack of models for this particular river so it may prove hard to quantify. The literature 
search also did not predict this river to be greatly affected by climate change, especially on the 
relatively short time scale chosen. 
 
(10.) Skiing, Alps (Winter sports) 
Although winter sports as a group were chosen twice, only one of the participants gave a spatial 
location for their activity. However, both reasonings are included here and both are accounted for 
in the icon trajectory. 
 
 “Winter sports. If climate change would lead to snow free mountains, there is now 
 change to do winter sports any longer. […] it would directly effect one nice activity 
 which many people are looking forward to over the whole year.”       
              Participant no. 42, Germany 
 
 “…it’s probably doomed anyway, um, but I did think of, of a visual, cause I mean, I think, 
 you know, you need striking visual images. And I do think people would respond to the,  
 the, and it’s one of the few areas where you can show people an immediate negative 
 payoff. […] ‘this is a ski slope, you know, as it is now, and this is what you can expect it 
 to be, perhaps in only ten or twenty years time.”                Alison, Norfolk, UK 
 
 "You know, will your kids be skiing down the same piste that you’re off to?"   
              Alison, Norfolk, UK 
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Skiing ranks fairly highly for pragmatic, but low for intangible reasoning. There has been much 
research in this area, so modelling for this icon could probably be carried out in a fully quantitative 
manner. Snow cover in the Alps is also very sensitive to changes in climate, as has already been 
seen over the last few decades (e.g. Scherrer & Appenzeller, 2004). This icon ranks at beyond a 
national level (but not global) as effects would be felt over several nations, and would also heavily 
impact the tourist market of western Europe.  
 
(11.) Penguins, S Pole (species) 
Penguins were chosen as an icon by four participants, two from LEAD and two from CP.net. The 
icon does not rate particularly highly on pragmatic reasoning. The reason given here is on the same 
lines as for polar bears – as they are “easily recognisable” (Participant 23, UK). More intangible 
reasoning is coded: 
 
"Penguin […] because it comes from an unpopulated area and therefore belongs to no-one 
in particular but to everyone in general."               Participant 23, UK 
 
[Talking of ‘March of the Penguins’ movie and penguins as an icon] “it's how people felt 
about it, people very touched by the film […] WWF was very, was very successful in 
choosing like, the, the, panda as their, as their symbol because it is like round, and round 
eyes, and all the people identify with that. So, that's why I decided that the penguin would 
be a good icon to work on that, working, humanising a penguin suffering from the climate 
change.”            Marcelo, Brazil 
 
Interestingly, though, although Marcelo considers the reasoning behind using penguins here makes 
a good icon for other people, he thinks they are not a good icon for him: 
 
 “because they humanise the Penguin's life, so this is like in the media, so people kind of 
 relate, I didn't even watch because I think it's bullshit” 
 
It would probably be possible to model this icon quantitatively, though preliminary results from the 
literature suggests that penguins might not be sensitive to climate change over the period to be 
modelled.  
 
(12.) Food security, China (food security) 
This icon was only cited by one participant in a LEAD focus group, but the icon did provoke 
discussion throughout the group, appearing particularly to find salience with the other Chinese 
participants. It does not rate for intangible reasoning, but for pragmatic reasoning this icon scores 
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highly. The icon would be quite sensitive to climate change over the period modelled and it would 
probably be possible to model it quantitatively. 
 
“Chinese is very focussed on food” […] you have some impacts on food. It's…                
            (Zhen, China)  
“…for the sensitive countries”             (Ang, China)   
…because it's highly populated, so… food security and all these issues that matters”     
                     (Liming, China) 
 
(13.) Water supply / hydro-electric, Nigeria (drought or water supply) 
Although this icon scored fairly highly for pragmatic reasoning, the literature review revealed that 
this icon is not likely to be affected by climate change in the timescale examined. (Water 
availability in Nigeria is predicted to stay the same or slightly increase, Arnell). 
 
(14.) Water availability, UK (drought or water supply) 
This icon is likely to be impacted by climate change over the timescale examined, and it is very 
likely that this icon could be quantitatively examined. It was chosen by one participant from a 
LEAD focus group. It does not rank on the intangible, although does rate on the pragmatic 
reasoning: 
 
“Water availability where it is running out, would be the most effective communications 
for the UK because the loss of East Anglia is not going to happen as rapidly as sort of 
saying, 'yes, this is another year where we are running out of water', because with water 
availability there is actually potentially a crisis this year with um, maybe parts of the 
southeast where they will have no water.”               Stephen, UK 
 
This reasoning is interesting as it notes that for an icon to be effective, the effect of climate change 
may need to be visible in the near term. This has implications for the timescale used to model the 
icon: a longer timescale would have a greater effect on the icon, but would decrease issue saliency, 
whereas a shorter timescale may not produce as dramatic effect on the icon but would be more 
salient. 
 
(15.) Reduction in polar ice volume (polar / ice) 
This icon was chosen by  three people, two from CP.net and Tiny from the CNS groups. It ranked 
fairly low for pragmatic reasoning, as the reasoning was coded into just one node – that the icon 
was a good communicator: 
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 “A melting arctic glacier breaking apart and dramatically plummetting into the ocean 
 Dynamic dramatic change.”              Participant 46, nationality unknown 
 
The icon did code a little higher for intangible reasoning though:  
  
 "The polar regions [...] because they’re pretty much unexplored places. And to have them 
 disappear before we have a chance to go and have a look at them in all their beauty, that 
 would be a shame."                Tiny, Norfolk, UK 
 
However, depending on both the location and timescale chosen, this icon could prove insensitive to 
climate change – although if the Arctic was chosen, then the icon is extremely sensitive. 
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22
Dear PBSG member
You are warmly invited to participate in an expert elicitation to investigate potential polar bear 
population dynamics under climate change over the next fifty years.
This expert elicitation forms part of a PhD researching ‘An iconic approach to communicating climate 
change’ (if you would like to know more, please see the attached information sheet). It is our hope that 
results from this elicitation are also published in the scientific literature. Our research has shown that 
polar bears are an icon of climate change for many people. Although investigations into polar bear 
population dynamics under climate change are currently in progress, we are investigating what the 
expert views and associated uncertainties in this area currently are. 
Expert elicitation is well established technique using a structured process to elicit subjective 
judgements from experts. It is widely used to quantify risk where there is a lack of empirical data to 
assess uncertainty, and it can make available knowledge that may not be otherwise easily accessible. 
Participants in the elicitation are asked to draw on all forms of knowledge available to them.
Should you accept this invitation to participate, we ask that you examine 3 sea-ice maps we have 
provided. We will then ask for your response to 9 questions. Once views have been collated from all 
experts, you will be invited to review your answers in conjunction with those from the expert group and 
resubmit should you wish to alter your responses. You can choose to participate online via a web link 
or offline via an email attachment. The elicitation will commence on Monday 8th January. Participants 
are asked to complete and return their elicitations by Sunday 28th January. We anticipate the elicitation 
should take about an hour. The second round, should you wish to participate further, will be carried out 
between Friday 2nd February and Sunday 11th February. A detailed timetable can be found on the 
attached information sheet. If you would like to participate but cannot make these dates, please do 
contact us and we will try to accommodate you.
You will remain anonymous throughout the procedure as your responses will be identified by a code 
letter only. You can modify your answers after seeing the group responses if you wish, but you will not 
experience pressure to do so. It is your choice whether you would like your name to be listed in any 
published work. If you prefer, you can remain anonymous throughout. In no case will responses be 
linked to individual experts.
In recognition of your time, the Tyndall Centre will contribute £50.00 per participant completing the 
elicitation to the charity Polar Bears International.
If you would like to know more and perhaps view examples of research in this area, please refer to the 
information sheet attached. We very much hope you will be able to assist us in this undertaking. If you 
have any questions before you decide whether to accept this invitation, please do not hesitate to 
contact us. 
If you would like to take part, please email: s.o-neill@uea.ac.uk before Monday 8th January 2007.
Yours faithfully,
Ms Saffron O’Neill and Prof Mike Hulme
s.o-neill@uea.ac.uk +44(0) 1603 593911
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Information for potential expert 
elicitation participants 
 
 
 
 
'Expert views and associated 
uncertainties of Polar Bear (Ursus 
maritimus) population dynamics 
under climate change to 2050’ 
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Dear PBSG member 
 
Thank you for taking the time to read this information sheet. The information sheet contains 
details of the submission of elicitation questions, time frame for the elicitation, some examples 
of the use of expert elicitation in the field of climate change and the abstract of the PhD 
research this elicitation forms a part of. 
 
Submission of elicitation questions 
We would like to gather your responses to 9 questions in the elicitation. There are two ways in 
which you can complete the elicitation form. You can either complete the elicitation entirely 
online via an invitation email to our survey site, or you can choose to open an email attachment 
form, print it out and fax it back when completed. 
 
Time frame for the elicitation 
The elicitation will be sent out on Monday 8th January and participants will have until Sunday 
28th January to complete and return it. The results of the elicitation will then be collated by the 
team here at the Tyndall Centre. We will send out the collated results on Friday 2nd February, 
and participants will have until Sunday 11th February to make adjustments to their answers if 
they would like, after viewing the responses from the group as a whole.  
 
Any amendments made by participants to the elicitation will be collated with the original 
results and re-sent on Friday 16th February. Participants can make further adjustments if they 
so wish: in which case, a further round of elicitation with these participants will ensue until all 
are satisfied with their contributions.  Participating in second or further stages is completely 
voluntary even if the first stage has been completed. The literature in this area suggests that 
more than one iteration is unusual. 
 
In recognition of your time, the Tyndall Centre will contribute £50.00 per participant 
completing the elicitation to the charity Polar Bears International. 
Activity Dates  Approximate time 
for completion 
First round of elicitation responses 
collected 
Monday 8th January - 
Sunday 28th January  
 
1 hour 
Responses collated by Tyndall Centre 
team 
Monday 29th January - 
Friday 2nd February 
 
 
Second round of elicitation responses 
collected 
Friday 2nd February - 
Sunday 11th February 
 
15 minutes  
(if you so wish) 
Responses collated by Tyndall Centre 
team 
Monday 12th February - 
Friday 16th February 
 
Table 1. Elicitation timetable 
 
Examples of the use of expert elicitation 
Morgan, G.M., Pitelka, L.F. and Shevliakova, E., 2001. Elicitation of expert judgments of 
climate change impacts on forest ecosystems. Climatic Change, 49: 279–307. 
 
Riseby, J.S. and Kandilkar, M., 2002. Expert assessment of uncertainties in detection and 
attribution of climate change. Bulletin of the American Meteorological Society, 83: 1317-
1326. 
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Vaughan, D.G. and Spouge, J.R., 2002. Risk estimation of collapse of the West Antarctic Ice 
Sheet. Climatic Change, 52: 65–91 
 
PhD to which this elicitation contributes: 
 
‘An iconic approach to communicating climate change’ 
 
Article 2. (UNFCCC, 1992) states ‘stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the 
atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the 
climate system’ as its ultimate objective: sparking a controversy surrounding the true nature of 
‘dangerous’ climate change. This research is designed to encourage climate change 
understanding in non-climate experts. It will argue that it is impossible to reduce a system with 
the complexity of the global climate to a single common metric. Instead, icons will be utilised. 
An icon is defined as a tangible global representation considered worthy of admiration or 
respect, which one can relate to and feel empathy for.  
 
There is some evidence of the usage of such icons already e.g. the melting of the West 
Antarctic Ice Sheet or potential thermohaline shutdown. Yet, these icons used by climate 
experts are likely to discourage efficacy in the non-expert as they are too remote from 
everyday life. This iconic approach aims to harness the emotive and visual power of icons 
already in the public eye with a rigorous scientific analysis of possible changes under a 
different climate future. The research is divided into three consecutive sections: 
 
1. What makes an ‘icon’, and how will the icons be chosen? 
One of the most fundamental questions to this project concerns how to choose the icons to be 
modelled. The icons must fulfil their role in providing an empathetic tool for climate 
communication. A robust sourcing for representative icons has been carried out with three 
diverse groups, with contributions from participants of LEAD International, 
climateprediction.net forum members, and Norwich residents. The methodologies used 
included focus groups and an online survey. The icons investigated are flooding and the North 
Norfolk Coast, London and the Thames Barrier and Polar Bear population dynamics. 
 
2. What are the effects of modelling a potential climate future upon the chosen icons? 
Quantitative models (Lisflood, and the Tyndall Coastal Simulator) and qualitative techniques 
(expert elicitation) will be used to ascertain the impact of climate change for the icon under the 
middle-range projection SRES scenario A1B. Results will be presented as impact assessment 
studies in the thesis and as icon information sheets combining narratives, maps and 
probabilistic information, utilising communication theory, for the evaluative stage. 
 
3. Does this method of communicating climate provide saliency to policy-makers, the 
layperson and stakeholders? 
It is anticipated that using non-expert icons will aid in providing saliency of climate change to 
the layperson, encouraging attitude change towards mitigative and adaptive action. This last 
stage will evaluate if the iconic approach modifies participants’ knowledge, emotional 
involvement and behaviour in relation to climate change. It will utilise a semi-quantitative 
approach, through a comparative study of the ‘expert-led’ icons arising from the ‘Avoiding 
Dangerous Climate Change’ conference held in Exeter, UK in 2005 against the non-expert 
icons defined in this thesis. 
 
Again, if you have any further questions, please do not hesitate to contact us. Yours faithfully, 
 
 
Ms Saffron O’Neill and Prof Mike Hulme 
s.o-neill@uea.ac.uk    +44(0) 1603 593911 
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Dear Participant. 
 
 
Thank you for taking the time to take part in this elicitation. The elicitation should take 
around an hour to complete. 
 
The elicitation will be available for completion until Sunday 28th January 2007. Results 
will then be collated. On Friday 2nd February, you will be sent an email allowing you to 
view the collated group response in regard to your own (anonymous) answers. You will 
have the opportunity to change any of your answers, if you so wish, until Sunday 11th 
February. 
 
 
When you have finished the elicitation, please fax it to:  +44 (0) 1603 593 901 
 
 
If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact us. Thank you for participating 
in this elicitation. Your time is very much appreciated.  
 
 
 
Saffron O’Neill and Mike Hulme 
(s.o-neill@uea.ac.uk) 
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Sea ice model information: Please read this before you start the elicitation 
We appreciate your expertise is in polar bear dynamics and not necessarily climate science. 
Therefore we are providing you with simulations of sea ice from the most recent climate 
model experiments. These were undertaken for the forthcoming 4th IPCC report and relate 
for the year 2050 under the middle-range climate scenario of the IPCC SRES A1B. Please 
refer to this selection of ice modelling plots to aid you in the elicitation. This elicitation is 
designed to gather your thoughts on polar bear dynamics, not on climate change science 
itself. It is important you familiarise yourself with the following information before 
completing the elicitation.  
 
   
          (a.)     (b.) 
 Change in sea-ice extent by 2050 for (a.) March and (b.) September. Colours 
 indicate change in the percentage of sea ice cover for each grid cell. Negative values 
 indicate a decrease in sea ice. 
 
 
     
 (c.) Change in “ice free” season by 2050. Colours indicate the change in the length 
 (in number of consecutive months) of the “ice free” season. “Ice free” season is 
 defined as that with sea-ice concentration less than 50% 
There are three parts to the elicitation. The first part will ask you for your thoughts on polar 
bear population dynamics under current management regimes and current conditions - you 
should assume as a baseline that conditions of any other impacts upon polar bears (other 
than climate change) stay the same as today.  The second part will ask for your opinions of 
% change in 
sea ice cover 
increase (no. of 
months) in “ice 
free season 
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polar bear dynamics under what you consider ‘best conservation practice’ and lastly, we 
will ask a few brief demographic questions.  
 
To complete the elicitation, you should draw on all knowledge, information, literature, 
models, advice, beliefs and gut feelings available to you. If you feel you cannot answer a 
particular question, or part of a question, please continue to the next. Each answer you 
provide is important to us. At the end of the elicitation, you will have a chance to tell us 
why you felt you couldn’t answer.  
 
Both experts and laypeople are routinely overconfident in their predictions50, whether it is 
an assessment of some defined scientific uncertainty or a simple probabilistic prediction of 
an everyday occurrence. Because of this, the questions asked here will first probe you for 
an absolute upper and lower bound, before you provide a best estimate.  
 
 
 
Part One: Polar bear population dynamics under climate change with current 
management regimes 
 
(1) What do you consider to be the three main concerns facing polar bears over the next 50 
years? Please write these concerns in rank order of importance (a = most important,              
c = lesser importance) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Before the next question, we would like you to follow this example through. The example 
demonstrates the question style we’ll be using for the rest of the elicitation.  
 
Example: Price of oil in 2050 
Please refer to the example box plot below (fig. 4) when reading the example question. 
 
The price of a barrel of oil is $61.53 today. There is no way of knowing exactly what the 
price of a barrel of oil will be in 2050. However, there are those who work with this sort of 
information every day, and thus have a better chance of estimating what this figure might 
be - the experts in the elicitation process.  
 
                                                 
50
 If you would like to know more about overconfidence in predictions, or designing an expert elicitation, 
please see Morgan, G.M. and Henrion, M. (1992) Uncertainty. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
a)  
b)  
c)  
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Figure 4.  ‘Price of a barrel of oil in 2050’ example box plot showing the expert’s estimations in blue 
 
Asking for an oil price directly may be difficult, as the expert may not wish to give their 
estimations in US dollars. Also, it may give a false sense of accuracy if the expert is asked 
to quote an exact price in dollars and cents in their elicitation. To avoid these problems, we 
want to know what the expert’s estimations are as a percentage, relative to today’s oil 
prices. For example: 
• if the expert thinks the price will be half of today’s price, they will answer ‘50%’  
• if  they think the price will be double today’s price, they will answer ‘200%’ 
• If they think the price will remain the same relative to today’s price, they will answer 
‘100%’. 
 
The expert cannot give a definitive answer to what price of a barrel of oil might be in 2050, 
but there are ranges of uncertainty surrounding this figure. We want to know what the 
bounds of possibility surrounding this estimate are, as well as what the expert considers 
their ‘best estimate’.  
 
We want to investigate the lower range of possibility, or the plausible “lower cost” 
scenario. For this, we want to know what price for which the expert considers there is only 
a 1 in 20 chance that the cost in 2050 will fall below (E1 on the box plot diagram).  The 
expert considers that there is a 1 in 20 chance - i.e. that it would be very unlikely - that the 
cost of a barrel of oil in 2050 will be less than halve of today’s price, so they answer ‘50 
%’.  
 
We also want to investigate the upper range of possibility, or the plausible “higher cost” 
scenario. For this, we want to know what price for which the expert considers there is only 
a 1 in 20 chance that the cost in 2050 will rise above (E5 on the box plot diagram).  The 
expert considers that there is a 1 in 20 chance - i.e. that it would be very unlikely - that the 
cost of a barrel of oil in 2050 will be greater than four times today’s price, so they answer 
‘400 %’.  
These figures are useful to know the outer bounds of what the expert considers plausible, 
but these figures represent a wide range of uncertainty. We would also like to know a 
narrower range which the expert considers more likely. So, we want to know what price 
for which the expert considers there is a 1 in 4 chance that the cost in 2050 will fall below 
(E2 on the box plot diagram).  The expert considers that there is a 1 in 4 chance - i.e. that it 
lower cost
 
higher cost 
 
                              ”E4 = 300%” 
 
(E4) mid-upper confidence bound:  
less than a 1 in 4 chance the actual 
figure will be above your estimate 
(E1) lower confidence bound:  
less than a 1 in 20 chance the actual 
figure will be below your estimate 
 
    “E1 = 50%” 
(E3) best 
estimate 
 
“E3 = 200%” 
(E5)  upper confidence bound:  
less than a 1 in 20 chance the actual 
figure will be above your estimate 
 
                                 “E5 = 400%” 
 
                                                                       ”E2 = 90%” 
 
(E2) mid-lower confidence bound:     
less than a 1 in 4 chance the actual 
figure will be below your estimate 
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would be unlikely - for the cost of a barrel of oil relative to today’s price to be less than ‘90 
%’.  
 
We also then want to know what price the expert considers there is a 1 in 4 chance that the 
actual cost change in 2050 will rise above (E4 on the box plot diagram).  The expert 
considers that there is a 1 in 4 chance - i.e. that it would be unlikely - that the cost of a 
barrel of oil in 2050 relative to today’s price will be greater than ‘300 %’.  
 
Finally, once the expert has defined the range of uncertainty in their answer, we would like 
to know what they consider their best estimate of the price of a barrel of oil in 2050 (E3 on 
the box plot diagram). The expert thinks their best estimate is that the price will double 
relative to today’s price, so they answer ‘200 %’.  
 
 
(2) In this next question, we will walk you through the steps we would like you to take to 
complete your own expert elicitation, in the same style as the example above. You will 
need to refer to Figure 5, the box plot diagram below. You will also need to refer to the sea 
ice information at the beginning of the elicitation.  
 
 
Fig. 5   Box plot diagram 
 
Please look at the box plot and the sea-ice model data now. We will be asking for your 
estimate for each of the points shown on the box-plot diagram above (Figure 5).  We will 
start with your outer bounds (E1 and E5), then your mid-outer bounds (E2 and E4), before 
ending with your best estimate (E3). 
 
This question is asking about the change in the area of the polar bear range across the 
Arctic in 2050, compared to the current situation. We would like you to estimate the range 
in 2050 (with the sea-ice change shown in the maps) expressed as a percentage of today’s 
range, under current management regimes. 
 
For example: 
• if you think the range will be half of today’s size, you should answer ‘50%’ 
(E4) mid-upper confidence bound:  
less than a 1 in 4 chance the actual 
figure will be above your estimate 
(E1) lower confidence bound:  
less than a 1 in 20 chance the actual 
figure will be below your estimate 
(E3) best 
estimate 
“worst” 
case 
larger habitat area 
OR 
larger population 
smaller habitat area 
OR 
smaller population 
 
“best” 
case 
(E5)  upper confidence bound:  
less than a 1 in 20 chance the actual 
figure will be above your estimate 
(E2) mid-lower confidence bound:     
less than a 1 in 4 chance the actual 
figure will be below your estimate 
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• if you think the range will be double today’s size, you should answer ‘200%’ 
• if you think the range will stay the same, you should answer ‘100%’ 
 
 
a) Look towards the “worst case” end of the scale. We would like an estimation of the first 
‘cross’, the lower confidence bound (E1 on the box plot diagram). This is the plausible 
“worst case” scenario. 
 
Could you estimate the range, less than which is very unlikely to occur by 2050, based on 
the evidence you have seen. (By this, we mean an estimate of the range below which you 
think there is only a 1/20 chance of occurring).  
Please estimate the change as a percentage of today’s range. 
 
 
 
b) Look towards the “best case” end of the scale. We would like an estimation of the 
second ‘cross’, the upper confidence bound (E5 on the box plot diagram). This is the 
plausible “best case” scenario. 
 
Could you estimate the range, greater than which is very unlikely to occur by 2050, based 
on the evidence you have seen. (By this, we mean an estimate of the range above which 
you think there is only a 1/20 chance of occurring).  
Please estimate the change as a percentage of today’s range. 
 
 
 
 
Please look over your confidence intervals E1 and E2 now. Remember, everyone 
tends to underestimate uncertainty and be overconfident in their predictions, so feel 
free to alter your lower and upper bounds if you think they are too narrow. 
 
 
c) Look towards the “worst case” end of the scale again. We would like an estimation of 
the left-hand edge of the ‘box’, the mid-lower confidence bound (E2 on the box plot 
diagram). 
 
Could you estimate the range, less than which is unlikely to occur by 2050, based on the 
evidence you have seen. (By this, we mean an estimate of the range below which you think 
there is only a 1/4 chance of occurring).  
Please estimate the change as a percentage of today’s range. 
 
 
 
d) Look towards the ‘best case’ end of the scale again. We would like an estimation of the 
left-hand edge of the ‘box’, the mid-higher confidence bound (E4 on the box plot diagram). 
 
Could you estimate the range, greater than which is unlikely to occur by 2050, based on 
the evidence you have seen, as a percentage of today’s range. (By this, I mean an estimate 
of the change that there is a 1/4 chance of being less than).  
Please estimate the change as a percentage of today’s range 
 
(E1)         % 
(E5)         % 
(E2)         % 
(E4)         % 
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e) Finally, could you give your best estimate (E3 in the box plot diagram) of change by 
2050, based on the evidence you have seen, as a percentage of today’s range.  
Please estimate the change as a percentage of today’s range. 
 
 
 
h) How did you arrive at these estimates? 
 
 
 
 
 
i) Where, if anywhere, do you see this change in range mostly occurring?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(E3)         % 
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3.) The question format here will be the same as question 2. You will need to refer to the 
sea ice information and the box-plot diagram (polar bears). To avoid having to go through 
the time-consuming and detailed procedure of answering the box plot elicitation questions, 
we’ll provide you with a simpler way of answering from now on. 
 
Please look at the box plot and the sea-ice model data now. We will be asking for your 
estimate for each of the points from E1 through to E5 on the box-plot diagram (Figure 5), 
but this time we are asking about the change in the polar bear population across the Arctic 
in 2050, compared to the current situation.  
 
We would like you to estimate the population in 2050 (with the sea-ice change shown in 
the maps) expressed as a percentage of today’s population, under current management 
regimes. As before: 
• if you think the population will be half of today’s size, you should answer ‘50%’ 
• if you think the population will be double today’s size, you should answer ‘200%’ 
• if you think the population will stay the same, you should answer ‘100%’ 
 
a) Please estimate the lower confidence bound (E1) for total polar bear population by 
2050:  
 
 
b) Please estimate the upper confidence bound (E5) for total polar bear population by 
2050:  
 
 
c) Please estimate the mid-lower confidence bound (E2) for total polar bear population by 
2050:  
 
 
 
d) Please estimate the mid-higher confidence bound (E4) for total polar bear population by 
2050: 
 
 
 
e) Could you give your best estimate (E3) for total polar bear population by 2050:  
 
 
 
h) How did you arrive at these estimates? 
 
 
 
 
 
i) Where, if anywhere, do you see this population change mostly occurring?  
 
 
 
 
 
(E1)         % 
(E5)         % 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(E2)         % 
(E4)         % 
(E3)         % 
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We would now like to investigate your views on specific populations of polar bears over 
five regions, as defined in figure 6 below. We have defined regions using the gridding 
system in the sea-ice models. We have tried to match these regions as closely as possible to 
the PBSG defined population regions. Some regions are amalgamations of PBSG-defined 
regions.  
 
 
Figure 6.  Geographic locations of the 5 regions 
 
Amalgamations are: 
 
Hudson Bay (includes Southern Hudson Bay, Western Hudson Bay and Foxe Basin) 
Archipelago (includes Gulf of Boothia, M’Clintock Channel, Lancaster Sound, Viscount 
 Melville Sound, Norwegian Bay, Queen Elizabeth, Kane Basin) 
Beaufort Sea (includes Southern and most of Northern Beaufort Sea) 
 
A time series is provided for each region to demonstrate the variability in the “ice free” 
period each year. You may also like to refer to the sea ice information maps you have 
already seen.  
 
We defined “ice free” as when the decline in the total cover of the melting sea ice reached 
50% or below (this value is biologically meaningful for polar bears in these analyses51). 
Polar bears can probably handle a single short ice season, but as the ice-free seasons 
increase in length, the bears will be subject to increasing stress2.  
 
Please look at the box plot and the sea-ice model data now. We will be asking for your 
estimate for each of the points from E1 through to E5 on the box-plot diagram (Figure 5), 
but this time we are asking about the change in the polar bear population across the Arctic 
in 2050, compared to the current situation.  
 
The next five questions are asking about the change in the polar bear population over five 
different regions in 2050, compared to the current situation. We would like you to estimate 
the population size in 2050, with climate change, as a percentage of today’s population.  
 
                                                 
51
 Stirling and Parkinson (2006). Possible Effects of Climate Warming on Selected Populations of Polar 
Bears (Ursus maritimus) in the Canadian Arctic. Arctic: 59 (3) 261-275 
Hudson Bay 
Archipelago 
Beaufort Sea 
Chukchi Sea 
Barents Sea 
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(4) This question is asking for elicitations on populations within the Barents Sea region as 
defined in question 4. Please refer to figure 7 when answering this question. 
 
Figure 7. Time series of length (in number of consecutive months) of the “ice free” season from 1950 to 
2050 for the Barents Sea region.  
 
 
a) Please estimate the lower confidence bound (E1) for the Barents Sea population by 
2050: 
 
 
 
b) Please estimate the upper confidence bound (E5) for the Barents Sea population by 
2050: 
 
 
 
c) Please estimate the mid-lower confidence bound (E2) for the Barents Sea population by 
2050: 
 
 
 
d) Please estimate the mid-upper confidence bound (E4) for the Barents Sea population by 
2050: 
 
 
 
e) Please provide your best estimate (E3) for the Barents Sea population by 2050: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(E1)         % 
(E5)         % 
(E2)         % 
(E4)         % 
(E3)         % 
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(5) This question is asking for elicitations on populations within the Chukchi Sea 
population as defined in question 4. Please refer to figure 8 when answering this question. 
 
Figure 8. Time series of length (in number of consecutive months) of the “ice free” season from 1950 to 
2050 for the Chukchi Sea region.  
 
a) Please estimate the lower confidence bound (E1) for the Chukchi Sea population by 
2050: 
 
 
 
b) Please estimate the upper confidence bound (E5) for the Chukchi Sea population by 
2050: 
 
 
 
c) Please estimate the mid-lower confidence bound (E2) for the Chukchi Sea population by 
2050: 
 
 
 
d) Please estimate the mid-upper confidence bound (E4) for the Chukchi Sea population by 
2050: 
 
 
 
e) Please provide your best estimate (E3) for the Chukchi Sea population by 2050: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(E1)         % 
(E5)         % 
(E2)         % 
(E4)         % 
(E3)         % 
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(6) This question is asking for elicitations on populations within the Beaufort Sea 
population as defined in question 4. Please refer to figure 9 when answering this question. 
 
Figure 9. Time series of length (in number of consecutive months) of the “ice free” season from 1950 to 
2050 for the Beaufort Sea region.  
 
a) Please estimate the lower confidence bound (E1) for the Beaufort Sea population by 
2050: 
 
 
 
b) Please estimate the upper confidence bound (E5) for the Beaufort Sea population by 
2050: 
 
 
 
c) Please estimate the mid-lower confidence bound (E2) for the Beaufort Sea population by 
2050: 
 
 
 
d) Please estimate the mid-upper confidence bound (E4) for the Beaufort Sea population 
by 2050: 
 
 
 
e) Please provide your best estimate (E3) for the Beaufort Sea population by 2050: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(E1)         % 
(E5)         % 
(E2)         % 
(E4)         % 
(E3)         % 
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(7) This question is asking for elicitations on populations within the Canadian Archipelago 
population as defined in question 4. Please refer to figure 10 when answering this question. 
 
Figure 10. Time series of length (in number of consecutive months) of the “ice free” season from 1950 
to 2050 for Canadian Archipelago region.  
 
 
a) Please estimate the lower confidence bound (E1) for the Canadian Archipelago  
population by 2050: 
 
 
 
b) Please estimate the upper confidence bound (E5) for the Canadian Archipelago  
population by 2050: 
 
 
 
c) Please estimate the mid-lower confidence bound (E2) for the Canadian Archipelago  
population by 2050: 
 
 
 
d) Please estimate the mid-upper confidence bound (E4) for the Canadian Archipelago  
population by 2050: 
 
 
 
e) Please provide your best estimate (E3) for the Canadian Archipelago  population by 
2050: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(E1)         % 
(E5)         % 
(E2)         % 
(E4)         % 
(E3)         % 
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(8) This is the last question on population change in specific regions. This question is 
asking for elicitations on populations within the Hudson Bay population as defined in 
question 4. Please refer to figure 11 when answering this question. 
 
Figure 11. Time series of length (in number of consecutive months) of the “ice free” season from 1950 
to 2050 for the Hudson Bay region.  
 
a) Please estimate the lower confidence bound (E1) for the Hudson Bay  population by 
2050: 
 
 
 
b) Please estimate the upper confidence bound (E5) for the Hudson Bay  population by 
2050: 
 
 
 
c) Please estimate the mid-lower confidence bound (E2) for the Hudson Bay  population by 
2050: 
 
 
 
d) Please estimate the mid-upper confidence bound (E4) for the Hudson Bay  population 
by 2050: 
 
 
 
e) Please provide your best estimate (E3) for the Hudson Bay  population by 2050: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(E1)         % 
(E5)         % 
(E2)         % 
(E4)         % 
(E3)         % 
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Part Two: Polar bear population dynamics under climate change with ‘best 
conservation practice’ 
For the last question, we would like to investigate your views on polar bear population for 
the Arctic as a whole with climate change to 2050, under best conservation practice, in 
contrast to the previous questions which have been under current management techniques.  
 
9)  What would you define as ‘best conservation practice’? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As with question 3, we will be asking for your estimate of the total Arctic polar bear 
population in 2050, compared to today. But this time, we would like to know your opinions 
with your definition of the ‘best conservation practice’ in operation.  
 
a) Please estimate the lower confidence bound (E1) for the total Arctic population under 
best conservation practice by 2050: 
 
 
 
b) Please estimate the upper confidence bound (E5) for the total Arctic population under 
best conservation practice by 2050: 
 
 
 
c) Please estimate the mid-lower confidence bound (E2) for the total Arctic population 
under best conservation practice by 2050: 
 
 
 
d) Please estimate the mid-upper confidence bound (E4) for the total Arctic population 
under best conservation practice by 2050: 
 
 
 
e) Please provide your best estimate (E3) for the total Arctic population under best 
conservation practice by 2050: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(E1)         % 
(E5)         % 
(E2)         % 
(E4)         % 
(E3)         % 
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Thank you for all your answers. Please could you briefly provide an overview of your 
background by answering the following questions. These will not be used without your 
consent in any communication of these results: you can remain anonymous throughout the 
process. Any personal details will not be shared and will be deleted at the end of the 
elicitation exercise. 
 
Part 3: your expertise 
10) Please enter your name: 
 
 
11) Please enter your email address: 
 
 
12) How would you describe your disciplinary or professional background? 
 
 
13) Please could you provide us with a self-evaluation of your expertise in the following 
areas (Please cross ‘X’  the appropriate box) 
 
 
Not 
familiar 
with this 
area 
Little 
knowledge 
of this 
area 
Some 
knowledge 
of this 
area 
Well 
informed 
in this 
area 
Among the 
top experts 
in the world 
in this area 
a) Polar bear life cycle 
dynamics      
b) Polar bear 
management practice 
(hunting quotas etc.) 
     
c) Sea ice dynamics 
modelling      
d) Climate modelling 
     
e) Climate policy 
     
 
14) Please could you tick the regions in which you have expertise in polar bear population 
dynamics: 
 
Hudson Bay (includes Southern Hudson Bay, Western Hudson Bay and 
Foxe Basin)  
Archipelago (includes Gulf of Boothia, McClintock Channel, Lancaster 
Sound, Viscount Melville Sound, Norwegian Bay, Queen Elizabeth, Kane 
Basin) 
 
Beaufort Sea (includes Southern and most of Northern Beaufort Sea) 
 
Chukchi Sea (region boundaries defined by sea-ice model not PBSG) 
 
Barents Sea (region boundaries defined by sea-ice model not PBSG) 
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15) Do you have any final thoughts on the elicitation? (you can include any reasoning 
behind unanswered questions, or additional information on specific questions): 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I consent to my name being listed as a PBSG participant in this elicitation in any 
publications which may arise from these results (specific responses will NOT be attributed 
to any member, nor will code letters be linked to any respondent) 
 
OR 
I would like to remain anonymous (identified by random code letter only) in any 
publications which may arise from these results,  
 
 
 
 
 
That's it! Thanks for contributing to this research - your time is very much appreciated. 
 
You will be emailed both your individual results and those of the group on Monday 15th 
January. You will then have a week to make adjustments to your answers if you wish, after 
viewing the responses from the group as a whole. 
 
 
Please fax this to: +44 (0) 1603 593 901, marked: 
‘FAO: Saffron O’Neill (Tyndall)’  
 
APPENDIX 6.4    
GCMS USED TO CONSTRUCT SEA ICE INFORMATION 
 
 
 259 
BCCR-BCM2.0 
CGCM3.1(T47) 
CGCM3.1(T63) 
CNRM-CM3 
CSIRO-Mk3.0 
GISS-AOM 
GISS-ER 
INM-CM3.0 
IPSL-CM4 
MIROC3.2(hires) 
MIROC3.2(medres) 
ECHO-G 
ECHAM5/MPI-OM 
MRI-CGCM2.3.2 
CCSM3 
UKMO-HadCM3 
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          Participant number: 
 
 
 
This is the first part of the mini-workshop 
 
 
We are interested in your opinions and your feelings. There are no right or 
wrong answers; it is your personal views that are important. This is not a 
test! 
 
If you would like any help with the surveys, please don’t hesitate to ask- but 
we cannot help with any particular questions on climate change until the end 
of this workshop. Once you’ve finished going through the mini-workshop, 
we will be more than happy to answer any questions you may have.  
Remember, this workshop is about what you personally think and about 
your views.  
 
 
 
 
1. How do you generally feel about the future? (please circle the number below 
the line to indicate your opinion): 
 
         I feel bleak                         I feel positive 
   about the future          about the future   
        
0      0   
 
      1 
 
    2 
 
  3 
 
  4 
 
     5 
 
       6  
 
7 
 
 
 
 
2. What comes to mind when you hear the phrase “climate change”? Please write 
down the first three things that come to mind:  
 
1) ______________________________________________________________ 
2) ______________________________________________________________ 
3) ______________________________________________________________ 
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3. How serious a threat do you think climate change is to: (Please tick the box 
that applies on each row) 
 
Very 
serious 
Fairly 
serious 
Not very 
 serious 
Not at all 
 serious 
a.) You     
b.) People in your local 
community 
    
c.) People in the UK     
d.) People in other 
countries 
    
 
e.) Animals and plants in 
your local area 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
f.) Animals and plants in 
the UK 
    
g.) Animals and plants in 
other countries 
    
 
 
 
4. When do you think climate change is / will be dangerous for: (Please tick the 
box that applies on each row) 
 
Now In 10 
years 
In 25 
years 
In 50 
years 
In 100 
years 
Never 
a.) You       
b.) Your local community       
c.) People in the UK       
d.) People in other 
countries 
      
       
e.) Animals and plants in 
your local area 
      
f.) Animals and plants in 
the UK 
      
g.) Animals and plants in 
other countries 
      
 
 
5. How interested are you in climate change?  
 
Not at all 
interested 
Not very 
interested 
Quite 
interested 
Very 
interested 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX 7.1    
STAGE 3 WORKSHOP: PRE-TEST QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
 262 
6. How worried are you about climate change? 
 
Not at all 
worried 
Not very 
worried 
Quite  
worried 
Very 
worried 
    
 
 
7. Please indicate to what extent you agree or disagree about the following 
statements:  
 
 
Strongly 
agree 
 
Tend to 
agree  
 
Neither 
agree 
nor 
disagree 
 
Tend to 
disagree 
 
Strongly 
disagree 
a.) The thought of climate 
change fills me with dread    
  
     
b.) Too much fuss is made 
about climate change    
  
     
c.) I feel a moral duty to do 
something about climate 
change  
  
     
d.) I do not believe that climate 
change is a real problem 
  
     
e.) Nothing I do makes any 
difference to climate change 
one way or another 
  
     
e.) The effects of climate 
change are likely to be 
catastrophic  
     
f.) If I come across information 
about climate change I will 
tend to look at it  
   
     
g.) I am well informed about 
climate change 
  
     
h.) It is already too late to do 
anything about climate change  
  
     
i.) Climate change is too 
complicated for me to 
understand  
  
     
j.) Talking about climate 
change is boring 
  
     
k.) Human activities are 
altering global temperatures  
  
     
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8. How likely are you to talk to the following people about climate change? (Please 
tick the box that applies on each row): 
 
 
Very 
likely 
Quite  
likely 
Neither 
more or 
less likely 
Quite 
unlikely 
Very 
unlikely 
a) Family  
   
     
b) Friends       
c) Colleagues      
 
 
9. Do you think climate change is going to affect you personally? 
  Yes (go to question 10) 
  No (go to question 11) 
  Don’t know (go to question 11) 
 
10. In which way(s) is it going to affect you? Please state the first three things that 
come to mind: 
1) ______________________________________________________________ 
2) ______________________________________________________________ 
3) ______________________________________________________________ 
 
 
11. Have you ever taken any action out of concern for climate change? 
 Yes (go to question 12) 
 No (survey 1 finished. Thank you. Please hand this form back to the facilitator) 
 
12. If yes, what did you do? 
________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
Thank you for completing the first stage of the workshop. 
Now please hand this form in to the facilitator 
 
We have been looking at using ‘icons’ to help communicate climate change. 
An icon is something that you may care about, or empathise with. It is 
something that you may consider worthy of respect.  
 
Now we will hand out information sheets on four different ‘icons’ to look 
through. This should take around 10 minutes. When this time is up, one of 
the facilitators will provide you with the final part of the mini-workshop. 
The Norfolk Broads and climate change
The sea wall is being damaged by the sea. Groynes, rocks and reefs are being used to try 
and protect the sea wall from further damage. Sea level will rise with climate change. Storm 
surges such as those seen in 1953 could also increase. This will cause further damage to the 
sea wall. The chance of the sea breaking through the Sea Palling / Winterton sand dunes will 
increase.
What will happen by 2050?
The likelihood of a flood continues to increase throughout the flood plain, but especially in Sea 
Palling and around Hickling Broad. There is also an increase to the expected cost of flood 
damages. Much higher costs are expected in Sea Palling, and also around Horsey. The 
expected annual damage cost in 2050 is about 25% greater than today. 
The Norfolk Broads
Map b.  Changes in the likelihood of a salt water flood to 2050: the blue squares indicate areas with 
increasing flood likelihood (darker blues indicate a greater flood likelihood than lighter blues)
flooding from the sea. The area between Sea Palling, Eccles and Potter Heigham (map b) 
has been flooded several times in recent history. The last flood was in 1953. A 14km-long sea 
wall was then built which has stopped flooding in this area. If the sea did break through this 
barrier over 9 000 hectares, 6 large villages and several farms could be flooded with salty 
water. A salt water flood would be negatively affect the rare freshwater plants and animals in 
Hickling Broad.
The Norfolk Broads are Britain’s largest protected wetland, 
with the status of a national park. It is home to some of the 
rarest plants and animals in the UK (picture a).
The northern Broads are not tidal, and seawater generally 
does not enter the rivers - even though much of the land in 
this area lies below sea level. In the past, the northern 
Broads were open to the sea via the Hundred Stream. This 
stream does not reach the sea today because it is blocked 
by sand dunes, but it means the area is vulnerable to Picture a.
A road
B road
minor road
river
lake, broad
village, town
woodland
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most complicated and expensive flood defence system in the UK. Since the Thames Barrier 
was completed, it has been very reliable. Developments such as the Thames Gateway 
Regeneration Area rely on the flood defences. The flood defence system protects around 
1.25 million people, 420 000 properties (worth over £80 billion), 400 schools, 16 hospitals and 
8 power stations. A flood in London could have an impact globally.
London and the Thames Estuary  and climate change
Sea level will rise with climate change. Storm surges such as those seen in 1953 
could also increase. There is also a threat of increased river water flowing down the 
Thames into the sea. The Thames Barrier already has to close more often to protect 
London from flooding than it did when it opened in 1982, and it is likely it will be closed 
more in the future. Low lying coastal areas in the Thames Estuary are at greater risk 
of flooding.
What will happen by 2050?
An extreme flood from the sea in 2050 would impact the Essex and Kent coastlines, 
especially around Foulness Island and Sheerness (map b). Southend would 
experience more severe flooding. There are no estimates of how much this might 
cost. It is expected that the Thames Barrier would still protect central London from 
flooding. 
London and the Thames Estuary 
Map b. The extent of an extreme flood from the sea today (light blue) and in 2050 (dark blue)
London has been an important settlement for over 2,000 
years. It is now a leading business, financial and cultural 
centre, and is home to more than 7 million people. 
London is located on the River Thames, and has always 
been at risk of flooding. Much of the City is no higher 
than 5m above the River (picture a). The first recorded 
flood was in 1099; the last was the Great Flood of 1953. 
The Thames Barrier was built after the Great Flood to 
guard London against such events in the future. It is  the
flood extent today
flood extent in 2050
city / town / village
woodland
motorway
major road
minor road
Picture a.
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What will happen by 2050?
Arctic sea ice is predicted to melt even more in the next 50 years. Polar bear habitat is 
predicted to decrease. The total number of polar bears is also predicted to decrease 
substantially; for example, the number of polar bears in the Barents Sea region is predicted to
decrease by about 60% (map b). The Hudson Bay population is also at great risk. The largest 
numbers of polar bears live in the Archipelago, Chukchi and Beaufort Sea regions, whose 
numbers may reduce less. Even after adopting best conservation practices, numbers of polar 
bears are predicted to drop substantially.
Polar bears (picture a) live in five main population groups 
in the Arctic (map b). Polar bears are at the top of the Arctic 
food chain. This makes them a good indicator for the health 
of all animals, fish and plants in the Arctic. 
Sea ice is essential for polar bears. They use it as a 
platform for travel, to hunt, for mating, and for birth dens. 
They are most common at the ice edge, as they catch prey 
either in shallow water near the shore, or in open water 
pools out on the ice. Polar bears are not well adapted to life 
on land, so rarely venture off the ice.
Polar bears (Ursus maritimus)
Polar bears and climate change
Polar bears in some areas are threatened by pollution and hunting. All polar bears are also 
threatened by climate change. 
The area of the Arctic covered in sea ice varies from year to year. It also varies through the 
year - there is more sea ice in winter than in the summer. In the last 50 years, much sea ice 
has melted and not refrozen.  Polar bear survival depends on sea ice. When there is less ice, 
bears find it harder to survive and to reproduce. If sea ice disappeared completely, it is 
unlikely polar bears would survive. 
Map b. Polar bear population decrease by 2050 (red segment shows percentage of bears lost)
Picture a.
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The thermohaline circulation (THC) is the flow of seawater 
around the world’s oceans. The THC is mainly controlled by the 
density of seawater. Warm, salty water at the equator is less 
dense than colder, less salty water towards the North Pole.
The North Atlantic Ocean is very important in driving the flow of 
the global THC. Seawater travels across from the Caribbean 
towards Iceland, partly pushed by winds known as the Gulf 
Stream (picture a). This warm water flows past Britain, keeping 
temperatures mild. As this seawater travels further north 
towards Iceland, it becomes colder and denser, and eventually 
Thermohaline Circulation
The THC and climate change
Climate would be affected if the THC was to ‘weaken’ i.e. to transport less seawater from the 
equator to the poles. The THC would weaken if ice melted (e.g. Greenland) and flowed into 
the North Atlantic. In the distant past, the THC has weakened rapidly, causing large changes
in climate over a century or less. If the seawater flowing past Britain is colder, average 
temperatures on land are also colder. However, even if the THC did weaken, temperatures in 
Britain would still be warmer than today because greenhouse gases are warming the 
atmosphere.
What is predicted to happen to the THC by 2050?
The flow of seawater near Greenland appears to be getting weaker. It is very likely that the 
flow of the THC in the North Atlantic will weaken in the next 40 years (map b) but it is very 
unlikely that the flow will stop. However, the chance of a large weakening in the THC beyond 
2050 would be more likely if greenhouse gas emissions were not significantly reduced by 
then.
-4    -3     -2    -1      0     1      2      3      4    (°C)
Map b.  Possible change in air temperature by 2050. As the THC weakens, the North 
Atlantic warms less than the North Pacific at a similar latitude (see green circles)
Picture a.
sinks towards the ocean floor near Greenland. This cold water then flows back at depth 
towards the equator.
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Ocean acidification
Ocean acidification and climate change
The ocean can absorb small increases in atmospheric carbon dioxide, but the current increase 
is about 100 times faster than natural variation. Over the past decades, the ocean has 
become more acidic, so carbonate starts dissolving at shallower depths. The under-saturated 
layer rises closer to the surface. Coral reefs in tropical regions (picture a) and polar regions 
are particually affected. The microscopic plants and animals which use carbonate to build their 
shells will be impacted first. This can then cause changes higher up in the food chain.
What will happen by 2050?
It is predicted that at least one type of carbonate will begin to be under-saturated in the 
Southern Ocean by 2050 (see map b). By 2050, some areas in the North Sea will have a 
totally different acidity range from the levels observed today. Many marine processes, plants 
and animals are thought to be vulnerable to a change in ocean acidity.
Map b.  The predicted under-saturation depth of a carbonate in 2050. Under-saturation is 
shallowest in the blue areas. (There is a minimum under-saturation depth now of about 150m).
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300
200
100 depth of 
undersaturation (m)
80
50
30
their shells and skeletons. 
At the moment, the surface layers of the ocean are ‘super-saturated’ with forms of carbonate, 
and only ‘under-saturated’ below a certain depth. When the ocean becomes under-saturated, 
the shells of marine creatures start to dissolve. Different areas of the ocean becomes under-
saturated at different depths.
Picture a.
Seawater can absorb large amounts of carbon dioxide from
the atmosphere. Carbon dioxide is constantly exchanged 
between the atmosphere and the ocean. In the ocean, 
carbon dioxide dissolves to form a weak acid. As more 
carbon dioxide dissolves into the ocean, the ocean becomes 
more acidic. As seawater becomes more acidic, it changes 
the amount of carbon, oxygen and nutrients in the ocean. 
Particularly important is how much carbonate (a compound 
made of of calcium, carbon and oxygen) exists in the ocean, 
since many marine creatures use carbonate to help make
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The WAIS and climate change
Even a small amount of warming could melt some ice and cause an increase in sea level. 
The WAIS has been flowing faster in recent years, and this may be because the ice shelves 
bordering the WAIS are thinning as the ocean warms (maps b and c). This could mean that 
in the future, much more ice from the WAIS could be lost, although it would take centuries to 
melt completely. A complete melt would raise global sea level by about 5 metres.
What is predicted to happen to the WAIS by 2050?
It is predicted that there will continue to be warming in Antarctica, and some reduction in ice 
shelves (maps b and c). However, the WAIS will remain too cold for widespread melting. The 
physics of ice sheets are not well understood. This limits the ability to make accurate 
predictions of the impact of climate change for the WAIS. 
Maps b. and c. The WAIS (grey) and its ice shelves (colour). 
The colour scale shows the amount of frozen ocean in (b.) 1990 and (c.) predicted in 2050
Picture a.
An ice sheet (picture a) is a thick body of ice, mainly 
formed from compressed snow. Because of the 
weight of the ice sheet above, the ice sheet flows 
very slowly towards the ice sheet edge. The West 
Antarctic Ice Sheet (WAIS) mainly rests on ground 
that is below sea level. It is kept from slipping into 
the ocean by ice shelves at its edges, which float in 
the ocean. Ice sheets grow when there is a cooler 
climate, and shrink in warmer climates, but shrinking
of ice sheets can be much faster than growth. The WAIS contains 13% of all the ice found 
on the Antarctic continent. 
(b.) (c.)
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Set 1            Participant number: 
This is the third part of the mini-workshop 
 
This final part of the mini-workshop asks you some of the same questions 
as the first survey. Please answer all the questions, even if they are 
repeated.  
 
 
13. How serious a threat do you think climate change is to: (Please tick the box that 
applies on each row) 
 
Very 
serious 
Fairly 
serious 
Not very 
 serious 
Not at all 
 serious 
a.) You     
b.) People in your local 
community 
    
c.) People in the UK     
d.) People in other 
countries 
    
 
e.) Animals and plants in 
your local area 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
f.) Animals and plants in 
the UK 
    
g.) Animals and plants in 
other countries 
    
 
 
14. When do you think climate change is / will be dangerous for: (Please tick the box 
that applies on each row) 
 
Now In 10 
years 
In 25 
years 
In 50 
years 
In 100 
years 
Never 
a.) You       
b.) Your local community       
c.) People in the UK       
d.) People in other 
countries 
      
e.) Animals and plants in 
your local area 
    
 
  
f.) Animals and plants in 
the UK 
      
g.) Animals and plants in 
other countries 
      
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15. How interested are you in climate change?  
 
Not at all 
interested 
Not very 
interested 
Quite 
interested 
Very 
interested 
    
 
 
16. How worried are you about climate change? 
 
Not at all 
worried 
Not very 
worried 
Quite  
worried 
Very 
worried 
    
 
 
17. Please rate how you feel about the following statements: (Please tick the box that 
applies on each row) 
 
 
Strongly 
agree 
 
Tend to 
agree  
 
Neither 
agree 
nor 
disagree 
 
Tend to 
disagree 
 
Strongly 
disagree 
a.) The thought of climate 
change fills me with dread    
  
     
b.) Too much fuss is made 
about climate change    
  
     
c.) I feel a moral duty to do 
something about climate 
change  
  
     
d.) I do not believe that climate 
change is a real problem 
  
     
e.) Nothing I do makes any 
difference to climate change 
one way or another 
  
     
e.) The effects of climate 
change are likely to be 
catastrophic  
     
f.) If I come across information 
about climate change I will 
tend to look at it  
   
     
g.) I am well informed about 
climate change 
  
     
h.) It is already too late to do 
anything about climate change  
  
     
i.) Climate change is too 
complicated for me to 
understand  
  
     
j.) Talking about climate 
change is boring 
  
     
k.) Human activities are 
altering global temperatures 
     
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18. Do you think climate change is going to affect you personally? 
  Yes (go to question 7) 
  No (go to question 8) 
  Don’t know (go to question 8) 
 
 
 
19. In which way(s) is it going to affect you? Please state the first three things that 
come to mind: 
1) ______________________________________________________________ 
2) ______________________________________________________________ 
3) ______________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
20. How likely are you to talk to the following people about climate change? (Please 
tick the box that applies on each row): 
 
 
Very  
likely 
Quite  
likely 
Neither 
more or 
less likely 
Quite 
unlikely 
Very 
unlikely 
a) Family  
   
     
b) Friends       
c) Colleagues      
 
 
 
 
21. Please indicate how much of the information on each icon sheet you 
understood, based on the scale below (circle the number below the line to 
indicate your opinion): 
 
 
understood                                                                   understood 
none of it                                                                            all of it 
a) The Norfolk 
Broads  
 
  0 
 
 
    1 
 
    2 
 
    3 
 
    4 
 
   5 
 
    6 
 
7 
 
b) London and the 
Thames Estuary 
 
 
  0 
 
 
    1 
 
    2 
 
    3 
 
    4 
 
   5 
 
    6 
 
7 
 
c) Thermohaline 
circulation 
 
  0 
 
 
    1 
 
    2 
 
    3 
 
    4 
 
   5 
 
    6 
 
7 
 
d) West Antarctic 
Ice Sheet 
 
 
  0 
 
 
    1 
 
    2 
 
    3 
 
    4 
 
   5 
 
    6 
 
7 
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22. We would now like to know how the icons made you feel on three different 
scales of interested/uninterested, concerned/unconcerned, and scared/not 
scared. Please rate how the icons made you feel about climate change on 
this scale. We take ‘interested’ to mean that you would like to know more about 
the impacts of climate change on the icon. (circle the number below the line to 
indicate your opinion): 
 
 
   un-                                                                                                
interested                                                                    interested 
a) The Norfolk 
Broads  
 
  0 
 
 
    1 
 
    2 
 
    3 
 
    4 
 
   5 
 
    6 
 
7 
 
b) London and the 
Thames Estuary 
 
 
  0 
 
 
    1 
 
    2 
 
    3 
 
    4 
 
   5 
 
    6 
 
7 
 
c) Thermohaline 
circulation 
 
  0 
 
 
    1 
 
    2 
 
    3 
 
    4 
 
   5 
 
    6 
 
7 
 
d) West Antarctic 
Ice Sheet 
 
 
  0 
 
 
    1 
 
    2 
 
    3 
 
    4 
 
   5 
 
    6 
 
7 
 
 
 
 
 
23. Now, please rate how the icons made you feel about climate change on this 
scale. By ‘concerned’, we take it to mean that you are worried about the 
impacts of climate change on the icon. (Circle the number below the line to 
indicate your opinion): 
 
 
  un-                                                                                                  
concerned                                                                  concerned 
a) The Norfolk 
Broads  
 
  0 
 
 
    1 
 
    2 
 
    3 
 
    4 
 
   5 
 
    6 
 
7 
 
b) London and the 
Thames Estuary 
 
 
  0 
 
 
    1 
 
    2 
 
    3 
 
    4 
 
   5 
 
    6 
 
7 
 
c) Thermohaline 
circulation 
 
  0 
 
 
    1 
 
    2 
 
    3 
 
    4 
 
   5 
 
    6 
 
7 
 
d) West Antarctic 
Ice Sheet 
 
 
  0 
 
 
    1 
 
    2 
 
    3 
 
    4 
 
   5 
 
    6 
 
7 
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24.  Please rate how the icons made you feel about climate change on this scale. 
By ‘frightened’, we take it to mean that this information scares you. (Circle the 
number below the line to indicate your opinion): 
 
 
  not                                                                                                 
frightened                                                                   frightened 
a) The Norfolk 
Broads  
 
  0 
 
 
    1 
 
    2 
 
    3 
 
    4 
 
   5 
 
    6 
 
7 
 
b) London and the 
Thames Estuary 
 
 
  0 
 
 
    1 
 
    2 
 
    3 
 
    4 
 
   5 
 
    6 
 
7 
 
c) Thermohaline 
circulation 
 
  0 
 
 
    1 
 
    2 
 
    3 
 
    4 
 
   5 
 
    6 
 
7 
 
d) West Antarctic 
Ice Sheet 
 
 
  0 
 
 
    1 
 
    2 
 
    3 
 
    4 
 
   5 
 
    6 
 
7 
 
 
 
25.  Finally, please could you rate how the icons made you feel generally about 
the future? (circle the number below the line to indicate your opinion): 
 
                             It made me                                                                    It made me 
                             feel bleak                                                                     feel positive  
                             about the future                                   about the future  
a) The Norfolk 
Broads  
 
  0 
 
 
    1 
 
    2 
 
    3 
 
    4 
 
   5 
 
    6 
 
7 
 
b) London and the 
Thames Estuary 
 
 
  0 
 
 
    1 
 
    2 
 
    3 
 
    4 
 
   5 
 
    6 
 
7 
 
c) Thermohaline 
circulation 
 
  0 
 
 
    1 
 
    2 
 
    3 
 
    4 
 
   5 
 
    6 
 
7 
 
d) West Antarctic 
Ice Sheet 
 
 
  0 
 
 
    1 
 
    2 
 
    3 
 
    4 
 
   5 
 
    6 
 
7 
 
 
26.  Which icon do you feel is most directly relevant for: 
 
 
The 
Norfolk 
Broads  
London and 
the Thames 
Estuary 
Thermohaline 
Circulation  
West 
Antarctic 
Ice Sheet  
a) You     
b) Your local community     
c) People in the UK     
d) People in other 
countries 
    
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27. a.) Now, looking at the icon sheets, which icon picture (‘a’) do you find 
 yourself most drawn to? _______________________________________        
 b.) Could you explain why? _____________________________________            
 ___________________________________________________________ 
 
28.  a.) Looking at the icon sheets, which icon picture (‘a’) do you find yourself 
 least drawn to? ______________________________________________        
 b.) Could you explain why? _____________________________________            
 ___________________________________________________________ 
 
29.  a.) Now, looking at the icon sheets again, which icon map (‘b’) do you find 
 yourself most drawn to? _______________________________________        
 b.) Could you explain why? _____________________________________            
 ___________________________________________________________ 
  
30.  a.) Which icon map (‘b’) did you find you find yourself least drawn to?            
 ___________________________________________________________        
 b.) Could you explain why? _____________________________________            
 ___________________________________________________________ 
 
 
31.  a.) Finally, looking at the icon sheet pictures, maps and text, which icon do 
 you feel most drawn to overall? _________________________________        
 b.) Could you explain why? _____________________________________ 
 ___________________________________________________________ 
 
32.   a.) Again, looking at the icon pictures, maps and text, which icon do you 
 feel least drawn to overall? ____________________________________                 
           b.) Could you explain why? _____________________________________ 
           ___________________________________________________________ 
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Thanks for answering those questions.  
 
Finally, just so that I can compare the views of different people, please could 
you tell me about yourself? Your details will not be passed on and these 
data will only be reported in summary statistical form, so that no one 
individual will be identifiable.  
 
33.  Are you: 
 
 Male 
 Female 
 
34. Please indicate your 
age: 
 16-24 
 25-34 
 35-44 
 45-54 
 55-64 
 65-74 
 75 or over 
 
 
35. How many children 
(under 18) live in your 
household?    
 
 None 
 1 child 
 2 children 
 3 children 
 4 or more children 
 
36. What is the first part of 
your postcode?            
(e.g. NR1): 
 
 
postcode:    ___________ 
37. What is your highest 
qualification? 
 No formal qualifications 
 GCSE / O-Level 
 A-level / Higher / BTEC 
 Vocational / NVQ 
 Degree or equivalent 
 Postgraduate qualification 
 Other (please write in _____________________)  
 
38. What is your highest 
qualification in a 
science-related 
subject? 
 No formal qualifications 
 GCSE / O-Level 
 A-level / Higher / BTEC 
 Vocational / NVQ 
 Degree or equivalent 
 Postgraduate qualification 
 Other (please write in _____________________)  
 
39. Which political party 
are you most likely to 
support? (please tick 
one box only) 
 
 Labour 
 Conservative 
 Liberal Democrats 
 Green 
 Other 
40. Do you regularly drive 
a car / van?  
 Yes 
 No 
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41. Please indicate your 
own approximate 
income per year 
(before tax): 
 Up to £9,999  
 £10,000 - £19,999  
 £20,000 - £29,999  
 £30,000 - £39,999  
 £40,000 - £49,999  
 £50,000 - £59,999  
 £60,000 - £69,999 
 Above £70,000  
 
42. Which of these 
newspapers do you 
read at least once a 
week? (tick as many 
as apply) 
 Sun / News of the World  
 Daily Mail / Mail on Sunday  
 Daily Telegraph / Sunday Telegraph  
 Times / Sunday Times  
 Express / Sunday Express  
 Guardian / Observer  
 Independent / Independent on Sunday  
 Other (please state) ______________________ 
 None 
 
43. Are you a member of 
any environmental 
organisations (e.g. 
RSPB, Friends of the 
Earth)? 
 
No     
Yes    if so, which one?  ____________________ 
 
44. If you would like to 
receive a copy of the 
results of this 
research, please enter 
your email address 
here: 
 
 
__________________________________________ 
 
45. If you have any 
comments about this 
mini-workshop, please 
write them here:  
__________________________________________ 
__________________________________________ 
 
 
Thank you!  
The mini-workshop is complete. Please hand this form back to the facilitator. 
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Non-response rates are not reported here. Any percentage values given are calculated only 
from participants who provided a response. See pre-test questionnaire (Appendix 7.1) and 
post-test questionnaire (Appendix 7.3) for examples of the full questions asked. 
 
 
46. How serious* a threat do you think climate change is to:  
 
Pre Post Diff 
a.) You 2.11 1.99 0.11 
b.) People in your local community 2.23 1.91 0.33 
c.) People in the UK 2.08 1.79 0.29 
d.) People in other countries 1.59 1.36 0.23 
e.) Animals and plants in your local area 1.90 1.78 0.11 
f.) Animals and plants in the UK 1.87 1.71 0.16 
g.) Animals and plants in other countries 1.36 1.23 0.13 
* 1 = very serious, 2 = fairly serious, 3 = not very serious, 4 = not at all serious 
 
 
47. When do you think climate change will be dangerous* for:  
 
Pre Post Diff 
a.) You 2.80 2.87 -0.07 
b.) People in your local community 2.72 2.73 -0.01 
c.) People in the UK 2.67 2.66 0.01 
d.) People in other countries 1.87 1.93 -0.06 
e.) Animals and plants in your local area 2.22 2.30 -0.08 
f.) Animals and plants in the UK 2.19 2.29 -0.10 
g.) Animals and plants in other countries 1.66 1.73 -0.07 
*1 = dangerous now, 2 = in 10 years, 3 = in 25 years, 4 = in 50 years, 5 = in 100 years, 6 = never 
 
 
48. How interested* are you in climate change?  
 
Pre Post Diff 
3.37 3.33 0.04 
* 1 = not at all interested, 2 = not very interested, 3 = quite interested, 4 = very interested 
 
 
49. How worried* are you about climate change? 
 
Pre Post Diff 
3.04 3.08 -0.04 
* 1 = not at all worried, 2 = not very worried, 3 = quite worried, 4 = very worried 
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50. Rate* how you feel about the following statements:  
 
 
Pre Post Diff 
a.) The thought of climate change fills me with dread    
  
2.67 2.61 0.06 
b.) Too much fuss is made about climate change 3.78 4.01 -0.24 
c.) I feel a moral duty to do something about climate change  
   
2.06 1.97 0.09 
d.) I do not believe that climate change is a real problem 
   
4.19 4.33 -0.14 
e.) Nothing I do makes any difference to climate change one 
way or another 
   
3.89 3.93 -0.05 
e.) The effects of climate change are likely to be catastrophic  
  
2.27 2.06 0.20 
f.) If I come across information about climate change I will 
tend to look at it  
    
1.97 1.83 0.14 
g.) I am well informed about climate change 
   
2.50 2.42 0.08 
h.) It is already too late to do anything about climate change  
   
3.84 3.94 -0.11 
i.) Climate change is too complicated for me to understand  
   
3.99 4.01 -0.02 
j.) Talking about climate change is boring 
   
3.91 3.99 -0.07 
k.) Human activities are altering global temperatures  
  
1.68 1.75 -0.08 
* 1 = strongly agree, 2 = tend to agree, 3 = neither / nor, 4 = tend to disagree, 5 = strongly disagree 
 
 
 
 
51. Do you think climate change is going to affect you personally? 
  
 Pre (%) Post (%) Diff (%) 
Yes 68.0 70.3 2.3 
No 21.3 20.0 -1.3 
Don’t know 10.7 9.7 -1.0 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
52. In which way(s) is it going to affect you?  
Pre-test
Post-test
Rhetoric 
(e.g."global 
warming")
Weather 
(e.g. 'hotter 
weather")
Impacts on 
individual (e.g. 
'everyday life', 
cost of living)
Natural world 
impacts (e.g. 
flooding, SLR)
Global social 
issues (e.g. 
migration, aid)
 
Participants were asked to state the first three things that came to mind. All participants 
gave at least one response.  
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53. How likely are you to talk to the following people about climate change? (Please tick the 
box that applies on each row): 
 
 
Pre Post Diff 
a) family 1.99 2.00 -0.01 
b) friends  2.09 2.04 0.04 
c) colleagues 2.22 2.17 0.06 
 
 
54. Indicate* how much of the information on each icon sheet you understood: 
 
Icon Mean score Rank  
Norfolk Broads 5.96 3 
London 6.13 2 
Polar bear 6.22 1 
THC 5.14 6 
Ocean acidification 5.16 5 
WAIS 5.41 4 
* On a scale of 0 (understood none of it) to 7 (understood all of it).  
 
 
55. Rate how the icons made you feel about climate change on this scale of interested to 
uninterested.  
 
Icon Mean score Rank  
Norfolk Broads 5.30 3 
London 5.51 1 
Polar bear 5.45 2 
THC 5.17 5 
Ocean acidification 5.04 6 
WAIS 5.24 4 
* On a scale of 0 (uninterested) to 7 (interested). Question included the wording: ‘we take ‘interested’ to 
mean you would like to know more about the impacts of climate change on the icon’. 
 
 
56. Rate how the icons made you feel about climate change on this scale of concerned to 
unconcerned: 
 
Icon Mean score Rank  
Norfolk Broads 5.43 4 
London 5.50 3 
Polar bear 5.54 2 
THC 5.41 6 
Ocean acidification 5.43 4 
WAIS 5.57 1 
* On a scale of 0 (unconcerned) to 7 (concerned). Question included the wording: ‘we take ‘concerned’ to 
mean you are worried about the impacts of climate change on the icon’. 
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57.  Rate how the icons made you feel about climate change on this scale of frightened to 
not frightened: 
 
Icon Mean score Rank  
Norfolk Broads 4.00 6 
London 4.32 2 
Polar bear 4.17 4 
THC 4.31 3 
Ocean acidification 4.13 5 
WAIS 4.36 1 
* On a scale of 0 (not frightened) to 7 (frightened). Question included the wording: ‘by ‘frightened’ we take 
it to mean that this information scares you’. 
 
 
 
 
58.  Rate how the icons made you feel generally about the future: 
 
 
Pre-test 
mean score 
Mean 
score 
 
Diff   
Rank 
(diff)  
‘How do you feel generally 
about the future?’ 
 
6.11    
Norfolk Broads  2.88 3.24 5 
London  3.11 3.00 6 
Polar bear  2.48 3.63 1 
THC  2.84 3.27 4 
Ocean acidification  2.70 3.41 2 
WAIS  2.80 3.31 3 
* On a scale of 0 (it made me feel bleak about the future) to 7 (it made me feel positive about the future) 
 
 
 
59. Which icon do you feel is most relevant for: 
 
 
% choosing icon 
 
Broads London P Bear THC OA WAIS 
a) You 53 38 7 26 13 15 
b) Your local community 81 34 1 16 11 7 
c) People in the UK 6 61 1 47 12 15 
d) People in other countries 1 2 7 53 46 39 
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Questions 15-20 quantitative results displayed and qualitative responses discussed in 
chapter 7. 
 
 
 
 
Demographics of sample 
 
 
60. Gender: 
 
  
% 
male 48.4 
female 45.1 
n/a 6.5 
 
 
 
61. Age: 
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
16-24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 65-74 75 or
over
n/a
age group
%
 
o
f p
ar
tic
ip
an
ts
 
 
62. Children (under 18) living at home: 
0
10
20
30
40
50
none 1 child 2 children 3 children 4+
children
n/a
number of children in household
%
 
o
f p
a
rt
ic
ip
a
n
ts
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63. Postcode: 
 
 Postcode / town % 
NR1-13 (Norwich central) 63.4 
NR14-34 (Norwich outskirts) 9.8 
CB (Cambridge) 2.0 
IP (Ipswich) 4.6 
RG (Newbury) 1.3 
CM (Chelmsford) 1.3 
SS (Rayleigh) 0.7 
PE (Swaffham) 0.7 
OX (Oxford) 0.7 
EN (Potters Bar) 0.7 
n/a 15.1 
 
 
 
25 / 26. Highest qualification / highest qualification in a science-related subject: 
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
no
ne
 
for
m
al
GC
SE
A l
ev
el
NV
Q
De
gre
e
Po
stg
ra
d
Oth
er n/a
qualification
%
 
o
f p
ar
tic
ip
an
ts
highest qualification highest qualification in a science-related subject
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27. Most likely to support (political party): 
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
labour conservative Lib Dem green other n/a
party
%
 
o
f p
ar
tic
ip
an
ts
 
 
 
28. Regularly drive a car / van: 
 
  % 
yes 48.4 
no 41.8 
n/a 9.8 
 
 
 
29. Income: 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
up to
£9,999
up to
£19,999
up to
£29,999
up to
£39,999
up to
£49,999
up to
£59,999
up to
£69,999
above
£70,000
n/a
income
c
u
m
u
la
tiv
e
 
%
 
o
f p
a
rt
ic
ip
a
n
ts
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30. Newspaper readership: 
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
Su
n
Da
ily 
Ma
il
Te
leg
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ph
Tim
es
Ex
pre
ss
Gu
ar
dia
n
Ind
ep
en
de
nt
ED
P
Ev
en
ing
 
Ne
w
s
newspaper
%
 
o
f p
ar
tic
ip
an
ts
 
 
 
 
31. Member of environmental organisation: 
 
  % 
No 62.1 
Yes * 24.2 
 n/a 13.7 
*RSPB 10.5%, Friends of the Earth 6.5%, WWF and Greenpeace both 2.6%. Rising Tide and Campaign 
against Climate Change only one mention each. 
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